Kevin Phillips

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm, possession of marijuana, and breach of probation following an incident on January 16, 2012.

The accused conceded causing bodily harm but claimed self-defence under section 34(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the initial use of force was justified, the accused continued the assault long after the threat was neutralized, acting out of anger rather than self-defence.

The court convicted the accused of assault causing bodily harm and breach of probation, and acquitted on the marijuana charge.

The accused, a 47-year-old computer programmer with no prior record, was found guilty of possessing child pornography.

A search of his computer revealed 24 videos and 17 images.

A psychiatric assessment diagnosed him with pedophilia and hebephilia, though he was deemed a low risk to re-offend.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence, the court sentenced the accused to 6 months' incarceration followed by 18 months' probation, along with a 20-year SOIRA order and a section 161 prohibition order.

The Crown applied for certiorari to overturn a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to discharge the respondent on first degree murder and commit her to stand trial for second degree murder.

The respondent had struck and killed the victim with her vehicle following a prolonged period of criminal harassment.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge committed jurisdictional error by impermissibly weighing competing inferences regarding whether the murder occurred while the respondent was committing criminal harassment.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding the preliminary inquiry judge properly conducted a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence and made no jurisdictional error in concluding there was insufficient evidence of criminal harassment at the exact time of the murder.

The accused brought a mid‑trial motion for a mistrial alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias arising from comments and findings made by the trial judge during a bail hearing conducted after the accused absconded during the trial.

The accused argued that the judge made adverse credibility findings and factual findings regarding emails sent to a witness in breach of bail conditions.

The court held that the comments made during the bail decision did not amount to credibility findings demonstrating bias and were based largely on accepting the accused’s own evidence.

The court further held that trial judges routinely make credibility determinations during interlocutory proceedings and that such findings do not require recusal.

Evidence and comments relating to the bail decision could not play any role in determining guilt at trial.

The motion for a mistrial based on reasonable apprehension of bias was therefore dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for careless storage of ammunition after burying hundreds of rounds of military rifle ammunition in shallow holes in a public county forest.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing the risk of harm to the public and improperly took judicial notice that public forests are used by the public.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that abandoning control of inherently dangerous material in a public domain constituted a marked departure from the standard of care, and that the trial judge's use of judicial notice regarding public land usage was appropriate.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application and in finding that breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The Superior Court reviewed the delay analysis under the framework in R. v. Morin and found no error in the trial judge’s characterization of certain periods of delay as neutral rather than institutional.

The court held that the findings of minimal prejudice to the accused and the balancing of societal interests against the delay were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The court also upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the breath samples were taken within a reasonably prompt timeframe under the circumstances.

The conviction was therefore affirmed.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content over 80 milligrams.

She argued the trial judge erred in dismissing her section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay and in finding that her breath samples were not taken as soon as practicable.

The summary conviction appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's characterization of the delay periods or his conclusion that the prejudice was minimal.

The court also upheld the finding that the breath samples, taken one hour and 36 minutes after the vehicle was stopped, were obtained within a reasonably prompt timeframe.

The appeal was dismissed.