COURT FILE AND PARTIES

Court File No.: FS-17-90786-00

Date: 2025-10-29

Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:

ASRA FATIMA, Applicant

– and –

NABEEL IRTAZA TUNIO, Respondent

Counsel:

Garav Gill, for the applicant

Prabh Singh Gill and Palak Behl, for the respondent

Heard: September 19, 22, 23, 24 and 25, and October 1 and 3, 2025

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The Honourable Justice Ranjan K. Agarwal

I. INTRODUCTION

[1] For almost his entire life, DT has been living in the shadow of his parents' separation and divorce. The parties were married for only four years, and they separated a few months after DT was born. Almost immediately, there was conflict between them. The parties are of modest means, so most of the post-separation conflict has centred on DT.

[2] There are five issues in dispute:

(a) decision-making responsibility;

(b) parenting time;

(c) child support;

(d) special and extraordinary expenses (specifically, DT's private school tuition); and

(e) retroactive child support.

[3] For the reasons discussed below, I conclude as follows:

(a) the applicant Asra Fatima shall have sole decision-making responsibility for DT over health and education, and the parties shall have joint decision-making responsibility for DT over culture and extra-curricular activities;

(b) DT shall have shared parenting time with the respondent Nabeel Tunio in accordance with the current parenting plan;

(c) Asra has an imputed income of $25,000 and Nabeel has an imputed income of $36,608, meaning that Nabeel shall pay Asra child support of $113 monthly;

(d) DT's private school tuition is not a section 7 expense and, thus, Asra doesn't have to share that expense; and

(e) Nabeel is liable for retroactive child support and Asra is liable for retroactive section 7 expenses, meaning that Asra shall pay $14,862 to Nabeel.

[4] I have also made several other orders that I consider appropriate to implement the parenting order.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Facts

[5] Asra and Nabeel met in Pakistan, though they were both raised and educated in Canada. They married in November 2011. In the beginning, they lived in Regina, where Asra was doing a post-secondary degree. Nabeel worked as a salesperson. The parties also operated a small business together. In 2012, Nabeel's brother, Jahanzeb Tunio, who was 16 then, lived with them for a few months. Though Asra and Nabeel intended to become Jahanzeb's guardian, he left after an altercation with Nabeel.

[6] Asra and Nabeel eventually moved to Ontario, where they both have family. Asra's parents and her brother live nearby. Nabeel is close to his uncle and aunt, and supports his mother who has a disability. He also has a sister close by. But Nabeel is estranged from Jahanzeb.

[7] DT was born in March 2015. The parties separated in November 2015, when DT was 8 months old.

[8] Nabeel worked as a real estate agent until 2023. He's currently on social assistance. In Spring 2017, Asra got a part-time retail job. She lost that job during the pandemic and has had trouble finding employment since then.

[9] Asra and Nabeel self-identify as South Asian and Muslim.

[10] The parties were divorced in September 2018. In November 2019, Asra remarried to Usman Makhdoom. They have a child together (age 4).

B. Litigation History

[11] Asra started this proceeding in November 2017. She claims for child support, decision-making responsibility, and parenting time. Nabeel's answer initially only sought child support and a parenting time order. He amended his answer in May 2021 to add claims for decision-making responsibility.

[12] In May 2018, Seppi J endorsed a temporary, without prejudice consent order:

• DT's primary residence would be with Asra
• the parties would consult each other on "major decisions" related to DT's health and education
• DT would have parenting time with Nabeel (two overnights and Sunday parenting time every other week, and 6-8 hours split between one or two visits on alternate weeks)
• neither party could travel with DT outside Ontario without consent
• starting June 1, 2018, Nabeel would pay $210 in monthly child support and the parties would share section 7 expenses
• the divorce was split from the other issues in the case

[13] In October and November 2019, there were two interim motions. The motions followed several events between the parties: (a) Asra was homeschooling DT; (b) she told Nabeel that she was getting remarried; and (c) she and Usman wanted to take DT on a holiday to Calgary and Vancouver to visit Usman's family. In October 2019, Tzimas LAJ (as she was then) ordered that DT be enrolled in school as soon as possible. The parties subsequently agreed to enrol DT in Al Falah Islamic School, a private faith-based school. In November 2019, Shaw J (as she was then) ordered that Asra could travel with DT.

[14] Nabeel didn't attend the settlement conference in March 2021. Price J ordered Nabeel to make significant disclosure, and he scheduled the trial for June 2021. In April 2021, Doi J scheduled a trial management conference for April 2021 on the basis that Nabeel inadvertently didn't attend the March 2021 settlement conference. He didn't reschedule the trial dates.

[15] For the 2020-2021 school year, Asra proposed that DT be transferred to Peel Elementary Virtual School because of concerns she had about distance learning at Al Falah. Nabeel objected because he believed that Asra was trying to homeschool DT again. Asra then advised Nabeel that she couldn't afford DT's tuition, so he'd have to be enrolled in public school anyway under Tzimas RSJ's order. In April 2021, Nabeel moved for an order for decision-making responsibility over DT's education, and that DT continue at Al Falah. Bloom J ordered DT to continue attending Al Falah, and ordered the parties to share the tuition expense. That said, Bloom J also ordered that if Asra couldn't afford the expense, Nabeel must pay all the fees if Asra gives him financial disclosure.

[16] The TMC didn't proceed because of a court shutdown in May 2021. Ricchetti RSJ (as he was then) adjourned the TMC to September 2021, and the trial to October 2021.

[17] The case was called for trial on October 8, 2021—the last day of the sittings. The parties agreed that McGee J, the trial judge, could conduct a settlement conference but they were unsuccessful in resolving the case. Nabeel, who was represented, insisted on starting the trial that day, which McGee J did. She scheduled continuation dates in April 2022.

[18] In February 2022, Nabeel became self-represented. He then moved for an order that McGee J was biased, and she should recuse herself. McGee J withdrew as the trial judge to avoid further costs to the parties, and given that the trial had barely started.

[19] The trial was supposed to proceed in September 2022. I don't know what happened next, but the trial was ultimately scheduled for September 2025.

[20] In November 2024, Nabeel brought an omnibus motion seeking various orders regarding child support and section 7 expenses. He also sought an order that Asra was in contempt of court. Trimble J dismissed the motion.

