Nadir Abidhusein Gulamhusein Sachak

Z.A. was charged with failing to comply with a release order condition prohibiting him from being in the presence of anyone under 16 unless in the direct presence of his surety.

The Crown presented evidence of Z.A. being with a young child at a mall.

The defence argued the Crown failed to prove the existence of a valid release order and the absence of a surety.

The court found the release order valid but concluded that the Crown did not disprove the rational possibility of a surety being present, as the burden shifted to the Crown once the defence raised the exception with an air of reality.

Z.A. was acquitted due to reasonable doubt regarding the absence of the surety.

The defendants, Michael Buckley and Dwayne Young, were charged with first-degree murder in the death of Jonathan Wite.

They pleaded not guilty to murder but guilty to manslaughter, which the Crown did not accept.

The trial proceeded to determine guilt for first-degree murder, second-degree murder, or manslaughter.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove first-degree or second-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, concluding that the incident was a "robbery gone wrong" rather than a planned murder.

Both defendants were found guilty of manslaughter based on common unlawful purpose and objective foreseeability of harm.

The applicant was charged with two counts of child luring contrary to section 172.1(2) of the Criminal Code and one count of communicating for the purpose of obtaining sexual services for consideration from a person believed to be under 18 contrary to section 286.1(2).

Following the Crown's case, the applicant applied for a stay of proceedings alleging a breach of his right to security of the person under section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alternatively seeking exclusion of his statement to police.

The applicant argued that police misconduct in allowing him to remain in urine-stained clothing for 15 hours constituted conduct so offensive to societal notions of fairness and decency as to warrant a stay.

The court dismissed the application, finding no breach of section 7 and that the police conduct, while not demonstrating ideal courtesy, fell considerably short of the threshold required to establish a Charter violation.

The applicant, Dellen Millard, facing a first-degree murder trial, brought a Rowbotham application for state-funded counsel after being denied Legal Aid.

The court found the first two branches of the Rowbotham test (denial of Legal Aid, serious and complex case requiring counsel) were met, but the third branch (lack of financial means) was disputed due to complex asset holdings under receivership.

The court adjourned the Rowbotham application sine die, directing the Receiver to apply to the Commercial List for the release of vendor take-back mortgage monies and cash from Millard Properties Inc. to fund Millard's defence, deeming it just and equitable given Millard's role in creating these assets.

This decision contains pre-charge conference rulings in a first-degree murder trial involving two accused.

The court addressed two main issues: the Crown's request to include constructive first-degree murder under s. 231(5)(e) of the Criminal Code as a route of liability, and Mr. Smich's request for a Vetrovec warning regarding certain Crown witnesses.

The court denied the Crown's request for constructive murder, finding no air of reality to unlawful confinement distinct from the killing.

It also denied Mr. Smich's request for a Vetrovec warning for the specified witnesses, concluding that the jury would be capable of assessing their credibility with general instructions.

However, the court granted Mr. Millard's counsel's request for a caution regarding Mr. Smich's testimony where it implicates Mr. Millard.

The Crown applied mid-trial to admit text messages between the two accused, previously ruled inadmissible, arguing that defence cross-examination had "opened the door" by asserting lack of planning, good character, or lack of knowledge of the "Eliminator." The accused opposed, citing prejudice and lack of material change in circumstances.

The court denied the Crown's application, finding no material change in circumstances to warrant reconsideration of the prior ruling, and that the probative value did not outweigh the significant prejudice, especially given the potential for references to another alleged murder.

Limited exceptions were made for cross-examination if the accused testified on specific points.

The Crown sought a mid-trial order for the jury to conduct a view of multiple crime scenes and an incinerator device in a murder trial.

The accused opposed, arguing prejudice due to late timing, potential for misleading the jury regarding the theoretical route, and inflammatory impact of the incinerator.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown failed to demonstrate a "very real and demonstrable advantage" that could not be achieved through existing evidence, and that the late stage of the trial exacerbated the risk of prejudice and overemphasis.

