Chaudhary v. Singh, 2026 ONSC 4914

CITATION: Chaudhary v. Singh, 2026 ONSC 4914

COURT FILE NO.: FC 23-241

DATE: 2026/08/26

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Ruchika Chaudhary, the Applicant

AND:

Manjit Singh, the Respondent

BEFORE: Justice Lia Bramwell

COUNSEL: Applicant is Self-Represented

Annemarie Roodal, Counsel for the Respondent

HEARD: December 11, 2025

February 5, 10and 25, 2026

ruling on motion to change

INTRODUCTION

Family history and structure

[1] Ms. Chaudhary and Mr. Singh were married, pursuant to an arrangement made between their families, in India on June 14, 2009. At that time, Mr. Singh was a permanent resident living in Canada and Ms. Chaudhary lived in India. The parties lived together briefly in India until Mr. Singh returned to Canada on August 6, 2009, and the parties have lived apart since.

[2] Mr. Singh was in the process of sponsoring Ms. Chaudhary to come to Canada in late 2009 when the parties had a disagreement. Mr. Singh withdrew his sponsorship application.

[3] Mr. Singh and Ms. Chaudhary share one child, Dhariya, who was born in India on February 24, 2010. He is now 16 years old.

[4] Ms. Chaudhary has never been to Canada. Neither has Dhariya.

Legal Proceedings in India

[5] In 2012, Ms. Chaudhary started a legal proceeding against Mr. Singh in India. The precise nature of the relief sought and granted is unclear based on the conflicting evidence provided by the parties on this Motion to Change. Mr. Singh characterizes it as an application for spousal support and the return of jewellery. Ms. Chaudhary says it was a complaint of domestic violence. Mr. Singh did not participate in the proceedings in India. Mr. Singh asserts that he did not have proper notice of the proceedings. Ms. Chaudhary says that the court in India declared Mr. Singh to be an offender.

[6] In 2015, the court in India dealt with the proceeding started by Ms. Chaudhary by issuing an Order that Mr. Singh pay “maintenance” (“Maintenance Order”). In the decision granting the Maintenance Order to Ms. Chaudhary, the judge in India wrote “as regards the quantum of compensation, the minor son of complainant is residing with her and she has to take care of the present as well as future interest not only of herself but also of the growing child.”[1]

Legal Proceedings in Canada

[7] In February 2016, Mr. Singh obtained a Divorce Order from the Ontario Superior Court in Brampton. Ms. Chaudhary did not file, with the Court, a response to the Divorce Application. Mr. Singh asserts she was properly served. Ms. Chaudhary says she sent her response, in which she opposed the divorce, to Mr. Singh’s then lawyer (who is not counsel on this Motion to Change) and believed that his lawyer would file it with the Court on her behalf.

[8] Approximately five weeks after the divorce took effect, in April 2016, Ms. Chaudhary commenced an Application in the Ontario Superior Court of Justice in Brampton seeking, among other forms of relief, parenting orders, child support, spousal support and equalization of net family property. Ms. Chaudhary says that she did not learn that the divorce had been granted until she was advised of it by the lawyer she retained after sending her response to the divorce to Mr. Singh’s lawyer.

[9] In August 2017, a judge in Brampton ruled that the Ontario Superior Court of Justice had jurisdiction over Ms. Chaudhary’s claims even though neither she nor Dhariya had ever been to Canada.

[10] Ms. Chaudhary’s Application proceeded through the family court process in Brampton and, at a Settlement Conference on March 21, 2018, before Justice Snowie, the parties signed Minutes of Settlement resolving all issues, on a final basis. Justice Snowie noted in her endorsement that Ms. Chaudhary was represented by counsel who spoke to her (Ms. Chaudhary was in India) and obtained her instructions to sign the Minutes of Settlement on her behalf. Justice Snowie’s Order dated March 21, 2018 (“Justice Snowie’s Order”), reflects the agreement reached by the parties in the Minutes of Settlement.

