Chantal Joanne Lefebvre

The offender, Justin Cassie-Berube, was sentenced for manslaughter, assault causing bodily harm, and assault related to the death of a five-year-old child, Chloe.

The court found that the offender failed to provide necessities of life and medical attention to Chloe, leading to her death, and had repeatedly abused her.

The sentencing considered aggravating factors such as the victim's vulnerability, breach of trust, and the deliberate failure to seek medical help to avoid legal jeopardy.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of criminal record, young age, and mental health issues, though his lack of true remorse limited mitigation.

A global sentence of 14 years imprisonment was imposed, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence.

The accused, Justin Cassie-Berube, was charged with six counts relating to the death of a five-year-old girl, including failing to provide necessaries of life, criminal negligence causing death, manslaughter, assault causing bodily harm, and assault.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts.

The judgment detailed the child's deteriorating health due to a bladder rupture and other injuries, and the accused's conscious decision to withhold medical attention due to fear of legal jeopardy from the child's visible bruises.

The court concluded that the accused's conduct constituted a marked and substantial departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent person, directly contributing to the child's death.

This criminal trial concerned Benoit Labrecque, who faced five charges arising from an altercation at a residence.

The charges included breaking and entering to commit assault, assaulting Brittany Elder causing bodily harm, assaulting Paul Fitzgerald causing bodily harm, uttering a threat of bodily harm to Fitzgerald, and conveying a death threat to Brandon Torrens.

The court meticulously assessed the credibility and reliability of witness testimonies, noting inconsistencies among complainants and finding the accused's testimony generally not credible.

The court acquitted Labrecque of breaking and entering and assaulting Elder due to reasonable doubt regarding Elder's evidence.

However, Labrecque was convicted of conveying a death threat to Torrens, communicating a threat of bodily harm to Fitzgerald (affirming that conditional threats are criminal offences), and assaulting Fitzgerald causing bodily harm, as his self-defence claim was rejected.

The defendant, a Member of Parliament, faced two counts of breach of trust under section 122 of the Criminal Code, alleging he solicited funds by deceit or for personal benefit in connection with his official duties.

After the Crown closed its case, the defence brought a motion for a directed verdict.

The court examined the evidence regarding loans obtained from individuals who had received immigration assistance or invitations to a Prime Minister's event.

The court found that the Crown failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish the second element of the offence, specifically that the alleged conduct was "in connection with the duties of his office." The court determined that the inferences required to support the Crown's theory, such as the loans being connected to prior immigration assistance or the event invitations demonstrating partiality, amounted to impermissible speculation or conjecture.

Consequently, the motion for a directed verdict was granted, and the defendant was acquitted on both charges.

Kivi Bar Wari pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his cellmate.

Crown and Defence jointly recommended an eight-year sentence, which the court accepted.

The primary outstanding issue was the calculation of pre-sentence custody credit.

The Crown argued for standard 1.5:1 Summers credit, while the Defence sought additional enhanced Duncan credit due to unduly harsh detention conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court, following R. v. Marshall, held that Duncan credit is a mitigating factor to be considered when determining the appropriate sentence, not an additional deduction after the sentence is set.

Since the joint sentencing submission had already factored in the harsh conditions, granting further enhanced credit would constitute "double accounting." The court applied the 1.5:1 Summers credit to the remaining pre-sentence custody.

During a criminal trial for second-degree murder and accessory after the fact, the court ruled on whether the partial defence of provocation should be put to the jury and whether directed verdicts of acquittal should be entered for the accessory charges.

The court found an air of reality to the provocation defence, noting evidence that the deceased may have fired first.

The court dismissed the application for a directed verdict on accessory after the fact to a firearms offence, but granted a directed verdict of acquittal for accessory after the fact to murder, as the victim was not yet dead when the assistance was provided.

The applicant, charged with impaired driving, brought a motion seeking permission for his counsel to conduct the trial without a mask and for witnesses to testify unmasked.