[21] In August 2025, Nabeel moved for an order adjourning the trial on the basis that DT needed his own lawyer. Tzimas RSJ dismissed the motion. Fifteen days later, Nabeel brought an urgent motion asking for the same relief. Mandhane J dismissed that request.

[22] Nabeel had a lawyer at the start of the case, but was self-represented from 2019 to 2021, and again from 2022 to the day before trial. Asra almost always had a lawyer, though she's changed representation several times. She was self-represented for the motion in November 2024.

[23] The case was called for trial on September 19, 2025. Nabeel asked for an adjournment of four to eight weeks. He had recently qualified for a legal aid certificate, and retained a lawyer the night before. I refused the adjournment request.

[24] In exercising the court's discretion to adjourn a trial, the trial judge should balance the interests of the applicant, the interests of the respondent, and the interests of the administration of justice in the orderly processing of trials on their merits. Several considerations may bear on these interests. See Khimji v Dhanani, at para 14; Ariston Realty Corp. v Elcarim Inc., at para 34.

[25] This application has been ongoing for eight years. There has been one aborted trial. Nabeel didn't adduce any evidence to show why he delayed in applying for and getting a legal aid certificate, or in retaining a lawyer after he got the certificate. Given that the trial was called on a Friday and he is the respondent, Nabeel and his lawyers would have had at least the weekend to prepare for Asra's cross-examination. Based on the schedule of witnesses, Nabeel wouldn't be testifying for a few days. And Nabeel was ready for trial—he had organized the documents he intended to rely on. Tzimas RSJ and Mandhane J had already dismissed two requests for an adjournment. Most importantly, DT needed and deserved the finality of a trial.

[26] After my ruling, Asra's lawyer offered that the trial be adjourned until September 22nd to give Nabeel's lawyers more time to prepare. Though I was prepared to recess the trial, if and when asked, to ensure that Nabeel's lawyers had adequate time to prepare for upcoming witnesses, they didn't request any adjournments. As it turned out, the trial was adjourned for a few days before Nabeel's evidence and the closing arguments because of a court holiday and the court and the lawyers' other commitments.

C. The Trial Evidence

[27] The trial proceeded by way of oral evidence and filed exhibits. Though it would've been ideal if the parties had agreed on a statement of facts and a joint document book, I understand why that wasn't possible given that Nabeel retained a lawyer at the last minute.

[28] In addition to herself, Asra called the following witnesses:

• Mahesh Prajapath, the OCL clinician
• Usman and Jahanzeb
• Nina Javet and Tracy Simpson-Organ, Halton CAS employees

[29] Nabeel was the respondent's only witness.

[30] After the trial was finished, the parties made further submissions on Nabeel's historical income and DT's tuition costs.

[31] I found all the witnesses except Nabeel to be credible and reliable. Credibility and reliability are different. Credibility has to do with a witness's veracity; reliability with the accuracy of the witness's testimony. Reliability engages consideration of the witness's ability to accurately observe, recall, and recount events in issue. Any witness whose evidence on an issue isn't credible can't give reliable evidence on the same point. Credibility, on the other hand, isn't a proxy for reliability: a credible witness may give unreliable evidence. See R v GF, 2021 SCC 20, at para 82; R v HC, 2009 ONCA 56, at para 41.

[32] The factors relevant to assessing credibility include: (a) honesty; (b) an interest in the outcome of the proceedings; (c) accuracy and completeness of observations; (d) circumstances of the observations; (e) memory; (f) availability of other sources of information; (g) inherent reasonableness of the testimony; (h) internal consistency, and consistency with other evidence; and (i) demeanour. See D Watt & J Makepeace, Watt's Manual of Criminal Jury Instructions 2024 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2024) at Final 14; R v King, 2025 ONSC 2448, at para 15; Dhanoa v Ramnarine, 2025 ONSC 3621, at para 24; Verma v Bhooi, 2025 ONSC 4260, at para 72.

[33] All of Asra's witnesses appeared honest. They all testified in a manner that gave me confidence that they were concerned with DT's best interests. Their oral evidence was consistent with the documentary evidence and other witnesses. It was also internally consistent. Asra was candid with the court about her mistakes.

[34] In contrast, I found Nabeel's evidence, in some parts, to lack credibility. He wasn't lying. But he exaggerated facts that helped him, and minimized facts that didn't. There were inconsistencies between his oral evidence and the documents. He also said things—like accusing Asra of being an extremist—that weren't grounded in any evidence.

IV. ANALYSIS AND DISPOSITION

[35] This case presents five issues:

(a) decision-making responsibility;

(b) parenting time;

(c) child support;

(d) special and extraordinary expenses (specifically, DT's private school tuition); and

(e) retroactive child support.

A. Issue #1: Decision-Making Responsibility

[36] Asra asks for sole decision-making responsibility for DT over health, education, culture, and significant extra-curricular activities. Nabeel requests joint decision-making responsibility, with him having the "tie-breaker" over education and Asra having the tie-breaker over health. He also requests an order that before exercising a "tie-break", the parent must provide the other parent with the "proposed decision and reasons in writing and consider any teacher/administrator/health-professional recommendations provided." Nabeel's proposal is really that the parties consult, but he has final responsibility over education and Asra over health.

[37] For the reasons discussed below, I order that Asra shall have sole decision-making responsibility for DT over health and education, and the parties shall have joint decision-making responsibility for DT over culture and significant extra-curricular activities.

1. Legal Framework

[38] This court may make an order for the exercise of decision-making responsibility for any child of the marriage, on application by either spouse. See Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 16.1(1). Decision-making responsibility means making significant decisions about a child's well-being, including for: (a) health; (b) education; (c) culture, language, religion, and spirituality; and (d) significant extracurricular activities. See Divorce Act, s 2(1). Decision-making authority helps ensure that a parent's relationship with their child isn't marginalized. See Rigillo v Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 548, at para 12.

[39] The court may allocate decision-making responsibility for the child, or any aspect of that responsibility, to either spouse, or to both spouses. See Divorce Act, ss 16.1(4)(b), 16.3. In deciding on the appropriate decision-making responsibility regime, the court must consider all possible frameworks, and not simply those proposed by the parties. The goal in crafting an appropriate decision-making regime is to promote the child's "right to grow up within a parenting regime that is co-operative and effective, where decisions are made in a child-focused way and with the least amount of acrimony and stress." See McBennett v Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610, at para 96. See also RG v JG, 2022 ONSC 1678, at paras 117-22, and KM v JR, 2022 ONSC 111, at paras 46-62.

