Ryan Bonin

Following a trial where the plaintiff was awarded $80,229.56 for unpaid construction invoices, the court determined costs.

The plaintiff sought $51,490.63 based on an offer to settle for $100,000 plus $15,000 in costs.

The court conducted a 'mini-assessment' of costs to determine if the judgment was more favourable than the offer.

Finding that the judgment plus partial indemnity costs would exceed the $115,000 offer, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter, totalling $51,490.63.

The plaintiff contractor sued the defendant homeowner for unpaid invoices relating to the demolition and reconstruction of a house.

The parties had no written contract and disagreed on whether the arrangement was a fixed-price or cost-plus agreement.

The court found there was no meeting of the minds on price, and therefore no binding contract existed.

The plaintiff's claim was assessed on the basis of quantum meruit.

The court awarded the plaintiff compensation for unpaid labour and some expenses, but denied claims for storage, tool rentals, and markup on materials sourced directly by the defendant.

The defendant's counterclaim for overpayment and delay was dismissed, but a set-off was allowed for the cost of repairing defective pocket doors.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for extended Society care for three Indigenous children with high needs.

The father sought their return under a supervision order, supported by the mother.

The court found that the protection concerns that led to the children's removal had not been mitigated by the parents, and the Society's efforts to provide culturally appropriate services and support were inadequate.

Despite the children's strong desire to return to their father, the court concluded that extended Society care was the only safe option.

However, recognizing the importance of the children's Indigenous identity and their meaningful relationships with their family, the court ordered robust access for both parents and the paternal grandmother.

In a child protection trial, the Children's Aid Society sought to qualify a pediatrician as a participant expert.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer and the parents opposed the qualification, arguing the pediatrician was engaged for litigation and his methodology was flawed.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and Rule 20.2 of the Family Law Rules, concluding the pediatrician could testify as a participant expert because his opinions were formed during his involvement as a treating pediatrician, not for litigation.

The court circumscribed the scope of his permissible evidence to his observations, diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis of the children.

The children's aid society brought a status review application regarding a young child who had been placed in the temporary care of the maternal grandmother after the parents were found to have physically abused the child's half-sibling.

At trial, the society and the parents sought the return of the child to the parents' care subject to supervision, while the maternal grandmother sought custody.

The court found that the parents had made significant rehabilitative efforts and demonstrated appropriate parenting, whereas the maternal grandmother exhibited hypervigilance that risked alienating the child from the parents.

The court ordered the child returned to the parents subject to a six-month supervision order, finding it to be in the child's best interests.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion to vary a temporary order that had placed two young children in its care, seeking to place them with the father of the younger child under supervision.

The mother opposed the placement.

The court dismissed the motion to change the primary placement, finding insufficient evidence of the proposed father's suitability and concluding that the least intrusive order consistent with the children's best interests was to maintain the current society care order.

The court did vary the order to restrict the older child's father's access to only his biological child.

The applicant mother sought sole custody, child support, section 7 expenses, and spousal support from the respondent father.

The parties resolved custody and access prior to trial.

The court determined the father's income for support purposes, including grossing up tax-free structured settlement income, but declined to impute additional employment income.

The court ordered retroactive and ongoing child support and section 7 expenses.

The applicant's claim for spousal support was dismissed, as the court applied the Molodowich factors and found the parties did not live together in a conjugal relationship and therefore the applicant was not a 'spouse' under the Family Law Act.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a 2011 consent order to terminate or reduce spousal support and health benefits payable to the respondent mother, and sought a restraining order.

The father had lost his employment after changing jobs to escape the stress of the mother's relentless campaign of disparagement and parental alienation, which included contacting his employers and posting defamatory comments on social media.

The court found a material change in circumstances, declined to impute income to the father as his job change was reasonable, and reduced spousal support to $274 per month subject to a six-month review.

The court also granted a restraining order prohibiting the mother from posting disparaging comments about the father or his partner and from coming within 500 metres of his home or workplace.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought statutory accident benefits.

Her occupational therapist submitted a treatment and assessment plan (OCF-18) that included a new diagnosis of a foot fracture.

The insurer denied the plan and required the applicant to attend an insurer examination with an orthopaedic surgeon to investigate the new diagnosis.

The applicant failed to attend the examination, arguing the insurer's notice lacked sufficient medical reasons.

The arbitrator found that investigating a new diagnosis constituted a valid medical reason, making the notice compliant with section 44 of the Schedule.

Consequently, the applicant was precluded from proceeding to mediation under section 55(2) of the Schedule.