[11] Justice Snowie’s Order requires Mr. Singh to pay child support for Dhariya and to contribute to s. 7 expenses, pay child support and s. 7 arrears, and to make an equalization payment to Ms. Chaudhary.

Further Legal Proceedings in India

[12] On January 7, 2020, Ms. Chaudhary obtained a “Warrant of Realization” in India. This seems to have been an application to have enforcement steps taken against Mr. Singh so that she could get the money he was ordered to pay in January 2015, pursuant to the Maintenance Order. The judge who granted the Warrant of Realization noted in his or her Order that Mr. Singh raised with the Court, in opposing the Warrant of Realization, the existence of Justice Snowie’s Order. Mr. Singh argued that Ms. Chaudhary was not entitled to maintenance in India because she had already received child support in Canada, from 2010 until Justice Snowie’s Order, as documented in Justice Snowie’s Order. He also argued that Ms. Chaudhary had hidden, from the Court in India, the fact that he had paid her child support from 2010 through 2018.

[13] The judge who granted the Warrant of Realization on January 7, 2020, rejected Mr. Singh’s arguments. He or she wrote, “it is worth mentioning here that it was for [Mr. Singh] to place on record a certified copy of [Justice Snowie’s Order]. Even otherwise, if the said order is perused, it clearly shows that the payment of $19,984.35 was paid by [Mr. Singh] towards the Child Support System until March 2018 and therefore, such contention of [Mr. Singh] that he has already paid [Ms. Chaudhary] the maintenance of $19,984.35 is not sustainable in the eyes of the law.”

[14] I understand the judge hearing the Warrant of Realization application in India to be saying that Mr. Singh demonstrated that, in Canada, as is reflected in Justice Snowie’s Order, he paid $19,984.35 in child support from 2010 (after the parties separated and he returned to Canada) through to March 2018 when Justice Snowie’s Order was made and that the judge in India drew a distinction between child support paid in Canada and the Maintenance Order made in India in 2015. In other words, I understand the judge in India, who granted the Warrant of Realization, to be saying that he or she found that Mr. Singh’s payment of child support in Canada from 2010 until March 2018 was a different obligation that the payments that were ordered by Justice Kumar in India on January 23, 2015, in the Maintenance Order.

[15] Mr. Singh then brought an application before Justice Chitkara of the High Court, in India, which was heard on August 23, 2021. In that application, Mr. Singh challenged the Warrant of Realization that had been granted on January 7, 2020. He did so through a Power of Attorney. In the application to set aside the Warrant of Realization, Mr. Singh essentially argued that Justice Snowie’s Order represented a settlement between the parties of all outstanding issues.

[16] Justice Chitkara dismissed Mr. Singh’s application. He found that Mr. Singh did not establish that he was permitted to challenge the Warrant of Realization through a Power of Attorney. Beyond that, Justice Chitkara found that Justice Snowie’s Order did not extinguish the “special rights and protection” given to women in India under the Domestic Violence Act, which was the statute that Ms. Chaudhary obtained the Maintenance Order under, back in 2015. Lastly, Justice Chitkara pointed out that Mr. Singh “stayed quiet” and did not challenge the Maintenance Order between 2015, when it was made and January 2020 when he opposed the Warrant of Realization being issued.

[17] Mr. Singh appealed Justice Chitkara’s decision to the Supreme Court of India. Mr. Singh again argued that, pursuant to Justice Snowie’s Order, Ms. Chaudhary had already been paid what was due her. On February 14, 2023, the Supreme Court of India dismissed Mr. Singh’s appeal. The Court found that Justice Snowie did not have accurate information before her at the Settlement Conference about the status of the parties and the citizenship of Ms. Chaudhary. The Court found that the “evidence placed before” the Ontario Superior Court of Justice on these matters was “clearly faulty.” The Court found this based on a finding that Ms. Chaudhary never came to Canada, did not have Canadian citizenship and had no right to reside here. The Supreme Court opined that Justice Snowie’s Order was “a product of collusion between practitioner and respondent’s lawyers in Canada.” The Court found that Ms. Chaudhary was “not bound by the outcome of the Settlement Conference.” I understand this to mean that the Supreme Court of India held that Ms. Chaudhary is entitled to recover on the Maintenance Order, regardless of the terms of Justice Snowie’s Order.

