Nicole Amelia Matthews

The respondent mother brought a motion to reinstate her time-sharing with the child, D.J., as per an existing temporary order.

The applicant father had unilaterally suspended time-sharing due to concerns about D.J.'s vulnerability to COVID-19, given his special medical needs.

The court applied the "material change in circumstances" test under the Children's Law Reform Act and found that the COVID-19 pandemic, while serious, did not, by itself, constitute a material change justifying the suspension of in-person parenting time.

The court emphasized that general fears are insufficient and that each parent's ability to mitigate risks must be assessed.

Finding the respondent mother to be a responsible parent who was taking appropriate precautions, the court dismissed the applicant's position and ordered the immediate reinstatement of the respondent's time-sharing as per the original temporary order.

The applicant father sought a temporary variation of a final parenting order, requesting primary residence and decision-making authority for the children, citing the respondent mother's manipulative behavior, false allegations, and obstruction of the children's therapeutic services.

The respondent mother opposed, bringing a cross-motion for OCL involvement.

The court found a material change in circumstances and that the existing equal time-sharing arrangement was intolerable due to the high conflict and the children's deteriorating emotional and developmental issues.

The court granted the father primary residence and decision-making authority, finding the mother's lack of insight and self-centered decisions detrimental to the children's best interests, and declined OCL involvement.

The applicant mother sought an urgent motion to suspend the respondent father's in-person access to their six-year-old daughter, proposing video contact instead, citing concerns about the father's adherence to COVID-19 safety precautions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it not urgent, emphasizing that the mother's allegations did not establish the father was irresponsible or unsafe, and criticized the "nuclear option" approach without exploring less restrictive solutions or good faith communication.

This motion addressed temporary spousal and child support claims in a family law proceeding marked by protracted litigation and a lack of timely advancement to trial.

The court criticized the parties' approach of relying on endless motions without adequate disclosure or questioning.

While parenting issues were resolved by minutes of settlement, the court was compelled to issue a temporary support order based on imperfect evidence due to the parties' delays.

The judge rejected the applicant's argument that a 2010 memorandum of understanding constituted a "forever waiver" of spousal support, given the subsequent six-year reconciliation.

Temporary child and spousal support were ordered with specific income imputations, and strict timelines were set for further disclosure and steps towards trial.

This trial concerned a mother's request to relocate with her two daughters and the father's opposition, coupled with his request for sole custody.

The court found a material change in circumstances and conducted a fresh inquiry into the children's best interests.

The court determined that the mother's irrational actions, including influencing the children's views and interfering with access, were detrimental to the children's well-being and their relationship with their father and brother.

Consequently, the court denied the mother's request to relocate, transferred sole custody of the daughters to the father, and extinguished child support arrears owed by the father.

This case involved a lengthy trial over custody and access to the parties' youngest child, Adam, and equalization of net family property.

The court considered the child's views and preferences, OCL recommendations for a parallel parenting regime, and financial claims.

The court found both parents contributed to conflict but were good parents when not litigating.

A joint custody order with parallel parenting was issued, with specific decision-making authority assigned to each parent for education and medical care, and an equalization payment ordered from the applicant to the respondent after various adjustments.

No child or spousal support was ordered.

The Applicant father brought a custody/access motion, which became complicated by his inclusion of irrelevant and humiliating nude photographs and "sexting" materials of the Respondent mother.

The court struck these materials and found the Applicant's actions constituted bad faith.

While there was divided success on the parenting issues, with the Respondent achieving greater success, the Applicant was ordered to pay costs.

The court considered the principles of costs, including partial indemnification, encouraging settlement, and sanctioning inappropriate behaviour.

The Applicant's bad faith conduct specifically impacted the costs award.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Court of Justice decision dismissing her motion to be added as a party to child protection proceedings involving six children who had been made Crown wards.

The appellant sought participation in order to propose a kinship placement plan, arguing that the motion judge improperly relied on conflict with the Children’s Aid Society and failed to properly consider her suitability and the feasibility of a home study.

The court applied the deferential appellate standard for factual and discretionary decisions in family and child protection matters, emphasizing that appellate intervention requires a palpable and overriding error.

The evidence supported the motion judge’s concerns about the appellant’s lack of cooperation with the Society, incomplete background checks, and the likelihood that adding her as a party would unduly delay proceedings affecting the children’s stability.

Finding no palpable and overriding error, the court dismissed the appeal.

Following the breakdown of a common-law relationship, the court determined issues relating to child support for a child of the relationship.

The central issue was the income of a self‑employed electrician operating an unprofitable business and whether income should be imputed under s. 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines for intentional underemployment.

Applying the principles from Drygala v. Panli and Riel v. Holland, the court held that a support payor cannot pursue unrealistic or unproductive career aspirations to the detriment of child support obligations.

Income was imputed beginning in 2010 at a level consistent with the payor’s earning capacity as an employed electrician.

Retroactive child support arrears were ordered and ongoing support set based on the imputed income, with proportional sharing of future section 7 expenses.

The payor brought a motion to terminate or reduce spousal support ordered following the breakdown of a long-term common-law relationship.

The payor argued the recipient’s increased income and ability to subsist on reduced payments constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court held that although the recipient’s income had increased, it remained at subsistence level and did not amount to a material change sufficient to vary support.

The motion was dismissed and the original support order reinstated.

The court also ordered partial arrears after finding the payor failed to disclose his return to employment while continuing to pay reduced support through enforcement proceedings.

Costs were determined following three family law motions concerning financial disclosure in related proceedings involving a motion to change child support and an application by an adult child for support.

Two motions sought to strike pleadings for failure to comply with financial disclosure obligations, while a third sought disclosure from another party.

The court held that the responding parties had acted in bad faith by failing to comply with prior disclosure orders and by obstructing disclosure required under the Family Law Rules and the Child Support Guidelines.

Full indemnity costs were awarded to the moving parties for the motions to strike, while partial indemnity costs were awarded on the disclosure motion.

The court also ordered that the costs were on account of child support, enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office, and prohibited further motions by the offending parties until the costs were paid.