CITATION: Khan v Shah, 2026 ONSC 273

COURT FILE NO.: FS-21-100157

DATE: 2026 04 16

BETWEEN:

MOHAMMAD SAJID KHAN

Applicant

– and –

SANAM SHAH

Respondent

Nav Shokar, for the applicant

Ramon Petgrave and Nicole Matthews, for the respondent

HEARD: January 13, 14, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, and 26, 2026

The Honourable justice Ranjan k. agarwal

1The applicant Mohammad Sajid Khan and the respondent Sanam Shah have two children, AK (age 19) and ZK (age 9). This family law case is about: (a) decision-making responsibility for ZK; (b) parenting time for ZK; (c) ancillary parenting orders; (d) child support; (e) special or extraordinary expenses; (f) retroactive child support; and (g) spousal support.

2The parties separated in 2019. There are three major events that underlie most of the issues here. First, Sanam was estranged from AK for several years. The parties lived together in the matrimonial home until May 2021. After they moved into separate homes, AK refused to have parenting time with Sanam. Second, a few months after moving out, Sanam was fired from her job. She has been on and off work ever since, and her income has decreased significantly. Third, ZK has a medical condition that requires weekly physio appointments and home exercises, and he must wear leg braces.

3Sanam alleges that Sajid is a controlling spouse, and that her actions or non-actions have been a response to his attempts to control her. Sajid alleges that Sanam has been a neglectful parent, as demonstrated by her inattention to the children’s needs.

4As I elaborate on below, the answer isn’t so clear-cut. Sajid has controlling tendencies. He wants to raise his children in a particular way and has strong ideas about their best interests. He believes that Sanam is a spend-thrift and lackadaisical about ZK’s condition. Sanam’s fear of alienating AK has driven many of her decisions, some of which haven’t been in ZK’s best interests. Because AK and ZK have a strong bond, she’s often disengaged from parenting ZK to avoid pushing away AK. And because Sajid takes up a lot of space in the children’s lives, she’s become much more passive, letting him take over parenting and decision-making for them.

5For the reasons discussed below, I conclude as follows:

(a) Sajid should have sole decision-making responsibility for ZK’s education, and the parties should have joint decision-making responsibility in the other areas;

(b) parenting time for ZK should be allocated on a 5-5-2-2 schedule;

(d) ZK’s private school tuition isn’t an extraordinary expense, so Sanam doesn’t have to share the cost;

(e) since 2021, the parties have had a shared parenting arrangement, meaning that Sajid is liable for retroactive child support;

(f) Sanam is liable for her share of the children’s section 7 expenses, which includes their retroactive private school tuition costs because she didn’t claim impecuniosity before the trial; and

(g) Sanam isn’t entitled to spousal support, either on a compensatory or non-compensatory basis.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

6Sajid and Sanam were married in September 2003. They separated in 2019 but continued to live, separate and apart, in the matrimonial home in Mississauga until May 2021.

7Sajid now lives in Brampton; Sanam lives in Mississauga with her father. Sajid and Sanam are around 20-25 minutes away from each other.

8There are two children of the marriage: AK, age 19, and ZK, age 9. AK is a first-year university student. ZK is in Grade 4 at Lynn-Rose School, a private school close to Sajid’s house. AK graduated from Lynn-Rose in Spring 2025.

9The parties don’t have a written parenting plan or interim parenting order. AK lives with Sajid, and commutes to school. He sees Sanam socially at Eid and birthdays, and when she transports ZK for parenting time. ZK’s “home base” is with Sajid. ZK has parenting time with Sanam every two days. During Sanam’s parenting time, Sajid is mainly responsible for ZK’s health appointments and extra-curricular activities.

10Sajid works for Royal Bank of Canada as a Regional Manager. Sanam is employed as an Early Childhood Assistant at Angus Valley Montessori School. She used to work for RBC Insurance until August 2021, when she was dismissed for cause.

11The parties self-identify as South Asian and Muslim, and the children are being raised as Muslims.

12There are some key events since the parties’ separation that provide context for the steps taken in this case and for the parties’ positions:

Date	Event
February 2019	the parties began living separate and apart in the matrimonial home
September 2019	Sajid started working from home
March 2020	COVID stay-at-home orders Sanam was an essential worker, and had to work in-person
May 2021	the matrimonial home was sold, and the parties started living separately Sanam moved to a 3-bedroom townhouse in the same neighbourhood Sajid moved into a detached home in Brampton the parties agreed on a two-day parenting schedule, but AK refused to have parenting time with Sanam
August 2021	Sanam’s employment with RBC Insurance was terminated
September 2021	the children started going to Lynn-Rose
January 2022	Sanam had a serious car accident
March 2022	Sanam started working at Billyard Insurance in Vaughan
October 2022	Sanam moved to a condo in Brampton
October 2023	Sanam moved with her father to a townhouse in Mississauga
February 2024	Sanam quit her job at Billyard Insurance
December 2024	Sanam started working at Angus Valley

B. Litigation History

13Sajid started this proceeding in April 2021. He claimed for child support, a parenting order for AK and ZK, and equalization of the parties’ net family properties. Sanam answered the case the next month. She made the same claims, and also requested spousal support.

14In July 2023, in response to a request from Kumaranayake J, the Office of the Children’s Layer filed a report under the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, s 112.

15At a case conference that same month, the parties agreed on a process for reunification therapy for AK. Sajid was required to provide the names of therapists covered by his insurance plan, and therapy would start by August 2023. Doi J granted Sanam leave to move for an interim parenting order after December 31, 2023, so that “reunification therapy for [AK] may unfold and hopefully remove the need for any further court intervention.” But Sanam didn’t pursue reunification therapy, and she didn’t move for a parenting order.

16In January 2025, the parties consented to an interim child support order:

Sajid shall pay 70 per cent of the children’s section 7 expenses
Sanam will pay $136.58 monthly to Sajid for life insurance, along with $2731.60 in retroactive payments for the policy
by March 2025, Sanam will pay, on a without prejudice basis, $14,355.60 to Sajid for retroactive section 7 expenses (tuition, health expenses, and extra-curricular expenses)
Sanam can’t deal with any of her assets without Sajid’s consent or a court order

17The trial was scheduled during the September 2025 trial sittings. It was called for trial in late October but didn’t proceed. In the interim, the parties settled equalization and, as I discuss, some decision-making responsibility issues.

C. The Trial Evidence

18The trial proceeded by way of oral evidence and filed exhibits. In addition to himself, Sajid called the following witnesses:

Emily Lund, ZK’s former physiotherapist
Michelle Lau, Lynn-Rose’s Head of Upper School
Nicole Dabrowski, Lynn-Rose’s Head of Lower School

As part of his case, Sajid read in excerpts from Sanam’s questioning. Sajid also relied on his request to admit.

19Sanam testified on her own behalf. She didn’t call any other witnesses.

20The parties cross-examined Shazeeda Haroon, the OCL’s clinical investigator.

21I found all the witnesses to be, for the most part, credible and reliable. Credibility and reliability are different. Credibility has to do with a witness’s veracity; reliability deals with the accuracy of the witness’s testimony. Reliability engages consideration of the witness’s ability to accurately observe, recall, and recount events in issue. Any witness whose evidence on an issue isn’t credible can’t give reliable evidence on the same point. Credibility, on the other hand, isn’t a proxy for reliability: a credible witness may give unreliable evidence. See R v GF, 2021 SCC 20, at para 82; R v HC, 2009 ONCA 56, at para 41.

22The factors relevant to assessing credibility and determining reliability include: (a) honesty; (b) an interest in the outcome of the proceeding; (c) accuracy and completeness of observations; (d) circumstances of the observations; (e) memory; (f) availability of other sources of information; (g) inherent reasonableness of the testimony; (h) internal consistency, and consistency with other evidence; and (i) demeanour. See David Watt & Jill D Makepeace, Watt’s Manual of Criminal Jury Instructions, 2026 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2026), at Final 14. See also Verma v Bhooi, 2025 ONSC 4260, at para 72.

23Ms. Lund was honest and straight-forward in her evidence. She was fair to all the parties, and she acknowledged the limits of her information or knowledge. Ms. Lau and Ms. Dabrowski were similarly honest. As I discuss below, my only issue with their evidence was that it showed a bias towards Sajid and therefore is unreliable.

24I’m persuaded that Sajid and Sanam tried to be honest in their evidence. That said, their interest in certain outcomes led them to underplay some events and embellish others. Sanam’s evidence was less reliable than Sajid’s. She couldn’t remember certain facts. More importantly, her evidence was often inconsistent. For example, she praised Sajid’s decision-making abilities for the children but later criticized his parenting skills. She often blamed others, like her lawyer or her doctor, for her failure to produce information.

25Sajid argues that I should draw an adverse inference against Sanam because of her failure to make financial disclosure or answer undertakings from questioning. She also redacted her bank records before producing them. This information isn’t relevant to the issues in dispute, so I don’t draw any inference from Sanam’s lack of disclosure. See, e.g., Conte v Pettle, 2024 ONCA 733, at para 12.

D. Preliminary Issue: did the parties settle decision-making responsibility?

26In October 2025, the parties consented to a final order on several issues, including decision-making responsibility:

[Sajid] and [Sanam] shall have joint decision-making responsibility and shall make important decisions about the child’s welfare…subject to the following:

a. the parties shall jointly make medical decisions concerning the Child, and in the event of disagreement, they shall abide by the recommendations of the treating doctors, therapists and physiotherapists.

The Child will be raised in the Islamic religion/faith.

27Sanam’s position is that the order expresses the parties’ intention to settle all decision-making responsibilities. Sajid responds that this order contains a mistake: the parties intended to resolve only decision-making responsibility over health and religion.

28At common law, trial judges have a broad discretion to rectify a mistake on “outcome-determinative matters” in their order. See SS&C Technologies Canada Corp. v The Bank of New York Mellon Corporation, 2024 ONCA 675, at paras 69-70, leave to appeal granted, 2025 35401 (SCC). After the order is entered, any judge can change an order, but only in limited circumstances, such as if there’s a mistake that undermines the order’s “manifest intention”. See Family Law Rules, r 25(19); Canadian Broadcasting Corp. v Manitoba, 2021 SCC 33, at para 33; Skrak v Skrak, 2025 ONSC 969, at paras 8-11.

