Nicole Amelia Matthews

The parties separated in 2019 and sought orders regarding decision-making responsibility, parenting time, child support, and spousal support for their two children.

The court granted the applicant father sole decision-making responsibility for the younger child's education, but ordered joint decision-making for health, religion, and extra-curricular activities.

A 5-5-2-2 shared parenting schedule was ordered.

The court found the respondent mother was not intentionally under-employed despite being terminated for cause, and ordered the applicant to pay set-off child support.

The court also held that private school tuition was not a section 7 extraordinary expense, ordered the applicant to pay retroactive child support, and dismissed the respondent's claim for spousal support.

The applicant father brought a motion seeking equal parenting time.

The parties had previously signed temporary minutes of settlement for parenting time, which included a review clause for an upcoming case conference.

The respondent mother argued the father must show a material change in circumstances to vary the temporary order.

The court held that no material change was required because the temporary order was intended to bridge the gap until the case conference, and the father only brought the initial urgent motion because the mother had denied him parenting time.

The court granted the father's request for extended parenting time, finding that overnight stays instead of evening drop-offs were in the children's best interests.

The mother, who had custody of the parties' seven-year-old child, died suddenly of a drug overdose.

The father brought an emergency motion for temporary custody.

The maternal aunt, who had been secretly caring for the child for the past year due to the mother's substance abuse issues, sought to be added as a party and requested custody based on the status quo.

The court found that the aunt and the mother had actively concealed the mother's struggles and the child's living arrangements from the father and the court.

The court granted temporary custody to the father, concluding that the aunt's deceptive conduct demonstrated a profound lack of insight and an inability to foster the child's relationship with her father.

Following a motion where the applicant father was overwhelmingly successful in obtaining primary residence of the children, he sought full recovery costs of $9,930.

The respondent mother argued she could only afford $1,500 due to her limited financial circumstances and receipt of Legal Aid.

The court found the mother's conduct unreasonable but not rising to the level of bad faith required for full recovery.

The court held that while ability to pay is a factor, it cannot shield a litigant from the consequences of unreasonable behaviour, nor is the receipt of Legal Aid a relevant factor in determining costs.

Costs were fixed at $6,000.

The respondent mother brought a motion to reinstate her time-sharing with the child, D.J., as per an existing temporary order.

The applicant father had unilaterally suspended time-sharing due to concerns about D.J.'s vulnerability to COVID-19, given his special medical needs.

The court applied the "material change in circumstances" test under the Children's Law Reform Act and found that the COVID-19 pandemic, while serious, did not, by itself, constitute a material change justifying the suspension of in-person parenting time.

The court emphasized that general fears are insufficient and that each parent's ability to mitigate risks must be assessed.

Finding the respondent mother to be a responsible parent who was taking appropriate precautions, the court dismissed the applicant's position and ordered the immediate reinstatement of the respondent's time-sharing as per the original temporary order.

The applicant father sought a temporary variation of a final parenting order, requesting primary residence and decision-making authority for the children, citing the respondent mother's manipulative behavior, false allegations, and obstruction of the children's therapeutic services.

The respondent mother opposed, bringing a cross-motion for OCL involvement.

The court found a material change in circumstances and that the existing equal time-sharing arrangement was intolerable due to the high conflict and the children's deteriorating emotional and developmental issues.

The court granted the father primary residence and decision-making authority, finding the mother's lack of insight and self-centered decisions detrimental to the children's best interests, and declined OCL involvement.

The applicant mother sought an urgent motion to suspend the respondent father's in-person access to their six-year-old daughter, proposing video contact instead, citing concerns about the father's adherence to COVID-19 safety precautions.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it not urgent, emphasizing that the mother's allegations did not establish the father was irresponsible or unsafe, and criticized the "nuclear option" approach without exploring less restrictive solutions or good faith communication.

The parties, who share joint custody and equal parenting time, brought a motion to determine which school their two children should attend after missing the first nine days of the school year due to an impasse.

The mother proposed a school near her home, while the father proposed one near his.

The court found both proposals evenly matched but selected the mother's proposed school because the father had better transportation options to facilitate the children's attendance on his parenting days.

No costs were awarded as both parties behaved unreasonably in delaying the decision.

The applicant sought Crown wardship for five children who had been apprehended due to domestic violence and physical discipline.

The mother, a victim of domestic violence, consented to Crown wardship with access, recognizing her limitations in caring for the children.

The father sought the return of the children to his care.

The court found that the father had not sufficiently addressed his emotionally and physically abusive parenting style and posed a risk of harm to the children.

The court ordered that the four youngest children be made Crown wards with access, while the oldest child remain in the father's care subject to supervision.

In a child protection summary judgment motion under Rule 16, the Society sought Crown wardship without access for a very young child who had been in care beyond the statutory time limits.

The court found there was no genuine issue requiring a trial concerning the mother’s unresolved drug addiction, the child’s continuing need of protection, the Society’s provision of services, and several findings about the dangers posed by the mother and the parents’ volatile relationship.

However, the court held that limited triable issues remained regarding the father’s ability to recognize the risk posed by the mother, report concerns candidly and promptly, keep the child safe from the mother, and maintain separation from her, as well as the possible role of family supports.

