Graeme B. Fraser

This costs decision follows a three-day trial in which Laurie Ann Huggins was almost entirely successful against Thomas Edward Hayhurst and Anne-Marie Carswell.

The court found that the Respondents acted in bad faith throughout the proceedings, including disobeying court orders, fraudulent conveyance of property, and intimidation.

The court reduced the Applicant’s Bill of Costs to $89,651.81, finding this amount reasonable and proportionate given the Respondents’ conduct and the complexity added to the litigation.

The Respondents were ordered to pay this amount immediately.

The payor father brought a motion to change a 2009 final order that imputed his income at $30,000 for child support purposes.

He sought to retroactively decrease support and rescind approximately $19,000 in arrears owed to the Family Responsibility Office and third-party assignees.

The court found a material change in circumstances as the children were now adults and the father's income had never reached the imputed amount.

Applying the Colucci framework, the court exercised its discretion to retroactively decrease the child support arrears to zero, noting the father's understandable delay, good faith voluntary payments, and severe financial hardship.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce over $1.6 million in spousal support arrears and to stay the respondent's motion to change support.

The applicant sought to access the cash surrender value of five life insurance policies, three of which the respondent had recently transferred to his adult children without consideration.

The court found the transfers were fraudulent conveyances intended to defeat the applicant's claims and declared them void.

The court also held the policies were not exempt from seizure under the Insurance Act because the beneficiary designations were either made in breach of a prior court order or did not qualify for the exemption.

The respondent was ordered to cash in the policies and pay the proceeds to the applicant, and his motion to change was stayed until he complied.

The moving party brought a motion under Rule 18(13) of the Family Law Rules to enforce an alleged settlement agreement regarding the transfer of the jointly owned matrimonial home.

The moving party relied on an email exchange between counsel, which culminated in the responding party's counsel stating they 'finally have a deal' and requesting a formal document.

The court found that the email exchange did not contain all the essential terms of a binding contract, leaving critical issues such as mortgage assumption and line of credit discharge unresolved.

The motion was dismissed, as the communications amounted only to an unenforceable agreement to agree.

The applicant brought an originating application under s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act seeking to impose a review order on the respondent's spousal support to monitor her efforts towards self-sufficiency.

The parties had a separation agreement requiring the respondent to make reasonable efforts to contribute to her own support.

The court found the respondent had made minimal efforts since separation.

Applying the principles from Leskun, the court held that a review order was appropriate given the respondent's non-compliance with the agreement.

The court ordered spousal support to continue at the current rate but imposed a review in five years, and fixed arrears owed to the respondent at $4,272.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding interim child support and a restraining order.

The applicant sought to impute income to the respondent based on his previous earnings in Alberta, while the respondent sought interim child support for the child residing with him.

The court declined to impute income, using the respondent's current Ontario income, and ordered the applicant to pay interim Guideline child support.

The court dismissed the applicant's request for a restraining order, finding insufficient evidence of abuse and noting that a recently agreed-upon parallel parenting order provided a clear framework for communication and contact.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action following termination without cause after approximately 16 years of service in a specialized technical role.

The court determined that the reasonable notice period and mitigation issues could be resolved on the summary judgment record, while claims for aggravated, punitive, and certain special damages required viva voce evidence at a summary trial.

Applying the Bardal factors, the court found a 16‑month reasonable notice period appropriate given the employee’s age, long service, specialized duties, and limited re‑employment prospects.

The employer failed to establish a failure to mitigate.

Judgment was granted for damages for lack of reasonable notice, with remaining issues reserved for a summary trial.