29I agree with Sajid’s position. The order doesn’t accord with the parties’ manifest intention. As a result, I find that the order only resolves decision-making responsibility over health and religion.

30On September 23, 2025, Sajid offered to settle the case. Two days later, Sanam’s lawyer accepted some of the terms by email:

Section 2: Decision Making (Medical)

The Applicant Father and the Respondent Mother shall have joint decision-making responsibility and shall make important decisions about the child's welfare, namely, [ZK]…subject to the following:

a. The parties shall jointly make medical decisions concerning the Child, and in the event of disagreement, they shall abide by the recommendations of the treating doctors, therapists and physiotherapists.

Section 5: Decision Making (Religion)

The child will be raised in the Islamic religion/faith.

31Sajid accepted some other terms (e.g., holiday parenting time, information entitlement) offered by Sanam in further emails. The parties’ lawyers then drafted minutes of settlement, which consolidated their agreements. They also prepared a 14B motion for a consent order on the terms of their agreement.

32The minutes of settlement and the draft order don’t have the headings “Decision Making (Medical)” and “Decision Making (Religion)” from the offer to settle or the email acceptance. Even so, Sajid signed the minutes, and his lawyer signed the consent in early October.

33But Sajid’s lawyer’s email to the trial office two days later shows that she believed there was only a “partial resolution” of decision-making responsibilities, and education remained “outstanding”. Though Sanam’s lawyer identified other outstanding issues for trial, he didn’t challenge Sajid’s lawyer’s belief that there was only a “partial resolution”.

34The omission of the headings from the order undermines its intention. The interpretation of a court order must consider the text, context, and purpose of the order, based on: (a) the express language of the order; (b) the purpose of the terms of the order; (c) the authority to make the order, including the statutory context and procedural rules; (d) the broader context within which the order was granted; and (e) resolving apparent inconsistencies between different terms by reaching an interpretation that can reasonably give meaning to each of the terms in question. See Aizic v Natcan Trust Company, 2025 ONCA 719, at para 27.

35These rules, when applied to the entered order, might mean that the parties settled all areas of decision-making responsibility. One interpretation is that they agreed to joint responsibility in all areas, with the caveat that they will defer to the treating professional if they have a disagreement over health decisions.

36But, if the headings “Decision Making (Medical)” and “Decision Making (Religion)” are added to the order, the most reasonable interpretation is that the parties only resolved decision-making responsibility over health. First, headings can be a “valid indicator” of meaning. See Cytrynbaum v Look Communications Inc., 2013 ONCA 455, at para 40. Second, the order is arguably inconsistent without them: there’d be no reason for a separate section on religious decision-making if section 1 of the order was intended to cover all areas of decision-making responsibility as Sanam asserts.

37As a result, I endorse an order deleting sections 1 and 2 of the order of Tzimas RSJ, dated October 8, 2025. I endorse the following orders:

(a) the parties shall have joint decision-making responsibility of ZK in respect of (i) health; and (ii) culture, language, religion, and spirituality;

(b) if the parties cannot come to an agreement about a decision in respect of ZK’s health, they will follow the recommendations of the treating health care professional;

(c) both parties have the right to consult with, and obtain information and records directly from, ZK’s doctors, dentists, physiotherapist, or any other professionals involved with ZK’s health; and

(d) the parties shall raise ZK in the Islamic religion.

III. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION

38The issues in this case are:

(a) decision-making responsibility;

(b) parenting time;

(d) child support;

(e) section 7 expenses;

(f) retroactive child support;

(g) spousal support; and

(h) other miscellaneous issues.

A. Issue #1: decision-making responsibility

39Sajid requests an order that he and Sanam have joint decision-making responsibility over ZK’s education and extra-curricular activities, but that he can make the final decision if the parties disagree (effectively, sole decision-making responsibility after consultation). He also proposes that if he’s asking Sanam to pay part of the cost of a disputed activity, they’ll submit the issue to a parenting coordinator.

40Sanam agrees that she and Sajid should have joint decision-making responsibility, but she proposes that any disputes be decided by a parenting co-ordinator.

41As a result, the issues in dispute are: (a) whether Sajid should have the “final say” on decisions about education and extra-curricular activities; and (b) whether a parenting coordinator should be involved in extra-curricular decisions where Sanam is being asked to contribute to the cost and she refuses to do so.

42For the reasons discussed below, I order that:

(a) Sajid shall have sole decision-making responsibility over ZK’s education, after consulting with Sanam;

(b) Sanam shall make day-to-day decisions about ZK’s education during her parenting time;

(c) Sanam has the right to consult with, and obtain information, records, and report cards directly from, ZK’s teachers or any other professionals involved with ZK’s education; and

(d) Sajid and Sanam shall have joint decision-making responsibility over ZK’s significant extra-curricular activities.

1. Legal Framework

43This court may make an order for the exercise of decision-making responsibility for any child of the marriage, on application by either spouse. See Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 16.1(1)(a). Decision-making responsibility means making significant decisions about a child’s well-being, including for: (a) health; (b) education; (c) culture, language, religion, and spirituality; and (d) significant extra-curricular activities. See Divorce Act, s 2(1). Decision-making responsibility helps ensure that a parent’s relationship with their child isn’t marginalized. See Rigillo v Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 548, at para 12.

44The court may allocate decision-making responsibility for the child, or any aspect of that responsibility, to either spouse or to both spouses. See Divorce Act, ss 16.1(4)(b), 16.3. In deciding on the appropriate decision-making responsibility regime, the court must consider all possible frameworks, and not simply those proposed by the parties. The goal in crafting an appropriate decision-making regime is to promote the child’s “right to grow up within a parenting regime that is co-operative and effective, where decisions are made in a child-focused way and with the least amount of acrimony and stress.” See McBennett v Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610, at para 96, quoting JBH v TLG, 2014 ONSC 3569, at para 354.

45For the court to grant joint decision-making responsibility in some or all areas, there must be some evidence that the parties are able to communicate effectively in the areas under consideration for the sake of the child, despite their differences. The best interests of the child won’t be advanced if the parties can’t make important decisions about the child under a joint decision-making arrangement. In analyzing the ability of the parties to communicate, the court must delve below the surface and consider the source of the conflict. See McBennett, at para 97.

46The quality of each party’s past parenting and decision-making, both during the parties’ relationship and post-separation, is key to determining whether an order for joint decision-making in some or all areas is appropriate. See McBennett, at para 97.

47A party who has not been granted decision-making responsibility for “significant decisions about a child’s well-being” nonetheless supports the child’s life and retains a decision-making role in daily issues that can be equally important to the child’s overall well-being. See Divorce Act, s 16.2(2). This section protects children and parents who have parenting time with each other from attempts by the party granted decision-making authority respecting significant decisions to intrude upon or marginalize the role of the other parent. See McBennett, at para 80. The Divorce Act, s 16.4, establishes the right of parents who have been allocated parenting time to request and receive information about the child’s well-being, including their health and education.

48The court shall take into consideration “only the best interests of the child of the marriage in making a parenting order”. See Divorce Act, s 16(1). The court must consider the following factors in carrying out the “best interests” analysis:

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents, and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

(c) each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they can’t be ascertained;

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious, and spiritual upbringing and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child’s care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact; and

(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security, and well-being of the child.

49In considering these factors, the court is required to “give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being”. See Divorce Act, s 16(2).

50The list of factors isn’t a “checklist to be tabulated with the highest score winning”. See Phillips v Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480, at para 47. The “primary consideration” recognizes that there may be conflicts in attempting to weigh the enumerated criteria. Any such difficulties should be resolved by ensuring that the child’s physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being are promoted. See McBennett, at para 82.

51In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not consider the past conduct of any person unless that conduct is relevant to the exercise of their decision-making responsibility. See Divorce Act, s 16(5). In cases of family violence, particularly spousal violence, it is “crucial that the court consider whether a co-operative parenting arrangement is appropriate.” See Bell v Reinhardt, 2021 ONSC 3352, at para 15.

2. Evidence and Findings of Fact

i. Education

52Sajid and Sanam agreed that their children would have a private school education. At first, both children attended Rotherglen School, which was about 25mins from the matrimonial home. There’s no dispute that both parties played a role in the children’s education.

53After separation, AK, who was in Grade 6 at the time, continued to attend Rotherglen. ZK started preschool there in 2019. Because Sajid began working from home, he played a larger role in the children’s education, health, and extra-curricular activities. In March 2020, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the government made the first of several “stay-at-home” orders. As a result, the children were in virtual school. Because Sanam was considered an essential worker and couldn’t work from home, Sajid was mostly responsible for the children’s care during work hours. Though Sajid made decisions for the children’s education, health, and extra-curricular activities, Sanam nonetheless played a role because the parties were living together.

54After the parties sold the matrimonial home in May 2021, they agreed on a rotating two-day parenting schedule. But AK refused to have parenting time with Sanam.

55In September 2021, when AK was in Grade 9 and ZK was in Senior Kindergarten, the children started going to Lynn-Rose. The school was closer to Sajid’s new house. Though Sanam suggested that it was Sajid’s decision to move the children to Lynn-Rose, I find that it was a joint decision: Rotherglen doesn’t have a high school, and Sanam participated in the registration process for Lynn-Rose, including paying half the registration fee.

56Sajid’s evidence is that he’s the de facto sole decision-maker because Sanam has neglected the children’s educational needs. He does all the drop-offs and pick-ups. He attends the children’s parent-teacher interviews. He completes all the school forms. He’s the main point of contact for the admin and the children’s teachers. He’s head of the parent association. Sanam only started attending school activities with any consistency in September 2025.

57Sanam doesn’t dispute these facts. Her involvement in the children’s school life is minimal. But she says that her actions must be viewed in the context of: (a) Sajid’s controlling nature; and (b) AK’s alienation. I agree somewhat. After Sanam and Sajid sold the matrimonial home, AK refused to have any parenting time with her. Though AK didn’t reject Sanam, he also didn’t look to her for care. As a result, Sanam chose not to attend his extra-curricular activities or school functions, and saw him only at Sajid’s house. She didn’t want to alienate him further. Sanam’s relationship with ZK was complicated because, according to Sajid, the children wanted to go to school together and attend each other’s extra-curricular activities. So, if AK was present, Sanam distanced herself, even if that meant less contact with ZK.