Counsel argued that masks impeded his ability to effectively cross-examine witnesses by obscuring non-verbal cues, muffling his voice, and causing distraction.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that counsel's effectiveness would not be meaningfully reduced and that public health concerns, supported by existing regulations and guidelines, justified the masking requirement.

The judge emphasized judicial discretion in balancing fair trial rights against public health measures and the importance of consistency in court procedures.

The accused was charged with 15 counts of violent offences, including assault, assault with a weapon, aggravated assault, and uttering threats, against his former intimate partner.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of the complainant and the accused, who provided contradictory accounts.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence, finding it inconsistent and contradicted by text messages and photographic evidence.

The court accepted the complainant's evidence, finding that the accused exerted financial control and committed numerous acts of violence, including grinding the complainant's legs into broken glass.

The accused was found guilty on all remaining counts.

The applicant, M.R.M., pleaded guilty to sexual contact and incest.

He sought a conditional stay of proceedings for the sexual contact charge based on the Kienapple principle and challenged the constitutionality of the five-year minimum sentence for incest under s. 155(2) of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court granted the stay for the sexual contact charge, finding a legal nexus with the incest charge.

However, the court upheld the constitutionality of the minimum sentence for incest, determining it was not grossly disproportionate, even when considering hypothetical less severe cases.

The final sentence imposed was five years imprisonment for incest.

Historical sexual offence prosecution arising from allegations that the accused repeatedly sexually abused his younger sister over many years in the family home, beginning in early childhood and continuing into her teens.

The court held that an adult complainant testifying about childhood abuse must have inconsistencies on peripheral matters assessed in light of her age at the time of the events, and that delayed disclosure cannot ground an adverse credibility inference.

The complainant's evidence was accepted as credible and reliable, materially corroborated by forensic DNA evidence on the complainant's dolls.

The parents' evidence was rejected as biased, tailored, and unreliable.

The accused was found guilty on all counts of sexual assault, incest, sexual assault with a weapon, and mischief.

Steevenson Joseph was convicted by a jury of receiving a benefit from the prostitution of a person under 18, procuring a person to offer sexual services (believing they were over 18), advertising sexual services, and making/possessing child pornography.

He was acquitted of more serious human trafficking and sexual assault charges.

The court considered the constitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences for these offences under section 12 of the Charter, finding them grossly disproportionate in this case and in reasonable hypothetical scenarios.

The judge declared the mandatory minimums for receiving a benefit from prostitution (two years) and making/possessing child pornography (six months, then one year) to be of no force and effect.

Joseph received a suspended sentence with one year probation, with credit for oppressive bail conditions.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision concerning the first-degree murder of Dady Junior Jean on November 4, 2015.

Four defendants were charged: Dominique P. Chrétien, Johnnie-Dean Locey-Derochie, Candy L. Locey, and Todd S. Turner.

The Crown sought committal of all four on first-degree murder.

The court examined whether there was sufficient evidence to commit each defendant to trial on first-degree murder, considering the elements of planning and deliberation.

The court found that the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including motive, opportunity, communications, procurement of a firearm, and coordinated actions, supported reasonable inferences that all four defendants knew of and participated in a planned and deliberate murder.

All four defendants were committed to trial on first-degree murder.

The Crown brought an application under section 540(7) of the Criminal Code to admit a videotaped police interview with a witness who subsequently died.

The witness had been interviewed regarding his role as a taxi driver transporting individuals allegedly involved in a first-degree murder.

The court declined to admit the statement, finding it did not meet the threshold of being credible or trustworthy, and exercising its discretion to refuse admission given that the declarant would be unavailable for cross-examination at trial and the evidence would therefore be inadmissible at trial unless it met the principled hearsay exception standard.

The accused was convicted after trial of multiple firearms offences, including discharging a firearm contrary to section 244.2(3) of the Criminal Code.