This Motion to Change

[18] Mr. Singh brings this Motion to Change Justice Snowie’s Order. He is seeking to have child support adjusted based on what he asserts is a legitimate decrease in his income that is not his fault. He seeks a retroactive reduction in child support payments.

[19] Mr. Singh also asks that Ms. Chaudhary be ordered to repay to him the equalization payment that he asserts he paid to her pursuant to Justice Snowie’s Order. He asserts that she failed to comply with the release of spousal support provision that was also a term of the Order and that she should therefore forfeit the equalization payment. He points to the protracted litigation in India in submitting that she failed to comply with the release of spousal support provision.

ISSUES

Issue #1 Should there be a retroactive adjustment of child support payable by Mr. Singh pursuant to Justice Snowie’s Order?

Mr. Singh’s Position

[20] Mr. Singh’s position is that, while he consented to his income for child support purposes being set at $110,000 in Justice Snowie’s Order in 2018, he did so very early in the year and, it turns out, he was overly optimistic about what he would earn that year. At that time, he had started up a small trucking transportation business which had started to become profitable in 2017. However, due to problems with the business in 2018, Mr. Singh says that he only ended up earning about half of what he hoped to earn. Mr. Singh says that his income was $52,200 in 2018.

[21] Mr. Singh says that he continued to pay child support pursuant to Justice Snowie’s Order by borrowing money on his line of credit and credit cards and by defaulting on his taxes, which remain unpaid.

[22] Mr. Singh says his struggling business was completely wiped out by the COVID-19 pandemic which began in 2020. He received a Canada Emergency Business Account loan from the federal government, during the pandemic. He says he owes about $65,000 on that now. He says he went from owning 5 trucks to only having one and that it broke down so he could no longer run the business.

[23] Mr. Singh says that his income was $51,750 in 2019 and 2020, $51,900 in 2021, $48,300 in 2022 and $26,450 in 2023.

[24] Mr. Singh says that he got a job working with another trucking company in 2024 but that that company shut down before his employment started.

[25] Mr. Singh says he is unemployed and earned an income of $18,000 in 2024 and 2025 through rental properties that he owns. He stays at home and cares for a 7-year-old daughter from a subsequent relationship.

[26] Mr. Singh asks me to find that he should only have to pay child support of $106 per month now, based on his income of $18,000. He also asks me to find that, based on his reported income from the years 2018-2024, his child support for those years should be recalculated at the lower incomes that he earned, instead of at $110,000. Mr. Singh asks me to find that, because of the recalculation, he has overpaid $29,047.36.

[27] Mr. Singh also asks me to adjust his proportionate share of s. 7 expenses based on what he asserts is his present income of $18,000.

Ms. Chaudhary’s Position

[28] Ms. Chaudhary’s position is that Mr. Singh is trying to hide his true income from the Court to avoid paying child support. Ms. Chaudhary says that Mr. Singh is not being truthful when he says that his business declined. She argues that someone with his level of experience as a truck driver should be able to earn in the range of $110,000 as was attributed to him in 2018. She states that Mr. Singh has not provided sufficient evidence as to why his business failed and as to what happened to the proceeds from his business, for example, the proceeds from the sale of the trucks that the business owned. Further, she argues that he has not submitted any evidence of his efforts to find work, either as a truck driver or in some other field, to meet his obligations to support his child.

[29] Ms. Chaudhary also points out that, pursuant to Justice Snowie’s Order, the parties were to provide financial disclosure to each other each year but that Mr. Singh did not. Had his income from his supposedly failing business truly been dropping as dramatically as he says it was, Ms. Chaudhary argues, one would expect him to have shared financial disclosure that supported the dramatic decline in income, right away.

[30] Ms. Chaudhary submits that Mr. Singh only brought this Motion to Change, at this point, many years after he says that his income dropped, because he was not successful in getting the Maintenance Order, made in India in her favour, set aside by the Supreme Court of India. Ms. Chaudhary says Mr. Singh is running his business in the names of his relatives and friends, to avoid the payment of child support.