58This pattern has led to Sajid being seen as the primary decision-maker. First, he does all the morning drop-offs. Even though Sanam has parenting time before and after school, Sanam drives ZK to Sajid’s house after breakfast. There, she helps ZK get ready for school. When AK was going to Lynn-Rose, Sajid would drop them both off at school. Now, he drops ZK off at school and AK off at the bus stop closer to his campus. The result is that Sajid is more visible to the school’s admin and teachers.

59According to Sajid, there are two reasons for this arrangement: (a) the children prefer to travel to school together; and (b) Sanam preferred stopping at Sajid’s house rather than dropping ZK off directly. Sajid’s explanation is incomplete. Sanam preferred stopping at Sajid’s house so she could spend time with AK, at least in the mornings. Similarly, Sanam accepted that AK and ZK wanted to go to school together, so she didn’t insist on dropping off ZK alone. It wasn’t just a personal preference as Sajid implies. Also, Sajid insisted that ZK’s uniform stay at his house. At trial, he described it as “my uniform” because he paid for it. Either Sanam had to buy a second uniform for ZK, or she had to change him at Sajid’s house.

60Second, Sajid is the main point of communication with Lynn-Rose. The school sends its formal communications to both Sajid and Sanam. But AK’s and ZK’s teachers and the principals fell into a habit of only communicating with Sajid. According to the principals, the teachers are busy, and they communicate with the more responsive parent. Though Sanam was initially copied on emails, she would be dropped off once Sajid responded. Sajid also said that he would communicate any issues to Sanam, but didn’t always do so. This included several communications between the school’s admin and Sajid about challenges that AK was having with his parents’ separation.

61Third, Sajid does after-school pick-ups. ZK either has physiotherapy, swimming lessons, or gymnastic classes. AK was enrolled in swimming and volleyball. Again, Sajid says that the children expressed a preference to attend each other’s activities. Sanam has been unable to take ZK to his activities because her jobs haven’t been as flexible as Sajid’s. That said, there’s some evidence that Sanam didn’t object to ZK’s extra-curricular activities being scheduled afterschool. But, regardless, Sajid is again more visible to the school because he would pick up the children.

62To be clear, Sanam also didn’t take any steps to rectify or rebalance the situation. She was an involved parent before the parties separated. She received all Lynn-Rose’s formal communications. She was invited to parent-teacher interviews. She could’ve purchased a second uniform for ZK. Indeed, starting in September 2025, she has become more involved in ZK’s school life. She says that’s because Tzimas RSJ’s order gave her the freedom to do so. I don’t accept that—the order doesn’t change the status quo over education or extra-curricular activities. She could’ve done so sooner. Further, Sanam overlooked Sajid’s controlling nature in the past—she’s taken a holiday with him and the children and he was the first person she called after her accident.

63At bottom, the facts are less black-and-white than either party portrays. Sanam isn’t a negligent parent. She had good reasons for distancing herself from AK and, as a result, ZK. But she also took no steps until a few months ago to reinsert herself in ZK’s education. Sajid also didn’t take any steps to encourage Sanam’s participation in the children’s education. For example, he didn’t consult with Sanam over AK’s post-secondary education. He wants to make all the decisions about the children’s education, so he doesn’t mind Sanam taking a backseat.

64Importantly though, Sanam doesn’t disagree with Sajid’s decisions. Sanam has been complimentary of Sajid as a father. ZK is doing well socially and academically at Lynn-Rose. AK had some challenges when he started at Lynn-Rose, but his grades improved dramatically by graduation. Sanam is prepared for ZK to continue at Lynn-Rose, except she says that she can’t afford the tuition cost (which I discuss below under section 7 expenses).

65The parties don’t disagree that, ideally, ZK would continue going to Lynn-Rose. Sajid says that if Sanam doesn’t contribute to ZK’s tuition costs, ZK may need to transfer to public school. Sajid wants to be the sole decision-maker to avoid a conflict over school choice.

ii. Significant Extra-Curricular Activities

66The parties concede that ZK isn’t involved in any “significant” extra-curricular activities. The parties encouraged their children’s growth by enrolling them in two enrichment programs. For ZK, that is swimming and gymnastics.

67As I will discuss below, the only dispute is around scheduling. But these aren’t significant activities, in that they don’t require large investment of the parties’ time or financial resources.

3. Analysis and Disposition

i. Education

68I conclude that Sajid should have sole decision-making responsibility for ZK’s education, which is effectively what he has asked for. Sajid has been making decisions about ZK’s and AK’s education in their best interests, often after consulting with the children’s educators. Sanam hasn’t disagreed with these decisions. As a result, it would be potentially disruptive to ZK for Sajid and Sanam to start making joint decisions now, or have those decisions made by a parenting coordinator. I make this conclusion for four reasons.

69First, I’m not persuaded that Sajid and Sanam can cooperate in ZK’s best interests, given his current needs. It would be preferable if Sajid and Sanam could “consult with each other and make major decisions jointly” about ZK’s education, at least until he’s mature enough to be more involved. See Association of Family and Conciliation Courts – Ontario, Parenting Plan Guide, at p 36; Divorce Act, s 16(3)(a). Children benefit when their parents cooperate and communicate. Parents who cooperate and communicate are more likely to manage flexible parenting arrangements and joint decision-making about their children. See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(i); Fatima v Tunio, 2025 ONSC 5474, at para 95.

70Here, the parties’ failure to communicate over the last four years has resulted in the patterns described above. Sajid has shared information about the children’s education with Sanam. But both parties avoid consulting each other about their children’s best interests. Sajid often tries to control situations and people around him; Sanam acquiesces.

71Second, Sanam hasn’t shown an ability or willingness, since separation, to be actively involved in her children’s education. The past, present, and future ability and willingness of a person to care for the child are important factors in determining the best interests of the child. In some cases, a parent’s physical, psychological, or other limitations may raise concerns for the child’s health, safety, well-being, and development. Courts must consider a person’s strengths and limitations when determining parenting arrangements. See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(h); Fatima, at para 86.

72I appreciate that AK’s alienation is one explanation for Sanam’s unwillingness to engage. She’s also the primary caregiver for her elderly father, and she’s had several health issues. But these factors, justified or not, have created a limitation that will take time and work to overcome. In the meantime, ZK requires someone making decisions for him that are in his best interests.

73Third, the status quo that has emerged shouldn’t be disrupted. Sajid and ZK have a strong bond. The nature of the child’s relationship with each parent, including the nature of their relationship as it existed during the marriage, is especially relevant to parenting. See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(b); Fatima, at para 59. Also, Sajid knows ZK’s routines and preferences around schooling, and can provide stability. He’s been making education decisions for AK and ZK since September 2019. Sanam doesn’t have the same knowledge or experience. See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(d); Fatima, at para 66.

74I acknowledge that Sajid’s deliberate actions have had the effect of excluding Sanam and, in doing so, he’s helped create this status quo. He’s shown an unwillingness to support and maintain ZK’s relationship with Sanam. See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(c). But Sajid’s actions aren’t so manipulative that he can’t be trusted with decision-making responsibility. See DeJong v DeJong, 2020 ONSC 5367, at para 21.

75Finally, Sanam didn’t have a plan for ZK’s care until recently. Parents are generally in the best position to identify what’s best for their children. They should develop parenting arrangements without court or third-party intervention as much as possible. See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(g); Fatima, at para 80.

76Sanam hasn’t filed a Form 35.1 Affidavit since May 2021. That version is totally out-of-date (for example, the “children will continue to attend Rotherglen School virtually”). Form 35.1 affidavits include designated information that is valuable for judges when considering parenting orders, including a parenting plan. See Bouchard v Sgovio, 2021 ONCA 709, at para 78. At trial, Sanam didn’t state a plan for ZK’s schooling if he must attend public school, which is the necessary outcome of her position on section 7 expenses.

77Relatedly, Sanam’s request for a parenting coordinator to resolve any conflicts doesn’t make sense in these circumstances. One of the main functions of a parenting coordinator is to help parents implement the parenting terms of their final order. See Jirova v Benincasa, 2018 ONSC 534, at para 10. As Sanam doesn’t have a plan for ZK’s education and seems satisfied by the education decisions that Sajid is making, adding a dispute resolution mechanism risks complicating matters, delaying decisions, and increasing the parties’ costs.

78The other best-interests factors (child’s views and preferences, upbringing and heritage, family violence, and other proceedings) aren’t relevant to this issue. See Divorce Act, s 16(1)(e), (f), (j), (k). On family violence, Sanam made an abuse allegation against Sajid to explain her decision to move out of the matrimonial home (which then led to AK’s estrangement). But she doesn’t rely on this factor in arguing for decision-making responsibility or parenting time.

79In conclusion, it’s in ZK’s best interests that Sajid continue making major decisions about ZK’s education. That said, Sajid shall consult with Sanam. She remains an important part of ZK’s life, and her past and current engagement in his schooling shows that she wants to be involved.

80Also, I am ordering that Sanam is entitled to information from ZK’s school about his education. Though the Divorce Act, s 16.4, makes this obligation mandatory on ZK’s school without the need for a court order, Lynn-Rose has ignored Sanam’s right to educational information. I’m also surprised that Lynn-Rose’s principals were prepared to take sides in this dispute. Their letters implied that Sajid was the more able and willing parent. But their evidence ignored the fact that Lynn-Rose’s admin and teachers facilitated Sanam’s exclusion from AK’s and ZK’s education. Lynn-Rose purported to disregard Sanam because she was “less responsive”. Further, Ms. Lau said she didn’t involve Sanam because Sanam hadn’t introduced herself to the school’s admin. The Divorce Act doesn’t make introductions or responsiveness a pre-condition to a parent’s entitlement to information.

ii. Significant Extra-Curricular Activities

81Again, ZK isn’t enrolled in any significant extra-curricular activities. Neither was AK. There’s no evidence that Sajid and Sanam couldn’t make a joint decision if ZK were to become involved in a significant extra-curricular activity. As a result, they should have joint decision-making responsibility over this area.

