Dr. John Burke Baird

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a child protection application regarding a four-year-old child.

The society sought a supervision order placing the child with the mother, while the paternal grandmother and father sought custody.

The court found the child in need of protection based on a risk of emotional harm under s. 74(2)(h) of the CYFSA, stemming from the paternal family's high-conflict and alienating behaviours towards the mother.

The court found no risk of physical harm from the mother.

Concluding that the mother was a capable and loving parent who would foster the child's relationship with the paternal family, the court awarded sole custody to the mother and granted specified parenting time to the father.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for extended Society care for three Indigenous children with high needs.

The father sought their return under a supervision order, supported by the mother.

The court found that the protection concerns that led to the children's removal had not been mitigated by the parents, and the Society's efforts to provide culturally appropriate services and support were inadequate.

Despite the children's strong desire to return to their father, the court concluded that extended Society care was the only safe option.

However, recognizing the importance of the children's Indigenous identity and their meaningful relationships with their family, the court ordered robust access for both parents and the paternal grandmother.

In a child protection trial, the Children's Aid Society sought to qualify a pediatrician as a participant expert.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer and the parents opposed the qualification, arguing the pediatrician was engaged for litigation and his methodology was flawed.

The court applied the White Burgess framework and Rule 20.2 of the Family Law Rules, concluding the pediatrician could testify as a participant expert because his opinions were formed during his involvement as a treating pediatrician, not for litigation.

The court circumscribed the scope of his permissible evidence to his observations, diagnosis, treatment, and prognosis of the children.

The accused stood trial on charges of sexual assault, sexual touching of a child under 16, and uttering threats arising from repeated intra-familial abuse of a young complainant over several years.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and the governing principles for assessing child witnesses and delayed disclosure in sexual offence cases, the court accepted the complainant’s evidence as credible and reliable despite incremental disclosure and some imprecision in detail.

Expert pediatric evidence was relied on to explain why the absence of physical findings did not undermine the allegations.

The accused’s denials were rejected, and the court found the Crown proved all counts beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with assault for allegedly spanking his five-year-old daughter excessively on March 7, 2017, contrary to Section 43 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, including medical evidence of severe bruising to the child's buttocks consistent with multiple forceful impacts by an adult hand, and the accused's proximity to the child during a stressful morning.

The defence challenged the Crown's burden of proof and the reliability of the accused's post-arrest statement.

The court found that while the accused was the most likely suspect, the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused's exculpatory statement, corroborated in part by the mother's testimony, created reasonable doubt that could not be dispelled by the circumstantial evidence alone.

The applicant society sought an order for Crown wardship without access for a two-year-old child who suffered severe, non-accidental brain injuries while in the parents' care.

The respondent mother sought the return of the child, and the respondent father supported placement with the paternal grandmother.

The court reviewed extensive medical evidence, a parenting capacity assessment, and a kinship care assessment.

Finding that the mother lacked the necessary skills to care for a special needs child and that the paternal grandmother faced significant stressors, the court concluded that placement with either was not in the child's best interests.

Given the statutory time limits and the child's need for permanency, the court ordered Crown wardship without access.