Mark Smich, a co-accused in a joint trial, brought an application to introduce evidence of Dellen Millard's general propensity or bad character, arguing that Millard's counsel had put Millard's character in issue during cross-examination of a witness.

Millard and the Crown opposed the application.

The court found that the cross-examination, which elicited evidence about Smich's violent temperament, anger issues, and control over others, including rap lyrics, was within the scope of a Pollock and Morrisson application.

This evidence was deemed probative to specific issues, such as Smich's ability to intimidate and weapon ownership, relevant to Millard's antagonistic defence.

The court concluded that Millard's general character had not been put in issue by these questions and that there was no imbalance requiring rebuttal.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, Mark Smich, sought a mistrial during a joint murder trial, alleging that co-accused Dellen Millard's counsel improperly introduced highly prejudicial propensity and bad character evidence, including violent rap lyrics, beyond the scope of a Pollock and Morrisson application.

The Crown and co-accused Millard opposed the application, arguing the evidence was within the scope of cross-examination for antagonistic defenses and that timely limiting instructions had been provided.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while one specific rap lyric reference exceeded the permitted scope, it was probative to a live issue (firearm ownership) and that any potential prejudice could be cured by jury instructions, not warranting the "last resort" remedy of a mistrial.

During a joint trial, counsel for one of the co-accused sought directions on the appropriate timing to introduce propensity or bad character evidence against the other co-accused through cross-examination of a Crown witness (a 'Pollock & Morrisson' application).

The court ruled that to maintain full answer and defence and procedural fairness, notice of such an application must be provided at the conclusion of the Crown's examination-in-chief, prior to the commencement of cross-examination by the co-accused's counsel.

During a criminal jury trial, the accused objected to the Crown's expert witnesses using PowerPoint presentations that included conclusions and opinions, arguing they would unfairly emphasize the Crown's case and act as written reports.

The trial judge ruled that the PowerPoint presentations were admissible as exhibits to assist the jury in understanding complex technical evidence, provided that certain bald conclusions or opinions were redacted.

The judge found that such demonstrative aids are reasonably necessary in modern trials to enhance juror comprehension, subject to proper limiting instructions.

During a murder trial, the accused applied for a mistrial after a Crown witness provided undisclosed opinion evidence suggesting an incinerator had been used more than once.

The accused argued this prejudiced them by implying involvement in other uncharged murders.

The trial judge dismissed the application, finding that a mistrial is a remedy of last resort and that a sharp instruction to the jury to disregard the unfounded opinion evidence was sufficient to cure any potential prejudice.

During a murder trial, the Crown brought a motion arguing that one of the co-accused had placed his good character in issue through the cross-examination of a Crown witness.

The co-accused's counsel had elicited testimony from the witness that the co-accused seemed like a 'nice fellow' who could not be imagined to be involved in the victim's disappearance.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the cross-examination was intended to repudiate the Crown's theory of the case and attack the reliability of the witness's testimony, rather than to introduce evidence of general reputation or good character.

The appellants were committed to stand trial for first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

They applied for certiorari to quash the committals, arguing a denial of natural justice because they were not permitted to make submissions on post-offence conduct evidence.

The reviewing judge found a denial of natural justice but dismissed the application, concluding the appellants suffered no prejudice as committal was inevitable.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that a reviewing judge has inherent jurisdiction to refuse certiorari where no prejudice occurs, and found sufficient evidence of planning and deliberation to support the committals.

The appellants, who were committed for trial on charges of first degree murder, appealed the dismissal of their applications to quash the committal order.

They brought a motion seeking an order that they not be required to pay for additional copies of the preliminary inquiry transcripts for the appeal, having already paid for copies used in the Superior Court.

They also sought an order requiring the court reporters to produce the transcripts on diskette for a nominal fee.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that rule 8(7) of the Criminal Appeal Rules is intended to avoid unnecessary duplication of expense, and ordered the court reporters to produce the transcripts on diskette for $1 each.