82There’s no need for a parenting coordinator to resolve disputes over unknown extra-curricular activities. If either parent seeks to enrol ZK in a significant extra-curricular activity, the other must agree that doing so is in ZK’s best interest. In that case, they’ll have to pay their proportionate share of the expense. If the parties can’t agree, the parent proposing the activity can move to change the order.

B. Issue #2: parenting time

83Sajid has proposed two alternative allocations of parenting time. His primary position is that the status quo should continue: ZK should have parenting time with Sanam every two days starting at 6pm. Though Sajid didn’t concede his main position, he acknowledges that the frequent exchanges and the lack of stability may not be in ZK’s best interests. Sajid’s alternative position is that ZK should have parenting time with Sanam on alternate weekends, and one midweek overnight visit on Wednesdays. He wants to maintain control over ZK’s physio appointments.

84Sanam’s proposal is a 5-5-2-2 schedule. She doesn’t have a stated preference as to the days of the week. She’s prepared to leave work early for ZK’s extra-curricular activities but can’t accommodate his current physio appointments at Butterfly.

85As a result, the parties agree on ZK spending alternate weekends with each parent, and at least one midweek overnight visit with Sanam. The main issue, therefore, is whether ZK should have a second midweek overnight and, if so, when.

86Sajid also asks for a form of penalty clause: if ZK is late for school on Sanam’s parenting days “more than 10% of [her] time in a 30 day period”, he’ll start driving ZK to school. He also asks for an order that either parent can attend any physio appointments or extra-curricular activities.

87For the reasons discussed below, I order that:

(a) ZK shall have parenting time on the following schedule—

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
Sajid after school	Sajid	Sanam after school	Sanam	Sajid after school	Sajid	Sajid
Sajid	Sajid	Sanam after school	Sanam	Sanam	Sanam	Sanam

(b) weekend visits shall be extended by one day if ZK is not required to attend school on the Friday before or Monday after the weekend;

(d) when a parent’s time ends on a school morning, that parent must drop off ZK at school and ensure that ZK has what they need for the school day;

(e) on non-school days, ZK will be picked up and dropped off at Tim Horton’s, 7025 Millcreek Drive, Mississauga, unless the parties agree otherwise in advance;

(f) the parties will alternate the Muslim Eid holiday dates every year—

i. starting in 2026 and in even-numbered years, ZK will be with Sanam for the first Eid (which coincides with the end of Ramadan) from after school the day before until before school the day after (if he is not otherwise in Sanam’s care), and will be with Sajid for the second Eid (Haj) from after school the day before until before school the day after (if he is not otherwise in Sajid’s care); and

ii. for 2027 and in odd-numbered years, ZK will be with Sajid for the first Eid and with Sanam for the second Eid.

(g) each party will have a two-week period of uninterrupted time with ZK during July and August, preferably attached to their regular weekends—

i. Sajid will have his first choice of weeks in odd-numbered years, and Sanam will have her first choice in even-numbered years;

ii. the party with the first choice will advise the other in writing by March 31 annually;

iii. the party with the second choice will advise the other in writing by April 15 annually; and

iv. the balance of the summer school break will follow the regular parenting time schedule.

(h) on ZK’s birthdays, the parties will have a joint dinner for up to two hours with ZK;

(i) a parent celebrating their birthday when they are the non-resident parent shall have the option, upon providing three weeks’ notice to the resident parent, that they want ZK to be with them for that day, in which case, ZK will be with that parent from after school the day before the parent’s birthday until before school the next day, at which time the regular schedule will resume;

(j) if the parent with scheduled time with ZK is unable to personally be with him, the other parent shall have the first option to provide childcare and should be contacted before alternate childcare arrangements are made;

(k) no party shall schedule activities for ZK during the other party’s time with ZK unless that party has agreed in advance;

(l) the parties shall not interfere directly or indirectly with ZK’s life, activities, or routines when he is with the other party;

(m) the parent with whom the child is residing at the time of the extra-curricular activity will be the sole parent to attend these activities unless they consent otherwise;

(n) both parents may attend school events, and medical and dental appointments;

(o) Sajid will have primary responsibility for making medical and dental appointments in consultation with Sanam, and Sanam or Sajid will take ZK to any appointments that fall within their parenting time, regardless of who made the appointment; and

(p) no party shall speak negatively about any other party in ZK’s or AK’s presence, and both parties shall also make their best efforts to prevent any other person from speaking negatively about the other party in ZK’s or AK’s presence.

88The parties resolved parenting time on Mother’s Day, Father’s Day, March Break, and Winter Break under Tzimas RSJ’s order. As I am ordering shared parenting time, there’s no need for me to make a declaration about ZK’s primary residence.

1. Legal Framework

89Parenting time may be allocated through a schedule. See Divorce Act, s 16.2(1). Children should have as much contact with each parent as aligns with their best interests. See Divorce Act, s 16(6); Barendregt v Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, at paras 133-135.

90Again, the court shall take into consideration “only the best interests of the child of the marriage in making a parenting order”. See Divorce Act, s 16(1).

91The court’s “unrelenting focus” on the best interests of each particular child means that there can be no presumption in favour of any one type of parenting order. All things being equal, each child deserves to have meaningful and consistent relationships with both of their parents. See Dayboll v Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510, at para 18(h). “It may end up being equal time. It may not. Each family is different, and the principle is a guide set out to benefit children.” See Knapp v Knapp, 2021 ONCA 305, at para 34.

92The party who seeks to reduce “normal parenting time” will usually be required to justify taking such a position. The greater the restriction sought, the more important it becomes to justify that restriction. See Dayboll, at para 27.

2. Evidence and Findings of Fact

93Again, there’s no parenting order. The formal parenting plan that the parties have agreed to is that ZK has a shared parenting schedule: he’s supposed to have parenting time with each parent every two days (6pm-6pm).

94But, in practice, Sajid always drops ZK to school in the mornings, and always picks him up after school. As discussed above, Sanam drops ZK off at Sajid’s house after breakfast. After school, Sajid picks up ZK from school for his physiotherapy appointments on alternating Mondays and Wednesdays, swimming on Tuesdays, and gymnastics on Thursdays. All these activities are finished by 6pm. Sanam picks ZK up from Sajid’s home around dinnertime. This routine has been in place since May 2021.

95Sanam testified that she’s committed to transporting ZK to and from his activities during her parenting time. That said, she also intends to rely on after-school care or giving Sajid a “right of first refusal”.

96These activities were planned in 2022. Sajid proposed scheduling them on Saturdays or Sundays. He ended up finding spots after school. Sanam agreed to this schedule. Given that she was working at Billyard in Vaughan and picking up ZK at dinnertime, I infer that both parties assumed Sajid would take ZK to the activities even during Sanam’s parenting time. There was no evidence that Sajid booked these activities on the basis that Sanam would take ZK.

97Sajid has four reasons for the orders he’s seeking. First, ZK needs consistent physio. Second, when Sanam was off work, she didn’t participate in ZK’s extra-curricular activities. Third, she’s often late dropping off ZK. Finally, Sanam didn’t follow-through with reunification therapy for AK.

i. Physio

98ZK has idiopathic toe walking—he walks on his tiptoes for no known reason. At first, it was severe—he couldn’t stand on his heels without falling, he “bum scooted” up the stairs, he had pain, and he didn’t participate in running activities.

99ZK has been undergoing therapy since November 2022. His treatment plan includes:

physiotherapy once per week
daily stretching and a home exercise program
wearing ankle-foot orthoses (braces) four to five hours per day

100ZK’s mobility has improved since starting physio. It can take at least three to five years of consistent physiotherapy to overcome toe walking. If ZK’s physio is inconsistent, he may suffer from poor balance or muscle imbalances, and he may eventually need surgery.

101ZK sees a physiotherapist at Butterfly Paediatric Therapy every other Monday at 3pm. These appointments are booked well in advance, and Butterfly doesn’t have availability on other days or times. As ZK needs weekly physio, he attends a drop-in physio session at ErinoakKids on alternating Wednesdays at 4pm.

102Sajid has attended all ZK’s physio appointments. Sanam has only attended a few because they’re during her work hours. That said, Sanam says she’s attended all the important doctors’ appointments. She also testified that Sajid discourages her participation. For example, she says that Sajid wouldn’t show her a copy of the exercises recommended by the physiotherapist, and Sajid didn’t tell her about one of ZK’s MRIs.

103Sajid responds that Sanam doesn’t take ZK’s condition seriously. She didn’t come to ZK’s physio appointments when she wasn’t working. When she does come, she doesn’t actively participate. Butterfly’s recommended exercises are available at the clinic for all parents. She’s inconsistent with ZK’s home exercises. As a result, he wants a parenting schedule where he takes ZK to physio (i.e., Monday and Wednesday overnights).

104I agree with Sajid’s perspective. Ms. Lund, ZK’s physiotherapist, testified that idiopathic toe walking is a serious condition if not treated consistently. In addition to mobility issues, ZK may suffer social and emotional challenges because he might be subject to bullying and may not be able to participate in sports. Sanam was cavalier towards ZK’s condition. She acknowledged that she didn’t always make ZK do his home exercises (because she’s the “chill” parent). She downplayed the condition on the basis that she’s seen lots of children with toe walking since working at Angus Valley.

ii. Sanam’s Time Off

105To begin, Sanam has had three jobs since separation, each of which she says have made it difficult for her to be at ZK’s physio appointments and extra-curricular activities. At RBC Insurance, where she worked until August 2021, she often worked until 8pm. She worked at Billyard Insurance from March 2022 to February 2024—this job was in Vaughan and she had a long commute. She now works at Angus Valley—though she can leave early, she’s an hourly employee and loses wages accordingly. Sajid says that Sanam could leave work early or take her lunch break around the appointments (like he does).

106I accept Sanam’s explanations. Looking at the evidence as a whole, I find that the parties tacitly agreed to organize their children’s activities before dinner, in part because Sajid has a more flexible work schedule. Though Sanam didn’t object to this schedule, she also didn’t commit to attending these activities. And there’s no other appointments for ZK at Butterfly.

