Marguerite Lewis

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment in a child protection application, seeking extended society care for the child D.M. without access for purposes of adoption.

The motion also sought to strike the father's Answer and Plan of Care.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, emphasizing the caution required in child protection cases, but granted summary judgment.

The child was found in need of protection due to a history of parental substance abuse, domestic violence, and lack of engagement, and was placed in extended society care without access for adoption.

This endorsement clarifies and replaces the terms of a supervision order and access conditions previously issued in a child protection matter.

The court ordered the Children's Aid Society to devise a gradual reintegration schedule for the children M and C to return to the mother's full-time care by August 14, 2017.

It also set out detailed conditions for the mother's twelve-month supervision order, including no contact with the father or other specified individuals, cooperation with the Society, drug testing, and participation in recommended programs.

For the father, limited supervised access of one hour every two weeks was granted, subject to specific conditions including cooperation with the Society and no unsupervised contact with the children.

The applicant sought Crown wardship of two young children based on allegations of severe physical, emotional, and sexual abuse by the parents against older siblings.

The court found the children in need of protection due to a real risk of physical and emotional harm, primarily stemming from the father's historical violence and the mother's failure to protect the older siblings.

However, applying the least disruptive alternative principle, the court rejected Crown wardship.

Instead, the court ordered that the children be placed in the mother's care under a 12-month supervision order with strict conditions, including that she have no contact with the father, who was granted only limited supervised access.

The applicant child protection agency brought a motion to set aside an order extending the respondent mother's time to perfect her appeal of a Crown wardship order, and to dismiss the appeal for delay.

The court found that the motion judge had properly exercised his inherent jurisdiction and considered the relevant factors, including prejudice and the mother's difficulties with legal aid, when granting the extension.

The agency's motion was dismissed, and the court set peremptory deadlines for the perfection and hearing of the appeal.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion to set aside an order extending time for the respondent mother, I.C., to perfect her appeal of a Crown Wardship order, and to dismiss the appeal for delay.

The court reviewed the factors for extending time to perfect an appeal, including the length and explanation for delay, prejudice to the respondent, and the merits of the appeal, as established in *Paulsson* and *Monteith*.

The court deferred to the discretion of the previous judge who granted the extension, finding no reason to interfere.

The motion by the Children's Aid Society was dismissed, and I.C.'s appeal was not dismissed for delay, with new peremptory timelines set for its perfection and hearing.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for a temporary order placing the child, S.M., in the temporary care and custody of the Mother, C.L., subject to supervision.

The Mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer consented, while the Father, M.M., opposed.

The court found ample evidence that the Father's verbal outbursts, aggressive behaviour, and refusal to cooperate with the Society or exercise supervised access had caused the child emotional harm.

The Father's arguments regarding the invalidity of a prior "without prejudice" order and his non-cooperation were rejected.

The motion was granted, placing the child with the Mother under Society supervision, with specific conditions for both parents, including the Father's participation in programs and a psychiatric assessment.

A respondent in a child protection trial brought a motion for the judge to recuse himself and declare a mistrial, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias.

The allegation stemmed from the judge contemplating, and seeking submissions on, whether to summon additional witnesses under s. 49 of the Child and Family Services Act (CFSA) to address conflicting evidence, a possibility the judge later decided against.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a reasonable, informed person would not conclude that the judge would not decide the case fairly.

The decision emphasized the high threshold for proving bias, the presumption of judicial impartiality, and the unique procedural flexibilities afforded to courts in child protection proceedings under the CFSA and Family Law Rules.

The appellant maternal grandparents appealed an order making their two grandchildren Crown wards.

They argued that the definitions of 'Indian' and 'native community' in the Child and Family Services Act violated s. 15 of the Charter by excluding non-status Aboriginals, and that they should have been awarded custody.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidentiary basis to establish a s. 15 Charter disadvantage and upholding the trial judge's conclusion that Crown wardship with access was in the children's best interests due to concerns about the grandparents' health and ability to provide permanent care.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of six children following their apprehension from the father's home.

The father had been experiencing severe mental health issues, including paranoia, and the home was found in a state of disarray with unsanitary conditions.

The mother, who also struggled with mental health issues, sought the return of the children but lacked suitable housing.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children would likely suffer harm if returned to either parent at this time.

The children were ordered to remain in the temporary care and custody of the Society, with supervised access granted to both parents.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship for two children, I.G. (13) and Z.C. (20 months), who had been in care beyond statutory timelines.

The respondent mother opposed, arguing for genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court, utilizing enhanced fact-finding powers under Family Law Rule 16(6.1), determined that both children were in need of protection due to the mother's untreated mental health, lack of cooperation with the Society, and inability to prioritize the children's needs.

Crown wardship was granted for both children.

Access for the mother to Z.C. was denied, while supervised access for I.G. was ordered, contingent on his welfare and desire.

The grandparents brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order of a single judge of the Divisional Court that dismissed their appeal for delay.

The underlying child protection case involved a constitutional challenge to the definition of 'Indian or native person' under the Child and Family Services Act.

The Divisional Court panel found that the motion judge erred by not considering the merits of the constitutional challenge, which had been properly included in the trial judge's reconsideration.

