Solomon Friedman

The offender was convicted of manslaughter for his role in facilitating a home invasion that resulted in the shooting death of the victim.

The Crown sought an eight-year sentence, arguing the four-year mandatory minimum for manslaughter with a firearm applied.

The court found the mandatory minimum did not apply because the offender did not know firearms would be used.

After weighing the aggravating factors of the violent home invasion against significant mitigating factors, including the offender's youth, lack of record, and extensive rehabilitation over ten years on bail, the court imposed a total sentence of five years.

With credit for pre-sentence custody and time spent on strict bail conditions, the remaining sentence to serve was two years and five months.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of driving 'over 80'.

The trial judge had excluded breathalyzer evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of the respondent's s. 10(a) and s. 10(b) rights.

The summary conviction appeal court upheld the findings of a s. 10(a) breach and an informational s. 10(b) breach, but found the trial judge erred in finding an implementational s. 10(b) breach.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the appeal court concluded the admission of the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, allowed the appeal, and entered a conviction.

The applicants, charged with robbery, assault, and weapons offences, brought a pre-trial application to exclude evidence obtained through intercepted communications.

The court previously found that the wiretap authorization was issued without reasonable and probable grounds, violating the applicants' s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court found the state conduct to be at the more serious end of the spectrum and the impact on the applicants' privacy rights to be significant.

The court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and ordered the intercepted communications excluded.

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking, brought a second application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The net delay of 37.5 months exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling.

The court applied the transitional exception and the Morin framework to assess whether the delay was justified.

Weighing the serious nature of the charges against the prejudice suffered by the applicant, the court found the delay was justified and dismissed the application.

The Crown brought an application under s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code to preserve a prior ruling dismissing the accused's s. 11(b) Charter application.

The original judge had recused himself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from his post-decision comments regarding a factual error he made in the ruling.

The court held that s. 653.1 applies purposively to pre-trial rulings even if no formal mistrial was declared.

However, the court found that it was in the interests of justice to allow the accused to relitigate the prejudice aspect of the s. 11(b) application with fresh evidence, while preserving the original judge's findings on the allocation of delay.

The applicants were found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to murder and first-degree murder.

Prior to sentencing, they applied for a stay of the conspiracy count, arguing that entering convictions for both offences would violate the rule against multiple convictions for the same delict.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the offences lacked both the factual and legal nexus required to engage the rule.

The conspiracy was complete weeks before the murder, and the legal elements of the offences protect different societal interests.

The appellant, a taxi driver, appealed his conviction and 30-day sentence for sexual assault of a passenger.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons regarding the complainant's reliability and improperly considered his race and religion during sentencing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient and clearly addressed the reliability of the complainant's evidence.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge's repeated references to the appellant's ethnicity and religion breached his Charter right to equal treatment.

The sentence was vacated and a new sentencing hearing was ordered.

The appellant appealed a firearms prohibition and forfeiture order made under section 117.05(4) of the Criminal Code.

The order was initially granted after the appellant, a university student, wrote disturbing comments on an exam, prompting police to seize his lawfully owned firearms.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the hearing judge erred in law by shifting the burden of proof from the Crown to the appellant and by relying on irrelevant considerations such as the number of firearms owned.

The order was set aside and the matter remitted for a new hearing.