107That said, since separation, Sanam has had two periods of unemployment:

from August 2021, when she was dismissed from RBC Insurance, to January 2022, when she had a serious car accident
from February 2024, when she quit Billyard Insurance, to December 2024, when she started working at Angus Valley

108During these periods, Sanam continued picking up ZK at 6pm, after his appointments and activities. Sanam had a myriad of explanations for why she didn’t participate more actively in ZK’s appointments and activities: “I just don’t want to. I would rather not. I don’t see why…he has to be at the appointments that are on my days. And even if they were on my days, I probably would ask him to go, as any parent would ask the other parent, married or not married. Because I’m working, I don’t have that flexibility—he works from home.” As a result, Sajid says that Sanam can’t be trusted to consistently take ZK to his physio appointments and activities.

iii. Lateness

109AK and ZK have been late for school many times. Sanam is often late dropping off ZK, which means that either Sajid must drop off AK and come back for ZK, or both children have been late. For this reason, Sajid asks for reduced parenting time for Sanam and a penalty clause—he doesn’t trust her to get ZK to school on time. There’s no evidence that the children have ever been penalized for being late.

110Sanam is also late picking up ZK, meaning that Sajid must sometimes feed ZK dinner.

111Sanam blames her commute from home or work for her tardiness. She explains that when they first separated, she and Sajid agreed to live in the same neighbourhood as their matrimonial home. Sanam’s family and support structure are in that same neighbourhood. But then Sajid moved to Brampton, which is farther away. This explanation only goes so far. For example, Sanam worked for two years in Vaughan, which was far regardless.

112Sanam has been more consistent since September 2025. Sajid says it’s because this trial was imminent. I don’t make any findings on Sanam’s motives. The more important conclusion is that she’s shown an ability to transport ZK to school or his appointments, and she’s willing to do so going forward.

iv. Reunification Therapy

113In May 2021, when Sanam moved out, she and Sajid agreed that the children would spend the first two nights with him because she didn’t have any furniture. She expected that both children would have parenting time with her, but ZK came alone. She says that Sajid didn’t facilitate parenting time between her and AK after that. Sajid responds that he can’t make AK spend time with Sanam, but he did suggest that AK should see a counsellor or talk to a trusted relative about the issue. In any event, Sanam says her relationship with AK has significantly improved since he got a phone when he turned 16. For example, they had alone time for the first time in September 2025.

114In 2023, Sanam and Sajid talked to AK about reunification therapy. Sajid provided the names of potential therapists and agreed to cover the costs. According to Sanam, AK was reluctant to talk to a stranger and, as a result, Sajid didn’t encourage AK to go to reunification therapy. Sanam decided not to engage in therapy or move for a parenting order because she didn’t want to force AK to see her or spend time with her.

3. Analysis and Disposition

115Sajid didn’t press the status quo parenting time schedule at the hearing. That was a reasonable concession. I don’t find the current schedule to be in ZK’s best interests—there are too many exchanges, and too little stability given his rotating after-school schedule. The AFCC-O guide recommends that children at ZK’s age have a “consistent routine” and, if possible, mid‑week parenting time should happen on the same night each week.

116I conclude that ZK should have shared parenting time with Sajid and Sanam on a 5-5-2-2 schedule for five reasons. As an overview, Sajid overstates Sanam’s deficiencies. Co-parenting is a learned skill. It involves a new way of parenting, and it’s an ongoing process. Sanam isn’t required either to meet Sajid’s expectations or give up parenting time, especially where there are few risks to ZK.

117First, at ZK’s age, he should have frequent contact with both parents. Prior to separation and for over two years after the parties separated, Sanam played a significant role in parenting. It’s also generally important that each parent support the child’s relationship with the other parent. A positive relationship with both parents provides stability for the child during their parents’ separation and divorce. According to the OCL, ZK has a strong relationship with both Sajid and Sanam. Sajid’s request that Sanam have less than equal parenting time suggests that he’s reluctant to fully support ZK’s relationship with Sanam. See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(b), (c); Fatima, at para 61.

118It’s also important that ZK doesn’t become estranged from Sanam like AK. To be clear, I’m not making a finding that Sajid alienated AK from Sanam. Sajid suggested counselling for AK and Sanam. When she couldn’t travel because of her accident, Sajid took the children to see her. He’s allowed her to have parenting time at his house. But Sanam and ZK shouldn’t experience the same rupture in their relationship, whatever the cause.

119Also, school-age children need far more predictability in terms of schedules and routines than adolescents. See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(a); Fatima, at para 53. The AFCC-O guide, at p 25, opines that children in the age 10-12 group should have “overnights or dinners during the school week and some weekends with each parent.” The guide also states that children at this age may do well with “alternate weeks with each parent or a 5-5-2-2 arrangement”.

120Second, Sanam knows enough about ZK’s health-related challenges, and having an additional weekday overnight won’t destabilize ZK. Courts must consider who knows the child’s routines, preferences, and health-related challenges, and can provide stability. This includes past caregiving roles and the child’s relationship with each person. See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(d); Fatima, at para 66. There’s no dispute that Sajid has been primarily responsible for ZK’s physio, but he’s also constructed that situation. For example, I didn’t hear any evidence about alternative clinics that Sajid explored so that ZK’s physio appointments could be on the weekend or evenings. Also, I didn’t hear much evidence about the ErinoakKids’s program—given that it’s a drop-in program, ZK may not need to go right after school.

121Third, Sanam has made some plans for ZK’s care. See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(g). She proposes that ZK attend after-school care on her parenting days. She’s open to Sajid picking him up if he wants. She’s prepared to leave work early to accommodate ZK’s extra-curricular activities and the drop-in physio. She just can’t facilitate physio at Butterfly.

122Fourth, Sanam’s unwillingness to take ZK to appointments and activities when she was off work is an important factor. See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(h). There’s also some evidence that she’s passed on parenting time because of bad traffic or other commitments. But I’m reluctant to deny her maximum contact with ZK only because of her past transgressions. The shame of being fired led her to pretend that she couldn’t pick up ZK earlier. Sanam has been upfront about her struggles post-separation, including unanticipated challenges in her immediate family, health problems, and in finding work.

123Finally, I am reluctant to let ZK’s physio appointments or extra-curricular activities dictate Sanam’s parenting time. The physio appointments might change. ZK may not need weekly physio. Or the parties may find an alternate provider whose schedule is better for them. According to Ms. Lund, gymnastics isn’t part of ZK’s treatment plan, so this activity is optional. And Sanam has indicated an ability and willingness to facilitate ZK’s involvement in gymnastics, swimming, and physio.

124Given that ZK has booked and consistent physio appointments at Butterfly on Mondays and it’s easier for Sajid to take him, Sajid should have parenting time at least on Mondays. Both parties agree that Sajid should also have parenting time on Tuesdays and Sanam should have an overnight on either Wednesday or Thursday. There’s no reason that Sanam can’t take ZK to ErinoakKids every other week. She’s prepared to leave work early if she must. It’s a drop-in program. And it directly engages her in ZK’s physical therapy, which is what Sajid seems to want.

125To the extent that Sanam’s commute or work schedule means that she’s late dropping ZK off at school or for his appointments and activities, it doesn’t matter. There’s no evidence of any prejudice or penalty to him. There’s no basis for Sajid to control her or the situation by having a penalty clause if she’s late.

126I’m also ordering that the parties not attend extra-curricular activities during the other party’s parenting time. I appreciate that Sajid wants to go to all the children’s activities. But there’s no need for him to be at every swimming class or gymnastics practice, especially where Sanam needs some space to parent ZK on her own. Again, I’m not persuaded that the parties can cooperate on this issue in ZK’s best interests given Sajid’s desire to control these activities and Sanam’s passivity. See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(i).

127I didn’t hear any evidence or submissions from the parties on parenting time on birthdays, summer holidays, or Eid. But both parties submitted draft orders on these issues. I have made orders that I believe are in ZK’s best interests, but the parties may consent to different orders.

128I have relied on the OCL’s report for limited purposes, such as ZK’s view that he has a positive relationship with both parties and likes the current schedule (which I interpret to mean he prefers a shared schedule). See Divorce Act, s 16(3)(e). Sajid submits that I should give the report no weight for two reasons: (a) it’s dated in that it was completed almost three years ago; and (b) Ms. Haroon didn’t interview several professionals in the children’s lives. He relies on Proulx v Proulx, 2021 ONSC 3657, at para 58, aff’d 2022 ONCA 428, and Albaz v Rihawi, 2024 ONSC 812, at para 39. But in those cases there was a material change in circumstances between the report and the trial.

129Here, I don’t agree that the report doesn’t reflect the parties’ current circumstances—the parties’ parenting plan, living arrangements, educational arrangements, and health needs are the same then as they are now. Though Ms. Haroon admits that she could’ve benefitted from more information, that doesn’t completely undermine the report, especially where some of the professionals in the children’s lives have testified at trial. But the report’s utility is limited: (a) there’s a lot of discussion about AK’s best interests, which aren’t at issue here; and (b) the parties’ positions on decision-making responsibility and parenting time were a lot more oppositional at that time. At trial, the issues in dispute were much narrower.

C. Issue #3: ancillary orders

130The court may, in the parenting order, provide for any other matter that the court considers appropriate. See Divorce Act, s 16.1(4)(d).

131In his draft order, Sajid requests that he keep ZK’s documents, and that Sanam shall have a copy. He also asks for an order allowing him to renew ZK’s documents without her consent if she doesn’t respond to his request within seven days. Finally, he asks for an order that neither party can travel with ZK outside of Canada without the other party’s consent, and an itinerary must be provided seven days before.

132I didn’t hear any evidence on these issues. In closing submissions, Sajid argued that this order was aligned with the status quo. Sanam disagreed but didn’t provide an alternative proposal.

133As a result, I order that:

(a) Sajid shall keep ZK’s passport, his SIN card, and his birth certificate at Sajid’s house, and these documents will be made available to Sanam as needed;

(b) Sanam shall return ZK’s documents to Sajid promptly;

(d) neither party shall apply for a passport for ZK without the written consent of the other party or further order of this court;

(e) no party shall remove ZK from Canada without the written permission of the other party, which shall not be unreasonably withheld; and

(f) if any party plans a vacation outside of Canada with ZK during their parenting time, that party shall give the other party a detailed itinerary at least 14 days before the vacation begins, or as soon as is practical if plans are made less than 14 days before the vacation begins, including the name of any airline carrier and flight times, accommodation, including address and telephone numbers, and details about how to contact ZK during the trip.

