Nathalie G. Fortier

The applicant mother sought an interim order permitting her to relocate the parties' two children to New York pending trial, while the respondent father sought interim sole custody.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that a temporary relocation shortly before trial was not in the children's best interests and that there was no compelling reason to change the existing custody order.

The court ordered that the children's primary residence remain with the respondent pending trial, granted him authority to make educational decisions including whether the children attend school virtually or in person, and ordered virtual access for the applicant.

The applicants, foster parents who had cared for a three-year-old child since birth, sought judicial review of a Child and Family Services Review Board decision that overruled the Children's Aid Society's approval of their adoption application.

The Board had directed the child be placed with the respondents, who had previously adopted two of the child's maternal half-siblings, citing the importance of the child's Métis heritage and biological siblings.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decision unreasonable, noting it applied differential standards to the evidence, ignored the child's strong bond with the foster family, and relied on speculation regarding the child's ability to transition to a new home.

The application for judicial review was allowed, the Board's decision was quashed, and the Society's decision approving the applicants' adoption was restored.

The Respondent father successfully brought a motion to prevent the Applicant mother from moving the children outside St. Catharines.

This endorsement addresses the costs of that motion.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the Respondent father, finding that while the Applicant mother's resistance to deferring the interim move was ill-advised, her conduct did not rise to the level of "egregious or reprehensible" to warrant substantial indemnity costs.

The court fixed costs at $1,500, considering proportionality and reasonableness, and noting that the Respondent father's offer to settle did not meet the strict requirements for full recovery costs under the Family Law Rules.

The Respondent father brought an emergency motion to prevent the Applicant mother from moving their two children (aged six and five) outside of St. Catharines, Ontario.

The mother had filed an application seeking leave to move with the children to Watertown, New York, and intended to make an interim move to Kingston, Ontario.

The court, confirming the urgency previously determined by a Triage Judge, found that while the existing custody order did not explicitly preclude the move, it would significantly impact the father's access.

The court granted the father's emergency motion, issuing a temporary order prohibiting the mother from moving the children's residence outside St. Catharines without the father's prior written consent or further court order, pending the final determination of the mobility application.

The court determined costs following a four-day family law trial concerning parenting schedules and school location for the parties' son.

Victoria (Respondent) was deemed substantially successful on the key trial issues, including the parenting schedule and the location of the child's school, despite some mixed success on specific aspects.

Applying the presumption of costs in favour of the successful party under the Family Law Rules, the court awarded Victoria $35,000 in costs, payable by Keith (Applicant) within 60 days, emphasizing proportionality and reasonableness in fixing the amount.

The parties, Keith Bradley Stouffer and Elizabeth Victoria Stouffer, separated after two and a half years of marriage, with one surviving child, Myles.

The trial addressed key unresolved issues including Myles's parenting schedule, school location, and child support.

The Applicant (father) sought to maintain Myles's current school in St. Catharines and a near-equal parenting schedule.

The Respondent (mother) proposed changing Myles's school to Smithville, near her new residence, and a parenting schedule with more school-day time for her.

The court ruled in favor of the Respondent, permitting Myles to attend school in Smithville from September 2019, finding it to be in the child's best interests.

A new four-week revolving parenting schedule was adopted, which reduced the father's parenting time but was deemed consistent with the maximum contact principle.

Child support was ordered from the father to the mother based on the Federal Child Support Guidelines, with section 7 expenses shared equally, considering the mother's upcoming maternity leave.

This endorsement addresses costs following a successful summary judgment motion in a family law proceeding.

The court applied Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules and the principles of reasonableness and proportionality, as articulated in Beaver v. Hill.

It considered the conduct of both parties, including the applicant's drug relapse, departure from the province, and non-cooperation with disclosure, as well as the respondent's impaired driving conviction which prolonged litigation.

The court awarded the respondent $18,000 in all-inclusive costs, with $3,000 designated as enforceable child support.

The respondent mother brought a motion for summary judgment seeking sole custody of the two children and child support.

The applicant father, who had a history of substance abuse and had recently relapsed, also sought sole custody.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the father had not seen the children in over a year, failed to exercise previously ordered supervised access, and provided insufficient evidence of drug treatment.

Summary judgment was granted, awarding sole custody to the mother, supervised access to the father, and ordering the father to pay child support.

