Kimberley A. Pegg

The Crown appealed from the respondent's acquittal on a charge of sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were insufficient under the legal standards established in R. v. R.E.M. and R. v. Sheppard.

The appellate court found that the trial judge's reasons, while brief and delivered orally, were sufficient to permit meaningful appellate review.

The trial judge clearly explained that she was left with a reasonable doubt because, faced with conflicting versions of events from the complainant and the respondent's text messages, she could not determine guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court emphasized that in credibility-based trials, a reasonable doubt can arise when the trial judge is unable to resolve conflicting evidence.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for summary judgment in a child protection matter concerning E.P., seeking a final custody order for the mother, N.P., with sole decision-making authority, and supervised access for the father, E.P., at a supervised access center.

The mother consented to the Society's request, while the father sought joint decision-making and unsupervised access, and the paternal grandmother sought to supervise the father's access.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding custody to the mother and supervised access for the father at a supervised access facility, citing the father's extensive criminal history, periods of incarceration, and the need for a neutral third party to supervise given the high conflict between the parents.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a summary judgment motion to dismiss openness applications filed by the mother (J.S.R.) and adult sister (H.S.R.) concerning two children, E. and R., who were in the Society's extended care and subsequently adopted.

The court considered the children's best interests, their consistent views against contact with the applicants, and the requirement for consent for children over 12 under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The motion was granted, dismissing the openness applications and ordering openness only according to the children's wishes as reflected in minutes signed by the Office of the Children's Lawyer and the Society.

The accused, Clayton Forrest, was charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine and fentanyl.

The fentanyl charge was amended to simple possession.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on items found in a backpack linked to Forrest.

The court found the chain of continuity for the seized drugs was proven.

However, while the court found Forrest owned and controlled the backpack and its contents, including the methamphetamine, it had a reasonable doubt that the methamphetamine was possessed for the purpose of trafficking, given the quantity and other circumstances.

The court also found a reasonable doubt regarding Forrest's possession of fentanyl due to conflicting evidence on its location.

Forrest was found guilty of simple possession of methamphetamine and not guilty of possession for the purpose of trafficking methamphetamine and simple possession of fentanyl.

The applicant children's aid society sought an order for extended society care for two First Nations children with special needs.

The children were removed from their father's care following disclosures of inappropriate touching, though the court could not conclude on a balance of probabilities that the father was the perpetrator.

The court found the children in need of protection due to a failure to provide treatment, emotional harm, and risk of emotional harm stemming from the parents' residential instability, the mother's unaddressed alcohol addiction, and exposure to domestic violence.

The court ordered the children placed in extended society care, finding that neither parent nor the maternal grandmother could provide a safe and stable environment.

Specified access was granted to both parents and the children's First Nations band.

In a child protection proceeding, the Society sought to introduce 45 out-of-court statements made by two children to various individuals, including social workers, a foster mother, a teacher, and therapists.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of these hearsay statements.

The court found that it was reasonably necessary to admit the statements without requiring the children to testify, given their age, special needs, and history of trauma.

Applying the principled approach and traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule, the court assessed the threshold reliability of each statement.

Ultimately, the court admitted some statements for the truth of their contents, some for the children's state of mind, some for narrative, and excluded others where the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value or threshold reliability was not met.

This motion concerned the temporary care and custody of two children, E.-L. and Z.P., following their apprehension due to ongoing adult conflict between the mother and Z.P.'s father.

The Family and Children's Services sought placement with the maternal grandfather, while the mother sought return of the children or placement with kin caregivers (the L.'s), and Z.P.'s father sought placement of Z.P. with him.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the persistent conflict.

It determined that the children could not safely remain with the mother.

The maternal grandfather was deemed unsuitable due to lack of assessment and negative reports.

The court ordered E.-L. to be placed in the temporary care of the L.'s and Z.P. to be placed in the temporary care of her biological father, Mr. P., conditional on him securing suitable housing.

The L.'s were also added as parties to the child protection proceedings.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that two children were in need of protection and an order placing them in Extended Society Care.

The mother opposed the application, seeking the return of the children to her care, supported by the father.

Following a lengthy trial, the court found the children in need of protection due to ongoing exposure to domestic violence, chronic school absenteeism, and the mother's inability to meet their basic needs.

The court concluded that the mother's plan was not viable and placed the children in Extended Society Care, while granting specified access to the mother, father, and siblings.

The children's aid society brought a motion to dismiss a mother's status review application on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction because the issue of access from the initial protection application was still pending following an appeal.

The court dismissed the society's motion, finding that status and access are distinct concepts under the legislation.

The court held that an outstanding access issue does not bar a parent from bringing a status review application regarding the children's placement, especially where significant changes in the proposed plans of care have occurred.

