Nicolas Abran

Thirty-one accused were arrested during a large-scale police operation arising from a narcotics trafficking investigation.

The appellants sought a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging that an accumulation of infringements of ss. 8 and 10(b) rights constituted abuse of process in the residual category under s. 7, even where certain accused were not personally victims of any individual infringement.

The Supreme Court held that all accused had standing to seek a stay under s. 24(1) provided the abusive conduct tainted the investigation or proceedings targeting them, but that the trial judge erred in finding s. 10(b) infringements without individualized analysis of each arrest, and further erred in granting a stay without first considering less drastic remedies.

New trials, including new hearings on the stay motions, were ordered for all groups.

A police officer was convicted of fraud over $5,000 after lying and wilfully withholding information during an assessment by a physician-arbitrator responsible for determining his disability diagnosis, thereby depriving his employer.

The majority of the Quebec Court of Appeal upheld the conviction; the dissenting judge would have substituted a verdict of attempted fraud.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right on the basis of a dissent on a question of law.

The majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal majority, finding sufficient causal connection between the dishonest acts and deprivation to sustain the fraud conviction.

The Crown appealed the fitness of the sentence imposed on the first respondent for child luring under s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and both respondents challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 172.1(2)(a) and (b) as cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter.

The majority held that the sentencing judge committed errors in principle in imposing a five-month concurrent sentence for luring, and increased the sentence to 12 months' imprisonment to be served consecutively.

The mandatory minimum sentences of one year (indictable) and six months (summary) for child luring were found to be grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonably foreseeable offenders and declared of no force or effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The dissent would have upheld the mandatory minimums as constitutional.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered by the Quebec Court of Appeal arising from the respondent's refusal to provide a roadside breath sample under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code when the demanding officer did not have an approved screening device (ASD) in his possession.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the word 'forthwith' in s. 254(2)(b) must be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning — immediately or without delay — and that the absence of an ASD at the scene at the time a demand is made is not an unusual circumstance justifying a flexible interpretation of that requirement.

A demand made when no ASD is present is therefore invalid, and a driver cannot be criminally liable for refusing to comply with a demand that it was physically impossible to comply with.

The Crown bears the burden of establishing unusual circumstances to justify any departure from the immediacy requirement.

The appeal was dismissed and the acquittal upheld.

The Crown appealed from a stay of proceedings granted on the basis of unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter in circumstances where the accused raised first-trial delay only after a new trial was ordered.

The Supreme Court held that after a new trial is ordered, the delay clock resets to zero and an accused cannot raise first-trial delay in a s. 11(b) motion brought during the retrial, as this would be contrary to the duty of all parties to act proactively under the Jordan framework.

The Court further held that the presumptive ceilings established in Jordan apply to retrial delay without modification.

Applying those principles, the retrial delay of 10 months and 5 days fell well below the 30-month presumptive ceiling and was reasonable in the circumstances.

The Crown appealed a Quebec Court of Appeal decision ordering a new trial on certain counts after the trial judge admitted, by consent of both parties, a transcript of testimony given at a first trial into a second trial commenced under s. 669.2(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal had required a two-part inquiry into the voluntariness of the accused's consent and the fairness of admitting prior testimony.

The Supreme Court held that s. 669.2(3) concerns jurisdiction, not evidence, and does not require any such statutory inquiry where parties have consented to filing prior testimony.

The presumption of competence of counsel applies, and absent indications vitiating consent, the judge need not intervene in counsel's tactical decisions.

The judge retains residual discretion to inquire where indications suggest consent is vitiated or trial fairness is undermined.

The Crown appealed as of right from a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that set aside the accused's convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had rejected the accused's self-defence claim under s. 34 of the Criminal Code, finding that he acted out of vengeance rather than to defend himself.

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal majority erred by reassessing the evidence without identifying a palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's analysis, and failed to defer to the trial judge's privileged position in assessing credibility.

The convictions were restored.