134Sanam asks for two orders related to insurance coverage: (a) the parties will maintain ZK on their extended health and dental plans; and (b) the parties will designate ZK as an irrevocable beneficiary of any life insurance coverage.

135On the first point, there’s no dispute that Sajid has extended health coverage, and ZK is a beneficiary. As a result, I order that the parties shall maintain ZK as a dependent on their extended health insurance plans. On the second point, I heard no evidence about why ZK should be a beneficiary under his parents’ life insurance plans, so I decline to make that order.

D. Issue #4: child support for ZK and AK

136Sajid acknowledged that if I ordered a 5-5-2-2 parenting time schedule, then the parties have shared parenting time. As a result, the child support for ZK is based on a set-off formula.

137Sajid’s 2024 income was $151,414; Sanam’s 2024 income was $55,488. That said, Sajid requests a declaration imputing $100,000 in annual gross income to Sanam. I disagree with Sajid’s position. I don’t find that Sanam is intentionally underemployed. Even if she was, she’s earning a reasonable income for her education and experience, albeit in a different industry.

138As a result, I order that Sajid shall pay to Sanam offset table child support in the amount of $503 monthly. I also order that the parties shall produce updated income disclosure, as outlined in section 21(1) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175, to the other party every year by July 1. Finally, I order that unless the support order is withdrawn from the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed. A support deduction order will be issued.

1. Legal Framework

139A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to pay for the support of any or all children of the marriage. See Divorce Act, s 15.1(1). A court making an order under section 15.1(1) shall do so in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines. See Divorce Act, s 15.1(3).

140If each spouse exercises not less than 40 percent of parenting time with a child over the course of a year, the amount of the child support order must be determined by considering:

(a) the amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the spouses;

(b) the increased costs of shared parenting time arrangements; and

See Federal Child Support Guidelines, s 9.

141The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, including where:

(a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed, other than where the under-employment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage, or any child under the age of majority, or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse; or

(b) the spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so.

See Federal Child Support Guidelines, s 19(1)(a), (f).

142Intentional under-employment is “particularly complex”. The court doesn’t need to be satisfied that a payor spouse has acted in bad faith before it imposes a support order based on imputed income. See Kohli v Thom, 2025 ONCA 200, at para 124, leave to appeal refused, 2025 83040 (SCC); Drygala v Pauli, 2002 41868 (Ont CA), at paras 29-30, 36. Rather, the court must consider whether the parent’s decisions around work choices are reasonable. See Drygala, at paras 38-40.

143“Intentionally” doesn’t apply where, through no fault or act of their own, the payor spouse is laid off, terminated, or given reduced hours of work. See Drygala, at para 28. That said, misconduct leading to the termination of the payor spouse’s employment can be intentional under-employment. See Daciuk v Daciuk, 2023 ONSC 70, at para 59. Even then, the court has a “broad discretion” to fix the payor spouse’s income—it can impute income in “an amount different than what the payor had been earning, or it can impute different amounts of income for different time periods.” See Daciuk, at para 63, citing Gordon v Wilkins, 2020 ONCJ 115, at para 47.

144 Section 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines doesn’t allow the court to arbitrarily select an amount as imputed income. There must be a rational basis underlying the selection of any such figure. The amount selected as an exercise of the court’s discretion must be grounded in the evidence. When imputing income based on intentional under-employment, a court must consider what’s reasonable in the circumstances. The factors to be considered are age, education, experience, skills, and health of the parent, standard of living during the parties’ marriage, the availability of job opportunities, the number of hours that could be worked considering the parent’s overall obligations including educational demands, and the hourly rate that the parent could reasonably be expected to obtain. See Drygala, at paras 44-45.

2. Evidence and Findings of Fact

145The parties’ incomes since they moved out of the matrimonial home are as follows:

	Sajid	Sanam
2022	$135,043	$66,814
2023	$159,798	$69,927
2024	$151,414	$55,488

146I didn’t hear any evidence about the parties’ 2025 incomes.

147Sanam has a high school education. After several other jobs, she started working for RBC Insurance in 2005. By 2008, she was employed in a management role. She has undertaken numerous courses related to her job.

148Sanam was dismissed from RBC Insurance in August 2021. Her father was driving her car without insurance. During the following corporate investigation, RBC Insurance concluded that it had cause to terminate her employment. Sanam subsequently applied for positions with banks and credit unions. She targeted jobs with an annual salary between $50,000 and $65,000. Higher paying jobs needed a degree. She had several interviews, but no one offered her a job. She estimates that she sent out over 100 applications. Her belief is that she’s been blacklisted from the industry. In 2020, her gross employment income from RBC Insurance was $100,059.33.

149In March 2022, she started working for Billyard, which is owned by one of her former colleagues. The job was in Vaughan, which was a long commute for Sanam. She tried transferring to one of the Mississauga branches, but each office is independently owned. Because it was a new job, the job was less flexible, and Sanam didn’t feel comfortable asking for flex time because she was training. She was allowed to work from home at first, but her manager eventually insisted on in-person work.

150In November 2023, Sanam got very ill, and she was on a sick leave. At the same time, her father also got very sick. Sanam moved in with him. As a result of the emotional toll, she quit Billyard in February 2024. She continued networking with former colleagues—although there were a few opportunities, they didn’t pan out, in part because of the distance.

151Sanam started working in education in December 2024. Angus Valley is owned by a friend of hers. She took this job because she believes that she’s unemployable in the financial industry. She earns $20 per hour.

3. Analysis and Disposition

152My conclusion is that Sanam is not intentionally under-employed. First, the caselaw shows that, usually, termination with cause is joined by some other misconduct by the payor spouse before the court will impute income. Here, there is no other misconduct by Sanam.

153The cases cited by Sajid show this nuance:

in Luckey v Luckey, 1996 11217 (Ont SC), the payor spouse was fired and charged for assaulting a co-worker
in Marucci v Marucci, [2001] OJ no 4888 (Sup Ct), the payor spouse quit his job to go back to school, which the court found to be a reckless decision in this case
in Strizzi v Traetto, 2024 ONCJ 278, the payor spouse didn’t apply for EI in time after a layoff
in MIM v CM, 2023 ONCJ 453, at para 37, the payor moved to the U.S. and took a lower paying job

154In Daciuk, Kurz J surveyed this issue in detail. He discussed some of these cases and cited several other Superior Court cases. But only one of them involved dismissal. In Sherwood v Sherwood, 2006 40795 (Ont SC), the payor spouse found new work soon after being fired for cause, but then took an unexplained leave of absence from that job and didn’t look for a new job. In Daciuk itself, the payor spouse was fired for chronic absenteeism. Kurz J imputed income, but that decision was made at an uncontested trial. It’s unclear from the decision whether the payor spouse was working at all or if he looked for a new job.

155Here, there’s no dispute that Sanam was dismissed for cause. I infer that RBC Insurance found that she was dishonest in her insurance application or claim, and that was incompatible with her managerial role. I accept Sanam’s evidence that she actively looked for work in the same industry but couldn’t find a new job right away. She did find new work within six months, which isn’t an unreasonable time period given her age, length of service, experience, and role. See Bardal v The Globe & Mail Ltd., 1960 294 (Ont HC). A reasonable inference is that hiring managers learned about the basis for her dismissal and weren’t willing to give her a second chance.

156Second, her decision to quit Billyard wasn’t unreasonable in the circumstances. A large part of Sajid’s case is that Sanam can’t be counted on to drop ZK off on time, pick him up on time, or take him to after-school activities. There’s no dispute that working in Vaughan meant that she had a long commute both ways. She tried working from home, but her employer insisted that she work from the office. She tried getting a transfer to one of Billyard’s offices in Mississauga, but that didn’t work out.

157Third, I don’t find that Sanam started working at Angus Valley to avoid her support obligations. She got the job from a friend. She didn’t have many other options. She’s interested in changing careers, partially because the financial industry seems closed off to her. Parents can take jobs with less money as long as the decision is reasonable. See Charron v Carrière, 2016 ONSC 4719, at para 57. Further, a mere desire to have more self-satisfying work may not be considered an acceptable reason for under-employment, but the prospect that less remunerative work may lead to more opportunities for advancement and financial security may be accepted as a reasonable explanation. See MAB v MGC, 2022 ONSC 7207, at para 483.

158Even if I had found that Sanam was intentionally under-employed, I wouldn’t have imputed $100,000 in income to her as Sajid asks. There’s a practical issue. Imputation of income assumes that once the court has made such a finding, the payor spouse will seek employment with higher income so they can meet their support obligations and their other expenses. But an imputation order can work an injustice if the payor spouse isn’t able to find new work, even if their misconduct caused the situation. See Daciuk, at para 64, citing Malcolm v McGee, 2017 ONCJ 357, at paras 47-48.

159Sajid didn’t lead any evidence about income ranges for someone with Sanam’s education and experience. Sanam’s evidence was that she might have earned as much as $60,000 working in the financial industry with a high school education. Her 2024 income was $55,488. At most, I would have found that a reasonable income for her was $60,000 based on the evidence.

160As a result, I order that the parties shall pay the amount set out in the applicable table for each of them:

starting on May 1, 2026, and on the first day of each month thereafter, Sajid shall pay to Sanam support for AK and ZK in the monthly amount of $1338
starting on May 1, 2026, and on the first day of each month thereafter, Sanam shall pay to Sajid support for AK and ZK in the monthly amount of $835

161The result is an offset amount of $503 monthly.

E. Issue #5: section 7 expenses

162The parties don’t dispute that they must proportionally share in the costs of AK’s and ZK’s special and extraordinary expenses, such as ZK’s health-related expenses that aren’t covered by Sajid’s insurance plan and AK’s post-secondary education expenses. I order that Sanam shall pay 33 percent of AK’s and ZK’s special or extraordinary expenses under the Federal Child Support Guidelines, s 7.