[40] For the court to grant joint decision-making in some or all areas, there must be some evidence that the parties are able to communicate effectively in the areas under consideration for the sake of the child, despite their differences. The best interests of the child won't be advanced if the parties can't make important decisions about the child under a joint decision-making arrangement. In analyzing the ability of the parties to communicate, the court must delve below the surface and consider the source of the conflict. See McBennett, at para 97.

[41] The quality of each party's past parenting and decision-making, both during the parties' relationship and post-separation, is key to determining whether an order for joint decision-making in some or all areas is appropriate. See McBennett, at para 97.

[42] A party who has not been granted decision-making responsibility for "significant decisions about a child's well-being" nonetheless supports the child's life and retains a decision-making role in daily issues that can be equally important to the child's overall well-being. See Divorce Act, s 16.2(2). This section protects children and parents who have parenting time with each other from attempts by the party granted decision-making authority respecting significant decisions to intrude upon or marginalize the role of the other parent. See McBennett, at para 80. The Divorce Act, s 16.4, establishes the right of parents who have been allocated parenting time to request and receive information about the child's well-being, including their health and education.

[43] The court shall take into consideration "only the best interests of the child of the marriage in making a parenting…order" See Divorce Act, s 16(1). The court must consider the following factors in carrying out the "best interests" analysis:

(a) the child's needs, given the child's age and stage of development, such as the child's need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child's relationship with each spouse, each of the child's siblings and grandparents, and any other person who plays an important role in the child's life;

(c) each spouse's willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child's relationship with the other spouse;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child's views and preferences, giving due weight to the child's age and maturity, unless they can't be ascertained;

(f) the child's cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing, and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child's care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact; and

(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security, and well-being of the child.

[44] In considering these factors, the court is required to "give primary consideration to the child's physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being". See Divorce Act, s 16(2).

[45] The list of factors isn't a "checklist to be tabulated with the highest score winning". See Phillips v Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480, at para 47. The "primary consideration" recognizes that there may be conflicts in attempting to weigh the enumerated criteria. Any such difficulties should be resolved by ensuring that the child's physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being are promoted. See McBennett, at para 82.

[46] In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not consider the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of their decision-making responsibility. See Divorce Act, s 16(5). In cases of family violence, particularly spousal violence, it is "crucial that the court consider whether a co-operative parenting arrangement is appropriate." See Bell v Reinhardt, 2021 ONSC 3352, at para 15.

2. Facts

[47] Seppi J's order effectively provides for joint decision-making responsibility for DT. The order was made when DT was three years old. In practice, the parties have exercised a form of joint decision-making responsibility, though it has been fraught with conflict, mostly over his education.

[48] DT doesn't have any major health-related issues. There's no conflict between the parties about the management of DT's health. The parties both have access to information from DT's doctors and dentists, and they follow the practitioners' recommendations.

[49] DT isn't involved in any significant extra-curricular activities. The parties don't have any concerns about their ability to make decisions in this area if he pursues significant sports, art, or volunteer activities.

[50] The parties share a culture, language, and religion. DT is being raised in South Asian families, and as a Muslim. The parties haven't had any major disagreements about his culture or religion.

[51] That leaves education, which has been the focus of the parties' dispute. DT has been going to Al Falah since Tzimas RSJ's order in 2019. He's in Grade 5 now. In 2029, he will need to change schools as Al Falah doesn't have a high school.

[52] DT is an excellent student. He's engaged in class and gets good grades in all his subjects. Both Asra and Nabeel are satisfied, if not happy, with DT's school. But Asra can't afford to share the tuition expense, and Nabeel can't afford the tuition on his own. As a result, Asra's view is that DT should go to the local public school. I discuss this issue further under section 7 expenses.

3. Analysis and Disposition

i. Child's Needs

[53] The court must consider the unique needs and circumstances of the child. For example, age, level of maturity, and temperament can all influence a child's ability to cope with change and their need for a particular parenting style. See Khurmi v Sidhu, 2022 ONSC 6413, at para 98. A child's needs change over time, and a child's stage of development is vital to determining their reaction to any situation. For example, school-age children generally need far more predictability in terms of schedules and routines than adolescents. See Albaz v Rihawi, 2024 ONSC 812, at para 64.

[54] Given DT's age and circumstances, it's in his best interest that Asra and Nabeel make as many decisions as they can jointly without generating unnecessary conflict or disrupting DT's schedules and routines.

[55] The Association of Family and Conciliation Courts – Ontario Parenting Plan Guide concludes that it's "preferable" if parents "consult with each other and make major decisions jointly", regardless of the child's age. That said, as children mature, they usually become "more involved in the decision-making process", such as being involved in school choice and consenting to medical treatment. The AFCC-O guide has been referred to by this court as "of great assistance" and "helpful". See Hatab v Abuhatab, 2022 ONSC 1560, at para 61; McBennet, at para 92.

[56] The OCL recommends that Asra have sole-decision-making responsibility because of the "high level of conflict and lack of demonstrated history of collaborative decision-[making]". Nabeel argues that I should give the OCL report no weight. The parties, DT, and other contacts were interviewed between January 2022 and May 2022. The report was disclosed to the parties in June 2022. Nabeel argues that the report doesn't reflect the current circumstances of the parties or DT—DT was only seven years old at the time. See Proulx v Proulx, 2021 ONSC 3657, at para 58; Albaz, at para 39.

[57] I disagree with Nabeel. First, many of the OCL's observations and conclusions in the report were affirmed by other witnesses' evidence at trial. That's strong circumstantial evidence that the report remains relevant. Second, unlike in Proulx or Albaz, this report is based on interviews and observations made in status quo circumstances. Asra and Usman were married in August 2019. DT started school that October. In November 2019, Nabeel imposed a new parenting plan on DT and Asra. That plan has remained in place since then, including when the OCL investigated this matter and since. There have been no material changes in DT's circumstances since 2022.

