Alisa P. Williams

This decision concerns the costs award following a 54-day family law trial.

The applicant, J.M.M., sought costs after being successful on all major issues, including parenting, child support, spousal support, and property.

The court awarded $150,000 in costs (inclusive of disbursements and HST), finding this amount fair and proportionate given the applicant’s success, the respondent’s unreasonable litigation conduct, and the respondent’s significant mental health and financial challenges.

The court structured payment terms to reflect the respondent’s limited means and designated a portion of the award as support, enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office.

In a 54-day family trial following years of child protection involvement, the court found a material change in the child’s circumstances and held that the child’s best interests required sole decision-making and primary residence with the father, with the mother restricted to professionally supervised parenting time.

The court found repeated unsubstantiated abuse and neglect allegations, coaching of the child, and longstanding mental health concerns had caused the child emotional harm and justified both supervised access and ordered psychiatric and psychological assessments.

On the financial issues, the court awarded the father retroactive and ongoing child support, an equalization payment, and reimbursement for funds taken from his share of the former matrimonial home sale proceeds, rejecting the contention that those funds were a gift.

The court recognized the mother’s entitlement to spousal support in principle, largely on a needs basis, but held that the father had already satisfied any spousal support obligation through credits and prior payments, leaving no retroactive or ongoing spousal support payable.

Privacy protections were ordered through initials and sealing of sensitive exhibits.

This decision addresses an interim parenting and school placement dispute following a parent's unilateral relocation with children in breach of a separation agreement.

The court finds the mother acted unilaterally and without candor, and orders the children to remain at their original school, with a detailed interim parenting schedule and joint decision-making (with final authority to the father if consensus cannot be reached).

The decision emphasizes the primacy of the children's best interests, the importance of stability, and the need for full disclosure and procedural fairness in family law proceedings.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking equal parenting time.

The parties had previously signed temporary minutes of settlement for parenting time, which included a review clause for an upcoming case conference.

The respondent mother argued the father must show a material change in circumstances to vary the temporary order.

The court held that no material change was required because the temporary order was intended to bridge the gap until the case conference, and the father only brought the initial urgent motion because the mother had denied him parenting time.

The court granted the father's request for extended parenting time, finding that overnight stays instead of evening drop-offs were in the children's best interests.

This is a triage endorsement for an urgent motion in a family law matter.

The applicant mother sought the return of her two children, alleging the respondent father refused to return them after a visit, disrupting a long-standing parenting status quo.

The court made a preliminary finding that the issues were potentially urgent and set a schedule for the filing of materials, emphasizing the need for evidence from both parents.

The court also provided guidance on parenting principles, including reluctance to disrupt status quo, maximum contact, and disapproval of unilateral action.

The respondent sought leave to proceed with an urgent motion regarding access to the two younger children, alleging the applicant withheld access due to COVID-19 concerns.

The court, acting as a triage justice, determined the matter was presumptively urgent as it involved the alleged wrongful retention of children contrary to a final order.

The motion was allowed to proceed on the issue of access for the two younger children, and timelines for submissions were set.

The mother (A.H.) brought a motion for temporary care of her child (D.), seeking placement with her under supervision or expanded access.

The Children's Aid Society of Hamilton (CAS) opposed, seeking continued care and a finding that the child was not First Nations, Inuk, or Métis.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer supported the mother.

The court found no reasonable grounds to believe the child would suffer harm if returned to the mother under supervision.

Applying the two-part test under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, the court ordered the child's return to the mother's care via an eight-week transitional schedule with specific supervision terms.

The finding regarding the child's Indigenous status was unopposed and granted.

Following a trial regarding spousal support where success was divided, the parties submitted written submissions on costs.

The respondent sought substantial and full indemnity costs based on an offer to settle, while the applicant argued each party should bear their own costs.

The court found the respondent's offer to settle was ambiguous and that she had not obtained a more favourable result.

Noting the respondent's unreasonable behaviour regarding financial disclosure and the divided success at trial, the court ordered that each party bear their own costs.

The applicant sought to terminate spousal support due to his impending retirement, while the respondent cross-moved for retroactive and increased spousal support.

The court found a material change in circumstances, allowing for a variation of the separation agreement.

Retroactive spousal support from 2015 was denied due to the respondent's delay in seeking variation and non-disclosure of cohabitation.

However, retroactive support was granted from January 1, 2018.

The court recognized the respondent's economic disadvantage from the marriage, warranting compensatory support, and applied the "double dipping" exception from Boston v. Boston.

The applicant was ordered to pay $1700 per month in spousal support from January 1, 2018, until December 31, 2022, based on his income of $95,000.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs due to divided success.

The parties, who share joint custody and equal parenting time, brought a motion to determine which school their two children should attend after missing the first nine days of the school year due to an impasse.

The mother proposed a school near her home, while the father proposed one near his.

The court found both proposals evenly matched but selected the mother's proposed school because the father had better transportation options to facilitate the children's attendance on his parenting days.

No costs were awarded as both parties behaved unreasonably in delaying the decision.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Hamilton brought a motion for summary judgment in a child protection proceeding involving three children.

The Society sought a custody order placing the oldest child with her biological father in Alberta, and Crown wardship with no access for the two younger children.

The mother and the father of the younger children opposed the motion, seeking a trial and the eventual return of the children to their care.