163The parties concede that ZK’s swimming and gymnastics aren’t “extraordinary”, so they aren’t covered by section 7. Sajid also asks for an order that Sanam shall contribute to the cost of school trips, summer camps, and tutoring. School trips and summer camps also aren’t extraordinary expenses, absent evidence that they’re necessary. See AE v AE, 2021 ONSC 8189, at paras 377-80. Further, I didn’t hear any evidence about the need for tutoring for either child. As a result, I’m not ordering Sanam to contribute to these expenses. That said, given that the parties have shared parenting time and there’s an offset for child support, it may make sense for Sanam to cover one of the two activities, or 33 per cent of the overall costs, so that ZK can enjoy these opportunities.

164There are two further disputes between the parties about future costs:

(a) ZK’s private school tuition costs; and

(b) the scope of AK’s post-secondary education expenses.

165I discuss retroactive costs under retroactive child support expenses below.

1. Legal Framework

166Section 7 expenses include any extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child’s particular needs. They also include expenses for post-secondary education. See Federal Child Support Guidelines, s 7(1)(d), (e).

167In awarding section 7 expenses, the trial judge must:

(a) calculate each party’s income for child support purposes;

(b) determine whether the claimed expenses fall within one of the enumerated categories of section 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines;

(c) determine whether the claimed expenses are necessary “in relation to the child’s best interests” and are reasonable “in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family’s spending pattern prior to the separation”;

(d) if the expenses fall under sections 7(1)(d) or (f) of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, determine whether the expenses are “extraordinary”; and

(e) finally, consider what amount, if any, the child should reasonably contribute to the payment of these expenses and then apply any tax deductions or credits.

See Titova v Titov, 2012 ONCA 864, at para 23.

168In determining the necessity of private school fees, the court will consider whether the parties would’ve paid the expense if they hadn’t separated “but were facing the financial circumstances of the post-separation family.” See Iddon v Iddon, 2006 1450 (Ont Sup Ct), at paras 76-77.

169For post-secondary expenses, the cost must be “sufficiently connected” to the child’s program of study. See Craig v Niro, 2022 ONSC 5178, at para 24.

2. Facts

170Lynn-Rose’s tuition fees for ZK were $16,860 for the 2025-2026 school year. This fee includes a tuition fee, activity fee, and material/tech fee.

171As discussed above, Sajid and Sanam, when they were together, decided to give their children a private school education. Lynn-Rose offers many benefits: smaller class sizes and individualized attention, and students can obtain an IB diploma. But these are the benefits of many private schools.

172Sajid identified three other specific benefits for ZK arising from his toe walking. First, as children with toe walking or wearing braces may suffer from bullying, it’s important that they have a supportive school environment. Second, Lynn-Rose’s admin and ZK’s homeroom teachers know how to help him with his braces if necessary. Finally, ZK may need accommodations for physical activities.

173AK’s university tuition for the 2025-2026 school year was $7312.70.

174The parties’ combined household income was, at its highest, $236,296. That was in 2020, when Sanam was working for RBC Insurance and the parties were still living together, albeit separately. Their combined household income is most recently $206,902 but, of course, their expenses have increased as they’re maintaining two households.

3. Analysis and Disposition

i. ZK’s Private School Expenses

175I find that ZK’s private school tuition isn’t extraordinary and, as a result, Sanam isn’t obligated to share this expense.

176First, Sajid overstates ZK’s need to attend Lynn-Rose. ZK has never been bulled at Lynn-Rose. There’s no evidence that public school teachers or admin can’t assist ZK with his braces or accommodate his physical needs. Indeed, the only accommodation that ZK has asked for so far is to try out for the school’s sports teams in private.

177Second, Sanam’s income was, in 2019 and 2020, over 40 percent of the parties’ household income. Recently, it’s just over a quarter. The fact that Sajid is earning more now than he did in 2020 (around $15,000 more) distorts the parties’ combined income. And Sanam’s expenses have increased. Rather than sharing household expense costs, she now must pay her own rent and utilities.

178Third, I don’t elevate the parties’ decision to send their children to private school when they were together to an ironclad guarantee. Parents are entitled to change their mind “based on changed family fortunes and circumstances, the needs of the children, the availability of suitable alternatives, such as high quality public school education, and the parent’s changing goals”. See Iddon, at para 75. I’m not persuaded, on the evidence, that if Sanam and Sajid were still together when she was fired that they wouldn’t have considered alternatives to private school education.

179Finally, in making his case for private school, Sajid points to some of Sanam’s choices. To begin, Sanam is voluntarily working less hours at Angus Valley, meaning that she earns less annually. But Sanam’s decision to work less hours is in direct response to Sajid’s complaint that she’s an absentee parent. She’s leaving work early to either attend ZK’s extra-curricular activities or pick him up before dinner. Next, Sajid combed through Sanam’s bank statements to try to show that she’s a spendthrift. I found this evidence unseemly. In effect, Sajid is arguing that Sanam should shop less at Zara so she can pay ZK’s tuition. That evidence might be relevant if ZK was unhoused or malnourished. But children don’t have a “free-standing right” to a private school education. See Iddon, at para 76. Further, this argument by Sajid highlighted his need or desire to control Sanam.

180In sum, private school education for ZK is unnecessary and unreasonable given Sanam’s means. It’s not a section 7 expense that she needs to share. That said, Sanam doesn’t oppose ZK continuing at Lynn-Rose or in private school generally if Sajid makes that decisions and pays the fees. Otherwise, as Sajid has sole decision-making responsibility over ZK’s education, he can decide which public school ZK should attend. Since the uniform was a bone of contention, I order that ZK’s uniform must travel with him during parenting exchanges. This order can be satisfied by Sajid purchasing a second uniform for ZK.

ii. AK’s Post-Secondary Expenses

181Sanam doesn’t deny that she’s required to contribute to AK’s expenses for post-secondary education. There’s no dispute that tuition, mandatory fees, and books are prima facie connected to AK’s course of study. Sanam must share in these costs on a proportional basis (33 percent). She’s entitled to ask for proof of payment.

182For other expenses, such as transportation, meals, supplies, and non-mandatory fees, Sajid or AK should consult with Sanam before incurring the cost, and Sanam should agree to contribute to any reasonable and necessary expenses. See Ford v Cassell, 2023 ONSC 1553, at paras 51-53.

F. Issue #6: retroactive child support

183Sajid argues that he’s entitled to retroactive child support. He submits that although the parties had a shared parenting schedule in theory, Sanam exercised fewer than 40 percent of her parenting time for both children in practice. He also seeks an award for retroactive section 7 expenses.

184Sanam responds that she and Sajid had a shared parenting schedule since they sold the matrimonial home. She seeks set-off retroactive child support for 2022 to present. That said, she doesn’t dispute that she hasn’t shared parenting time for AK.

1. Legal Framework

185“Retroactive” awards aren’t truly retroactive. They don’t hold parents to a legal standard that didn’t exist at the relevant time. But they’re “retroactive” in that they’re not being made on a go-forward basis: the payor is being ordered to pay what, in hindsight, should have been paid before. See DBS v SRG, 2006 SCC 37, at para 2.

186This case engages the third situation identified in DBS: there is no court order for child support. See DBS, at paras 80-84. There’s no restriction in the Divorce Act, s 15.1(1), as to the date from which the court may order that the support award take effect. Though Cudjoe J ordered Sanam to pay section 7 expenses, that order was without prejudice.

187There are four key factors to consider before making a retroactive child support order:

the reason why support or variation of support wasn’t sought earlier
conduct of the payor parent
circumstances of the child at the current time and at the time the support should have been paid
hardship occasioned by the retroactive award to the payor parent

See DBS, at paras 94-116.

188“Effective notice” for retroactive increases only requires the recipient to broach a potential increase. See DBS, at para 121. The payor also has an ongoing obligation to engage in meaningful dialogue with the recipient about any further changes to income or economic capacity. Failure to do so may impact the period of retroactivity when the court applies the discretionary DBS factors. See Colucci v Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, at para 90.

189Again, if each parent has the child at least 40 percent of the time, the court must set child support by looking at each parent’s table support, the increased costs, and the financial circumstances of both parents and the child. See Federal Child Support Guidelines, s 9.

190When counting time under section 9, parenting time means to “have the child in a parent’s care or…having responsibility for the child” (such as during school hours). See Desjardins v Bouey, 2013 ABQB 714, at para 18; Julien D Payne & Marilyn A Payne, Child Support Guidelines in Canada 2024 (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2024), at p 340.

191That said, counting time under section 9 must “remain flexible” to account for varied circumstances. The goal is a “realistic and more holistic” calculation. See Barnes v Carmount, 2011 ONSC 3925, at para 51.

2. Evidence and Finding of Fact

i. Child Support

192As discussed above, Sanam has been dropping ZK off at Sajid’s house after breakfast and picking him up around dinner. In short, Sajid is responsible for ZK from the time they leave for school until Sanam picks him up around dinnertime. As a result, Sajid’s position is that he’s parenting ZK around two-thirds of the time once these hours are included.

193Sanam, as above, argues that Sajid has forced this situation by trying to control ZK’s uniform, drop-offs with AK, and ZK’s extra-curricular activities. In reply, Sajid points to text messages showing that: (a) Sanam was free to buy another uniform for ZK; (b) Sanam agreed to ZK’s extra-curricular activities; and (c) he had no control over ZK’s physio appointments.

ii. Extra-Curricular Activities

194Sajid adduced evidenced of all the expenses he’s incurred for the children’s extra-curricular activities, tuition, and ZK’s physio. These can be categorized as follows:

Section 7 Category	Particulars	Amount
health-related expenses	Butterfly physio, out-of-pocket expenses	$15,019.25
primary or secondary school education	tuition, uniform, tutoring, trips, summer camp	$167,770.93
post-secondary education	tuition, iPad	$8962.50
extra-curricular activities	gymnastics, swimming, volleyball	$12,560.98

195Sanam paid 50 percent of the children’s extra-curricular activities between May 2021 and January 2022. Though she started working again in March 2022, she didn’t resume paying for section 7 expenses because the activities were booked unilaterally by Sajid and, in any event, she couldn’t afford the expenses.

196In January 2025, under Cudjoe J’s order, Sanam agreed to pay 30 percent of all the children’s expenses for medical, dental, physio, and extra-curricular activities on a temporary basis. Further, Sanam paid $14,355.60 towards “section 7 arrears” on a without prejudice basis.

