Carl Holmes Leep-Ngeen Lem

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death contrary to section 320(14)(3) of the Criminal Code.

On February 24, 2023, the accused drove his vehicle while impaired with his six-year-old daughter as a passenger for approximately 3.5 hours, ultimately colliding with another vehicle and killing the driver.

The accused's blood alcohol concentration was more than twice the legal limit.

The court imposed a sentence of six years less 99 days imprisonment, considering aggravating factors including the extended period of impaired driving, extremely high blood alcohol levels, and the presence of the accused's young daughter in the vehicle, balanced against mitigating factors including the guilty plea, genuine remorse, and significant rehabilitative efforts undertaken while on bail.

The appellant was convicted of operating a conveyance over 80.

The appeal concerned whether the trial judge erred in finding a valid Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand existed, even after excising a compelled statement about alcohol consumption.

The appellant argued the trial judge replaced a subjective/objective test with an objective/objective test for the officer's grounds.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly assessed the officer's subjective belief, considering the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable police officer, and that the finding of subjective reasonable suspicion was supported by evidence even without the compelled statement.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of refusing to comply with an approved screening device demand.

The appeal argued that the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard, specifically requiring "reasonable and probable grounds to believe" that the accused had care or control of a motor vehicle, instead of the lower standard of "reasonable grounds to suspect" as required by s. 320.27(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the trial judge indeed applied the wrong legal standard, which affected the verdict.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg, following a trial judge's decision to exclude breath samples due to a s. 10(b) Charter infringement.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred in law by unreasonably assessing the police officer's safety concerns, concluding that the brief delay in informing the accused of his right to counsel was justified and did not constitute a Charter breach.

Alternatively, even if a breach occurred, the subsequent Charter-compliant conduct severed the connection to the breath samples, rendering them admissible under the "fresh start" principle.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, a conviction entered, and the minimum sentence imposed.

The appellant, Augustine Mulimbwa, appealed his conviction for impaired care and control of a conveyance.

He argued that the trial was unfair due to the judge's handling of his self-representation, the validity of his admission of impairment, and the failure to consider the impact of involuntary cocaine ingestion on mens rea and care and control.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided adequate assistance to the self-represented accused, the admission of impairment by voluntarily consumed cannabis was valid, and the defence regarding involuntary cocaine ingestion lacked an air of reality as voluntary cannabis consumption established the necessary mens rea.

The court concluded that the trial judge properly considered the totality of the evidence of impairment.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on an "over 80" charge, following a trial judge's finding of a s. 10(b) Charter breach and exclusion of breath results.

The trial judge had accepted the respondent's testimony that her request to call her mother was "obvious" in its purpose to facilitate finding a lawyer.

The appeal court found that the trial judge erred by failing to make a critical factual finding: whether the police officer knew or assumed the respondent's request to call a third party was for the purpose of facilitating her right to counsel.

Precedent requires the detainee to articulate this purpose, or for the officer to have such knowledge/assumption.

Without this finding, the s. 10(b) breach could not be established.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered for the "over 80" charge.

The Crown appealed a trial judge's decision to stay proceedings against the respondent for refusing an approved screening device sample.

The trial judge found a s. 9 Charter breach due to the respondent being arbitrarily detained for 74 minutes after arrest while the officer continued investigating Highway Traffic Act offences.

The appeal court upheld the finding of arbitrary detention, clarifying that placing a suspect in a police cruiser, of itself, requires reasonable necessity, and that the trial judge's reliance on *R. v. Aucoin* was correct.

However, the court remitted the matter to the trial judge to reconsider the appropriate remedy, as the Crown had not fully advanced arguments for alternative remedies at trial.

Richard Hall was convicted of sexual assault against his teenage stepdaughter, which occurred between December 2011 and September 2016.

The sexual assault involved non-penetrative touching of the complainant's legs, genital areas, and breasts, primarily when she was 17-18 years old and vulnerable due to substance abuse and estrangement from her mother.

