R. J. Mazza

The applicant sought Crown wardship for five children who had been apprehended due to domestic violence and physical discipline.

The mother, a victim of domestic violence, consented to Crown wardship with access, recognizing her limitations in caring for the children.

The father sought the return of the children to his care.

The court found that the father had not sufficiently addressed his emotionally and physically abusive parenting style and posed a risk of harm to the children.

The court ordered that the four youngest children be made Crown wards with access, while the oldest child remain in the father's care subject to supervision.

The applicant father brought a motion for summary judgment seeking sole custody of his three children and an order forcing them into a reunification program (Family Bridges) with a 90-day no-contact period with the respondent mother.

The mother brought a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking sole custody and access at the children's discretion.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, concluding that the children's refusal to see their father was a justified estrangement resulting from his past violence, rather than parental alienation by the mother.

The court respected the strong and consistent views and preferences of the children, dismissed the father's motion, and granted the mother's motion for sole custody with access at the children's discretion.

The Catholic Children’s Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion for Crown wardship without access for the child P-J.S-M. The mother, M.S., supported the paternal grandmother's (K.N.) plan of care, while the father, R.M., was noted in default.

The Society argued K.N. was unsuitable due to her history of non-cooperation and inability to protect the child from R.M.'s violent behavior.

K.N. contended the Society failed its duty to conduct a kin assessment.

The court found the Society had justifiable reasons not to conduct a kin assessment, citing R.M.'s aggressive behavior, K.N.'s past defense of him, and the inadequacy of her safety plan.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and that access would impair the child's future adoption opportunities.

In a child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act, the Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking findings that the child was in need of protection and requesting Crown wardship without access.

Evidence demonstrated a prolonged history of parental substance abuse, domestic violence, criminal involvement, and failure to engage with child protection services, as well as prior Crown wardship orders for the parents’ other children.

The parents did not participate meaningfully in the proceeding and failed to present evidence establishing any realistic prospect of improved parenting capacity.

Applying the summary judgment standard in child protection matters, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and concluded that the child’s best interests required permanence without delay.

Crown wardship without access was ordered.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, several extended family members brought a motion seeking party status to advance a kinship placement plan.

The court applied the test for adding parties established in Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. H.(S.), considering the child’s best interests, delay, necessity for determination of issues, and whether the proposed party could advance a viable care plan.

The court found that the proposed caregiver being assessed for placement had a legal interest and that her participation was necessary to determine the appropriate placement of the child.

However, other relatives who supported the plan but were only in a transitional caregiving role were not necessary parties.

The court therefore granted party status to the proposed caregiver only and dismissed the motion as it related to the other relatives.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, counsel for a sibling sought to add the sibling as a party to the proceeding concerning a younger child.

The court applied the criteria set out in Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. H.(S.) for adding a party in child protection litigation, including best interests of the child, potential delay, necessity for determining the issues, the ability to present a plan of care, and legal interest.

The court found the moving party had minimal contact with the child and no meaningful existing relationship beyond a biological connection.

Adding the sibling would likely delay the proceeding and was unnecessary for determining access issues that could be raised by existing parties.

The court concluded the criteria were not met and declined to add the sibling as a party.

The respondent brought a motion for leave to appeal a case conference order made in a family law proceeding.

At the case conference, the judge ordered the matrimonial home listed for sale and froze the respondent’s RRSP except for payments required to maintain the mortgage.

The moving party argued the orders were made without instructions or consent and were beyond the court’s authority at a conference under Rule 17(8) of the Family Law Rules.

The court held that notice of the requested orders had been given and that the evidence before the conference judge justified asset preservation orders.

The court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the order and dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

The applicant brought a motion to temporarily vary an existing custody arrangement so that the children would primarily reside with him pending trial.

The respondent opposed the request, disputing allegations regarding school attendance and safety concerns related to her household.

The court focused primarily on the children’s best interests and their consistent attendance at school.

Given the proximity of the applicant’s residence to the children’s school and the pattern of lateness when they resided with the respondent, the court found that temporary residence with the applicant would provide greater stability.

The order was made without prejudice pending the scheduled trial, and child support was temporarily terminated.

A motion to change an earlier custody order proceeded as a trial of an issue concerning whether joint custody remained workable.

The moving party sought sole custody on the basis that the parties were unable to communicate or make joint decisions about the child’s medical treatment, schooling, religious upbringing, and other major issues.

Evidence included testimony from witnesses and a report from the Office of the Children’s Lawyer recommending sole custody to the primary caregiver.

The court found a material change in circumstances and concluded that joint custody had become unworkable due to persistent conflict and inability to cooperate.

Sole custody was granted to the moving party with ongoing access for the other parent and additional conditions regarding the child’s medical treatment and access schedule.

In a child protection proceeding under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act, the court determined the temporary placement of three children.

The mother sought placement of all children with the maternal grandmother, citing allegations by one child that the father possessed weapons, used drugs, and engaged in abusive conduct.

The father denied the allegations and relied on a recent access order and a child protection worker’s investigation finding no safety concerns in his home.

The court found the allegations inconsistent with recent positive access experiences and unsupported by evidence.

A temporary order placed two children with their biological father under supervision and one child with the maternal grandparents under supervision.

The moving party brought a motion to change seeking to vary a prior custody order so that the child could reside with him in a different community.

