Marie-Hélène Claire Sylvie Giroux

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder and assault with a weapon following charges of first degree murder and assault with a weapon.

The appellant appealed his second degree murder conviction on the ground that the trial judge failed to mention the mens rea required for manslaughter in jury instructions and in answering the jury's questions about that offence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's instructions and answer were sufficient, as the accused had conceded guilt for manslaughter.

The dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by inadequately answering the jury's questions about manslaughter, creating a reasonable possibility that jurors misunderstood the mens rea required for second degree murder.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, with one justice dissenting.

The Crown appealed as of right from a Quebec Court of Appeal decision that set aside the accused's convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace, and ordered a new trial.

The trial judge had rejected the accused's self-defence claim under s. 34 of the Criminal Code, finding that he acted out of vengeance rather than to defend himself.

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeal majority erred by reassessing the evidence without identifying a palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's analysis, and failed to defer to the trial judge's privileged position in assessing credibility.

The convictions were restored.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered on criminal organization counts and the quashing of a possession-for-trafficking conviction.

The Court held the possession verdict was unreasonable because the evidentiary nexus between the seized cocaine and the accused’s conspiracy was not proven.

It further held that the accused was not a member of the trafficking group for purposes of membership-based liability under the organized-crime provisions.

However, the Court found the trafficking offence was committed in association with the organization because the accused knowingly supplied and supported its operations.

The appeal was therefore allowed only to restore the conviction on the association-based count.

The appellants, recognized as Convention refugees in Canada due to persecution in Hungary based on their Roma ethnic origin, were sought for extradition by Hungary on fraud charges.

The Minister of Justice ordered their surrender, concluding they had not established a continuing risk of persecution.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Minister has the authority to extradite a refugee, the Minister erred by placing the burden on the refugees to prove they would face persecution if returned.

The Court ruled that under section 44(1)(b) of the Extradition Act, a recognized refugee is presumed to face prejudice, and the burden is on the state to show the person is no longer entitled to refugee protection.

The appellant appealed from a judgment of the Quebec Court of Appeal that set aside his acquittal for extortion and entered a conviction.

The Supreme Court of Canada, in a brief oral judgment, dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that the trial judge drew the necessary findings from the evidence and that the substitution of a conviction for the acquittal was justified in the circumstances.

Two justices dissented and would have ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered four appeals involving offenders who had been detained for significant periods before being sentenced.

The trial judges imposed custodial sentences of less than two years and probation for three years, taking into account the pre-sentence custody.

In one case, the judge also ordered the offender to serve half his sentence before being eligible for parole.

The Court held that the term of imprisonment is the term imposed by the judge at the time of sentence, and pre-sentence custody is not part of the sentence but a factor taken into account.

Therefore, the sentences were less than two years, making the probation orders valid and the parole ineligibility order invalid.

The appellant was arrested at a secluded marijuana plantation along with four others.

He was convicted at trial of illegal production of marijuana.

The appellant appealed, arguing the verdict was unreasonable as it was based solely on his mere presence at the scene.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the conviction rested on the cumulative effect of his apprehension at the scene, the rejection of his explanation, the nature of the offence, and other circumstantial evidence, rather than mere presence.