Julie Dassylva

The appeal concerned a constitutional challenge to the six-month mandatory minimum sentence for obtaining, or communicating for the purpose of obtaining, sexual services from a person under 18 for consideration.

The majority held that although the reasonably foreseeable youthful-offender hypothetical warranted a fit sentence of five months’ incarceration, the additional month required by the mandatory minimum did not meet the demanding standard of gross disproportionality under s. 12 of the Charter.

The Court emphasized the grave and inherently exploitative nature of child sexual commodification, the priority of denunciation and deterrence in sentencing such offences, and the need to exclude irrelevant sympathetic details from hypothetical scenarios.

The declaration of invalidity issued by the Court of Appeal was therefore set aside.

The appellants challenged the Quebec Court of Appeal's declarations of unconstitutionality with respect to mandatory minimum sentences of one year's imprisonment for possession and accessing of child pornography under ss. 163.1(4)(a) and 163.1(4.1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that a two-stage contextual and comparative analysis is required to determine whether a mandatory minimum sentence complies with s. 12 of the Charter, including the use of reasonably foreseeable scenarios.

Applying a reasonably foreseeable scenario of an 18-year-old who briefly receives and views a sexted image of a 17-year-old friend, the majority concluded that the mandatory minimum sentences were grossly disproportionate and violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding that none of the hypothetical scenarios considered had a sufficient factual and legal connection with the cases before the Court and thus none could be considered reasonable.

The Crown appealed the fitness of the sentence imposed on the first respondent for child luring under s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and both respondents challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 172.1(2)(a) and (b) as cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter.

The majority held that the sentencing judge committed errors in principle in imposing a five-month concurrent sentence for luring, and increased the sentence to 12 months' imprisonment to be served consecutively.

The mandatory minimum sentences of one year (indictable) and six months (summary) for child luring were found to be grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonably foreseeable offenders and declared of no force or effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The dissent would have upheld the mandatory minimums as constitutional.

The appellant Crown sought to uphold s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code, which authorized courts to impose consecutive 25-year parole ineligibility periods for each count of first degree murder.

The respondent, convicted of six counts of first degree murder in the Quebec City mosque attack of January 29, 2017, challenged the constitutionality of the provision.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 745.51 violates s. 12 of the Charter because it effectively authorizes imprisonment for life without a realistic possibility of parole, which is degrading in nature and intrinsically incompatible with human dignity.

The provision was declared of no force or effect immediately and retroactively to its enactment in 2011, resulting in the respondent serving his six 25-year parole ineligibility periods concurrently for a total ineligibility period of 25 years.

The appellants sought to restore mandatory minimum fines imposed on a corporation under Quebec's Building Act after the Court of Appeal held that s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms could apply to corporations.

All nine justices of the Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, unanimously concluding that s. 12 does not protect corporations from cruel and unusual treatment or punishment.

The majority, writing jointly through Brown and Rowe JJ., held that the text 'cruel and unusual' inherently denotes a protection only human beings can enjoy, and that the concept of human dignity anchoring s. 12 is inextricably linked to natural persons.

Abella J., concurring with the result on behalf of three justices, reached the same conclusion through a broader purposive analysis emphasising the human-dignity foundation of s. 12, while cautioning against placing undue primacy on textual analysis or erecting barriers to the use of international and comparative law sources.

Kasirer J. concurred briefly, agreeing with the dissenting Court of Appeal judge that it would distort the ordinary meaning of the word 'cruel' to say that a corporate entity could be subjected to it.

The Court allowed the appeals and held that the mandatory victim surcharge in section 737 of the Criminal Code violates section 12 of the Charter for impecunious offenders.

The provision was declared of no force and effect immediately.