[58] The evidence at trial affirms the OCL's conclusions. Asra and Nabeel have a lot of post-separation conflict about how to raise DT, specifically around his education. As a result, any parenting order should allow them both to support DT's needs but reduce the areas of conflict.

ii. Nature and Strength of Child's Relationships

[59] The nature of the child's relationship with each parent, including the nature of their relationship as it existed during the marriage, is especially relevant to parenting. In addition, children often have important relationships with other family members, such as siblings or grandparents. These relationships can provide stability at a time of substantial change in the child's life. See Khurmi, at para 101; Albaz, at para 68.

[60] DT has a strong relationship with both parents. As a result, it's in DT's best interest that, as much as possible, both parents play a supportive and co-operative role in decisions about his life.

iii. Supporting the Child's Relationship with the Other Spouse

[61] It's generally important that each parent support the child's relationship with the other parent. A positive relationship with both parents provides stability for the child during their parents' separation and divorce. See Khurmi, at para 103; Albaz, at para 71.

[62] Nabeel hasn't always supported DT's relationship with Asra and, more specifically, with Usman. In contrast, Asra has encouraged DT and Nabeel's relationship. Again, this disparity means that any parenting order must minimize conflict.

[63] For example, in February 2021, Nabeel insisted that the school communicate "directly with [DT's] parents" and "involve no 3rd party…in [DT]s matters" without "mutual resolution or permanent court order", to the point that he didn't want Usman "as [DT's] emergency contact". Nabeel dictated that Asra could add her father as DT's emergency contact.

[64] This unilateral direction, which Nabeel was able to facilitate because the parties have interim joint decision-making responsibility, wasn't in DT's best interest. Usman lives with Asra and the children. He works from home. Their home is 10 minutes from the school. In contrast, Asra's father is elderly and farther away. If there was an emergency, it's in DT's best interest that the school contact Usman if they can't reach Asra or Nabeel.

[65] Nabeel has also refused to allow DT to have video calls with Asra if Usman is around. If DT asked to speak to Usman, Nabeel would snatch the phone away or end the call. As a result, Asra stopped asking for video calls when DT had parenting time with Nabeel.

iv. History of Care

[66] Courts must consider who knows the child's routines, preferences, and health-related challenges, and can provide stability. This includes past caregiving roles and the child's relationship with each person. See Albaz, at para 79.

[67] DT doesn't have any significant health issues. Both parties know his schedule and likings. They are equally facilitating his attendance at Al Falah. As a result, again, any parenting order should allow for joint decisions so long as conflict can be avoided.

v. Child's Views and Preferences

[68] Children who can form their own views should have a say in the decisions that affect their lives, whether made by judges or parents. The older and more mature a child is, the more weight their views will carry. See Albaz, at para 81.

[69] Nabeel submits that this court should adjourn the trial either to appoint a lawyer for DT or for the court to interview DT. His view is that this court doesn't have any information about DT's views and preferences.

[70] The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, art 12, provides that children should be given "the opportunity to be heard" in legal proceedings affecting their rights to ensure that the child has the "right to express those views freely". See Mader v McCormick, 2018 ONCA 340, at paras 10-12; BJG v DLG, 2010 YKSC 44; Children's Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c C.12, s 64(1). In a case that involves a child who is not a party, the court may authorize a lawyer to represent the child, and then the child has the rights of a party, unless the court orders otherwise. See Family Law Rules, r 4(7). That said, the appointment of a lawyer is a "blunt instrument"—it implicates the child directly in the case, and can cause them "untold harm". See Mader, at para 13, citing Reynolds v Reynolds, at para 3.

[71] Alternatively, the court may interview the child to determine the views and preferences of the child. See CLRA, s 64(2). The decision whether to interview a child must be in their best interests. See LEG v AG, 2002 BCSC 1455, at para 5; LA-MB v PDMM, 2024 ONSC 4419, at para 32. The court should only interview a child where other methods of determining the child's preferences (such as assessments) are unavailable. See Stefureak v Chambers, at para 62.

[72] I'm not appointing a lawyer for DT or interviewing him. There's no need for it, at least none that outweighs the prejudicial effect on DT. As I discuss below, both parties want DT to continue at Al Falah. According to the parties, DT wants the same thing. The issue, as I discuss below, is what happens if one or both parents can't afford the tuition. And on parenting time, Asra isn't arguing that DT needs or prefers less time with Nabeel. Her position, as I discuss in greater detail below, is that Nabeel is negatively influencing DT, so he and DT should have less parenting time together. I'm operating on the presumption, as reported by the OCL, that DT wants maximum contact with both parents. There are no salutary benefits from having DT affirm these views, either through a lawyer or a judicial interview, when they're aligned with his parents' evidence. But there is a risk of harm to DT if I adjourn the trial now either to appoint a lawyer or to interview him.

[73] That all said, the OCL report and the parties' evidence about DT's views and preferences aren't probative on the issue of decision-making responsibility. As expected, the OCL report doesn't opine on DT's views about decision-making responsibility.

[74] As a result, the only conclusion I make on this factor is that DT would prefer to stay at Al Falah. And I infer that he would like his parents to make decisions without conflict and so that he has stability.

vi. Child's Cultural and Religious Upbringing

[75] Children's culture or religion may provide an added support system for them. Asra's and Nabeel's ability to maintain and promote DT's understanding of, and link to, his cultural, linguistic and religious heritage, as well as the potential for him to develop his own cultural identity and self-esteem, are important factors. See Khurmi, at para 105; Albaz, at para 83.

[76] Both Asra and Nabeel are Muslim and South Asian. They're raising DT as a Muslim. There seem to be no significant disputes between them about DT's cultural and religious upbringing. That said, Nabeel tried to characterize Asra as having extremist beliefs that have influenced her decisions about DT's education.

[77] Nabeel says that Asra attends a TROID mosque, which has taught her to look at "non-Muslims as subhuman". He also relies on text messages that Asra sent him in 2019, where she expressed concern about DT using the word "magic": "If it was science school bus id be fine with it .. but i dont wanna casually throw around the word magic like its nothing to a point where he sees actual trickery and is like oh this is just like that nbd". She also sent Nabeel links to two podcasts, one of which was entitled "691-the-evils-of harry-potter-and-the-kufr-of-magic". The podcast wasn't introduced into evidence, and no one testified about it. Nabeel argues that Asra wanted to homeschool DT because of these extreme religious beliefs.