Legal Principles that Apply

[31] The payor’s motion to change support is governed by s. 37(2.1) of the Family Law Act which reads as follows:

Powers of court: child support

(2.1) In the case of an order for support of a child, if the court is satisfied that there has been a change in circumstances within the meaning of the child support guidelines or that evidence not available on the previous hearing has become available, the court may,

(a) discharge, vary or suspend a term of the order, prospectively or retroactively;

(b) relieve the respondent from the payment of part or all of the arrears or any interest due on them; and

(c) make any other order for the support of a child that the court could make on an application under section 33.

[32] The Supreme Court of Canada set out the framework for deciding retroactive applications to decrease support in Colucci v. Colucci, 2021 SCC 24 (“Coluci”) at para. 113 as follows:

(1) The payor must meet the threshold of establishing a past material change in circumstances. The onus is on the payor to show a material decrease in income that has some degree of continuity, and that is real and not one of choice.

(2) Once a material change in circumstances is established, a presumption arises in favour of retroactively decreasing child support to the date the payor gave the recipient effective notice, up to three years before formal notice of the application to vary. In the decrease context, effective notice requires clear communication of the change in circumstances accompanied by the disclosure of any available documentation necessary to substantiate the change and allow the recipient parent to meaningfully assess the situation.

(3) Where no effective notice is given by the payor parent, child support should generally be varied back to the date of formal notice, or a later date where the payor has delayed making complete disclosure in the course of the proceedings.

(4) The court retains discretion to depart from the presumptive date of retroactivity where the result would otherwise be unfair. The D.B.S. factors (adapted to the decrease context) guide this exercise of discretion. Those factors are:

(i) whether the payor had an understandable reason for the delay in seeking a decrease;

(ii) the payor’s conduct;

(iii) the child’s circumstances; and

(iv) hardship to the payor if support is not decreased (viewed in context of hardship to the child and recipient if support is decreased). The payor’s efforts to pay what they can and to communicate and disclose income information on an ongoing basis will often be a key consideration under the factor of payor conduct.

(5) Finally, once the court has determined that support should be retroactively decreased to a particular date, the decrease must be quantified. The proper amount of support for each year since the date of retroactivity must be calculated in accordance with the Guidelines.

Threshold Issue of Change of Circumstances

[33] In Colucci, the Supreme Court of Canada, offered the following guidance for determining the threshold issue of whether the payor has established that there has been a change of circumstances:

a) Section 14 of the Guidelines lists situations constituting a change in circumstances, including the coming into force of the Guidelines. A change in circumstances could also include a change that, if known at the time, would probably have resulted in different terms, such as a drop in income (para. 59).

b) The onus is on the party seeking a retroactive decrease to show a change in circumstances. In some cases that may be relatively straightforward: for example, establishing that the children are no longer legally entitled to support because they are no longer children of the marriage (para. 60).

c) Most commonly, the retroactive variation claim will be based on a material change in income. To meet the threshold, a decrease in income must be significant and have some degree of continuity, and it must be real and not one of choice. Trivial or short-lived changes are insufficient to justify a variation (para. 61).

d) The payor must have disclosed sufficient reliable evidence for the court to determine when and how far their income fell, and to ascertain whether the change was significant, long lasting, and not one of choice. A decision to retroactively decrease support can only be made based on “reliable, accurate and complete information”. The payor cannot ask the court to make findings on income that are contrary to the recipient’s interests “while at the same time shielding information that is relevant to the determination of their income behind a protective wall” (para. 62).

e) A payor whose income was originally imputed because of an initial lack of disclosure cannot later claim that a change in circumstances occurs when he or she subsequently produces proper documentation showing the imputation was higher than the table amount for their actual income. The payor cannot rely on their own late disclosure as a change in circumstances to ground a variation order. This would “defeat the purpose of imputing income in the first place” and act as “a disincentive for payors to participate in the initial court process” (para. 63).

