Ryan Bonin

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for extended Society care for three Indigenous children with high needs.

The father sought their return under a supervision order, supported by the mother.

The court found that the protection concerns that led to the children's removal had not been mitigated by the parents, and the Society's efforts to provide culturally appropriate services and support were inadequate.

Despite the children's strong desire to return to their father, the court concluded that extended Society care was the only safe option.

However, recognizing the importance of the children's Indigenous identity and their meaningful relationships with their family, the court ordered robust access for both parents and the paternal grandmother.

In a child protection trial, the Children's Aid Society sought to qualify a pediatrician as a participant expert.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer and the parents opposed the qualification, arguing the pediatrician was engaged for litigation and his methodology was flawed.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and Rule 20.2 of the Family Law Rules, concluding the pediatrician could testify as a participant expert because his opinions were formed during his involvement as a treating pediatrician, not for litigation.

The court circumscribed the scope of his permissible evidence to his observations, diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis of the children.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion to vary a temporary order that had placed two young children in its care, seeking to place them with the father of the younger child under supervision.

The mother opposed the placement.

The court dismissed the motion to change the primary placement, finding insufficient evidence of the proposed father's suitability and concluding that the least intrusive order consistent with the children's best interests was to maintain the current society care order.

The court did vary the order to restrict the older child's father's access to only his biological child.

The applicant mother sought sole custody, child support, section 7 expenses, and spousal support from the respondent father.

The parties resolved custody and access prior to trial.

The court determined the father's income for support purposes, including grossing up tax-free structured settlement income, but declined to impute additional employment income.

The court ordered retroactive and ongoing child support and section 7 expenses.

The applicant's claim for spousal support was dismissed, as the court applied the Molodowich factors and found the parties did not live together in a conjugal relationship and therefore the applicant was not a 'spouse' under the Family Law Act.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a 2011 consent order to terminate or reduce spousal support and health benefits payable to the respondent mother, and sought a restraining order.

The father had lost his employment after changing jobs to escape the stress of the mother's relentless campaign of disparagement and parental alienation, which included contacting his employers and posting defamatory comments on social media.

The court found a material change in circumstances, declined to impute income to the father as his job change was reasonable, and reduced spousal support to $274 per month subject to a six-month review.

The court also granted a restraining order prohibiting the mother from posting disparaging comments about the father or his partner and from coming within 500 metres of his home or workplace.