The court found significant aggravating factors, including a profound breach of trust as the accused was in a loco parentis relationship, the victim's youthful age and vulnerability, and the significant psychological impact on the complainant.

Mitigating factors included the accused's lack of a prior criminal record, stable employment, and compliance with bail conditions.

The court considered the Supreme Court of Canada's guidance in R. v. Friesen, which emphasizes denunciation and deterrence for child sexual offenses, and the collateral immigration consequences (risk of deportation for the permanent resident accused).

The court ultimately imposed a sentence of two years less one day in jail, followed by a two-year probation order, finding that a conditional sentence would be disproportionate despite the immigration implications.

Ancillary orders included a 20-year SOIRA order, DNA order, firearms prohibition, and non-communication order.

The appellant, David Zomou, appealed his convictions for impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusal to provide a breath sample.

The appeal raised issues of reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge, arbitrary detention, sufficient grounds for arrest for public intoxication, and the voluntariness of the appellant's utterances.

The court found no reasonable apprehension of bias or arbitrary detention, and upheld the lawfulness of the arrest for public intoxication.

However, the court found that the trial judge erred in relying on inadmissible hearsay evidence to determine the voluntariness of the appellant's statements, which were crucial to the impaired operation conviction.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered solely for the impaired operation charge, while the refusal conviction was upheld.

The appellant appealed her conviction for driving with more than 80mg/100ml of alcohol, arguing a breach of her s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel due to a three-minute delay in being informed of her rights after arrest.

The court found no breach, determining the delay was justified by safety protocols (calling for a female officer, tow truck, and seating the appellant in the cruiser) and consistent with the contextual analysis required for "without delay" in s. 10(b).

The appeal was dismissed.

The court also noted that even if a breach had occurred, the evidence would likely not have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit similar fact evidence against the accused, Mohamad Barkhadle, who is charged with first-degree murder involving strangulation during a sexual assault.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of three prior incidents where Mr. Barkhadle allegedly choked women in sexual circumstances.

The court analyzed the admissibility of this evidence, focusing on its relevance to the nature of the actus reus, motive, and identification.

The court found a "striking similarity" in Mr. Barkhadle's "peculiar and distinctive method" of using a choke hold to overcome resistance to sexual activity, deeming it a "signature." Balancing the high probative value against the potential for moral and reasoning prejudice, the court ruled the similar fact evidence admissible.

The accused, Neville Brisson, was charged with failing to comply with a demand by a peace officer under the Criminal Code after a single motor vehicle collision.

The court addressed the lawfulness of the Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand and Standard Field Sobriety Tests (SFSTs), and a Charter s. 10(b) breach regarding the right to counsel.

The court found the ASD demand and SFSTs lawful, and while a s. 10(b) breach occurred due to a brief delay in informing the accused of his rights post-arrest, the evidence of his refusal to comply with the DRE demand was admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Ultimately, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the DRE demand was valid and the accused unequivocally refused it, leading to a finding of guilt.

The accused, Hamze Abdi Ahmed, was charged with assault with a weapon and aggravated assault.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused stabbed the complainant, Jared Kakegamic, or if the complainant stabbed himself during an altercation.

The court found the Crown witnesses credible and rejected the defence's version of events, including the accused's testimony and that of his witnesses, due to inconsistencies and lack of corroboration.

The court relied on the complainant's immediate 911 call, the paramedic's testimony, and Tracy Hultquist's account.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to fraud under $5,000 contrary to s.380(b) of the Criminal Code, covering fraudulent transactions totalling $47,045.41 committed over approximately six years (January 2010 to April 2016) against a developmentally disabled adult.

The accused, employed as a support worker, exploited her position of trust to make 871 fraudulent transactions using the victim's debit card for personal luxuries while the victim lived in poverty.

The Crown sought 15 months incarceration plus probation and a 10-year prohibition order.

Defence argued for a conditional sentence.

