Michael P. Clarke

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order and a costs order made by the lower court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

No costs were awarded on the leave motion.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order requiring him to disclose certain information.

He had also brought a separate motion before the motion judge to correct a mistake in the same order pursuant to rule 25(19)(b) of the Family Law Rules.

The Divisional Court held that the leave to appeal motion was premature and adjourned it until the motion to correct the order was decided and finalized.

The moving party sought an extension of time to bring a motion for leave to appeal an order requiring him to produce corporate financial disclosure and pay costs in a family law proceeding.

The responding party opposed the extension, arguing the moving party lacked a firm intention to appeal and was simultaneously pursuing a motion to change the order.

The court applied the four-part test for extending time and found that the moving party had formed a bona fide intention to appeal within the time limit, there was no prejudice to the responding party, the delay was explained by a change of counsel, and the proposed appeal had some merit.

The motion for an extension of time was granted.

The applicant's motion to change was dismissed, and the respondent sought costs of $185,000 on a full indemnity basis.

The court found the respondent was the successful party and entitled to costs.

The court determined that costs should be awarded on a partial indemnity scale, noting the complexity of the issues and the amount at stake.

After adjusting the hourly rates and reducing the time claimed for preparation and trial, the court fixed the respondent's costs at $134,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The applicant sought to vary a spousal support order, arguing a material change due to the respondent's significantly increased income.

The respondent resisted, denying a material change or seeking a reduction.

The court found a material change in circumstances but dismissed the applicant's request for a substantial increase in fixed spousal support, upholding the original formula-based order.

The court also interpreted the definition of 'incentive employment income' for bonus calculations, finding only one minor item qualified.

Following a six-day trial regarding custody and school choice, the successful applicant mother sought full indemnity costs of $54,001.06.

The court found that the applicant's offers to settle did not trigger full recovery costs under Rule 18(14) because they included predetermined costs penalties.

The court also found that while the self-represented respondent's behaviour was unreasonable, it did not meet the high threshold for bad faith under Rule 24(8).

Balancing success, unreasonable behaviour, and proportionality, the court ordered the respondent to pay costs fixed at $32,000.

The Applicant mother sought sole custody and decision-making authority for the parties' child, Grace, including the choice of school.

The Respondent father, who was self-represented, also sought sole custody and proposed a different French-only school.

While child support and timesharing were settled by consent, the trial proceeded on the issues of sole custody and schooling.

The court found the Respondent's behavior to be uncooperative, controlling, and detrimental to co-parenting, citing instances of unilateral decision-making, defiance of court orders, and hostility towards the Applicant.

The court granted the Applicant sole custody and decision-making authority, including the right to enroll the child in a French Immersion program at a school near her residence, finding this to be in the child's best interests given the Respondent's conduct and the Applicant's child-focused approach.

Following a family law motion concerning parenting time for an infant child, the court addressed liability for costs.

The responding party on the motion sought full recovery costs on the basis that he had been more successful overall, while the other party argued that success was mixed and that any costs should be minimal.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and the discretionary principles under s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court found that both parties had adopted unreasonable positions and that the ultimate order represented a middle‑ground outcome.

The court also considered the absence of a formal offer to settle by the moving party and the limited financial means of the other party.

In these circumstances, the court exercised its discretion to order that each party bear their own costs.

The applicant spouse brought a motion for interim spousal support retroactive to shortly after separation in the context of a divorce proceeding.

The respondent opposed entitlement and brought a cross-motion for summary judgment seeking an equalization payment calculation and transfer of the matrimonial home.

Applying s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act and the principles in Bracklow v. Bracklow, the court held the applicant had established a prima facie entitlement to interim spousal support on a non-compensatory basis given the disparity in income and the economic hardship following separation.

Using the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, the court ordered interim support within the mid-range and set a presumptive commencement date based on MacKinnon v. MacKinnon.

The respondent’s motion for summary judgment regarding equalization and transfer of the matrimonial home was dismissed due to genuine issues requiring a trial.

In a family law trial limited to monetary claims for equalization and post-separation adjustments, the court resolved numerous financial disputes between the parties.

The court found that the respondent was solely responsible for the aborted sale of the matrimonial home and that the applicant signed an agreement to pay her $125,000 under duress, rendering it invalid.

The court also adjudicated claims regarding staging costs, valuation of jewellery, the applicant's purchase of a Mercedes-Benz using joint funds, and numerous withdrawals from joint bank accounts, ordering various reimbursements based on the available evidence.

In protracted matrimonial litigation, the responding party brought a motion to change prior court orders requiring him to maintain life insurance naming the children as beneficiaries with the other parent as trustee, and also sought reimbursement for alleged unpaid extraordinary expenses under a prior order allocating such expenses between the parties.

The court held that the motion to change lacked merit because the children remained dependants while pursuing university studies and child support obligations continued, making the life insurance requirement appropriate.

The court further found that most claimed extraordinary expenses were unsupported by evidence establishing that they were reasonable and necessary within the meaning of special expenses.

Only limited expenses related to tutoring and eye care were accepted as agreed between the parties.

The responding party’s broader reimbursement claims were dismissed.

The payor brought a motion to terminate or reduce spousal support ordered following the breakdown of a long-term common-law relationship.

The payor argued the recipient’s increased income and ability to subsist on reduced payments constituted a material change in circumstances.

The court held that although the recipient’s income had increased, it remained at subsistence level and did not amount to a material change sufficient to vary support.

The motion was dismissed and the original support order reinstated.

The court also ordered partial arrears after finding the payor failed to disclose his return to employment while continuing to pay reduced support through enforcement proceedings.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision refusing to order the respondent to pay a proportionate share of their daughter's tutoring expenses.

The Divisional Court found that the motion judge erred in law by failing to properly apply the definition of 'extraordinary expenses' under s. 7(1.1) of the Child Support Guidelines, specifically by not considering the appellant's income and ability to cover the expense.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for a rehearing.