SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
COURT FILE NO.: 389/02
DATE: 2012-06-07
RE: RAINA BHANDARI, Applicant
AND:
VINEET KUMAR BHANDARI, Respondent
BEFORE: MURRAY J.
COUNSEL:
Raina Bhandari, Self-Represented
Michael P. Clarke, Counsel for the Respondent
HEARD: June 4, 2012
ENDORSEMENT
[ 1 ] These motions arrive in court after lengthy and protracted matrimonial litigation. One might have hoped that the litigation might subside but regrettably it has not.
[ 2 ] In this motion the respondent, Vineet Bhandari, seeks:
an order changing the order of Justice Kruzick dated May 23, 2000 and the order of Justice Seppi dated June 6, 2003;
an order requesting the applicant, Raina Bhandari, to pay the sum of $9,575.71, plus interest and costs, with respect to her obligation to pay for extraordinary expenses pursuant to an order made by Justice Langdon on November 2, 2006.
The Motion to Change
[ 3 ] With respect to the first motion - the motion to change - the parties both agree that the orders of Justice Kruzick and Justice Seppi required that the respondent carry life insurance naming the children as beneficiaries and the applicant as trustee. The children of the marriage are: Sameera Bhandari, born May 1, 1991, and Archan Bhandari, born September 28, 1992.
[ 4 ] The orders of Justices Kruzick were incorporated into a separation agreement signed on June 17, 2001 in which each party agreed to "irrevocably designate the other as beneficiary in trust for the children of a life insurance policy in an amount not less than $400,000 for so long as either is required to pay child support pursuant to this agreement." It is not disputed that child support is still being paid as the two children are both in university and are both dependants.
[ 5 ] The position of the respondent is that both children are intelligent, responsible adults and would not require a trustee in the event that they receive life insurance proceeds as a result of the death of the respondent. It may be that the children are now intelligent adults. They remain dependants. Child support is still being paid. The motion to change is unmeritorious and is dismissed.
The Respondent's Motion for an Order to Compel Payment of Extraordinary Expenses by the Applicant
[ 6 ] The root of this problem is Justice Langdon's order of November 2, 2006 which, in paragraph 1, provided as follows:
In accordance with paragraph 3 of the Judgment of Mdm. Justice Seppi dated June 6, 2003 each party shall be responsible for the day-to-day expenses that arise when the children are in their care. Extraordinary expenses such as orthodontia, eyeglasses, school trips, overnight camp etc. shall be shared 62:38, respondent and applicant respectively.
[ 7 ] It is the respondent's claim - for which he seeks redress in this motion - that the applicant has not paid her share of various extraordinary expenses paid by him.
[ 8 ] The applicant agrees to contribute 38% of costs related to tutoring for the children and for costs related to their eye care. As a result, the applicant agrees to pay $1,786.95 (38% of $4,702.50 which is the amount spent by the respondent on tutoring) and $1,108.46 (38% of $2917, which is the amount spent by the respondent on eye care for the children).
[ 9 ] What remains in dispute? The respondent says he spent a total of $6,965.78 on computers and computer-related equipment for the children. He spent this money without any consultation with the applicant. There is no evidence other than that the money was spent. There is no evidence that the expenses were reasonable and necessary. Clearly, the onus is on a parent seeking special expenses to prove that the claimed expenses fall within one of the categories and are reasonable and necessary: Park v. Thompson (2005), 2005 14132 (ON CA) , 77 O.R. (3d) 601 (C.A.).
[ 10 ] Similarly, with respect to other expenses, including all items under the respondent's claims for 38% reimbursement for expenses he made related to university housing and university applications, there is no attempt by the respondent to prove that the claimed expenses are reasonable and necessary.
[ 11 ] The final heading for reimbursement is a general category called school supplies for which he asserts that he spent $4,235.04 and for which he claims reimbursement of 38% or $1,609.31. A review of this category of expenses makes it abundantly clear that the respondent's understanding of the meaning of the term “extraordinary expenses” was, to say the least, expansive. In his claim, he considers such matters as throwaway ballpoint pens, for which he paid $1.99, to be extraordinary expenses. Indeed, there are multiple claims for reimbursement for expenses incurred of less than $5.00. As with other claims noted above, there is no attempt by the respondent to prove that the claimed expenses are reasonable and necessary. Indeed it would be virtually impossible to do so. Hundreds of small expenses - none of which are extraordinary - do not aggregate to one recoverable extraordinary expense.
[ 12 ] Apart from the payments agreed to by the applicant, the respondent's motion is dismissed. It is ordered that the applicant pay to the respondent the sum of $4,433.94.
Costs
[ 13 ] The applicant indicated to me that she had made an offer to settle. If the parties are unable to agree on costs then she should provide me with a copy of the offer to settle. I have already entertained submissions with respect to the quantum of costs sought by each party. I do not require further submissions except on the implications of the offer to settle which was not accepted by the respondent. Therefore, in the event of no agreement on costs, I suggest the following:
the applicant should provide the respondent and the Court with a copy of her written offer to settle within 10 days after receipt of this decision, together with her submissions with respect to the implications of such offer; and
the respondent's counsel may make reply submissions within 10 days after receipt of the applicant’s submissions on costs;
MURRAY J.
Date: June 7, 2012

