Pamela Ruth Barron

The applicant child protection agency brought a Wagg motion seeking production of the complete Crown Brief regarding pending criminal charges against the respondent father for sexual offences against his child.

The Attorney General opposed production, arguing it could prejudice the ongoing criminal prosecution and taint witnesses.

The court granted the motion, finding that the agency met the test under Rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules and that the rights and interests of the parties in the child protection proceeding outweighed any possible prejudice to the Attorney General in the criminal proceedings.

The moving party father brought a motion for contempt against the responding party mother, alleging she intentionally obstructed his parenting time with their two teenage children on four occasions.

The mother argued she was minimally involved in the exchanges and the children themselves refused to attend.

The court dismissed the motion, finding insufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the mother engaged in deliberate conduct to breach the parenting order, noting that passivity does not equate to intentional obstruction.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision granting the respondent sole decision-making authority over their child.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence and finding a material change in circumstances.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that hearsay evidence is admissible on a motion to change under the Family Law Rules, and that compelling evidence, including the child's escalating behavioural crisis and the parents' inability to communicate, supported the finding of a material change.

The parties submitted a consent order on a Motion to Change child support and parenting terms.

The court required clarification on whether the order was made under the federal Divorce Act or provincial legislation, as the new Family Law Rules Form 25 requires the legislation to be specified.

After reviewing the historical pleadings and previous orders, the court determined that the original 2013 final order was made under the Family Law Act and Children's Law Reform Act because it predated the divorce order.

The court amended the 2013 order nunc pro tunc to reflect this and signed the new consent order specifying the provincial legislation.

The applicant brought a motion seeking a finding of contempt against the respondent for breaching a Final Order regarding income disclosure, child support adjustments, and Section 7 expenses.

The court reviewed the high threshold for contempt findings, emphasizing it as a last resort.

While acknowledging some non-compliance, the court found that the respondent had largely remedied the disclosure issues by the time of the motion and that other issues were not suitable for contempt.

The court dismissed the contempt motion but issued detailed orders for both parties to provide outstanding income and expense disclosure and to attend mediation as per the original order.

This case concerns a child protection matter focusing on access between a child, B., and her mother, S.D., following a summary judgment finding B. in need of protection and awarding joint custody to the father and maternal grandmother.

The trial addressed the extent and conditions of the mother's access, including supervision and location.

The court considered the mother's personality disorder, her inability to regulate emotions, and her "victim's stance" as well as her cannabis use and history of conflict.

The court ultimately increased the mother's access duration from the status quo but denied overnight visits and a rotating three-week schedule, allowing home visits only after CAS inspection.

The decision emphasized the child's best interests, the need to reduce conflict, and the mother's lack of insight into her issues.

In a child protection trial, the father served a summons to compel the 12-year-old child to testify.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion to quash the summons, supported by the applicant society and the mother.

The court granted the motion to quash, finding that compelling the child to testify posed a significant risk of emotional harm and that the father's primary purpose was to impeach her credibility rather than prove material facts.

The court also ruled on the father's request to introduce the entirety of the child's police interview video, holding that only specific prior inconsistent statements relating to substantive issues, and not collateral facts, could be admitted.

In a child protection application, the applicant sought to introduce out-of-court statements made by the child to child protection workers and a counsellor for the truth of their contents.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the threshold reliability of these hearsay statements.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court evaluated the circumstances under which the statements were made, including the child's spontaneity, the absence of leading questions, and the timing of the recordings.

The court found that the majority of the statements met the threshold reliability test and were admissible, with the exception of one response to a directive question.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for a temporary order placing the child, S.M., in the temporary care and custody of the Mother, C.L., subject to supervision.

The Mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer consented, while the Father, M.M., opposed.

The court found ample evidence that the Father's verbal outbursts, aggressive behaviour, and refusal to cooperate with the Society or exercise supervised access had caused the child emotional harm.

The Father's arguments regarding the invalidity of a prior "without prejudice" order and his non-cooperation were rejected.

