Thomas W.G. Pratt

The accused was convicted of possession of proceeds of crime and money laundering after receiving $348,751.57 from a sophisticated phishing fraud and immediately dispersing the funds.

The Crown sought 30 months' incarceration, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, noting the significant impact on the corporate victim and the accused's rapid diversion of the funds.

The accused was sentenced to 18 months' incarceration, two years' probation, and ordered to pay $348,751.57 in restitution.

The accused, Fattah Abdel, was charged with possession of money obtained by an indictable offence and transferring money with intent to conceal or convert it, knowing it was derived from a designated offence, contrary to section 462.31(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that Abdel received illicit funds totaling $348,751.57, which were obtained through an email hacking fraud committed against Air Palace and Rotor Maxx.

Abdel deposited these funds into a company account he controlled and then quickly dispersed them via bank drafts to pay off his personal and business debts.

He provided conflicting and false explanations for the funds' origin to his business partners.

The court found Abdel guilty on both counts, concluding that he either had actual knowledge that the funds were illicit or was wilfully blind to their illicit nature, given the unusual transaction, his desperate financial circumstances, and his deceptive actions.

The paternal grandmother brought a motion to be added as a party to the continuing divorce action between the parents, where the father's access was the primary issue.

The grandmother had been supervising the father's access and argued she should be a party because her status as a supervisor was in dispute.

Both the mother and the father opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that being a supervisor is not a substantive right and that adding the grandmother would needlessly complicate the proceedings.

Costs of $1,000 were awarded to the mother.

On a motion to change a temporary custody and access order, the applicant sought permission to relocate the children from Hamilton to Wasaga Beach after securing better full-time employment.

Applying the two-step mobility framework from Gordon v Goertz and s. 29 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court found a material change in circumstances and concluded the move was in the children’s best interests.

The responding party relied largely on unsupported allegations already rejected in prior proceedings and offered no compelling evidence that the relocation would harm the children.

The motion was granted, the access exchange location was revised to a half-way point, and the existing order remained temporary.

The court determined costs following competing family law motions for temporary relief.

The responding party sought various interim orders including increased spousal support, rental income sharing, and enforcement-related relief, while the applicant and additional respondents brought a counter-motion for questioning and an affidavit of documents.

The court found that each side achieved partial success on different issues, including reimbursement of certain s. 7 expenses and a business valuation order in favour of the responding party, while other claims were unsuccessful.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court held that success was divided and that certain issues should have been resolved without court intervention.

In the circumstances, no order as to costs was appropriate.

The applicant filed a duty of fair representation complaint against the union, alleging it failed to properly investigate a grievance and coerced him into signing minutes of settlement regarding his termination.

The union and the intervenor employer brought preliminary motions to dismiss the application for failing to plead a prima facie case.

The Board found that even if the applicant's allegations were true, the union's conduct during the settlement negotiations did not violate the Act, as the applicant had the option to refuse the settlement and proceed to arbitration.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant union alleged a sale of a business from Ontario Place Corporation to MCA Concerts Canada, claiming MCA was bound by a collective agreement as a successor employer.

The Board determined as a preliminary issue whether a collective bargaining relationship existed between the union and Ontario Place Corporation.

The Board found that the historical arrangement for supplying stagehands and lighting personnel was a sub-contracting relationship for specialized technical services, not a collective bargaining relationship.

The letter agreements lacked standard collective agreement language and were seasonal.

Consequently, the application was dismissed.

The union applied for certification to represent stagehands and sought a declaration that the three corporate respondents constituted a single employer under section 1(4) of the Labour Relations Act.

The Board granted the single employer declaration, finding the respondents were engaged in associated or related businesses under common control.

However, applying the seven-factor true employer test, the Board found that the respondents were not the employer of the stagehands working on the application date, as direction, control, and the ultimate burden of remuneration rested with the third-party producer of the theatrical production.

Consequently, the certification application was dismissed.

The applicant employer suspended two full-time employees and requested the respondent union to refer replacement employees pursuant to the collective agreement.

The union refused, asserting the employer had no right to suspend the employees.

The employer applied to the Board under section 92 of the Labour Relations Act, alleging the union's refusal constituted an unlawful strike or a threat of an unlawful strike.

The Board dismissed the application, finding no actual work stoppage or threat of one, as the suspended employees continued to work and the core dispute was a matter of collective agreement interpretation appropriate for arbitration.

The applicant trade union applied for certification.

The Board raised the issue of whether section 13 of the Labour Relations Act prohibited certification because the applicant's local constitution restricted membership to citizens of the United States or Canada.

The Board found that while the local constitution contained a citizenship requirement, the parent union's constitution prohibited discrimination on the basis of national origin and expressly prevailed over inconsistent local provisions.

Therefore, the applicant was not governed by a requirement restricting membership to citizens and was not prohibited from certification under section 13.

The matter was relisted to determine the appropriate bargaining unit.