[78] There's no basis in the evidence for Nabeel's portrayal of Asra. I heard no evidence about TROID except that it operates a mosque in Toronto. There was no evidence that Asra held non-Muslims in disregard. Indeed, during the trial, where several of the participants self-identified as non-Muslim, Asra was civil, courteous, and respectful to everyone. And other than Asra's concern that DT, who was five then, shouldn't mistake magic for trickery, there's nothing in the evidence tying her desire to homeschool DT in 2019 to an extremist belief system.

[79] Asra is an observant Muslim and wears a niqab. Nabeel appears to be stereotyping Asra as an extremist because of how she practices her faith, and where she practices her faith. But his beliefs aren't grounded in the evidence, which makes them irrelevant.

vii. Plans for Child's Care

[80] Parents are generally in the best position to identify what's best for their children. They should develop parenting arrangements without court intervention as much as possible.

[81] Nabeel hasn't always made decisions about parenting arrangements in DT's best interests. He has sought the court's intervention rather than compromising or cooperating with Asra. His actions raise concerns about his parenting skills and judgment. In contrast, Asra has shown an ability to co-parent with Nabeel without court intervention.

[82] In October 2019, Nabeel unilaterally imposed a parenting time schedule on DT and Asra. After some back and forth about how best to accommodate DT starting school, Nabeel told Asra what the allocation would be:

When [DT] starts his new school schedule, I'll be conducting pickups and drop off to and from his school. Not your place of residence any longer. If you wish to arrange to pick up after school hours. You may do so with me at a mutually agreeable location.

Due to your lack of cooperation on the matter, The current access schedule will be executed as follows.

Week 1: Fatima Tuesday morning school drop-off. Tunio Tuesday after school pick up to Wednesday Morning School Drop off. Fatima Wednesday after school pick up. Fatima

Friday morning Drop off. Tunio Friday after school picks up to Monday morning school drop off. Fatima Monday after school picks up.

Week 1 Long weekend: In the event of a long weekend on week 1 schedule rotation starts on a Friday and ends on Monday. Tunio will pick up [DT] Thursday after school to Tuesday Morning school drop off. Fatima picks up [DT] Tuesday after school.

In the event, the long weekend starts from Friday with school beginning on Monday. Tunio will conduct after school pick up on Thursday to Monday morning school drop off. Fatima Monday after school pick up.

In Event of Long weekend being a Monday, Tunio will pick up [DT] after school friday to tuesday morning school drop off. Fatima Tuesday after school pick up.

Resuming to Week 2 rotation: If drop off was Monday morning school than Tunio After school pick up on Tuesday with Wednesday morning school drop off. Fatima Wednesday after school pick up.

Tunio Thursday after school pick up to Friday morning school drop off. Fatima Friday after school pick up.

[83] Asra decided not to challenge Nabeel's actions in court to avoid conflict and the impact on DT. Nabeel didn't adduce any evidence at trial about how this new plan was better for DT. I find that Nabeel orchestrated this parenting plan to reduce his child support obligations. At trial, he insisted that he didn't know that shared parenting time was more than 40 per cent of parenting time. That's not believable. For example, in an email to Al Falah in February 2021, Nabeel specifically referenced "40% of his time with me", suggesting that he was tying the parenting plan to the threshold for a child support set-off.

[84] Self-help tactics in family law show "poor judgment". They can harm the child because the child doesn't know if they can trust their parent's promises, and they absorb the stress and the conflict. It exacerbates the conflict between the parents. It can waste court time and money. See Sain v Shahbazi, 2023 ONSC 5187, at para 21. A parent who engages in self-help tactics despite the best interests of the child will generally raise serious questions about their own parenting skills and judgment. In many cases, courts conclude manipulative, selfish, or spiteful parents simply can't be entrusted with custodial authority they would likely abuse. See Rifai v Green, 2014 ONSC 1377, at para 22.

[85] Nabeel's actions around DT's parenting plan mean that he sometimes prefers his interests over DT's best interests.

viii. Ability and Willingness

[86] The past, present, and future ability and willingness of a person to care for the child are important factors in determining the best interests of the child. In some cases, a parent's physical, psychological, or other limitations may raise concerns for the child's health, safety, well-being, and development. Courts must consider a person's strengths and limitations when determining parenting arrangements. See Khurmi, at para 108; Mane v Mane, 2023 ONSC 5343, at para 111; Albaz, at para 85.

[87] For the most part, both parties have shown an ability and willingness to care for DT's physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being. That said, Nabeel has one major limitation: he's not prepared to accept that other people involved in DT's care may have a different view from him. As a result, I don't believe a consultative approach on major decisions is in DT's best interests.

[88] My discussion both above and below shows Nabeel's refusal to accept Asra's advice about parenting DT. I have also detailed Nabeel's unwillingness to accept this court's orders when they don't favour his viewpoint. And I've already discussed his disagreement with the OCL's recommendations.

[89] I add to this growing list his disagreement with Halton CAS's recommendations. In October 2024, Nabeel contacted Halton CAS about DT. Nabeel alleges that DT told him that Asra slapped him, and DT was refusing to leave Nabeel's home. The investigation worker identified post-separation conflict between Asra and Nabeel, and ongoing conflict between Asra and Usman. As some point, the file was transitioned to Ms. Javet, an Ongoing Child Protection Worker, to help support the family. Ms. Javet testified that Asra was co-operative, worked with a family support worker, and took Halton CAS's recommendations. In contrast, Nabeel was hostile and unwilling to cooperate with Halton CAS.

[90] In March 2025, Halton CAS investigated whether Nabeel assaulted DT. He met with Halton CAS on April 1, 2025. He spoke to Ms. Simpson-Organ, a family support worker, on April 25, 2025. In a follow-up email to that call, he accused Ms. Simpson-Organ, Ms. Javet, and other Halton CAS employees of ganging up on and bullying him at the April 1st meeting. He also accused Ms. Simpson-Organ of making sexist comments and dodging his questions in their phone call. But Nabeel sent a long email to Halton CAS right after the April 1st meeting, and he didn't mention any concerns about his treatment during the meeting.

[91] In July 2024, Nabeel alleged that Asra and Usman were exposing DT and his brother to parental conflict, and Usman was verbally abusing DT. Ms. Simpson-Organ was engaged in July 2025 after DT again refused to leave Nabeel for parenting time with Asra. She met with Nabeel once and spoke to him on the phone twice. She found him to be intimidating and "not an easy person to work with".

