Marie-Pier Boulet

The appeal concerned a constitutional challenge to the six-month mandatory minimum sentence for obtaining, or communicating for the purpose of obtaining, sexual services from a person under 18 for consideration.

The majority held that although the reasonably foreseeable youthful-offender hypothetical warranted a fit sentence of five months’ incarceration, the additional month required by the mandatory minimum did not meet the demanding standard of gross disproportionality under s. 12 of the Charter.

The Court emphasized the grave and inherently exploitative nature of child sexual commodification, the priority of denunciation and deterrence in sentencing such offences, and the need to exclude irrelevant sympathetic details from hypothetical scenarios.

The declaration of invalidity issued by the Court of Appeal was therefore set aside.

The Law Society alleged that the Licensee engaged in professional misconduct by failing to act with honour and integrity, practising while suspended, and failing to co-operate with investigations.

The Licensee admitted to lying to three clients about the status of their matters, fabricating correspondence and court documents, and charging for work that was not done.

The Tribunal found professional misconduct as alleged and admitted.

The Licensee's licence to practise law was revoked, and she was ordered to repay the Compensation Fund and pay costs to the Law Society.

The accused voluntarily made admissions during a treatment process concerning acts of a sexual nature committed against a child.

Those admissions were sent to the director of youth protection and then to police with the accused's consent.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and filed a motion to exclude the admissions, which the trial judge dismissed.

The Court of Appeal entered an acquittal on the basis that the admissions were inadmissible.

The Supreme Court, in a majority decision, allowed the Crown's appeal on the sole issue of the accused's consent to disclosure of his admissions, restoring the conviction.

The dissenting judge would have dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal majority.

The Crown appealed a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that quashed four convictions and entered a stay of proceedings based on a violation of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The trial judge had found a s. 11(b) infringement but declined to stay proceedings on the basis that the accused had not been prejudiced by the delay.

The Court of Appeal erred by entering a stay without re-examining the reasonableness of the delays, even though the record contained a detailed statement of admissions.

The Supreme Court held that a functional analysis of the trial judge's reasons showed he considered the relevant Morin factors and reached the correct conclusion.

The defence-caused delays, including multiple unsuccessful applications and insistence on conflicted counsel, must be subtracted, and the transitional exceptional circumstance under Jordan further supported the conclusion that s. 11(b) was not infringed.

The Crown appealed an acquittal on an over-80 charge where the trial judge found the statutory presumptions for breath test results were rebutted by non-compliance with a recommended observation procedure.

The majority held that an accused must adduce evidence both of malfunction or improper operation and that the defect tends to cast doubt on reliability in the specific case.

It concluded the evidence remained theoretical and speculative on reliability, so the presumptions were not rebutted.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, finding the technician evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt and warning against expanding the accused’s evidentiary burden.