[34] In summary, to obtain a retroactive adjustment to the child support he is required to pay under Justice Snowie’s Order due to what he alleges is a dramatic decrease in his income since the Order was made in 2018, Mr. Singh has to first satisfy me, based on evidence, on a balance of probabilities (that it is more likely than not), that his financial circumstances have changed significantly, consistently over time and through no choice of his own. To determine whether Mr. Singh’s financial circumstances have changed, I must have reliable, accurate and complete information before me. I must be able to determine when his income fell, how far it fell, whether it was a significant change and whether the change was because of a choice or choices that Mr. Singh made.

FINDINGS

[35] I find that Mr. Singh has not satisfied me that his financial circumstances have changed significantly and consistently, and through no choice of his own. I do not find that I have a clear picture, from the evidence that Mr. Singh tendered, about what his income is now or what it has been since 2018. Mr. Singh has failed to put reliable, accurate and complete information before me about his income.

[36] The evidence that Mr. Singh put before me on this Motion to Change about his income is incomplete, inconsistent, and unclear. It consists of the following:

1. An assertion in his Affidavit, sworn December 3, 2025 (“the December Affidavit), at paras. 3 and 7, that his income declined around May 12, 2023, which was when he began falling into arrears in child support payments.

This assertion is inconsistent with other evidence contained in the December Affidavit which suggests that Mr. Singh’s income declined, starting in 2018, not 2023. Further, this evidence makes it clear that, Mr. Singh was able to come up with funds to satisfy his child support obligations until May 2023.

2. An assertion in the December Affidavit, at para. 37 that although he hoped to earn around $110,000 in 2018, he ended up only earning $52,200 that year because he lost an important contract for his transport trucking business because he could not find qualified truck drivers.

This was a bald assertion made without any supporting financial documentation. There were no records from the business and no records of Mr. Singh’s income provided. All that was provided in support of this assertion was an exchange of emails between Mr. Singh and a person who is the manager of the company he lost the subcontract with and Mr. Singh and someone else. The meaning of these emails is not clear.

There was no evidence provided of attempts to secure other contracts. There was no evidence provided of Mr. Singh’s efforts to secure work in the same field, or in another field, to address the purported loss of half of his income.

3. An assertion in the December Affidavit, at para. 38, that Mr. Singh continued to pay child support by borrowing money on his line of credit and credit cards and by failing to pay personal and business taxes.

4. An assertion in the December Affidavit, at para. 39 that his business did not improve in 2019 because he could not get new contracts.

Again, there was no evidence provided of Mr. Singh’s efforts to secure other contracts or of what revenue the business generated, what expenses it had, or what it paid to Mr. Singh. Further, and again, there was no evidence provided of Mr. Singh making any efforts to secure employment with another company as a transport truck operator or in any other field.

5. An assertion in the December Affidavit, at para. 40, that Mr. Singh lost his trucking business completely in 2020 due to the pandemic. He described having to sell four of his trucks. He says he could not find drivers for his business and he had to take a Canada Emergency Business Account loan from the federal government.

No supporting documentation was provided other than a letter from the Canada Revenue Agency to a numbered company dated November 20, 2025, saying that a Canada Emergency Business Account load in the amount of $65,554.09 had come due. No evidence was provided of Mr. Singh’s efforts to find drivers. No evidence was provided as to where the funds went from the sale of the four trucks.

6. An assertion in the December Affidavit, at para. 43, that “around mid 2024” Mr. Singh obtained employment with a transport company but that the company filed for bankruptcy and shut down before he started working for them.

No evidence was provided about how Mr. Singh supported himself or what income he earned between 2020 and 2024 other than his statement as to what he earned and the attachment of his Notices of Assessment. In 2021, he is listed as earning $51,900. In 2022, he is listed as earning $48,300. In 2023, he is listed as earning $26,450. No evidence was provided as to where these funds came from. No evidence was provided of Mr. Singh’s efforts to find employment other than this one job that did not come to fruition.