The mother brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the children's aid society's protection application regarding her infant child.

The society alleged the child was in need of protection due to the father's history of substance abuse, domestic violence, and a prior judicial finding that he likely sexually abused another child.

The court found no triable issue regarding physical or emotional harm, as the mother had adequately cared for the child.

However, applying the cautionary approach to summary judgment in child protection matters, the court concluded there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the mother could protect the child from the risk of sexual harm posed by the father.

The motion was dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa (Society) brought a motion seeking to continue a temporary order for the care and custody of a three-month-old child (M.K.) on a with prejudice basis, placing the child in the Society's temporary care.

The Respondent Mother opposed the motion, requesting the child's return to her care with conditions.

The Respondent Father was removed as a party after a paternity test revealed he was not the biological father.

The court applied the two-part legal test under subsections 94(2), (4), and (5) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The court found credible and trustworthy evidence of a risk of harm to the child due to the Mother's long-standing, unresolved mental health issues, including chronic delusional disorder and recent bipolar diagnosis, her inability to cooperate with professionals, and an insufficient support network.

The court concluded that the child could not be adequately protected by an interim supervision order.

The Society's motion was granted, and the child remained in the Society's care and custody, with access to the Mother at the Society's discretion, pending the completion of proceedings.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision concerning the first-degree murder of Dady Junior Jean on November 4, 2015.

Four defendants were charged: Dominique P. Chrétien, Johnnie-Dean Locey-Derochie, Candy L. Locey, and Todd S. Turner.

The Crown sought committal of all four on first-degree murder.

The court examined whether there was sufficient evidence to commit each defendant to trial on first-degree murder, considering the elements of planning and deliberation.

The court found that the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including motive, opportunity, communications, procurement of a firearm, and coordinated actions, supported reasonable inferences that all four defendants knew of and participated in a planned and deliberate murder.

All four defendants were committed to trial on first-degree murder.

A respondent in a child protection trial brought a motion for the judge to recuse himself and declare a mistrial, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias.

The allegation stemmed from the judge contemplating, and seeking submissions on, whether to summon additional witnesses under s. 49 of the Child and Family Services Act (CFSA) to address conflicting evidence, a possibility the judge later decided against.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a reasonable, informed person would not conclude that the judge would not decide the case fairly.

The decision emphasized the high threshold for proving bias, the presumption of judicial impartiality, and the unique procedural flexibilities afforded to courts in child protection proceedings under the CFSA and Family Law Rules.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for temporary care and custody of three children with their respective fathers, following a warrantless apprehension due to the mother's breach of a previous supervision order (pets in home) and non-cooperation with a child protection worker.

The mother sought the children's return.

The court found the mother not credible, upheld the warrantless apprehension as justified due to her non-cooperation and the prior deplorable state of the home, and determined that the risk to the children in the mother's care outweighed the emotional harm of separation.

The motion for temporary care and custody with the fathers was granted.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa sought summary judgment to place three children (E.S., J.S., R.S.) in the legal custody of their maternal grandparents, with discretionary access for the parents.

The mother opposed, seeking the children's return or a supervision order.

The court dismissed the Society's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues for trial.

These issues included the admissibility and apparent contradiction of medical evidence regarding the children's initial physical condition and developmental delays, and a significant change in the mother's bail conditions which allowed her to present a plan of care.

The court emphasized that summary judgment requires a full evidentiary record and should not be granted where material facts are in dispute or credibility is an issue.

The appellants appealed a decision ordering Crown wardship with access to the maternal grandmother for two Aboriginal children.

The children had been apprehended and placed with a non-Aboriginal foster family for several years.

The appellants argued the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the children's First Nations status.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while Aboriginal heritage is an important consideration under the Child and Family Services Act, it does not override the paramount consideration of the children's best interests.

The court upheld the finding that removing the children from their established foster family would be damaging, and that their cultural connection could be maintained through access visits.

In this child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, the court determined that two Native children were in need of protection and made orders regarding their placement.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with placement in a non-Native foster family (the S.D. family), while the maternal grandmother and the Algonquin Nation sought placement with the grandmother with CAS supervision.

The court found that the children had been in need of protection due to the grandmother's inability to protect them from unsupervised contact with their mother, who had a significant criminal history, and the grandmother's ongoing struggles with alcohol and dishonesty with authorities.

Despite the importance of cultural connection for Native children, the court prioritized the children's established attachment to their foster family, their expressed wishes to remain in that home, and their emotional security and stability.

The court ordered Crown wardship with the children remaining in the S.D. family's care, with reasonable access for the grandmother twice per year while the foster family resided in the United Kingdom.