The motion was granted, placing the child with the Mother under Society supervision, with specific conditions for both parents, including the Father's participation in programs and a psychiatric assessment.

A 4-year-old child, B., was apprehended and placed with her maternal grandmother under a temporary supervision order.

The Children's Aid Society (CAS) initially sought a supervision order to the grandmother but later amended its application to seek a 6-month supervision order to the father.

The CAS and father then moved for a temporary placement with the father, while the mother sought placement with her.

The court dismissed the mother's request and, after reserving on the father's request, ordered that the child remain with the maternal grandmother under the temporary supervision order, pending final determination of the amended application.

The decision emphasized the importance of continuity of care and the high threshold ("require") for changing a child's placement before a final determination, and highlighted the need for adherence to statutory timelines in child protection cases.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding a previous default order made while the respondent was in pre-trial custody on criminal charges that were later dismissed.

The respondent sought to vary child support and vacate a restraining order, while the applicant sought to declare the respondent a vexatious litigant and impute income.

The court found the previously imputed income was unrealistically high given the respondent's circumstances, reducing the imputed income to $25,000 and child support to $200 per month.

The court declined to vacate the restraining order and dismissed the applicant's other requests, ordering strict compliance with existing disclosure and cost orders.

On competing interim motions in a custody dispute concerning a four‑year‑old child, the court considered whether to alter the existing parenting arrangements following a period during which the child had primarily resided with the father.

Applying the Children’s Law Reform Act and the principle that interim orders should generally preserve the status quo absent compelling evidence, the court examined stability, parental capacity, and recent changes in the mother’s circumstances.

Evidence included frequent moves by the mother, concerns about drug use, and the father’s stable home environment and childcare arrangements.

The court concluded that the child’s best interests were served by maintaining primary residence with the father while preserving meaningful parenting time for the mother.

Joint interim custody was ordered, with the father having decision‑making authority over health and education.

Following a family law motion concerning imputed income, child support, spousal expenses, and access terms, the respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis after being substantially successful.

The court considered the parties’ offers to settle, noting that the result was nearly identical to the respondent’s offers except for a lower imputed income amount.

Because the result did not equal or exceed the offers, the court declined substantial indemnity costs and instead awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court also considered proportionality and the similarity between the parties’ legal bills.

Costs were ordered payable by the applicant to the respondent.

Following a motion regarding parenting time for an infant child, the court determined costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The moving party father had sought a rapid progression to a 50/50 access schedule, while the responding mother sought a gradual increase in parenting time.

The court found the mother was largely successful on the motion because the ordered access schedule closely resembled her proposal.

Considering the reasonableness of the parties’ conduct, the complexity of the matter, and proportionality, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful party.

Following a family law motion concerning a restraining order, temporary spousal support, disclosure, reimbursement of expenses, and a cross‑motion for occupation rent and credits, the court determined the issue of costs.

The moving party was successful on the majority of issues, although she did not obtain the restraining order sought and received less spousal support than requested.

The responding party obtained only a modest credit for occupation rent and support already paid.

Applying s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court held that costs should follow the event but that full indemnity costs were not appropriate.

The court awarded partial costs of $4,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements to the moving party.

The father brought a motion seeking an order that the parties’ child attend a homogeneous French-language Catholic elementary school, while the mother sought enrollment in an English-language public school with a French immersion program.

The court applied the best interests test under s. 24(2) of the Children’s Law Reform Act.

Although the child was bilingual and the father emphasized cultural and linguistic benefits of French-language schooling, the court placed significant weight on the mother’s inability to communicate in French, assist with homework, or participate meaningfully in school activities.

The court also considered transportation difficulties and the lack of religious practice in either household despite the proposed Catholic school.

The court concluded that enrollment in a public school French immersion program better served the child’s best interests.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a final order granting the respondent mother sole custody and child support.

The final order was made in the appellant's absence immediately after his solicitor was removed from the record.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant was unaware of his solicitor's motion to be removed and the respondent's motion proceeded without personal service.

The Court held that the resulting procedural unfairness tainted the proceedings, warranting the setting aside of the default orders.