[92] After Ms. Simpson-Organ's involvement, Nabeel accused her of threatening him and distressing DT. He sent an aggressive email to Ms. Javet, threatening to "escalate" the matter. Ms. Javet described Nabeel as aggravated, defensive, and angry when they met.

[93] Halton CAS eventually closed its file in August 2025 because any concerns had been mitigated.

[94] In sum, Nabeel seems to have formed the view that only he has DT's best interests at heart. As a result, when somebody disagrees with him, he becomes litigious, either refusing to accept their recommendations or threatening to escalate the matter. In contrast, all the evidence shows that Asra is acutely concerned with DT's well-being, to the point that she seeks out and follows recommendations about his care.

ix. Communicate and Cooperate

[95] Children benefit when their parents cooperate and communicate. Parents who cooperate and communicate are more likely to manage flexible parenting arrangements and joint decision-making about their children. See Khurmi, at para 111; Mane, at para 118; Albaz, at para 95.

[96] Asra and Nabeel have failed to foster and develop any serious communication or cooperation skills when it comes to co-parenting DT. As I will explain, I find that most of these failings have come from Nabeel, but Asra also must shoulder some responsibility. As a result, joint decision-making in areas of conflict isn't in DT's best interests.

(a) Communication

[97] Nabeel has poor communication skills. His tone and manner are often hostile, demanding, aggressive, and controlling:

• 2019—"Take your goddamn attitude and shove it up your ass. I don't owe you shit."
• May 2019—"you better be agreeing on this voice text" and "I don't care what you think of my voice notes. I've sent you what I said and if you don't listen is your problem. Guess you will see when w.e I've informed you about happens. And ok"
• August 2019—"This last weekend my son told me to come and have a sleepover so both his parents could be in the same house. You suck and are a shit mother for not trying during our marriage and even after."

[98] In August 2019, in response to Asra advising Nabeel that she was getting married, and requesting consent to travel with DT, Nabeel responded with hostility:

• "…I'm not going to authorize any form of you know permissions for him to travel whatsoever so you can do whatever the hell you want to do with your life. I don't really care but he isn't going anywhere."
• "I'm telling you right now that if your new husband lays a hand on him now or ever [because DT is a 'hyperactive' child and 'does play fighting'] you'll have to deal with me personally and to the full extent of the law. You can send him this voice text as well all right."
• "I guess you're bullshit plan about telling me that you wanted [DT] to grow up in Dubai was completely crap because I don't see you moving whatsoever. I'll also be placing a restriction on him being able to travel you know outside of a 20 to 30 km radius. Also you know you might want to also check with your lawyer about how much part of their way you can move because you know you're not allowed to move more than what 5 to 10 km radius from where I live just so you know that."

[99] At trial, Nabeel was presented with these statements. He refused to concede that he or his words were aggressive. He asserted that Asra was also rude to him, but there's no evidence of that.

[100] He also argued that he and Asra had a lot more conflict leading up to 2019 but, in his view, they have communicated well since then. That's not accurate. For example, in July 2020, Nabeel advised Asra that he would be out of town for three weeks. He then dictated what would happen with his parenting time:

After I return I will be making up my missed access days. I'd prefer to do it on mutually agreeable days with you on select days so you aren't inconvenienced. If you chose not to, as you have an established pattern of not cooperating/agreeing on make up access days and you have stated you don't wish to cooperate. The access days will be made up after you have been informed of those make up days.

[101] In contrast, Asra's responses were civil and constructive: "I can work around giving you one of my weekends for you in august and one in september in sha Allah." She then asked whether she could take DT on a family holiday to Calgary. Nabeel responded antagonistically: "Absolutely not. I have major and legitimate concerns with your husbands and his aggressive behavior towards [DT] and your dismissive attitude towards any issues raised." He hinted at a pattern of increasing and "worrying complaints" by DT. He then shut the conversation down: "Your reply is not needed."

[102] Remarkably, Nabeel refused to acknowledge that he had any role in this negative communication. His evidence is that the "only issue" is from Asra's side. I disagree—Nabeel is the source of the conflict.

(b) Education

[103] DT's education has been a major sticking point. In January 2019, Asra texted Nabeel about meeting up to talk about enrolling DT in JK for September. Asra wanted to homeschool DT. She wanted to give him individualized attention, and teach him Urdu and Arabic and about the Quran. At first, Nabeel wouldn't discuss this option at all. Then, he refused to meet in person. For whatever reason, they didn't connect by phone until March or April.

[104] In May 2019, Asra sent the podcasts on magic that I discussed above and some voicechats, which weren't adduced into evidence. Nabeel responded: "If you think I'm letting you home school him past this year your nuts…Let alone past elementary schools."

[105] In June 2019, the issue came to a head. Nabeel asked Asra whether she had registered DT for school. She responded: "I haven't and don't intend to either. You can file your motion in sha Allah. Allahumusta'an." She then explained that she had been "exhaustively" researching schooling options, including various Islamic schools, and didn't find any "better alternatives" to homeschooling. She repeated her invitation that they litigate the issue: "I understand you see differently so its okay if you want to proceed via court to sort it out. No worries, In sha Allah khayr."

[106] At some point, Asra raised the idea of raising DT in Dubai. This issue wasn't fleshed out at trial, and the text messages are ambiguous. I infer that Asra was considering moving to Dubai and, in response, Nabeel was open to the idea of also moving. But he was skeptical that Asra was serious about such a move. Nabeel then responded with the threat of litigation:

Than I'll be passing a motion for his registration at alfalah or any other Islamic school where you're going to be paying for 50% of the expenses and will be responsible for his transportation to and from school. I won't care about how far his school distance will be. as long as he goes to an Islamic one ..

If that isn't possible for whatever reason, he will go to a public school.

[107] Nabeel also sent two hostile voice messages, which I have discussed above.

[108] No one scheduled a motion. In September, Asra started homeschooling DT. JK isn't mandatory in Ontario, so Asra wasn't doing anything wrong by failing to register DT for school. But there's no dispute that she didn't intend to enrol him in public school because, in her view, homeschooling was the best option for him.

[109] Nabeel eventually brought a motion in October 2019. He was self-represented, and sought several parenting and child support orders. Tzimas RSJ heard only the school choice motion. She held that homeschooling wasn't in DT's best interest, and ordered that DT either attend the local public school or a private Islamic school if the parties could agree on his tuition.