197In August 2025, Sajid bought AK an iPad and accessories for his university classes. He asked Sanam to pay 30 percent, but she has refused because she wasn’t consulted about the expense.

3. Analysis and Disposition

i. Child Support

198I find that the parties have had shared parenting time of ZK since May 2021.

199I accept that, practically, Sajid has had ZK in his care for more of the day. But I also find that Sajid accepted this responsibility for several reasons. He lives closer to Lynn-Rose, he works from home and has a more flexible work schedule, he doesn’t want to relinquish control of ZK’s uniform, and he wants to ensure that ZK’s physical therapy plan is strictly followed, which he doesn’t trust Sanam to do. Further, even though he initially planned to schedule ZK’s extra-curricular activities on the weekends, he could only find slots during Sanam’s parenting time. He didn’t seek her agreement to transport ZK.

200At bottom, there’s no evidence that Sajid insisted on a strict application of the parenting schedule that he and Sanam agreed to. He could’ve given ZK’s uniform to Sanam and required that she drop ZK off to school and pick him up after school. If Sanam couldn’t do so, I infer that she would’ve made childcare arrangements, or asked Sajid to mind ZK, as she plans to do so now. The extra-curricular activities could’ve been moved. But, again, there was a failure to communicate, and both parties made a tacit agreement that Sajid would take on these responsibilities during Sanam’s parenting time.

201As a result, I order that Sajid shall pay $18,887 to Sanam for retroactive child support from January 1, 2022, to April 30, 2026. My order is based on the following calculations:

	Sajid	Table Amount	Sanam	Table Amount	Offset	Total
2022	$135,043	$1185	$66,814	$1018	$167	$2004
2023	$159,798	$1370	$69,927	$1065	$305	$3660
2024	$151,414	$1309	$55,488	$847	$462	$5544
2025	$151,414	$1338	$55,488	$835	$503	$5667
2026	$151,414	$1338	$55,488	$835	$503	$2012

202Sanam didn’t adduce evidence or argue that there should be a deviation from the Federal Child Support Guidelines amount. See Clarke v Dowe, 2016 ONSC 4773, at para 24.

ii. Extra-Curricular Activities

203Based on my findings about the parties’ incomes and child support since 2022, Sajid’s proportion of section 7 expenses ranges between 63 and 67 percent. For retroactive support, I find that his proportion is 65 percent.

204First, there’s no dispute from Sanam that she’s liable for the children’s health-related expenses (Sanam’s share is $5256.74).

205Second, Sanam is liable for AK’s post-secondary tuition costs (Sanam’s share is $2559.45). Though Sanam deposed that her intention to pay this expense is conditional on her having funds, her ability to pay doesn’t negate her liability for this expense. I’m not ordering that she reimburse Sajid for the cost of AK’s iPad. That’s the type of sundry expense that Sajid should have consulted Sanam about first—she might have taken the position that a brand-new iPad, pencil, and warranty aren’t reasonable expenses.

206Third, under Cudjoe J’s order, Sanam is liable for 30 percent of the children’s extra-curricular costs from January 21, 2025, to present. I only heard evidence about ZK’s swimming and gymnastics expenses during this period (Sanam’s share is $710.41).

207Fourth, I’m not ordering Sanam to reimburse Sajid for the costs of ZK’s uniform, tutoring, or summer camp. On the tutoring and summer camp, I didn’t hear any evidence about how these expenses were necessary, or that Sanam agreed to contribute to these expenses. And, as Sajid said, it’s his uniform.

208The private school tuition and school trips are trickier. When the parties were together, they agreed to send their children to private school. After they separated, Sanam didn’t seek to deregister the children from Rotherglen. After the parties started living separate and apart, she participated in registering them at Lynn-Rose and contributed to their 2021-22 tuition. I infer that because she was working at RBC Insurance, she anticipated covering the costs. After she was fired and her annual income decreased substantially, there’s no evidence that she notified Sajid that she couldn’t afford their tuition or that she moved to enrol the children in public school. She didn’t tell Sajid that she’d lost her job or that she was earning less elsewhere. In cases where a party is seeking a retroactive decrease, “effective notice” requires that the payor provide reasonable proof of changes that is enough to allow the recipient to independently assess the situation. See Colucci, at para 90. Sajid reasonably expected that she would contribute to this cost.

209As a result, I’m ordering that Sanam is liable for 35 percent of the children’s tuition up to the 2025-2026 school year (Sanam’s share is $55,593.13). I’m also ordering that Sanam is liable for any retroactive school trip costs ($481.95).

210Under Cudjoe J’s order, Sanam has paid $14,355.60 towards these expenses. As a result, I’m ordering that Sanam shall pay $49,535.67 to Sajid for retroactive section 7 expenses.

G. Issue #7: spousal support

211Sanam seeks an order for spousal support. Sajid responds that she’s not entitled to spousal support. I agree with Sajid.

1. Legal Framework

212A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to secure or pay such lump sum or periodic sums as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse. See Divorce Act, s 15.2(1). The court may make an order under section 15.2(1) for a definite or indefinite period or until a specified event occurs, and may impose terms, conditions, or restrictions in connection with the order as it thinks fit and just. See Divorce Act, s 15.2(3).

213In making an order under section 15.2(1), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs, and other circumstances of each spouse, including: (a) how long the spouses cohabited; (b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (c) any order, agreement, or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. See Divorce Act, s 15.2(4).

214There are three dimensions to spousal support: (a) entitlement; (b) amount; and (c) quantum.

2. Evidence and Finding of Fact

215I will repeat the relevant facts summarily. The parties were together for just over 15 years. Both parties worked in the financial industry until Sanam’s dismissal in 2021. Sajid helped Sanam get a job at RBC Insurance, and she was steadily promoted. Sajid earned an Executive MBA while he worked. During Sanam’s first pregnancy, Sajid had to travel to South Africa for a school project, but this was only for two weeks.

216There’s a dispute between the parties about who was the children’s primary caregiver before Sajid started working from home. Like many families, I anticipate the scope of their role changed frequently depending on the children’s needs, their respective work schedules, and the assistance they received from their families. At bottom, they were both involved in child-rearing.

3. Analysis and Disposition

217Sanam’s claim is for compensatory and non-compensatory support. See Bracklow v Bracklow, 1999 715 (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 420, at para 37.

218Compensatory support aims to provide equitable sharing of the economic consequences of marriage. The goals of a compensatory award are to provide some compensation for economic loss or disadvantage experienced by the recipient spouse because of the roles adopted during the marriage or following separation, or for the economic benefits which the payor spouse derived from the claimant’s sacrifices and contributions, for which the claimant hasn’t been adequately compensated. See Moge v Moge, 1992 25 (SCC), [1992] 3 SCR 813, at 859-61; Bracklow, at para 18.

219Compensatory support responds to two objectives under the Divorce Act: (a) recognizing the economic advantages or disadvantages arising from the marriage or its breakdown (s 15.2(6)(a)); and (b) apportioning financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage beyond any obligation for support of any child of the marriage (s 15.2(6)(b)).

220Non-compensatory support is often called the “means and needs” approach: it aims to narrow the gap between the means and needs of the spouses. The need of the recipient spouse may arise because of health-related challenges, the roles they adopted during the relationship, or because a status quo developed over time with the party being out of the workforce. See McBennett v Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610, at para 356; Shen v Tong, 2013 BCCA 519, at para 76. Non-compensatory support is based on the concept of marriage as an interdependent union. As a result, the burden for meeting the needs of a disadvantaged spouse should fall on the former partner, rather than the state. See Bracklow, at para 23.

221Non-compensatory support also responds to objectives under the Divorce Act: (a) to relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage (s 15.2(6)(c)); and (b) as far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period (s 15.2(6)(d)).

222I find that Sanam is not entitled to spousal support under either basis. There’s no evidence that Sanam suffered any economic loss or disadvantage during the parties’ marriage. Sajid helped her get a toehold into the financial industry. He used his influence to help her succeed. At separation, she had a management role, which is unique for someone with a high school education. The parties were equal partners in this marriage, both with respect to their finances and child-rearing. They both sacrificed to raise their children. And to the extent that Sanam suffered a disadvantage after separation, it was because she lost her job through no fault of Sajid’s.

223If I am wrong, and Sanam is entitled to support, I would order that Sajid pay spousal support to Sanam in the amount of $1100 per month, starting May 1, 2026. In addition, I would have ordered Sajid to pay retroactive lump sum spousal support in the amount of $63,800 for the period from June 2021 (when the parties started living separate and apart) and now. The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines provide guidance for the appropriate range of support. See Fisher v Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11. The range in this case is $1065 to $2070. Sanam’s claim is on the weaker end of the scale given the absence of any economic disadvantages flowing from the parties’ marriage.

224I would have also ordered that the spousal support order is terminated effective March 1, 2029, again based on the SSAG. Given Sanam’s age, skills, education, and opportunity for retraining, I find that 7 ¾ years is reasonable to promote her self-sufficiency.

H. Issue #8: other miscellaneous issues

225Several other issues can be dealt with summarily.

226Sajid seeks an order that any child support payable by Sanam be secured by life insurance. Given that I have concluded that Sajid is the payor, this order is unnecessary. For the same reason, the non-dissipation order made by Cudjoe J is terminated.

227I order that the parties, who were married on September 28, 2003, shall be divorced and the divorce shall take effect 31 days after the date of this order.

228This order bears interest at the post-judgment interest rate of 4 percent from the date of this order.

229Sajid averted to amounts owing to him for equalization and unpaid interest. I heard almost no evidence or submissions about these issues. I trust that the parties can cooperate in calculating any setoffs, which can then be reflected in the draft order.

IV. CONCLUSION

230The parties will engage in meaningful discussions and negotiations respecting the costs of this trial. If they can’t resolve costs, any party seeking costs will serve, file, and upload to Case Center costs submissions (2500 words), any relevant offers to settle, and their bill of costs by May 1, 2026, 4pm. The other party’s responding submissions (2500 words) will be served, filed, and uploaded to Case Center by May 15, 2026, 4pm.

Agarwal J

Released: April 16, 2026