Michel Déom

The appeal concerned a constitutional challenge to the six-month mandatory minimum sentence for obtaining, or communicating for the purpose of obtaining, sexual services from a person under 18 for consideration.

The majority held that although the reasonably foreseeable youthful-offender hypothetical warranted a fit sentence of five months’ incarceration, the additional month required by the mandatory minimum did not meet the demanding standard of gross disproportionality under s. 12 of the Charter.

The Court emphasized the grave and inherently exploitative nature of child sexual commodification, the priority of denunciation and deterrence in sentencing such offences, and the need to exclude irrelevant sympathetic details from hypothetical scenarios.

The declaration of invalidity issued by the Court of Appeal was therefore set aside.

Successive tripartite agreements were entered into by the governments of Canada and Quebec and an Indigenous band council to establish and maintain an Indigenous police force serving the First Nation's community.

Government funding proved inadequate to ensure the maintenance of the police force, resulting in accumulated operating deficits totalling $1,599,469.95 over four years.

The band council sought reimbursement on both a contractual basis under Quebec civil law (good faith under arts. 1375 and 1376 C.C.Q.) and a public law basis grounded in the honour of the Crown.

The Supreme Court of Canada (8-1) dismissed the appeal, finding that the provincial government's refusal to renegotiate funding upon renewal of the agreements constituted both a breach of good faith under Quebec civil law and a breach of the obligation to act consistently with the honour of the Crown.

The remedy was grounded in reconciliatory justice rather than corrective justice alone, and the provincial government was ordered to pay its share of the accumulated deficits ($767,745.58) as a measure to restore the honour of the Crown and place the parties back on the path to reconciliation.

The appellants challenged confidentiality orders made in proceedings involving a police informer who was charged with criminal offences and brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on abusive state conduct.

The trial court proceeded entirely in camera without notice to the media and without listing the proceedings on the docket.

The Court of Appeal allowed the informer's appeal, stayed the conviction, but upheld sealing of all identifying information.

The Supreme Court held that no secret trial occurred, that the Vancouver Sun procedure should not be modified, that judges must retain discretion over notice to third parties, and that privileged information cannot be disclosed even to counsel for interested third parties.

However, the Court held that the trial judge should have created a parallel proceeding with its own record number, and that the Court of Appeal erred by not making public a redacted version of the trial judgment.

Appeals allowed in part and case remanded to the Quebec Court of Appeal.

Two appeals from the Quebec Court of Appeal concerning whether the statutory exclusion of first-level managers from Quebec's Labour Code labour relations regime infringed freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter.

The majority (Jamal J., Karakatsanis, Kasirer and O'Bonsawin JJ.) held that there is one unified framework under s. 2(d) — the two-part substantial interference test originating in Dunmore — and that the Dunmore factors do not constitute a separate elevated-threshold test for positive rights claims.

Applying that framework, the Court found no substantial interference because the respondent association had managed to organize, voluntarily bargain, and had access to court remedies, with no causal link shown between the legislative exclusion and the employer's conduct.

Wagner C.J. and Côté J. concurred in the result but maintained that the distinct three-step Dunmore framework applies to positive rights claims.

Rowe J. also concurred, agreeing the Dunmore framework should be preserved for positive claims.

Appeals allowed.

The Crown appealed the fitness of the sentence imposed on the first respondent for child luring under s. 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, and both respondents challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences in s. 172.1(2)(a) and (b) as cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter.

The majority held that the sentencing judge committed errors in principle in imposing a five-month concurrent sentence for luring, and increased the sentence to 12 months' imprisonment to be served consecutively.

The mandatory minimum sentences of one year (indictable) and six months (summary) for child luring were found to be grossly disproportionate when applied to reasonably foreseeable offenders and declared of no force or effect under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The dissent would have upheld the mandatory minimums as constitutional.

The Court considered constitutional challenges to Criminal Code evidentiary presumptions governing breath test prosecutions for blood alcohol levels over the legal limit.

A majority held that sections 258(1)(c), (d.01), and (d.1) did not infringe section 7 or section 11(c) but did infringe section 11(d), with section 258(1)(d.01), section 258(1)(d.1), and a severed version of section 258(1)(c) justified under section 1.

The Court allowed the appeal in part and upheld the respondent's conviction.

The union filed a grievance against the Cégep's decision to withdraw employment priority from a teacher, alleging it constituted dismissal without good and sufficient cause under s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards.

The arbitrator found she lacked jurisdiction to apply s. 124 as the collective agreement did not provide an equivalent remedial procedure.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 124 is not implicitly incorporated into the collective agreement, and where an agreement lacks adequate protection, the Commission des relations du travail has exclusive jurisdiction.

The appellant union filed grievances on behalf of two employees (one casual, one probationary) who were dismissed.

The collective agreement denied them access to the grievance procedure for dismissals.

The union argued that the public order standard in s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards, which prohibits dismissal without good and sufficient cause after two years of service, was implicitly incorporated into the collective agreement, giving the arbitrator jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the standard is not implicitly incorporated, the public order nature of the Act renders the collective agreement clauses denying arbitration absolutely null.

Consequently, the grievance arbitrator has jurisdiction to hear the complaints and provide a recourse equivalent to that of the Commission des relations du travail.