Robie S. Loomer

The applicant moved for an interim order for the partition and sale of a jointly owned home under the Partition Act.

The parties had separated following an incident of family violence by the applicant against the respondent's child, resulting in the applicant's removal from the home.

The respondent opposed the sale, arguing it would prejudice her resulting trust claim to be determined at trial and would negatively impact the children.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that an interim sale would prejudice the respondent's trust claim and cause undue hardship to the children, who would be forced to move from their community.

The respondent mother brought a motion to strike the appellant father's appeal of a garnishment dismissal order.

The father had a lengthy history of vexatious litigation, deliberately avoiding child support obligations, and failing to pay numerous prior costs awards totaling over $25,000.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to strike the appeal, awarded costs to the respondent, and ordered that the father may not bring any further claims or motions without leave of the court and until all outstanding support arrears and costs are paid in full.

Following a family law motion addressing parenting issues, school enrollment, and child support, the court determined costs arising from the motion.

The moving party had limited success, obtaining a slight reduction in child support and resolving summer access, but was unsuccessful on the central issue concerning enrollment of the child in junior kindergarten without both parents’ consent.

The responding party had been required to prepare materials for several issues that did not proceed due to the matter being better addressed at trial after a settlement conference.

Considering the divided success and the preparation required, the court awarded the responding party partial costs.

Costs were fixed at $3,500 inclusive, payable in monthly installments.

The applicant brought a family law motion addressing several interim parenting and support issues, including summer parenting time, child support recalculation following a change in employment income, and whether the child should be enrolled in junior kindergarten.

The court accepted that the applicant’s shift to a lower-paying full-time position was not voluntary underemployment but imputed modest additional income for potential summer employment and adjusted child support accordingly.

The court declined to order the child’s enrolment in junior kindergarten given disputed facts and the absence of a custody or decision-making order.

On the respondent’s request, the court directed the Office of the Children’s Lawyer to conduct an updated clinical investigation using a different investigator in preparation for trial.

Summer parenting time was resolved by consent.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his claim to rescind $75,000 in child support arrears enforced by the Family Responsibility Office.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the claim exceeded the $50,000 statutory limit under the Courts of Justice Act.

The court declined to transfer the appeal to the Court of Appeal, noting the appellant's failure to move expeditiously, his history of using proceedings to delay payment, and the lack of legal merit in the appeal.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded to the respondent.

Following a successful motion for child support and special expenses in a family law proceeding, the mother sought substantial indemnity costs on the basis that the father had refused to pay support after the child returned to reside with her and the maternal grandparents.

The father argued that costs should be reserved to the trial judge.

The court rejected that submission, holding that costs should generally be fixed after each step under the Family Law Rules.

While the father’s refusal to pay support justified an award of costs, his position was not sufficiently unreasonable to warrant substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity basis.

A mother brought a motion seeking temporary sole custody, a restraining order, disclosure, and mental health assessment relating to the father’s mental health issues, including suicidal ideation and paranoid delusions.

The father sought joint custody and access.

The court found further information about the father’s treatment was required but declined to compel full medical record disclosure or a formal custody-access assessment at that stage.

The court granted the mother temporary custody and ordered that the father’s access be supervised until his mental health treatment stabilized and further information was provided.

A restraining order was issued restricting the father’s contact with the mother except regarding access.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking unsupervised access to his infant son, while the respondent mother argued that supervised access should continue due to allegations of abuse, concerns about the child’s distress during visits, and fears of international abduction.

The court reviewed evidence from supervised access program notes and found the father cooperative, capable, and receptive to guidance in caring for the child.

The court found no objective evidence supporting allegations that the father posed a risk of harm or that he intended to abduct the child.

The respondent’s concerns were not supported by admissible evidence, and her conduct had contributed to the termination of supervised access services.

The court concluded that continued supervised access was not in the child’s best interests and ordered a structured transition to unsupervised access, with incremental increases in parenting time.

The father brought a motion seeking an order compelling the Attorney General to provide state-funded counsel for a child custody trial arising in the context of child protection proceedings.

Applying the test from New Brunswick (Minister of Health and Community Services) v. G. (J.), the court considered whether a refusal of counsel would infringe the applicant’s section 7 Charter rights, whether counsel was necessary for a fair hearing, whether legal aid had been refused after exhaustion of appeals, and whether the applicant lacked the financial means to retain counsel.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate complexity requiring counsel, had previously lost his legal aid certificate due to nondisclosure of assets, and had not provided credible evidence of financial hardship.

The court further found the applicant capable of representing himself and not an indigent litigant.

The request for state-funded counsel was dismissed.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, the child protection authority sought an interim supervision order placing the child with the mother subject to conditions and supervised access for the father.

The father brought a cross-motion seeking interim custody.

The court reviewed prior findings of significant parental conflict, allegations of violence, and a Family Court Clinic Assessment identifying personality difficulties and concerns about the father’s inability to shield the child from parental conflict.

Although concerns remained about both parents, the evidence indicated the child was presently doing well in the mother’s care and that a transfer of custody to the father posed a risk of emotional harm.

The court granted an interim supervision order placing the child with the mother under supervision and dismissed the father’s request for custody.

Following a two-day trial concerning child support in a shared parenting arrangement, the respondent sought full recovery costs of over $32,000.

The trial result imputed modest additional income to the respondent and resulted in minimal net support adjustments.

The court found the respondent was the successful party and that the applicant had advanced serious allegations without supporting evidence and had engaged in litigation misconduct by strategically listing public officials as witnesses to pressure settlement.

However, the respondent had also failed to fully comply with disclosure obligations and attempted to tender previously undisclosed documents at trial.

Treating the parties’ litigation conduct as offsetting factors, the court awarded partial recovery costs to the successful party.

In a family law motion to change child support, the applicant sought leave on the eve of trial to amend pleadings, conduct questioning of the respondent before trial, and obtain additional disclosure.

The proceeding had already been set down for trial following a settlement conference.

Applying Rule 48.04 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted through the Family Court Rules, the court held that motions or discovery after a matter is placed on the trial list require leave and will only be granted in exceptional circumstances.

The court found no substantial or unexpected change in circumstances justifying procedural discovery and concluded that the proposed amendment would significantly expand the issues and delay the trial.

Leave was refused and the motion dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion to vary a consent order for child and spousal support.

The motions judge had found no material change in circumstances, noting the appellant was deliberately underemployed and maintained a comfortable lifestyle financed by credit, despite claiming no income.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the motions judge's findings of fact or application of the law.

The appellant mother sought to increase the respondent father's child support obligation by imputing income to him under s. 19(1) of the Child Support Guidelines based on his lifestyle and financial support received from his father.

The respondent suffered from severe personality disorders and was unemployable, relying entirely on his father for housing, career training, and a monthly allowance.

The trial judge dismissed the application and vacated an existing consent order for support.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in refusing to impute the father's gifts as income, as they were intended to provide basic support and encourage self-sufficiency for a disabled adult child.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his motion to set aside a final order granting the respondent mother sole custody and child support.

The final order was made in the appellant's absence immediately after his solicitor was removed from the record.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the appellant was unaware of his solicitor's motion to be removed and the respondent's motion proceeded without personal service.

The Court held that the resulting procedural unfairness tainted the proceedings, warranting the setting aside of the default orders.