7. An assertion in the December Affidavit, at para. 42, that Mr. Singh is currently unemployed and contributes to the support of himself and his family, which consists of his partner and 7-year-old child, on $18,000 that he earns from rental income. He stated that he takes care of his 7-year-old child.

No evidence was provided as to why Mr. Singh cannot work as a truck driver or in another field, especially given that his child, at age 7, would be in school full-time.

8. An assertion in his Affidavit, sworn January 29, 2026, at para.15, that he has “since” applied to three other jobs, as a caller for London Painters, cold caller for Wholesale Houses and a texting supervisor for Kids Help Phone but that he has not heard further since applying for those jobs.

It is not clear what “since” means in this context. No evidence was provided about when Mr. Singh applied for these jobs. For example, it is unclear if Mr. Singh is providing evidence of having applied for only three jobs since 2020. However, that inference is certainly available on the evidence provided. No supporting documentation relating to these applications was provided.

9. An assertion in his Financial Statement, sworn December 5, 2025, that he has been “unemployed since April 2023.”

[37] I am not satisfied, based on the evidence before me, as to why Mr. Singh’s income was cut in half, then cut in half again and then cut further down to only $18,000. While I understand the impact of COVID on his business, the worst part of COVID, with the most negative impact on businesses, was six years ago. I note, for example, that the corporate tax returns show that while the net income of the business was around $20,000 in 2021, it rose to approximately $53,000 in 2022.[2]

[38] There is no detailed and reliable evidence before me that Mr. Singh has made significant and prolonged efforts to return to the work force to earn in the range of $100,000, which he was clearly capable of earning at the time of Justice Snowie’s Order. I find that Mr. Singh appears to have made a choice to stay home with his 7-year-old child instead of making sustained efforts to seek and maintain employment that pays what he is capable of earning.

Conclusion

[39] Mr. Singh has not met the threshold test of demonstrating, on reliable, complete and accurate evidence, that his income has changed. He has offered nothing more than his own assertion that it has. Accordingly, his request to adjust child support payments, including retroactively, is dismissed.

Issue #2 Should the equalization payment Mr. Singh made to Ms. Chaudhary pursuant to Justice Snowie’s Order be set aside and Ms. Chaudhary required to pay it back?

Mr. Singh’s Position

[40] Mr. Singh argues that Ms. Chaudhary should have to pay back the $54,000 equalization payment that he paid her, pursuant to Justice Snowie’s Order, because she failed to abide by the release of spousal support provision that was also part of Justice Snowie’s Order. Mr. Singh points to Ms. Chaudhary’s pursuit of litigation in India as evidence of her failure to abide by the spousal support release.

[41] Mr. Singh relies on Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules and argues that the Court has a broad discretion to address non-compliance with court orders and that the list of remedies set out in Rule 1(8) is non-exhaustive.

[42] Mr. Singh asks me to exercise my broad discretion under Rule 1(8) to order Ms. Chaudhary to pay back the $54,000 payment ordered by Justice Snowie because she has, essentially, not kept up her end of the bargain, by failing to abide by the release of spousal support in Justice Snowie’s Order.

Ms. Chaudhary’s Position

[43] Ms. Chaudhary states that she did not receive the $54,000 equalization payment that she was supposed to, pursuant to Justice Snowie’s Order. She says that she also only received $62,000 of the $67,000 that was ordered to be paid to her for arrears of child support. Ms. Chaudhary points out that she cannot pay back funds that she never received.

[44] Further, Ms. Chaudhary submits that she did not breach Justice Snowie’s Order. She points out that the legal proceeding in India started in 2012 and the Maintenance Order was made by the Court in India in 2015. In other words, the Maintenance Order from India predated the legal proceedings in Canada. Further, Ms. Chaudhary argues that the Maintenance Order was made pursuant to Indian domestic violence legislation and is because of the way that Mr. Singh and his family treated her. She argues that it is not spousal support and that she has not sought spousal support in India. She points out that the steps she has taken in India in 2020 and following were only to enforce the Maintenance Order that was made in 2015.