The court found that a material change in circumstances existed because the moving party had relocated and the teenage child had expressed a wish to live with him.

Applying the best interests analysis from Gordon v Goertz, the court considered the child’s wishes, stability of the current living environment, schooling, community ties, and the parents’ ability to meet the child’s needs.

The court determined that relocating the child would cause significant disruption and that the current custodial arrangement with the responding parent offered greater stability.

The motion to change was dismissed, with minor adjustments to the access provisions due to the parties’ geographic distance.

The responding party to the original family proceeding brought a motion to change seeking termination of spousal support on the basis that the recipient had begun cohabiting with a new partner and that her financial circumstances had improved.

The other party brought a cross‑motion seeking increased spousal support and increased child support based on the payor’s higher income.

The court found that the evidence did not establish permanent cohabitation amounting to a material change in circumstances and dismissed the request to terminate spousal support.

Child support was increased based on the payor’s 2014 income and proportional sharing of section 7 expenses was adjusted according to the parties’ respective incomes.

The court declined to impute income to the support recipient and set revised spousal support effective January 1, 2016, with termination scheduled for December 31, 2019.

The applicant children’s aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a Crown wardship order without access in relation to three children.

The respondents opposed the motion, arguing the society’s affidavit evidence contained hearsay, relied on unidentified sources, and improperly incorporated medical opinions based on second-hand information.

The court reviewed the affidavits and medical reports and concluded that significant issues remained regarding admissibility, credibility, and the reliability of conclusions drawn from third‑party information.

The court also noted concerns that the mother’s proposed care plan may have been rejected without sufficient consideration.

The court held that the society had not established that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

In a child protection summary judgment motion under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act, the society sought Crown Wardship without access for a child who had been in care since birth.

The court held there was no genuine issue for trial as against either the mother or the maternal grandmother, finding the evidence showed ongoing concerns about domestic violence, failure to protect, instability, and the absence of a sufficiently secure and permanent kin placement.

Applying the statutory best interests factors, the court concluded that delay would be harmful and that the proposed family placements did not provide the necessary permanency.

The court also held that continued access would not be beneficial and meaningful from the child’s perspective and would likely impair future adoption opportunities.

On a motion to change a temporary custody and access order, the applicant sought permission to relocate the children from Hamilton to Wasaga Beach after securing better full-time employment.

Applying the two-step mobility framework from Gordon v Goertz and s. 29 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court found a material change in circumstances and concluded the move was in the children’s best interests.

The responding party relied largely on unsupported allegations already rejected in prior proceedings and offered no compelling evidence that the relocation would harm the children.

The motion was granted, the access exchange location was revised to a half-way point, and the existing order remained temporary.

The applicant father brought an application under the Hague Convention seeking the return of his three-year-old child to California.

The respondent mother had travelled to Ontario with the child with the father's consent but later refused to return.

The court found that the child was not wrongfully removed, as the initial travel was consensual.

Furthermore, the father's subsequent action of shredding the mother's US immigration papers constituted active acquiescence to the child remaining in Ontario.

The court also held that returning the child to California would expose him to a grave risk of harm due to the mother's inability to re-enter the US and the child's special medical needs.

The application was dismissed.

The children's aid society sought Crown wardship with no access for three children who had been apprehended due to severe neglect, unsanitary living conditions, and failure to thrive.

The mother, who struggled with mental health and addiction issues, did not participate in the trial.

The father sought return of the children, proposing to parent them with his new partner, a recovering alcoholic with a history of child welfare involvement.

The court found the children in need of protection, noting the father's passivity, poor judgment, and inability to recognize or address the children's basic needs.

Concluding that the father could not provide adequate care and that access would impair the children's opportunities for adoption, the court ordered Crown wardship with no access for all three children.

Addendum to a family law judgment clarifying additional terms relating to parenting access, reimbursement of mediation and legal consultation fees, transfer of a motor vehicle, and continuation of benefits coverage.

The court confirmed that access would proceed in accordance with previously agreed Minutes of Settlement.

The applicant was ordered to reimburse the respondent for mediation costs and potentially legal consultation fees if undisputed.

The applicant was also directed to transfer his interest in a vehicle to the respondent and to maintain benefit coverage for the children and the respondent until the divorce was finalized.

The applicant father sought to prevent the respondent mother from relocating to the Netherlands with their two young children.

The mother argued she could not find suitable employment in the Hamilton area and had a job offer and family support in the Netherlands.

The court applied the mobility framework from Gordon v. Goertz, focusing on the children's best interests and the maximum contact principle.

The court found that both parents were highly involved and capable, and that moving the children to the Netherlands would drastically reduce their contact with the father, which was not in their best interests.

The court denied the move to the Netherlands but permitted the mother to seek employment elsewhere in Ontario or Canada, excluding New Brunswick and Nova Scotia.

The court also made orders for joint custody, access, child support, and spousal support.

In a family law trial limited to monetary claims for equalization and post-separation adjustments, the court resolved numerous financial disputes between the parties.

The court found that the respondent was solely responsible for the aborted sale of the matrimonial home and that the applicant signed an agreement to pay her $125,000 under duress, rendering it invalid.

The court also adjudicated claims regarding staging costs, valuation of jewellery, the applicant's purchase of a Mercedes-Benz using joint funds, and numerous withdrawals from joint bank accounts, ordering various reimbursements based on the available evidence.