[110] The parties enrolled DT in Al Falah. At first, Asra paid the tuition.

[111] In March 2020, due to the COVID pandemic, Ontario schools were closed to in-person learning. As Asra testified, it was difficult for DT—he was only 5, and it was challenging for him to do virtual school and for Asra to supervise him.

[112] In August 2020, Asra raised the idea of transferring DT to public school, which had a virtual school option. Nabeel immediately presumed that Asra was trying to homeschool DT in the face of Tzimas RSJ's order. As Asra explained, Al Falah wasn't offering "zoom calls and remote learning" at that time—either DT could attend in person, or the class might be livestreamed. In contrast, the Peel District School Board had a virtual elementary school. This discussion devolved into a back-and-forth about whether Asra was proceeding unilaterally and their respective interpretations of the court order.

[113] Around this time, Asra announced that she couldn't pay DT's tuition for the upcoming school year. She wasn't working because of the pandemic shutdown, and couldn't afford it. That said, her messages leave the impression that she was being more strategic. Because she insisted on distance learning for DT, she told Nabeel that either he had to "absorb all school related costs and expenses…so [DT] can attend their livestream" or if he can't carry the costs, DT would be automatically enrolled in public school, which offers a "proper distance learning" option. Nabeel started paying the tuition.

[114] DT ended up continuing at Al Falah but doing distance learning. This led to yet another dispute. Asra contended that DT's parenting time with Nabeel was limited to after-school hours even if he was remote learning from home. She refused to provide Nabeel with DT's textbooks, workbooks, and school materials. They eventually resolved this issue.

[115] In February 2021, Asra advised Nabeel that Al Falah was too far for her as she had moved in August 2020, and she was considering a different Islamic school that was either equidistant or closer to her home and the same cost. She didn't sign DT's enrolment forms.

[116] In April 2021, Nabeel confronted DT's teacher about whether students are "restricted on movement" or reminded "harshly" to sanitize and social distance. The teacher explained the different types of activities that students were doing in class. She expressed surprise at Nabeel's questions because she was posting class videos on a learning app for parents to see. The teacher also raised concerns that DT had changed his behaviour, and was negative about school. Though Nabeel argues that Asra was encouraging DT's negative comments, I can't make that finding. It's unclear to me whether, at this time, DT was attending school in-person or virtually.

[117] Nabeel then brought a motion for sole decision-making responsibility over DT's education, and an order that DT keep going to Al Falah. Bloom J ordered DT to continue attending Al Falah, and that the parties shall share his tuition costs unless Asra provides evidence that she can't afford it. He also directed that DT attend school in-person and not virtually (though the school ended up being closed to in-person learning for the rest of the year).

[118] The issue came up again in November 2024. Nabeel was paying all of DT's tuition. He brought a motion seeking several orders, including that Asra must share the private school costs. She responded that DT should go to the local public school. On this issue, Trimble J found that both parties had failed to produce any financial disclosure to show that they couldn't pay for the tuition. Ultimately, he rejected Nabeel's request, leaving Bloom J's order to govern the parties.

[119] In sum, both parties have acted unilaterally, and not necessarily in DT's best interest. Asra unilaterally decided to homeschool DT, despite Nabeel's objection. The reasonable compromise would've been the outcome that they agreed to—private Islamic school. Asra suggests that Nabeel had effectively agreed to homeschooling because he didn't bring a motion before the start of the school year—he only did so, in her view, after she told him that she was getting remarried and out of spite. I can't make that finding. Nabeel was self-represented. He maintained his opposition to homeschooling. I don't know why he delayed, but I can't conclude that he'd tacitly consented to Asra's proposal.

[120] Nabeel's refusal to consider virtual public school was also not in DT's best interest. Given the COVID pandemic, DT's age, and the lack of virtual learning at Al Falah, virtual public school was a reasonable alternative. Nabeel didn't want Asra homeschooling DT, but that isn't what she was proposing.

[121] This narrative shows that the parties can't make decisions about DT's education together. They have different views about his best interests and, as a result, don't know how to cooperate or communicate about his education.

(c) Travel

[122] Nabeel has consistently refused to let DT travel with Asra. I have discussed some of these instances already.

[123] Nabeel refused to consent to DT travelling to Calgary and Vancouver with Asra in 2019. He provided no grounds for his refusal, even though Seppi J's order requires that consent shall not be unreasonably withheld. That led to a motion, and Shaw LAJ ordering that Asra could travel with DT to Calgary.

[124] In 2020, Asra again asked for consent to travel with DT to Calgary. Nabeel refused based on "your husbands and his aggressive behavior towards [DT] and your dismissive attitude towards any issues raised."

[125] In March 2025, Asra asked Nabeel for consent to travel to Pakistan with DT. Nabeel refused on the basis that Asra hadn't paid her share of section 7 expenses and because Pakistan hasn't ratified the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. He implied that Asra was seeking to abduct DT to Pakistan on the eve of trial. Nabeel's email claims that travel isn't in DT's best interests. In responding this way though, Nabeel didn't really consider DT's interests. First, the issue of section 7 expenses is irrelevant to travel. Second, there are significant benefits to travel, especially where children get to visit extended family and explore their heritage. See Yacoub v Yacoub, 2010 ONSC 4259, at para 21. Finally, Nabeel asserted no evidence then or now to show that it was even plausible that Asra, who has significant ties to Ontario, would refuse to return from Pakistan.

[126] As Asra intended to travel without DT given the lack of consent, she asked for makeup parenting time when she returned. Nabeel's response: "Like for all aspects of our matter the Status quo remains. Ms Fatima has never accommodated me for any of my missed parenting time with DT when I have had to travel. Thus the same status quo for the missed days in her case as well." That is patently false—there's plenty of evidence of Asra accommodating Nabeel, including when he travelled for a family emergency in Summer 2020, and again in October 2023 and January 2024.

[127] That said, in June 2023, Nabeel did consent to Asra travelling with DT to Calgary that August.

[128] Nabeel's refusal to be reasonable about travel is yet another example of the parties' inability to communicate about major decisions for DT. Again, Nabeel is the source of the conflict.