Legal Principles that Apply

[45] Rule 1(8) of the Family Law Rules provides:

If a person fails to obey an order in a case or a related case, the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter, including,

(a) an order for costs;

(a.1) an order to pay an amount to a party or into court as a penalty or fine;

(b) an order dismissing a claim;

(c) an order striking out any application, answer, notice of motion, motion to change, response to motion to change, financial statement, affidavit, or any other document filed by a party;

(d) an order that all or part of a document that was required to be provided but was not, may not be used in the case;

(e) if the failure to obey was by a party, an order that the party is not entitled to any further order from the court unless the court orders otherwise;

(f) an order postponing the trial or any other step in the case; and

(g) a contempt order, if sought under rule 31.

Rule 1(8.1) provides:

Failure to follow rules

(8.1) If a person fails to follow these rules, the court may deal with the failure by making any order described in subrule (8), other than a contempt order under clause (8) (g).

[46] The Court follows a three-part test when a motion is brought pursuant to Rule 1(8). That test is as follows:

1. Determine whether there is a triggering event.

2. If a triggering event exists, consider whether the court should exercise its discretion, by sanctioning that party.

3. If the court determines it will not exercise its discretion in favour of a noncompliant party, it is then left with a very broad discretion as to the appropriate remedy pursuant to the provisions of either sub rule 1(8) or sub rule 14(23).[3]

[47] If the judge is satisfied that there has been a failure to obey an order, subrule 1(8) is triggered and the relief provided for in that Rule can be ordered. Although Rule 1(8) provides an itemized list of forms of relief that are available, that list is inclusive, not exclusive. Further, the reach of the remedial orders that can be made is governed not by the itemized list in that rule, but by the general and broad language of the heading that precedes it, which provides that “the court may deal with the failure by making any order that it considers necessary for a just determination of the matter”.[4]

Findings

[48] In this case, I am not satisfied that there has been a triggering event. In other words, I am not satisfied that Ms. Chaudhary has breached the terms of Justice Snowie’s Order.

[49] I find this for the following three reasons:

1. Justice Snowie’s Order references the parties releasing their right to spousal support from each other forever. It does not say that Ms. Chaudhary releases her right to pursue enforcement of the 2015 Maintenance Order in India. The existence of that Order was known to the parties when they consented to Justice Snowie’s Order in 2018. If Mr. Singh wanted Ms. Chaudhary to release her right to enforce the Maintenance Order, that should have been negotiated in 2018 and made part of the Minutes of Settlement that led to Justice Snowie’s Order;

2. There is nothing in Justice Snowie’s Order that ties the $54,000 payment by Mr. Singh to Ms. Chaudhary to the release of spousal support. Instead, the $54,000 is clearly referenced as payment “in full satisfaction of [Ms. Chaudhary’s] claim of equalization of the family property. In other words, the $54,000 was clearly an equalization payment, not a lump sum spousal support payment; and

3. I am not satisfied that the steps Ms. Chaudhary has taken in India to enforce the 2015 Maintenance Order are an effort by Ms. Chaudhary to get spousal support, as Mr. Singh asserts. As stated earlier, the judge who granted the Maintenance Order referenced, in determining the amount of compensation that should be granted, Ms. Chaudhary’s need to provide for herself as well as her child. This suggests to me that the Maintenance Order is meant to provide compensation to both Ms. Chaudhary and Dhariya. Further, the judge’s use of the term “compensation” supports Ms. Chaudhary’s argument that this was an award made to her pursuant to Indian domestic violence legislation because of her mistreatment at the hands of Mr. Singh and his family. Further, Ms. Chaudhary asserted in her evidence that the Maintenance Order is not, in fact, spousal support.

[50] Given that this is Mr. Singh’s Motion to Change, the onus is on him to establish that the Maintenance Order, in fact, represents spousal support that Ms. Chaudhary is pursuing, in breach of Justice Snowie’s Order. He has not done so. It is not open to me to inject a term into Justice Snowie’s Order reflecting an agreement or understanding between the parties that Ms. Chaudhary would not pursue enforcement of the Maintenance Order in India when Justice Snowie’s Order, which was made with the consent of the parties, is silent on that point.

