Maggie Scull

The applicant children's aid society moved to terminate a supervision order placing two children in the care of a family friend.

The children's lawyer opposed termination, arguing the children's anxiety about potentially returning to their father constituted a new protection concern, and alternatively sought a custodial order under s. 102 of the CYFSA.

The court found the original protection concerns had been resolved, that the children were no longer in need of protection, and that the society was not required to proceed by summary judgment.

The court declined to make a s. 102 custody order, noting it would be inequitable where the father had not filed materials and the proposed custodian was a non-party.

The supervision order was terminated and the cross-motion dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for extended Society care for three Indigenous children with high needs.

The father sought their return under a supervision order, supported by the mother.

The court found that the protection concerns that led to the children's removal had not been mitigated by the parents, and the Society's efforts to provide culturally appropriate services and support were inadequate.

Despite the children's strong desire to return to their father, the court concluded that extended Society care was the only safe option.

However, recognizing the importance of the children's Indigenous identity and their meaningful relationships with their family, the court ordered robust access for both parents and the paternal grandmother.

In a child protection trial, the Children's Aid Society sought to qualify a pediatrician as a participant expert.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer and the parents opposed the qualification, arguing the pediatrician was engaged for litigation and his methodology was flawed.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and Rule 20.2 of the Family Law Rules, concluding the pediatrician could testify as a participant expert because his opinions were formed during his involvement as a treating pediatrician, not for litigation.

The court circumscribed the scope of his permissible evidence to his observations, diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis of the children.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for an interim order to change the child's care and custody pending a status review application.

The child had been placed with the paternal grandparents under a final order.

The Society sought to return the child to the mother under supervision.

The court found that the mother was not yet ready for unsupervised care and that the grandparents and mother had recently agreed to a comprehensive joint parenting plan through mediation.

The court held that the child's best interests did not require a temporary change in placement and dismissed the motion.

The plaintiff and the deceased purchased a property together, with the plaintiff contributing half the down payment but title registered solely in the deceased's name.

Following the deceased's death, his estate claimed the plaintiff was merely a tenant, while the plaintiff claimed 100% beneficial ownership.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found the parties had been in a domestic relationship and applied the presumption of resulting trust.

The court concluded the plaintiff held a 50% beneficial ownership interest in the property and ordered it sold with proceeds divided equally.

The applicant sought an order to remove a mature black walnut tree located on the property line between his and the respondents' properties, arguing that falling nuts hitting his roof constituted a private nuisance.

The court applied the two-part test for private nuisance, finding that the interference was neither substantial nor unreasonable.

The court noted the nuts only fell for a few weeks a year, and the property was located in a heritage conservation district known for its mature trees.

The application was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.