Susan Sullivan

The maternal grandparents moved to be added as parties to a child protection application concerning their grandchildren, D.C. and E.C., and sought access.

The children had been removed from the mother's care due to severe sexual abuse by her boyfriend and deplorable living conditions.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society and the father opposed the motion, arguing the children were thriving with the father, adding parties would cause delay, and the grandparents lacked insight into the abuse.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that adding the grandparents was not in the children's best interests, would increase conflict, and their proposed plan was not realistic given the children's current stable placement with their biological father.

The applicant Society brought a motion under section 74 of the Child and Family Services Act for the production of the respondent mother's mental health records from various non-parties.

The mother consented to the records being produced to the Society but requested that they be vetted for relevance before being disclosed to the respondent grandmother and counsel for the children.

The court declined to vet the records, finding them clearly relevant to the child protection concerns, and ordered the Society to disclose the records to all parties, subject to conditions protecting the mother's privacy interests.

In a child protection proceeding, the maternal grandmother and step-grandfather brought a motion for access to their five-year-old grandchild.

The mother had terminated their access after the child's father was arrested for alleged sexual offences against the child, believing the grandmother had coached the child's disclosure.

The Society took no position on the motion.

Applying the Chapman principles, the court found that a positive grandparent-grandchild relationship existed and that the mother's decision to terminate access was arbitrary and contrary to the child's best interests.

The court granted temporary access, initially supervised.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, several extended family members brought a motion seeking party status to advance a kinship placement plan.

The court applied the test for adding parties established in Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. H.(S.), considering the child’s best interests, delay, necessity for determination of issues, and whether the proposed party could advance a viable care plan.

The court found that the proposed caregiver being assessed for placement had a legal interest and that her participation was necessary to determine the appropriate placement of the child.

However, other relatives who supported the plan but were only in a transitional caregiving role were not necessary parties.

The court therefore granted party status to the proposed caregiver only and dismissed the motion as it related to the other relatives.

In a child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, an incarcerated caregiver sought to adjourn a scheduled Crown wardship trial until after her release from custody, arguing she required additional time to demonstrate personal progress and prepare her case for the return of the children or alternative kin placement.

The child protection agency opposed the adjournment, emphasizing the statutory timelines governing child protection proceedings and the children’s need for stability and permanency.

The court held that the paramount purpose of the legislation requires prioritizing the best interests of the children over a parent’s litigation interests.

Given the lengthy period the children had already spent in care and the statutory limits on wardship timelines, the proposed delay would undermine the objectives of timely permanency planning.

The motion to adjourn the trial was dismissed.

In a child protection proceeding, the Children’s Aid Society brought a motion under s. 54 of the Child and Family Services Act seeking an order requiring the respondents to undergo a risk assessment by a specified expert.

The court dismissed the motion and later considered whether costs should be awarded against the Society.

The mother sought costs alleging unreasonable conduct by the Society, including insufficient evidence for the assessment and procedural unfairness.

Applying the principles governing costs against child protection agencies under the Family Law Rules and the Courts of Justice Act, the court held that although the Society was unsuccessful, it had acted cautiously and in good faith in pursuing the assessment given the history of domestic violence and child protection concerns.

The court concluded the Society’s conduct was not patently unfair or indefensible and declined to award costs.