Allison Lendor

The respondent mother brought a motion seeking findings of contempt against the applicant father for alleged breaches of a final parenting order, including issues related to daycare drop-offs, summer camps, and extracurricular activities.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the alleged transgressions did not meet the strict threshold for civil contempt and that some had reasonable explanations or were minor.

The court noted that contempt should be a remedy of last resort and encouraged the parties to use mediation or a motion to change to resolve their disputes.

The respondent father brought a motion to have the applicant removed as trustee of his deceased partner's life insurance policy, which was intended for the benefit of their children.

The applicant and her former counsel, who had been previously removed from the record for a conflict of interest, engaged in obstructive behavior and ongoing litigation against the respondent.

The court found that the applicant had lost focus on the best interests of the beneficiaries and ordered her removed as trustee under the Trustee Act.

The court directed the insurance proceeds to be paid into court and administered by the Public Guardian and Trustee, and issued a non-communication order against the applicant's former counsel.

The applicant father sought costs of $11,550 following a motion brought by the respondent mother regarding parenting, child support, and disclosure.

The father argued he was the successful party on the primary issue of parenting time.

The court found divided success, as the mother succeeded on issues of decision-making, child support, and disclosure.

Due to the father's unreasonable conduct in failing to provide disclosure and the divided success, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The respondent brought a motion to remove the applicant's counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The respondent alleged that the applicant's counsel had previously provided him with legal advice on issues currently before the court, and was now using that information against him.

The court found that the counsel was in a clear conflict of interest and ordered his removal as solicitor of record.

Costs of $1,500 plus HST were awarded to the respondent.

The respondent mother brought a motion for an interim order granting her sole decision-making responsibility and sole discretion over the applicant father's parenting time, citing his ongoing alcohol addiction.

The father opposed the motion, seeking to reinstate supervised parenting time after the mother withheld access for ten months.

The court dismissed the mother's request for sole discretion, finding no material change in circumstances, and ordered supervised in-person and virtual parenting time for the father, along with reunification therapy.

The court maintained joint decision-making, granted a time-limited police enforcement clause, and ordered the father to pay child support arrears based on his actual income.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary an interim parenting order to lift the supervision requirement, increase his parenting time, and obtain joint decision-making authority.

The court found that the father had failed to comply with previous court orders, including refusing to cooperate with the Office of the Children's Lawyer and failing to disclose mental health records.

Applying the test under the Children's Law Reform Act, the court held there was no compelling reason to vary the status quo before trial, as the child was doing well under the current regime.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant father brought a motion for the interim sale of two jointly owned properties under s. 2 of the Partition Act.

The respondent mother consented to the sale of the rental property but opposed the sale of the family home, seeking exclusive possession.

The court found that the mother's right to claim exclusive possession under the Family Law Act was extinguished upon the parties' divorce.

However, the court denied the father's request to sell the family home, finding that he failed to plead the Partition Act in his original application.

Furthermore, the court exercised its discretion to refuse the interim sale under the Partition Act, citing the hardship it would cause the mother and children, the mother's offer to purchase the father's interest, and the need to resolve equalization issues at trial.

The applicant father brought a motion for a temporary order to increase his parenting time to a shared week-about schedule and reduce child support.

The respondent mother brought a cross-motion for increased child support and temporary spousal support.

The court declined to change the existing temporary parenting order, finding no evidence that the current arrangement was harmful to the child's best interests.

The court ordered the father to pay table child support of $1,338 per month starting August 1, 2021, and temporary spousal support of $1,000 per month starting July 1, 2021, declining to impute income to the mother at this temporary stage.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary child support.

The respondent father had been unemployed since 2017 and owned a vacant, mortgage-free rental property.

The court found the father had not made reasonable efforts to gain employment or utilize his property to generate income promptly upon separation.