The Children's Aid Society of the Niagara Region sought to continue a temporary care and custody order for the child L.H. due to ongoing concerns regarding parental drug abuse, the mother's untreated mental health issues, and inadequate care.

The respondent parents opposed this, requesting the child be placed in the father's care subject to Society supervision.

The court found compelling evidence of drug abuse by both parents, the father's interference with the mother's mental health treatment, and a lack of full disclosure by the parents regarding their living situation.

Applying the two-part test under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, the court concluded that the child was at risk of harm and could not be adequately protected by a supervision order.

The Society's motion was granted, continuing the temporary care and custody order.

The applicant mother brought a motion for a temporary order for custody of the parties' two children, proposing limited access for the respondent father.

The mother raised concerns regarding the father's mental health and parenting style.

The court found the father's mental health was well-managed and the mother's parenting concerns were minor.

The court ordered a temporary parenting schedule that provided the father with significant overnight parenting time, noting that it was in the children's best interests to maximize time with both parents.

The appellant children's aid society appealed a temporary order placing a newborn child in the care of the respondent parents subject to supervision terms.

The society argued the application judge erred by imposing terms irreconcilable with his findings regarding the mother's mental health and the father's prior criminal conviction.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge correctly applied the test under section 51(2) of the Child and Family Services Act and made no palpable and overriding error.

The Court also dismissed the society's motion to introduce fresh evidence regarding the paternal grandfather's criminal record, applying a relaxed test but finding the evidence would not have affected the result.

The children's aid society apprehended a child and applied for a finding that the child was in need of protection.

The society, the father, and the paternal grandmother all sought temporary care and custody of the child.

The court found that both the father and the grandmother had charge of the child immediately before the intervention.

Due to the parents' history of domestic violence, substance abuse, and mental health crises, the court concluded there was a risk of harm if the child was returned to the parents.

The court ordered that the child remain in the temporary care of the paternal grandmother pursuant to section 51(2)(c) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Children's Aid Society moved for temporary care and custody of a newborn child pending its appeal of a motion judge's order that placed the child with the parents under supervision.

The Society argued the motion judge erred by omitting a statement of the plans of care and sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the mother's mental health and the paternal grandfather's history of allowing a sex offender to reside in his home.

Applying a modified test for a stay pending appeal, the court found a serious issue to be tried based on the fresh evidence and concluded that the risk of irreparable harm to the child outweighed the harm of temporary separation from the parents.

The motion was granted, and the child was placed in the Society's care pending the appeal.

The applicant children's aid society sought a temporary order to keep three children in the care and custody of their father, subject to society supervision, following their apprehension from the mother and stepfather.

The apprehension was triggered by suspicious bruising on the youngest child, which a medical assessment concluded was highly suspicious for inflicted injury.

The mother and stepfather opposed the motion, seeking the return of the children and offering an alternative explanation for the bruising.

The court found the society's evidence credible and trustworthy, concluding there were reasonable grounds to believe the children would be at risk of harm if returned to the mother and stepfather.

The court granted the society's motion for temporary care and custody with the father.

The respondent, having successfully stayed a custody application due to lack of jurisdiction and secured the child's return, sought costs.

The applicant opposed, citing inability to pay and challenging the Family Responsibility Office's enforcement jurisdiction.

The court denied FRO enforcement for custody-related costs but awarded $100,000 in costs to the respondent, citing the applicant's egregious conduct, bad faith, and unreasonableness, and the importance of the issues, while considering the applicant's ability to pay.

In an international custody dispute, the mother sought custody in Ontario after removing the child from Egypt without the father’s consent, while the father moved to stay the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The court held the child was habitually resident in Egypt and that Ontario could assume jurisdiction only if the child would suffer serious harm if returned.

Applying the serious-harm approach equated with Hague Convention article 13(b) jurisprudence, the court found the sexual-abuse allegations were not credible, found no evidentiary basis for other alleged risks, and held nothing displaced the presumption that the Egyptian court would protect the child’s welfare.

The Ontario court therefore declined jurisdiction over permanent custody and ordered the child returned to Egypt under temporary CLRA relief.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judgment granting Crown wardship of her 8-year-old child without access, with a view to adoption.

The child had been in the temporary care of the respondent society due to the mother's psychiatric problems and the child's own needs.

Expert psychiatric evidence at trial strongly recommended against continued access, emphasizing the child's need for stability and permanency through adoption.

The Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error or error of law in the trial judge's decision to terminate access.

The appeal was dismissed.