Annemarie Roodal

This decision addresses costs following a motion to change parenting arrangements, including a proposed relocation of the child, M.B., from Ontario to British Columbia.

The court reviews the parties’ conduct, offers to settle, and financial circumstances, ultimately awarding costs to the successful party, Mr. Bowick, but in an amount reduced for proportionality and ability to pay.

The applicant father failed to attend a scheduled virtual trial, leading the court to proceed in his absence.

The court dismissed the father's claim and granted the mother's requests for sole decision-making responsibility, primary residence of the child, discretionary virtual and in-person parenting time for the father (with conditions due to past abuse and flight risk), permission to obtain/renew the child's passport and travel internationally without the father's consent, a divorce, the right to add her last name to the child's, and financial disclosure from the father.

Costs were awarded to the mother.

The respondent mother sought a final parenting order for the parties' two-and-a-half-year-old child after the applicant father was noted in default.

The father failed to attend the uncontested trial.

The court reviewed the best interests of the child under section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act, noting the mother's role as primary caregiver, the child's medical needs, and allegations of family violence by the father.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence, with parenting time for the father at the mother's discretion.

Child support issues were severed to be heard at a later trial.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce over $1.6 million in spousal support arrears and to stay the respondent's motion to change support.

The applicant sought to access the cash surrender value of five life insurance policies, three of which the respondent had recently transferred to his adult children without consideration.

The court found the transfers were fraudulent conveyances intended to defeat the applicant's claims and declared them void.

The court also held the policies were not exempt from seizure under the Insurance Act because the beneficiary designations were either made in breach of a prior court order or did not qualify for the exemption.

The respondent was ordered to cash in the policies and pay the proceeds to the applicant, and his motion to change was stayed until he complied.

The applicant father brought a Hague Convention application seeking the return of his two children to the UK.

The respondent mother sought an adjournment pending the children's refugee claims in Canada.

The court bifurcated the hearing, proceeding first with the issues of habitual residence and wrongful removal.

The court found that the family had relocated to London, UK, following the end of the father's diplomatic posting in Canada, and that the children were habitually resident there.

The mother's removal of the children to Canada was found to be wrongful.

The second stage of the hearing regarding whether the children should be ordered returned was deferred until after the refugee claims are decided.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change a 2012 final order to allow for equal, week-about parenting time for the parties' 14-year-old child.

The child expressed a consistent preference for a shared parenting arrangement to an assessor.

However, the court found significant ongoing conflict between the parents and instances where the applicant undermined the respondent's decision-making authority and parenting time.

Applying the best interests of the child test under section 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act, the court dismissed the motion to change the parenting schedule, finding the current arrangement primarily in the respondent's care remained in the child's best interests.

Child support was ordered on a set-off basis.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion under s. 130 of the CYFSA for the production of third-party records relating to the parents and their five children.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing they had previously consented and the motion was premature.

The kin, who were added as parties to seek access to one child, brought a cross-motion seeking disclosure of the Society's entire file and the third-party records.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding the records relevant to the child protection concerns, with minor exceptions for counselling notes.

The court dismissed the kin's cross-motion, holding that their limited participatory rights only entitled them to records relevant to their claim for access to the one child.

The respondent mother, J.L., brought a motion for the presiding judge to recuse herself from hearing pending motions and the upcoming trial, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the judge's prior involvement, evidentiary rulings, and perceived negative language.

The respondent father, A.C., supported the motion.

The Children's Aid Society, counsel for the child B.L., and the added kin parties (T.P. and M.C.) opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, emphasizing judicial continuity in complex family law cases and the high threshold for recusal.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion to prevent the respondent mother from relocating with their nine-year-old autistic child to Fergus, Ontario.

The mother brought a cross-motion seeking leave to relocate, arguing the move would provide better autism support services and family support.

The court applied the Gordon v. Goertz framework and found that, despite the interim nature of the motion, there were compelling circumstances to allow the move.

The court granted the mother's cross-motion to relocate on a temporary basis and established a new access schedule for the father.

The applicant mother sought sole custody, child support, and permission to relocate with the parties' young child to Arnprior.

The respondent father sought joint custody, increased parenting time, and relief from child support arrears due to his return to school.

The court ordered joint custody, finding the mother had unreasonably restricted the father's access.

The father was granted increased parenting time.

The court imputed income to the father for a period of voluntary unemployment but suspended ongoing child support and section 7 expenses while he remained a full-time student.

The mother's request to relocate with the child was denied as it would disrupt the child's relationship with the father.

In a child protection trial, the father served a summons to compel the 12-year-old child to testify.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion to quash the summons, supported by the applicant society and the mother.

The court granted the motion to quash, finding that compelling the child to testify posed a significant risk of emotional harm and that the father's primary purpose was to impeach her credibility rather than prove material facts.

The court also ruled on the father's request to introduce the entirety of the child's police interview video, holding that only specific prior inconsistent statements relating to substantive issues, and not collateral facts, could be admitted.

In a child protection application, the applicant sought to introduce out-of-court statements made by the child to child protection workers and a counsellor for the truth of their contents.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the threshold reliability of these hearsay statements.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court evaluated the circumstances under which the statements were made, including the child's spontaneity, the absence of leading questions, and the timing of the recordings.

The court found that the majority of the statements met the threshold reliability test and were admissible, with the exception of one response to a directive question.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for a temporary order placing the child, S.M., in the temporary care and custody of the Mother, C.L., subject to supervision.

The Mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer consented, while the Father, M.M., opposed.

The court found ample evidence that the Father's verbal outbursts, aggressive behaviour, and refusal to cooperate with the Society or exercise supervised access had caused the child emotional harm.

The Father's arguments regarding the invalidity of a prior "without prejudice" order and his non-cooperation were rejected.

The motion was granted, placing the child with the Mother under Society supervision, with specific conditions for both parents, including the Father's participation in programs and a psychiatric assessment.

The parties consented to an order designating the mother as the primary residential parent of their five-year-old child, with the father having extensive access.

The sole remaining issue at trial was whether the mother should be permitted to relocate the child's permanent residence from Ottawa to Toronto, where she had secured employment.

Applying the Gordon v. Goertz framework, the court found that the move was in the child's best interests, noting the mother's role as primary caregiver, her financial stability in Toronto, and the father's ability to exercise his access in Toronto.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking elimination of substantial child and spousal support arrears, relief from ongoing support obligations, and access to three children he had not seen for approximately five years.

The court considered the principles governing rescission of support arrears, including the payor’s capacity to pay, the contractual nature of the obligation, delay in seeking relief, and hardship.

The court declined to impute income during documented periods of unemployment and rescinded arrears accumulated during those periods, but refused to extinguish the remaining arrears.

The court also ordered a graduated access regime beginning with supervised access through a community access centre, transitioning to progressively longer unsupervised visits.

Following a contested custody and access motion, the successful party sought costs of $8,613.93 despite being represented through legal aid.

The opposing party argued success was divided and no costs should be awarded.

The court applied Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, considering partial success, settlement offers, party conduct, and reasonable expectations regarding legal costs.

The court held that legally aided status does not affect the assessment of costs and found the hourly rate sought reasonable.

Balancing the factors, the court awarded reduced costs reflecting partial success by the opposing party.

The applicant moved for temporary spousal support, while the respondent moved for possession and sale of the matrimonial home, dispensing with the applicant's consent for the sale, and a restraining order.

The court awarded temporary spousal support to the applicant, imputing a modest income to her while recognizing her need and language barriers.

The court ordered the sale of the matrimonial home but declined to dispense with the applicant's consent or to issue a restraining order due to lack of evidence.

Costs were awarded to the successful applicant.