[51] Given that I find that Mr. Singh has not demonstrated that Ms. Chaudhary breached Justice Snowie’s Order, it is not open to me to consider what remedies should be granted to Mr. Singh, including repayment of $54,000.

[52] Mr. Singh’s counsel asks me to find that the $54,000 has, in fact, been received by Ms. Chaudhary, contrary to Ms. Chaudhary’s claims that it has not. I cannot make this finding on the evidence before me.

[53] Mr. Singh provided evidence of a Direction/Authorization from Ms. Chaudhary to his lawyer dated July 25, 2018. In it, Ms. Chaudhary directs Ms. Singh’s lawyers to pay $54,000 and $67,000 (total $121,000) to her lawyer in trust for her. This is not proof that those amounts were actually paid. It is simply proof that Ms. Chaudhary authorized her lawyer to be paid, instead of the funds being paid to her directly.

[54] Mr. Singh provided evidence of a letter from his lawyer to FRO dated August 3, 2018 in which his lawyer provides a copy of the Direction/Authorization signed by Ms. Chaudhary as well as Mr. Singh’s signed undertaking that he would pay the funds owed. Again, this is not proof that those amounts were actually paid. It is proof that Mr. Singh had a stated intention to pay.

[55] Mr. Singh provided evidence of a bank draft dated September 27, 2018, made out to Ms. Chaudhary’s lawyer, in trust, in the amount of $121,000. This is not proof that $121,000 was received by Ms. Chaudhary. It is proof that Mr. Singh got a bank draft. It is not proof that it was sent to Ms. Chaudhary’s lawyer. It is not proof that Ms. Chaudhary’s lawyer received it. It is not proof that Ms. Chaudhary’s lawyer dispensed any funds to her, assuming he received them.

[56] Ms. Chaudhary’s evidence is that she received $62,000 from her lawyer, of the $121,000 that was ordered. She has provided copies of her bank statements showing all deposits in the relevant period. While I agree with Mr. Singh’s counsel that Ms. Chaudhary could have other bank accounts into which the money was deposited, that is only one possible explanation for why she says she only received $62,000.

[57] Mr. Singh asks me to find that Ms. Chaudhary has received $121,000 based on several assumptions that I cannot make, including that he actually sent the bank draft to her lawyer, that her lawyer received it, that her lawyer deposited it and that her lawyer provided the funds to her. I cannot make those assumptions without evidence.

[58] I cannot resolve this factual dispute.

CONCLUSION

[59] Mr. Singh has not met the threshold test of establishing that Ms. Chaudhary has done or failed to do something that amounts to a breach of Justice Snowie’s Order. Accordingly, he is not entitled to a remedy.

Overall Conclusions

[60] Having failed to meet the threshold tests of establishing a material change in circumstances with respect to his income and action or inaction on Ms. Chaudhary’s part that amounts to a breach of Justice Snowie’s Order, I find that Mr. Singh is not entitled to a variation of his child support obligations or to a return of the equalization payment of $54,000, assuming it was paid. I cannot determine whether it was paid or not.

[61] Mr. Singh’s Motion to Change is dismissed.

COSTS

[62] Ms. Chaudhary is the successful party on this Motion to Change. She is self-represented and has been granted permission to attend all court appearances, including the multiple hearing dates required for this Motion to Change, some due to technical problems on her end, on Zoom. I will not be ordering any costs payable to Ms. Chaudhary. Mr. Singh will be responsible for his own costs.

The Honourable Justice Bramwell

Date: August 26, 2026

1Decision of Justice Gaura Kumar, dated January 23, 2015, para. 9, Affidavit of Ruchika Chaudhary, sworn January 15, 2026, attached as exhibit, but not numbered.

2The corporate tax returns were not filed as evidence on the Motion to Change. However, Mr. Singh’s counsel referenced them in her reply submissions.

3Ferguson v. Charlton, 2008 ONCJ 1, 2008 CarswellOnt 667 (Ont. C.J.)

4Bouchard v. Scovio, 2021 ONCA 709, 2021, ONCA709