The court imputed an income of $58,000 to the father for 2020 and ordered him to pay $13,776 in child support for that year, with ongoing support based on his new $100,000 salary.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion seeking temporary primary care of the parties' two young children, alleging the respondent mother's mental health posed a risk.

The mother, who was the primary caregiver prior to separation, also sought primary care.

The court found no evidence that the children were in danger in the mother's care, noting that neither the police nor the Children's Aid Society had raised protection concerns.

The court ordered that the children reside primarily with the mother, with the father having temporary access on alternate weekends and one mid-week overnight.

The respondent father brought a motion for an order that the parties' four-year-old son be enrolled in in-person kindergarten.

The applicant mother opposed the motion, arguing that the child should continue in daycare due to his asthma and the risk of COVID-19, and brought a cross-motion to enroll the child in counselling without the father's consent.

The court granted the father's motion, finding that the mother failed to provide sufficient medical evidence to establish an unacceptable level of risk to the child from attending school.

The court also dismissed the mother's cross-motion regarding counselling, finding no evidence that her preferred program was better than the home-based program the father agreed to.

The respondent mother brought a motion for a temporary order imposing a parenting regime and determining the child's school.

The parties, who had a history of conflict, could not agree on which Catholic elementary school the child should attend, and the applicant father had unilaterally enrolled the child in his preferred school.

The court found that while neither school was demonstrably superior, a decision had to be made in the best interests of the child to ensure stability.

The court ordered temporary joint custody, primary residence with the mother, and enrollment in the mother's preferred school, while maintaining the status quo parenting schedule.

The applicant child protection agency brought a motion to set aside an order extending the respondent mother's time to perfect her appeal of a Crown wardship order, and to dismiss the appeal for delay.

The court found that the motion judge had properly exercised his inherent jurisdiction and considered the relevant factors, including prejudice and the mother's difficulties with legal aid, when granting the extension.

The agency's motion was dismissed, and the court set peremptory deadlines for the perfection and hearing of the appeal.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion to set aside an order extending time for the respondent mother, I.C., to perfect her appeal of a Crown Wardship order, and to dismiss the appeal for delay.

The court reviewed the factors for extending time to perfect an appeal, including the length and explanation for delay, prejudice to the respondent, and the merits of the appeal, as established in *Paulsson* and *Monteith*.

The court deferred to the discretion of the previous judge who granted the extension, finding no reason to interfere.

The motion by the Children's Aid Society was dismissed, and I.C.'s appeal was not dismissed for delay, with new peremptory timelines set for its perfection and hearing.

The respondent mother sought costs after successfully defending the applicant father's motion for summer access.

The mother's offer to settle was identical to the court's order.

The court applied Rule 18(14.5) of the Family Law Rules, finding the mother enjoyed complete success and her offer was reasonable.

While the father attempted to negotiate, his offer was deemed unreasonable.

The court awarded the mother $9,500 inclusive of HST and disbursements, declining to award costs for a case conference attendance.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for summary judgment seeking Crown wardship for two children, I.G. (13) and Z.C. (20 months), who had been in care beyond statutory timelines.

The respondent mother opposed, arguing for genuine issues requiring a trial.

The court, utilizing enhanced fact-finding powers under Family Law Rule 16(6.1), determined that both children were in need of protection due to the mother's untreated mental health, lack of cooperation with the Society, and inability to prioritize the children's needs.

Crown wardship was granted for both children.

Access for the mother to Z.C. was denied, while supervised access for I.G. was ordered, contingent on his welfare and desire.

The applicant mother travelled to Nigeria with her two children for a holiday but was unable to return to Canada because the youngest child's Canadian passport had expired.

The respondent father, who resides in Nigeria, refused to consent to the passport renewal.

The applicant brought a motion for substituted service, leave to proceed without notice, and an order dispensing with the father's consent for the passport renewal.

The court dismissed the request for substituted service due to lack of evidence but granted leave to proceed without notice.

The court granted the applicant temporary sole custody and permission to travel with the children to Canada without the respondent's consent.