Amy Katz

A child protection agency brought a motion under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 seeking a declaration that the father was a "special party" within the meaning of Rule 2(2) of the Family Law Rules, and an order appointing the Public Guardian and Trustee as his legal representative under Rule 4(3).

The Public Guardian and Trustee declined to consent, taking the position that the father had not met the legal test for incapacity.

The court applied the presumption of capacity under the Substitute Decisions Act and found that, despite the father's unusual, paranoid, and hostile communications, the agency had not established that the father was mentally incapable of understanding the issues and making decisions in the litigation.

The motion was dismissed.

This decision addresses a motion by the paternal grandmother, M.P., to be added as a party to child protection proceedings concerning K.F.-W. The court reviews the statutory and discretionary bases for party status under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 and the Family Law Rules.

The court finds that M.P. does not meet the definition of "parent" under the Act and that adding her as a party is not in the best interests of the child, would unduly complicate and delay the proceedings, and would increase conflict.

The motion is dismissed.

In this child protection proceeding under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, the maternal grandmother moved to be added as a party and sought expanded, unsupervised, and overnight access to her two young grandchildren.

The Hamilton Child & Family Supports agency opposed the motion, arguing that the grandmother did not qualify as a statutory parent and that her past conduct raised safety and cooperation concerns.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding that the grandmother failed to establish that her participation as a party was necessary or in the children's best interests.

The court also declined to expand access, noting that the children required stability and that the grandmother's current supervised access was sufficient.

The society brought a motion for an interim order allowing a foster child to reside with the added parties pending the hearing of the foster parents' application to review the society's refusal of their adoption application and proposed removal of the child.

The society had removed the child without providing the statutorily required 10 days' notice and without obtaining a local director's opinion that the child was at risk of harm.

The Board dismissed the society's motion, finding that it was in the child's best interests to remain with the foster parents, who had cared for the child since birth, pending the hearing on the merits.

The Children's Aid Society of Hamilton brought a motion to terminate a supervision order concerning a child who had suffered severe, unexplained head injuries as an infant.

Despite positive developments in the parents' care and compliance with supervision, the court dismissed the motion, deeming it premature given the horrific nature of the initial injuries and the unresolved culpability of the parents.

The existing supervision order was continued, emphasizing the court's responsibility to protect vulnerable children in cases of severe abuse.

The mother brought a motion for increased and unsupervised access to her two children, who were in the temporary care of the Children's Aid Society.

The children had been apprehended due to concerns regarding domestic violence, the mother's inability to protect the children from the abusive father, and her parenting capacity.

The court applied the best interests of the child test under the Child and Family Services Act and found that the mother had not demonstrated sufficient progress in addressing the protection concerns.

The court dismissed the motion, concluding that expanded or unsupervised access, or access supervised by the maternal grandparents, was not in the children's best interests.

In a child protection proceeding, the Children’s Aid Society brought a motion under s. 54 of the Child and Family Services Act seeking an order requiring the respondents to undergo a risk assessment by a specified expert.

The court dismissed the motion and later considered whether costs should be awarded against the Society.

The mother sought costs alleging unreasonable conduct by the Society, including insufficient evidence for the assessment and procedural unfairness.

Applying the principles governing costs against child protection agencies under the Family Law Rules and the Courts of Justice Act, the court held that although the Society was unsuccessful, it had acted cautiously and in good faith in pursuing the assessment given the history of domestic violence and child protection concerns.

The court concluded the Society’s conduct was not patently unfair or indefensible and declined to award costs.

Following a concluded child protection trial in which the court ordered Crown wardship without access for the child, the court addressed a related proceeding under the Children's Law Reform Act involving claims for custody, access, and child support.

Because the child protection order had already determined the child’s status and eliminated parental access, the court found no basis to continue adjudicating the family law claims.

The court therefore dismissed all outstanding claims in the CLRA proceeding as moot in light of the Crown wardship order made in the child protection file.

The applicant society sought an order for Crown wardship without access for a two-year-old child who suffered severe, non-accidental brain injuries while in the parents' care.

The respondent mother sought the return of the child, and the respondent father supported placement with the paternal grandmother.

The court reviewed extensive medical evidence, a parenting capacity assessment, and a kinship care assessment.

Finding that the mother lacked the necessary skills to care for a special needs child and that the paternal grandmother faced significant stressors, the court concluded that placement with either was not in the child's best interests.

Given the statutory time limits and the child's need for permanency, the court ordered Crown wardship without access.