Matthew Wolfson

The appellant, a lawyer, was convicted of criminal harassment, extortion, and two counts of uttering threats arising from his conduct toward a former client and a friend.

He was sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

He applied for bail pending appeal under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding that while the appeal was not frivolous, the appellant failed to meet the public interest component of the bail test on both public safety and public confidence grounds.

The appellant's paranoid and grandiose testimony at trial, combined with the gravity of the offences and the weakness of the appeal, supported detention.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident at a motel in Deep River.

The complainant and her friend met the accused and his co-worker at a bar, and later returned to the accused's motel room.

While in the room, the accused suddenly pushed the complainant onto the bed and removed her pants without her consent.

The complainant's friend intervened immediately.

The central issue was whether the complainant communicated consent to the removal of her pants.

The court found that friendly conduct, conversation, physical proximity, and presence in the motel room did not constitute communicated consent to sexual touching.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

The applicant, charged with impaired driving, brought a motion seeking permission for his counsel to conduct the trial without a mask and for witnesses to testify unmasked.

Counsel argued that masks impeded his ability to effectively cross-examine witnesses by obscuring non-verbal cues, muffling his voice, and causing distraction.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that counsel's effectiveness would not be meaningfully reduced and that public health concerns, supported by existing regulations and guidelines, justified the masking requirement.

The judge emphasized judicial discretion in balancing fair trial rights against public health measures and the importance of consistency in court procedures.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for impaired driving and operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

At trial, the judge excluded breath samples and police observations under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding a section 8 breach because the arresting officer lacked subjective grounds to arrest for impaired driving.

The trial judge also found the officer's testimony attempting to justify the arrest was misleading, which exacerbated the seriousness of the breach.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's factual findings regarding the officer's lack of subjective grounds and misleading testimony were reasonable and entitled to deference.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault alleged to have occurred between December 30, 2018 and January 6, 2019.

Both the defendant and complainant were hospital employees.

The defendant brought a motion under sections 278.3 and O'Connor of the Criminal Code seeking production of documents held by the hospital and a workplace investigator relating to the complainant's allegations and the investigation conducted.

The court determined whether the documents constituted "records" under section 278.1 of the Criminal Code and whether they should be produced to the court for review.

The court addressed the definition of "records," the reasonable expectation of privacy, the exemption for records made by persons responsible for investigation or prosecution, and the test for likely relevance under section 278.5.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that his Charter rights under s. 8 and s. 10(b) were breached and that the admission of breath samples tainted the trial judge's finding of impairment.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusion on the impaired driving charge was amply supported by overwhelming civilian and paramedic evidence, independent of the breath samples.

The court held it was unnecessary to address the alleged Charter breaches given the strength of the other evidence.

The applicant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to six months' imprisonment followed by eighteen months' probation.

He appealed his conviction on grounds including misapplication of the law concerning reasonable steps in ascertaining consent and insufficient reasons for judgment.

The motion judge found the appeal was not frivolous and granted bail pending appeal, noting the short sentence made the appeal vulnerable to becoming moot.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood and impaired operation of a motor vehicle.

The trial proceeded on a blended basis with a Charter application.

The court addressed four issues: whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to make a breath demand under section 254(2) of the Criminal Code; whether the section 254(3) demand was reasonable despite lack of evidence of officer training; whether the accused's section 10(b) Charter rights were breached when not permitted to dial counsel directly; and whether the Crown proved impairment beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found the officer had reasonable suspicion, the demand was lawful, no Charter breach occurred, and the Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The defence challenged the validity of the arrest and detention on Charter grounds, arguing that the right to counsel was not provided forthwith and that the accused was unlawfully over-held.

The court found a technical breach of section 10(b) of the Charter regarding the timing of right to counsel advice, but declined to exclude evidence.

The court also found no Charter violation regarding the continued detention, as the officer's decision to hold the accused to allow her to sober up and calm down was reasonable in the circumstances.

The Crown proved both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The applicant brought a motion to stay charges of impaired driving and "over 80" on the basis of a breach of his right to be tried within a reasonable period of time under Section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The charges were laid on June 24, 2014, with the information sworn on July 9, 2014.

The trial was scheduled for one day but was not completed until April 13, 2016, with judgment delivery delayed until February 7, 2017.

The total delay was 26 months, or 24 months after deducting defence delay.

The court found that the net delay of 24 months exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and that the Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to rebut the presumption.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The Crown sought an extension of time to appeal the respondent's acquittal on a fraud charge.

The respondent moved to dismiss the Crown's application for non-compliance with appeal timelines.

The court applied the three-factor test for extending time: bona fide intention, explanation for delay, and merit of the appeal.

While the Crown demonstrated an intention to appeal, it failed to provide adequate explanations for significant delays in serving the notice of appeal, transcripts, and prosecuting the application.

The Crown also did not sufficiently establish the merit of the appeal.

The court found a lack of diligence from the Crown.

Consequently, the respondent's application to dismiss was granted, and the Crown's application for an extension of time was dismissed.