The court imposed 12 months incarceration followed by 24 months probation, finding that while full restitution was paid and mitigating factors existed, the egregious breach of trust, vulnerability of the victim, and need for general deterrence and denunciation required a custodial sentence.

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging an infringement of his right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 32.5 months, marginally exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in *R. v. Jordan*.

The court deducted one month for defence delay (accused being a fugitive), resulting in a net delay of 31 months.

The Crown invoked the "transitional exceptional circumstances" exception, arguing reasonable reliance on pre-*Jordan* case law (*R. v. Morin* guidelines) and existing scheduling practices in Ottawa.

The court found that counsel and the court had reasonably relied on the previous regime for calculating s. 11(b) delay, and that staying a second-degree murder charge under these circumstances, where the *Jordan* ceiling was only moderately exceeded, would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing death contrary to section 255(3) of the Criminal Code.

The collision occurred on March 10, 2013, when the accused, driving eastbound on Innes Road with a blood alcohol concentration between 165-230 mg/100mL, failed to stop at a stop sign and collided with the victim's vehicle at high speed.

The victim died at the scene from multiple trauma.

The accused was subsequently arrested for breaching bail conditions by consuming alcohol and tampering with an alcohol-monitoring bracelet.

The court imposed a sentence of four years and nine months with a 12-year driving prohibition, balancing denunciation and general deterrence against rehabilitation and the accused's youth and lack of prior criminal record.

Mid-trial evidentiary ruling in a homicide prosecution addressing the admissibility of disposition evidence relating to the deceased.

The defence sought to adduce evidence of a prior violent altercation between the deceased and police officers to support the inference that the deceased reacted aggressively when verbally confronted, thereby raising a reasonable doubt regarding intent for murder and supporting a potential provocation argument.

Applying the principles from Scopelliti and related jurisprudence, the court considered relevance and weighed probative value against prejudicial effect.

The court held the prior incident was sufficiently probative of the deceased’s tendency to react violently in confrontational situations and that any risk of prejudice could be managed through jury instructions.

The defence was therefore permitted to call the evidence.

Mid‑trial Corbett application in a second degree murder prosecution where the accused sought to limit cross‑examination on prior convictions if he testified.

The defence sought to exclude several assault and robbery convictions from the accused’s youth and adult criminal record.

Applying the balancing approach from R. v. Corbett and s. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act, the court considered the nature, age, and similarity of the convictions, along with fairness to the trial process and potential prejudice.

The court concluded that certain youth assault convictions and a later adult assault conviction should be excluded, and that youth robbery convictions should be edited to theft convictions to reduce moral prejudice while preserving the integrity of the credibility assessment.

During a jury trial for homicide, the Crown brought a mid‑trial application seeking to introduce similar fact evidence of the accused’s alleged violent conduct toward individuals he believed to be paedophiles, including an assault on another inmate while in custody after the charged offence.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to motive, animus, intention, and to cross‑examine a defence psychiatric expert regarding the accused’s mental state.

Applying the framework from R. v. Handy, the court held that although the evidence had some relevance to hostility toward paedophiles, its probative value was significantly reduced because similar animus was already before the jury and the proposed incident occurred two years after the alleged homicide.

The court found the moral and reasoning prejudice from introducing the detention‑centre assault—particularly a surveillance video—far outweighed its probative value and risked diverting the jury from the issues in the trial.

The Crown was therefore prohibited from adducing evidence about that assault but was permitted limited cross‑examination about other admitted past altercations and hostility toward child molesters.

The accused was charged with second degree murder and challenged the admissibility of several statements made to police following his arrest, alleging breaches of his rights under ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the common law confessions rule.

The court examined whether the statements were voluntary and whether any Charter breaches required exclusion under s. 24(2).

The court found that statements made in response to questioning by an officer while the accused was detained in a police cruiser and before being advised of his right to counsel were involuntary and obtained in breach of s. 10(b).

Those statements were excluded.

All other spontaneous or later videotaped statements, made after the accused had been advised of his rights and had consulted counsel, were found voluntary and admissible.