Salvatore Garcea

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a child protection application regarding a four-year-old child.

The society sought a supervision order placing the child with the mother, while the paternal grandmother and father sought custody.

The court found the child in need of protection based on a risk of emotional harm under s. 74(2)(h) of the CYFSA, stemming from the paternal family's high-conflict and alienating behaviours towards the mother.

The court found no risk of physical harm from the mother.

Concluding that the mother was a capable and loving parent who would foster the child's relationship with the paternal family, the court awarded sole custody to the mother and granted specified parenting time to the father.

The respondent mother brought a motion to reinstate her time-sharing with the child, D.J., as per an existing temporary order.

The applicant father had unilaterally suspended time-sharing due to concerns about D.J.'s vulnerability to COVID-19, given his special medical needs.

The court applied the "material change in circumstances" test under the Children's Law Reform Act and found that the COVID-19 pandemic, while serious, did not, by itself, constitute a material change justifying the suspension of in-person parenting time.

The court emphasized that general fears are insufficient and that each parent's ability to mitigate risks must be assessed.

Finding the respondent mother to be a responsible parent who was taking appropriate precautions, the court dismissed the applicant's position and ordered the immediate reinstatement of the respondent's time-sharing as per the original temporary order.

The respondent father brought a motion to enroll the parties' four-year-old child in a public school in Dundas, Ontario, while the applicant mother brought a cross-motion to enroll the child in Jarvis, Ontario.

The parties shared equal parenting time under a temporary order, but lived an hour apart.

The court applied the best interests of the child test, focusing on stability and the child's status quo.

Finding that the child's ordinary residence had historically been Dundas and that the father's plan offered more stability with fewer unsettling features, the court granted the father's motion and ordered the child enrolled in Dundas.

The Children's Aid Society of Hamilton brought a motion for summary judgment within a Status Review Application, seeking extended society care for three children (aged 16, 11, and 3) due to the parents' ongoing issues with alcohol abuse, mental health, domestic violence, and inability to meet the children's needs.

The parents failed to file responding materials or attend the motion.

The court granted the motion, finding the children remained in need of protection and that extended society care was in their best interests, with discretionary access for the two older children to the parents and all siblings, but no access for the youngest child to the parents to facilitate adoption.

This is a costs decision arising from a custody and access appeal concerning three children.

The father's appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on all four grounds.

The court awarded the mother costs fixed at $25,000, representing 60-70% of her actual costs.

The decision addresses the presumption of costs in favour of successful parties in family law matters, the application of the Family Law Rules cost framework, and the impact of unreasonable conduct by both parties.

The court also addressed costs related to an unsuccessful appeal to the Divisional Court, declining to award costs for that stage due to the confusing nature of family law appeal routes in Ontario.

The appellant father appealed a custody and access order from the Superior Court of Justice concerning his three sons.

The motions judge granted summary judgment in favour of the respondent mother, awarding her sole custody of two of the three children and ordering that the father's access and communication with the children be at the children's discretion.

The father challenged the appropriateness of summary judgment, the weight given to the custody assessment, the best interests analysis, and alleged Charter violations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's decision to proceed by summary judgment, his consideration of the evidence, his analysis of the children's best interests, and his costs award.

The appellant father appealed a final custody and access order to the Divisional Court.

The panel raised the issue of jurisdiction, noting that the order was made in a proceeding where both parties sought a divorce.

Under section 27 of the Children's Law Reform Act, claims for custody and access are stayed in favour of the Divorce Act when a divorce is claimed.

Because the order was made under the Divorce Act, the appeal route lies to the Court of Appeal under section 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, not the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court found the father had a meritorious appeal regarding the termination of his access and transferred the appeal to the Court of Appeal pursuant to section 110(1) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicant father brought a motion for summary judgment seeking sole custody of his three children and an order forcing them into a reunification program (Family Bridges) with a 90-day no-contact period with the respondent mother.

The mother brought a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking sole custody and access at the children's discretion.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, concluding that the children's refusal to see their father was a justified estrangement resulting from his past violence, rather than parental alienation by the mother.

The court respected the strong and consistent views and preferences of the children, dismissed the father's motion, and granted the mother's motion for sole custody with access at the children's discretion.

During a child protection trial involving allegations of sexual abuse, the parents moved for a mistrial after the presiding judge raised concerns that the Society's counsel had inadvertently undermined the credibility of the key witness, a vulnerable 17-year-old complainant, during examination-in-chief.

The judge granted the mistrial, finding that it was impossible to rule out that the witness's subsequent testimony was affected and that a reasonable apprehension of bias would arise if the trial continued, thereby compromising fairness to the parties and the integrity of the court process.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society of Hamilton brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order of Crown wardship with no access for an eight-month-old child.

The parents, who both have profound cognitive delays, opposed the motion and sought to have the child returned to their care or placed with the maternal grandparents.

Relying on a previous parenting capacity assessment and current evidence of the parents' inability to safely care for the child, the court found no genuine issue for trial.

The court granted the motion, finding the child in need of protection and ordering Crown wardship with no access for the purpose of adoption.

The child protection agency brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order that the child be made a Crown Ward without access to the biological parents.

The mother opposed the motion and requested that the matter proceed to trial, while the father was in default and did not participate.

Applying Family Law Rule 16 and the test for summary judgment in child protection proceedings, the court held there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

Evidence from a parenting capacity assessment and consistent observations of social workers demonstrated that the mother had not developed the ability to safely parent despite extensive services and supports.

The court concluded that the child’s best interests required permanent Crown wardship without access to allow prompt adoption.

The parents appealed a summary judgment order making their child a Crown ward without access for the purpose of adoption.

The child had been in care for her entire life (23 months) and the statutory time limit for temporary wardship had lapsed.

The Divisional Court upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no genuine issue for trial regarding the child's best interests, noting the father's ongoing substance abuse and criminal issues, and the mother's lack of insight into the risk he posed.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the application judge erred in applying the Miglin test and that there was inadequate disclosure by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge properly applied the Miglin test.

The Court also held that the respondents made proper documentary disclosure, and the appellant's failure to review the documents or seek legal advice did not render the disclosure inadequate.

The moving parties, the parents of a child made a Crown ward, sought to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing their appeal for failure to perfect, and requested an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The respondent Children's Aid Society argued the court lacked jurisdiction because the child had already been placed for adoption following the Registrar's dismissal.

The Divisional Court held that the placement of the child for adoption overrides the opportunity for a review of the Registrar's order under Rule 61.16(5), subject to the child's best interests.

Finding that further delay in permanent placement would not be in the child's best interests, the court dismissed the motion.

The Children's Lawyer appealed an order requiring it to prepare a report and mandating that the report be authored by a different worker than the one who prepared a previous report.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the judge of first instance lacked jurisdiction to require a report to be made or to dictate which designated worker must author it.

The Court held that while a judge may request a different worker, it remains for The Children's Lawyer to decide whether to participate on those terms.

The father brought a motion to stay an order making his child a Crown ward with no access, pending his appeal.

The child had been apprehended multiple times and placed in foster care.

The court dismissed the motion to stay the Crown wardship, finding it was not in the child's best interests.

However, the court granted a stay of the no-access order, allowing the father supervised access pending the appeal, as he posed no risk and temporary access would not impair future placement opportunities.