The recusal motion was dismissed for want of any reasonable apprehension of bias, and the matter was directed to a focused trial with the judge remaining seized.

Following a motion for child and spousal support, both parties sought costs against each other.

The court noted significant deficiencies in both parties' presentations, including inadequate financial disclosure and delayed action.

Although the respondent was more successful overall in obtaining support, her costs claim was significantly reduced due to divided success and poor presentation.

The applicant was ordered to pay the respondent $1,000 in costs.

This motion addressed temporary spousal and child support claims in a family law proceeding marked by protracted litigation and a lack of timely advancement to trial.

The court criticized the parties' approach of relying on endless motions without adequate disclosure or questioning.

While parenting issues were resolved by minutes of settlement, the court was compelled to issue a temporary support order based on imperfect evidence due to the parties' delays.

The judge rejected the applicant's argument that a 2010 memorandum of understanding constituted a "forever waiver" of spousal support, given the subsequent six-year reconciliation.

Temporary child and spousal support were ordered with specific income imputations, and strict timelines were set for further disclosure and steps towards trial.

This trial concerned a mother's request to relocate with her two daughters and the father's opposition, coupled with his request for sole custody.

The court found a material change in circumstances and conducted a fresh inquiry into the children's best interests.

The court determined that the mother's irrational actions, including influencing the children's views and interfering with access, were detrimental to the children's well-being and their relationship with their father and brother.

Consequently, the court denied the mother's request to relocate, transferred sole custody of the daughters to the father, and extinguished child support arrears owed by the father.

This case involved a lengthy trial over custody and access to the parties' youngest child, Adam, and equalization of net family property.

The court considered the child's views and preferences, OCL recommendations for a parallel parenting regime, and financial claims.

The court found both parents contributed to conflict but were good parents when not litigating.

A joint custody order with parallel parenting was issued, with specific decision-making authority assigned to each parent for education and medical care, and an equalization payment ordered from the applicant to the respondent after various adjustments.

No child or spousal support was ordered.

The Applicant father brought a custody/access motion, which became complicated by his inclusion of irrelevant and humiliating nude photographs and "sexting" materials of the Respondent mother.

The court struck these materials and found the Applicant's actions constituted bad faith.

While there was divided success on the parenting issues, with the Respondent achieving greater success, the Applicant was ordered to pay costs.

The court considered the principles of costs, including partial indemnification, encouraging settlement, and sanctioning inappropriate behaviour.

The Applicant's bad faith conduct specifically impacted the costs award.

The applicant father brought a motion for temporary primary residence of the parties' eight-year-old son and expanded access to their 16-month-old daughter.

In his affidavit, the father attached nude photographs and graphic text messages of the respondent mother, obtained without authorization from her discarded cell phone.

The court struck the offensive materials from the record, finding them completely irrelevant to the parenting issues and a malicious attempt to humiliate the mother.

The court declined to make major changes to the timesharing arrangement pending an Office of the Children's Lawyer investigation, maintaining the children's primary residence with the mother while slightly expanding the father's access.

The applicant was previously awarded costs for a motion and counter-motion regarding financial disclosure and setting the matter down for trial.

The court found that the respondent intentionally refused to produce relevant documentation to frustrate the determination of child support.

The applicant claimed $13,143 in total costs.

To send a message that nothing short of full financial disclosure is acceptable, the court fixed costs at $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The Children’s Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment within a child protection application seeking Crown wardship without access for a young child apprehended at birth due to parental substance abuse, instability, and neglect.

The court reviewed extensive evidence of the mother’s long-standing drug addiction, housing instability, missed access visits, and failure to cooperate with services, as well as the father’s extensive criminal history and repeated incarceration.

Applying Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules and the Child and Family Services Act, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and that the parents’ evidence did not establish a realistic possibility that the child could safely be returned to their care.

Considering the statutory timelines and the child’s need for permanence, the court concluded that Crown wardship was the only appropriate disposition.

The court also held that neither parent established that continued access would be beneficial and meaningful to the child.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Court of Justice decision dismissing her motion to be added as a party to child protection proceedings involving six children who had been made Crown wards.

The appellant sought participation in order to propose a kinship placement plan, arguing that the motion judge improperly relied on conflict with the Children’s Aid Society and failed to properly consider her suitability and the feasibility of a home study.

The court applied the deferential appellate standard for factual and discretionary decisions in family and child protection matters, emphasizing that appellate intervention requires a palpable and overriding error.

The evidence supported the motion judge’s concerns about the appellant’s lack of cooperation with the Society, incomplete background checks, and the likelihood that adding her as a party would unduly delay proceedings affecting the children’s stability.

Finding no palpable and overriding error, the court dismissed the appeal.

Following the breakdown of a common-law relationship, the court determined issues relating to child support for a child of the relationship.

The central issue was the income of a self‑employed electrician operating an unprofitable business and whether income should be imputed under s. 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines for intentional underemployment.

Applying the principles from Drygala v. Panli and Riel v. Holland, the court held that a support payor cannot pursue unrealistic or unproductive career aspirations to the detriment of child support obligations.

Income was imputed beginning in 2010 at a level consistent with the payor’s earning capacity as an employed electrician.

Retroactive child support arrears were ordered and ongoing support set based on the imputed income, with proportional sharing of future section 7 expenses.