The panel concluded the appeal had a real chance of success and set aside the order dismissing the appeal, allowing the grandparents to perfect their appeal.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for Crown wardship for three children.

The mother and the two fathers of the children opposed the application, seeking to have the children returned to their care.

The court found that the children were in need of protection due to the parents' significant mental health issues, substance abuse, and inability to provide a stable environment.

The mother was physically disabled and insisted on caring for one of the fathers, who suffered from severe mental illness and required constant supervision.

The other father had a history of substance abuse and an unstable lifestyle.

The court concluded that the parents' plans of care were unworkable and that it was in the best interests of the children to be made Crown wards for the purpose of adoption, with some transitional access and potential openness agreements.

The respondent children's aid society brought a motion to dismiss the appellants' appeal for delay.

The appellants brought a cross-motion to extend the time to perfect their appeal, citing delays in obtaining Legal Aid funding.

The court found that while the delay was not caused by the appellants, the proposed appeal had no chance of success.

The appeal raised a constitutional challenge regarding the definition of 'Indian' or 'native person' under the Child and Family Services Act, which the court found irrelevant as the children did not fall within the applicable definitions.

Given the lack of merit and the prejudice of further delay to the children, the court granted the motion to dismiss the appeal.

Following a Divisional Court order requiring reconsideration of a prior Crown wardship decision, the court conducted a full reconsideration of a child protection status review involving two young children.

The moving parties argued that the statutory definitions of “Indian” and “native person” in the Child and Family Services Act were unconstitutional and sought placement of the children with family members rather than Crown wardship.

The court rejected the constitutional challenge, finding insufficient evidentiary foundation to establish discrimination under s. 15 of the Charter and no breach of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

On the merits, the court found that proposed family placement plans lacked sufficient indicia of permanence and stability after the children had already spent an extended period in care.

Considering the statutory best‑interests factors and the importance of permanency, the court concluded that Crown wardship with access best served the children’s interests.

The child protection agency brought a motion for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship of a child for adoption or other permanent placement, along with approval of substituted service on the father.

The mother did not participate and provided no evidence, and the father was in default and of unknown whereabouts.

The evidence showed repeated parental substance abuse issues, missed access visits, and instability, while the child had lived primarily in the same foster home since birth and was thriving.

Applying the summary judgment framework under the Family Law Rules and Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the child’s best interests.

Crown wardship was granted against the mother and conditionally against the father, with continued discretionary access to the mother.

In a child protection proceeding, the society sought continuation of an interim order placing three children in its temporary care and custody following apprehension.

The motion focused on the mental health condition of one parent, including psychiatric diagnoses, medication compliance concerns, and recent warnings from the treating psychiatrist indicating potential risk if the children were returned home.

The court emphasized the absence of the ordered family court clinic assessment and the uncertainty surrounding the parent's mental health stability.

Given recent concerns about medication non‑compliance and potential substance use, the court concluded that the risk to the children had not been adequately resolved.

The interim order continuing society care was granted pending the forthcoming assessment.

In a child protection proceeding, the applicant society sought an order prohibiting disclosure of a court‑ordered Family Court Clinic assessment to two teenage children who were the subjects of the report.

Although s. 54(5) of the Child and Family Services Act generally requires that children aged twelve or older receive a copy of such reports, the court may withhold disclosure if satisfied it would cause emotional harm.

The court considered the best interests of the children, the sensitive and highly personal content of the multidisciplinary assessment concerning multiple family members, and the evidence from the society and parents that disclosure could destabilize the children’s progress.

The court concluded that disclosure at that time would likely cause emotional harm and undermine privacy interests of other assessed family members.

The motion was granted and disclosure of the assessment to the children was prohibited.

In a child protection status review application, the applicant society sought a final order of custody to the children's maternal grandmother under s. 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The court found the mother's alcoholism remained unresolved, with repeated relapses and no reliable evidence of sustained sobriety, while the children had been thriving in a stable kinship placement with their grandmother and maternal aunt.

Applying the best interests factors in s. 37(3), the court concluded that security, continuity, family support, and cultural and religious consistency favoured the existing placement.

A final order of custody was granted to the grandmother, with continued access to the mother at the grandmother's discretion.

The Children's Aid Society sought a finding that two children were in need of protection and an order placing them in the care of their mother and her spouse.

The father sought to have the children returned to his care.

The court found the children in need of protection due to exposure to domestic violence, drug trafficking, weapons, and parental alienation by the father.

The court granted joint custody to the mother and her spouse, with no access to the father, finding that the father's anti-social behaviour and refusal to follow court orders posed a significant risk of emotional and physical harm to the children.

The children's aid society and the parents brought competing summary judgment motions regarding the custody and access of two children following a highly conflictual separation involving domestic violence.

The court found the children were in need of protection due to emotional harm caused by the parents' toxic relationship.

The court granted the society's motion to place the children in the sole custody of the mother, noting she had successfully completed programming and cooperated with the society.

The father's motion for sole custody was dismissed.

However, the court declined to terminate the father's access to the younger child on a summary basis, directing that the issue of access proceed to trial.