He brought a Charter application under section 12 to challenge the mandatory minimum sentence of seven years as grossly disproportionate.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Lloyd and determined that the mandatory minimum was not grossly disproportionate given the accused's prior conviction for armed robbery, the circumstances of the current offence involving multiple discharges in a residential area, and the appropriate sentencing range for such offences.

The Charter application was dismissed and the accused was sentenced to eight years imprisonment.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault with a weapon and unlawful confinement against his spouse.

The offences involved luring the complainant, binding her, whipping her with a belt, and forcing sexual intercourse.

Despite the complainant's plea for a non-custodial sentence to preserve their business and co-parenting arrangement, the court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence for serious domestic violence.

The accused was sentenced to two years in penitentiary for sexual assault with a weapon and a concurrent 12-month term for unlawful confinement.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault with weapons arising from an incident involving a former spouse following the breakdown of their marriage.

The Crown alleged that the accused lured the complainant upstairs under the pretext of reviewing financial information, restrained her with rope, whipped her with a belt, shaved her pubic hair, and engaged in non-consensual intercourse.

The accused argued that the encounter formed part of consensual sexual role‑playing and that he honestly believed the complainant consented.

The court rejected the defence, finding no evidence that the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain consent as required under s. 273.2 of the Criminal Code and concluding that the complainant did not consent to any aspect of the encounter.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault, unlawful confinement, and assault with weapons.

À la suite de condamnations pour introduction par effraction, agression sexuelle causant des lésions corporelles, voies de fait et menaces de mort, la Couronne a demandé que le délinquant soit déclaré délinquant dangereux en vertu de l’art. 753 du Code criminel.

La preuve démontrait un long historique criminel comprenant plusieurs agressions sexuelles, violences conjugales et manquements à des ordonnances judiciaires, ainsi qu’un refus constant d’assumer la responsabilité de ses actes ou de participer à des traitements.

La Cour a conclu que les critères des al. 753(1)(a) et (b) étaient satisfaits, notamment la répétition d’actes violents et l’incapacité de contrôler ses impulsions sexuelles.

Elle a également déterminé qu’il n’existait aucune possibilité réelle de contrôler le risque dans la communauté au moyen d’une ordonnance de surveillance de longue durée.

Une peine indéterminée a donc été imposée afin d’assurer la protection du public.

The applicant, a 51-year-old Innu man from Cambridge Bay, Nunavut, sought an exemption from a mandatory firearm prohibition imposed following his guilty plea to sexual assault.

The applicant argued that the prohibition would constitute a virtual prohibition on his only realistic means of employment—operating an outfitting and hunting guide business—and that he would need firearms for sustenance hunting.

The court granted the exemption under section 113(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, finding that the applicant had satisfied the necessity requirement on the balance of probabilities.

The court emphasized that the necessity requirement need not be permanent and that a realistic, contextual approach must be taken when assessing employment prospects in remote communities.

The court also noted that satisfying the necessity condition is necessary but not sufficient; the court must also be satisfied that granting the exemption does not pose an undue risk to public safety.

The accused was charged with assault with a weapon and aggravated assault arising from an incident on October 28, 2011, where he struck the complainant with a golf club.

The central issue was whether the accused's use of force was justified as self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that the accused had a reasonable perception of force or threat of force, acted with a defensive purpose, and that his response was objectively reasonable in the circumstances.

The accused was acquitted of both charges.

The Crown sought admission at trial of the complainant’s testimony from the preliminary inquiry after the complainant died before trial.

The accused argued that admission of the prior testimony would be unfair because cross‑examination at the preliminary inquiry had a different purpose and was not as extensive as it would have been at trial, raising concerns about reliability and prejudice.

The court considered s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code and the principled hearsay framework, including necessity and threshold reliability.

Finding that the complainant testified under oath at the preliminary inquiry in the presence of the accused and was subject to cross‑examination without restriction, the court concluded that the statutory requirements and reliability threshold were met.

The prior testimony was therefore admissible, with ultimate weight to be determined at trial.