The court found that the parents had profound and unresolved issues including mental health struggles, substance abuse, and domestic violence, and had failed to make meaningful progress.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The oldest child was placed in her father's custody, and the younger children were made Crown wards with no access, as the parents failed to establish that access would be beneficial and meaningful or that it would not impair future opportunities for adoption.

This is a costs endorsement following an eight-day trial primarily concerning custody and access in a mobility context.

The Respondent was successful at trial, having met or exceeded her Offer to Settle, which presumptively entitled her to costs.

The Respondent sought full recovery costs of $35,206.50.

The Applicant argued for no costs or nominal costs, citing the inherent difficulty of mobility cases and his precarious financial circumstances.

The Court found the Respondent's conduct was not unreasonable and that success was not divided.

However, considering the unique challenges of mobility disputes, the Applicant's reasonable pursuit of the status quo, and his precarious financial situation, the Court exercised its discretion under Rule 24(11)(f) to mitigate the costs award.

The parties separated and initially shared parenting of their two children in Hamilton.

The mother subsequently moved to Brampton and sought sole custody and primary residence, while the father sought joint custody and to maintain the shared parenting schedule in Hamilton.

The court found that the mother had always been the primary caregiver and that the father required significant third-party assistance to manage his parenting time.

Applying the best interests of the child test under the Children's Law Reform Act and the relocation principles from Gordon v. Goertz, the court awarded sole custody and primary residence to the mother in Brampton, with the father having parenting time three weekends out of four and mid-week visits.

Child support was also ordered.

Annette Walters sought full recovery costs against Derek Walters following a settlement of their family law matter.

The court found Derek's conduct, including unproven allegations of fraud, relentless pursuit of irrelevant disclosure, and withdrawal of an unequal division claim shortly before trial, constituted bad faith.

Annette's offers were close to the final settlement, while Derek's offers did not trigger costs consequences.

The court awarded Annette full recovery costs, finding Derek's actions unnecessarily prolonged and complicated the litigation.

The paternal grandmother brought a motion to be added as a party to the continuing divorce action between the parents, where the father's access was the primary issue.

The grandmother had been supervising the father's access and argued she should be a party because her status as a supervisor was in dispute.

Both the mother and the father opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that being a supervisor is not a substantive right and that adding the grandmother would needlessly complicate the proceedings.

Costs of $1,000 were awarded to the mother.

Following a 28‑year unmarried relationship with two children, the parties litigated claims relating to child support, spousal support, and alleged unjust enrichment tied to a family‑owned food truck business.

The respondent asserted entitlement to an ownership interest or compensation for unpaid labour, alleging the parties jointly operated a profitable business generating undeclared income.

The court rejected the unjust enrichment claim, finding the applicant alone purchased the business from her father and that the respondent’s contributions did not enrich the applicant or increase the business’s value.

However, the court accepted evidence that the applicant understated income and imputed annual income of $100,000 for support purposes.

Orders were made for guideline child support, certain section 7 expenses, and a lump‑sum spousal support payment to assist the respondent’s transition to a reduced standard of living.

This was a costs decision following a two-and-a-half-day oral hearing of a motion to change concerning child support for the parties' son.

The moving party on the underlying motion established a material change in circumstances after an involuntary layoff, and the court rejected the opposing party's position that pre-layoff income should continue to be imputed under s. 19 of the Child Support Guidelines.

Applying Rules 18 and 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court held the successful party was predominantly entitled to costs, although reduced for divided success on section 7 and extraordinary expenses, unreasonable conduct by both sides, and proportionality concerns.

A prior offer was found close to the result and relevant under Rule 18(16), but insufficiently precise to trigger full recovery under Rule 18(14).

Costs were fixed at $17,000 inclusive of H.S.T. and disbursements.

The respondent father brought a motion to change the child support provisions of a separation agreement after losing his long‑term employment due to a plant closure and pursuing retraining as a plumber.

The applicant mother sought to have income imputed at the father’s former level, arguing that his decision to undertake a plumbing apprenticeship and accept severance instead of recall rights reflected unreasonable employment choices.

The court applied the principles governing imputation of income under s. 19 of the Child Support Guidelines and the test from Drygala v. Pauli.

The court found the job loss was involuntary, the retraining plan was reasonable in the circumstances, and the father had acted in good faith while diligently seeking employment.

Income was therefore not imputed; support was recalculated based on the father’s reduced income and adjusted section 7 expense contributions were ordered.

A father applied for custody of a young child and raised numerous allegations of neglect, abuse, and health concerns regarding the mother’s care.

The court considered extensive evidence, including Office of the Children’s Lawyer reports, a psychiatric assessment suggesting features of schizotypal personality disorder, and repeated unsubstantiated reports made by the father to authorities.

The court found the mother to be the credible and stable primary caregiver and determined the father demonstrated little insight into child development and a persistent inability to support the child’s relationship with the mother.

Given the father’s behaviour and risk of undermining the child’s security and relationship with the mother, the court ordered sole custody to the mother and restricted the father’s access.

Access was limited to supervised visits at a supervised access centre.

Following a concluded child protection trial in which the court ordered Crown wardship without access for the child, the court addressed a related proceeding under the Children's Law Reform Act involving claims for custody, access, and child support.

Because the child protection order had already determined the child’s status and eliminated parental access, the court found no basis to continue adjudicating the family law claims.

The court therefore dismissed all outstanding claims in the CLRA proceeding as moot in light of the Crown wardship order made in the child protection file.