James Mountford

The father brought a motion for the reinstatement of parenting time, which the mother had unilaterally suspended.

The mother also filed affidavits from the children, which were later withdrawn.

The court found that the mother's unilateral suspension of the court-ordered parenting schedule was unacceptable and that any changes to a court order must be sought through a formal Motion to Change.

The court ordered the immediate reinstatement of the parenting schedule from a 2013 order and dismissed the father's request for make-up time.

The mother was ordered to pay costs to the father due to her unreasonable conduct, including her failure to follow a court order and the improper filing of children's affidavits.

This motion concerned a father's urgent request to enforce a pre-existing time-sharing arrangement for his five-year-old son, Zachary, during the COVID-19 pandemic, which the mother had suspended due to concerns about the child's asthma and the father's essential worker status.

The mother brought a cross-motion to formally suspend the father's in-person access.

The court deemed the matter urgent due to the prolonged denial of access.

The court dismissed the mother's motion to suspend access, finding that the father's detailed adherence to COVID-19 safety protocols as an essential service plumber was sufficient to mitigate risks, and that maintaining physical contact was in the child's best interest.

The court also dismissed the father's motion for a finding of contempt against the mother and his request for timelines to initiate a motion to change custody.

The existing time-sharing order was reinstated, and the father was granted make-up access time, with both parents ordered to strictly follow public health guidelines.

The respondent father brought a motion seeking to reinstate face-to-face access with his five-year-old child, which the applicant mother had suspended due to COVID-19 concerns.

The court, acting as Triage Judge, made a preliminary determination that the matter was "potentially urgent" given the suspension of a long-standing time-sharing arrangement.

The court set a schedule for the filing of responding and reply materials and provided guidance on the general principles for parenting issues during COVID-19, emphasizing cooperation and child-focused problem-solving.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, several extended family members brought a motion seeking party status to advance a kinship placement plan.

The court applied the test for adding parties established in Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. H.(S.), considering the child’s best interests, delay, necessity for determination of issues, and whether the proposed party could advance a viable care plan.

The court found that the proposed caregiver being assessed for placement had a legal interest and that her participation was necessary to determine the appropriate placement of the child.

However, other relatives who supported the plan but were only in a transitional caregiving role were not necessary parties.

The court therefore granted party status to the proposed caregiver only and dismissed the motion as it related to the other relatives.

In a child protection motion under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act, the Society sought a temporary supervision order while leaving the children in the parents’ care, with drug testing as a central term.

The court accepted that some anonymous and collateral reports deserved limited weight, and that many proposed supervisory terms were overbroad, but found the family’s recent and documented history of parental drug abuse, deception, treatment attendance, and renewed reports of use created a probable risk of harm absent court-ordered supervision.

Applying the temporary protection standard and the least intrusive placement principle, the court held the children could remain with the parents under supervision rather than be removed.

Random drug testing for both parents was ordered as a cornerstone term of supervision.

The applicant children's aid society brought a summary judgment motion seeking an order that a child be found in need of protection and made a Crown ward without access.

The respondent parents, who had significant cognitive limitations and a history of having four other children made Crown wards, opposed the motion.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the parents failed to respond meaningfully to the society's evidence regarding their inability to parent.

The court granted the summary judgment, finding the child in need of protection and ordering Crown wardship without access.

The parents appealed a summary judgment order declaring their child a Crown ward without access.

They argued the motions judge erred by admitting past parenting capacity assessments and that the summary judgment rule in child protection cases violated section 7 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the assessments were expressly admissible under the Child and Family Services Act and declining to hear the Charter challenge as it was raised for the first time on appeal without an evidentiary foundation.