(d) Exchanges

[129] At times, exchanges have been challenging. I infer that DT is asserting his needs and preferences more now that he's older. For example, in October 2024, DT didn't want to leave Nabeel's house. Nabeel accused Asra of yelling at DT, taking out her alleged conflict with Usman on DT, and slapping DT. Asra responded that she never "hit or abused" DT but he did get in trouble for being "disrespectful and rude". Nabeel repeatedly insisted that Asra should speak to DT "to sort this out." This happened again in November and January 2025. Again, Nabeel blamed Asra.

[130] Neither party acquitted themselves well. Nabeel shouldn't have accused Asra of abusing DT—even if he was repeating what DT said to him, there's no evidence of abuse. But Asra didn't help matters by refusing to engage with DT. As Nabeel pointed out, DT's anxiety about returning home may have been exacerbated by her refusal to talk to him.

xx. Family Violence

[131] The court must consider the effect of family violence on parenting and contact arrangements, including its impact on the ability and willingness of the person who engaged in family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child. In cases of family violence, the court must also consider whether to require the parties to co-operate on matters related to the child. Family violence need not be a criminal offence. It's violent or threatening conduct, or a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour, or behaviour that causes the other family member to fear for their safety or another's safety. Family violence includes a child's direct or indirect exposure to this conduct. See Mane, at para 99.

[132] To assess the ability and willingness of a perpetrator of family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, the court must consider what the history of family violence demonstrates about that person's ability to parent in the child's best interests. For example, the court would need to consider whether the person,

• might be violent with the child
• might use their relationship with the child to be violent with or control another person
• has caused the child to be fearful of them
• can be an appropriate role model for, and provide guidance to, the child

See JI v New Brunswick (Justice), 2021 NBQB 150, at para 22; AW v NP, 2022 SKQB 150, at para 50; Mane, at para 100.

[133] In cases of family violence, particularly spousal violence, it's crucial that the court consider whether a co-operative parenting arrangement is appropriate. A victim of family violence might be unable to co-parent because of the trauma they have experienced or ongoing fear of the perpetrator. In addition, co-operative arrangements may lead to opportunities for further family violence. See Bell, at para. 15.

[134] In considering the effect of any family violence under the Divorce Act, s 16(3)(j), the court shall consider the following:

(a) the nature, seriousness, and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;

(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;

(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;

(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and

(h) any other relevant factor.

[135] There are five claimed instances of alleged family violence. First, Asra said that Nabeel would punch walls, yell at her in public, and verbally abuse her, all of which made her scared for her life. Nabeel denies this allegation.

[136] Second, in September 2015, the parties had an argument in the elevator of her dad's apartment building. Nabeel was holding DT in his car seat. Asra says that Nabeel got riled up, and slammed the car seat down. Nabeel denies this allegation.

[137] Third, in early 2015, Asra saw DT punch his younger brother in the chest, and say, "I have to teach him a lesson…you guys are not teaching him." DT allegedly disclosed to Asra that Nabeel teaches him through punches and slaps. For example, DT feared a dark hallway at Nabeel's house. DT told Asra that he's not afraid anymore because Nabeel punched him. Asra says that CAS investigated this complaint, and the CAS worker told her that it was verified. But the CAS notes say that it's not verified.

[138] Fourth, in December 2020, there was an altercation between Usman and Nabeel outside Asra and Usman's home. Nabeel had been speaking to Asra uncivilly. Usman confronted Nabeel during a parenting exchange. Nabeel responded by swearing at Usman, and grabbed his collar and shook him. Asra and Usman called the police, but no charges were laid. Nabeel denies this allegation.

[139] Finally, Nabeel alleges that DT told him that Usman kicked him. Nabeel recorded a conversation between him and DT about this incident. Rather than showing that Usman was abusing DT, the recording undermines Nabeel's credibility:

Nabeel: So you're saying you forget now?

DT: Yeah

Nabeel: OK. before you were telling me what does he do. Tell me.

DT: I forget again.

Nabeel: No. I know you said you forget but what did you tell me. When he takes you to the mosque, what does he do?

DT: He just walks with me.

Nabeel: And then?

DT: Nothing. He just walks.

Nabeel: And then you said he kicks you in the butt. And you said he kicks you in the eye. I know you're nodding yes but tell, say it.

DT: To what?

Nabeel: Tell mama.

DT: You.

Nabeel: You just want to tell me?

DT: Yeah.

Nabeel: You don't want to tell mama?

DT: No.

Nabeel: Why?

DT: Because.

Nabeel: Because what.

DT: Because I just want to tell you.

[140] DT never says that Usman kicked him. Even in response to Nabeel's leading questions, DT doesn't say that he was kicked. I can't infer that Usman kicked DT only because DT said he didn't want to tell Asra what happened, or only wanted to tell Nabeel. The OCL clinician didn't believe that Usman kicked or abused DT.

[141] Jahanzeb testified that Nabeel beat him several times, including when Jahanzeb was 15 or 16 years old and in Nabeel and Asra's care. But, in closing submissions, Asra didn't rely on this evidence to support her argument that there was family violence.

[142] On balance, I'm not persuaded that Nabeel would be violent with DT. For sure, he has a short temper. I accept Usman's and Asra's evidence that Nabeel has been aggressive with them and around DT. But the only evidence of him using force on DT is weak. I also don't believe that Usman ever assaulted DT.

[143] That all said, I do believe that Nabeel has engaged in coercive control. Coercive control is where someone uses "tactics of isolation, manipulation, humiliation, surveillance, micro-regulation of gender performance, economic abuse, and threats" to control their partner. See Jennifer Koshan et al., "Introduction: Domestic Violence and Access to Justice within the Family Law and Intersecting Legal Systems", (2023) 35:1 Can J of Fam L 1 at 12; Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, 2023 ONCA 476, at para 103; SVG v VG, 2023 ONSC 3206, at para 100; Zunnurain v Chowdhury, 2024 ONSC 5552, at para 239.

[144] First, Nabeel has tried to weaponize their faith against Asra. In August 2019, after Asra told him that she was getting married, Nabeel warned Asra that after she got married that "I'm going to…let you and your husband know that I want him under Islamic law to be living with me because he is mine." Nabeel was attempting to dissuade Asra from getting married. Despite this threat, Nabeel has never litigated whether Islamic law governs DT's primary residence.

[145] Second, Nabeel has tried to control the scope of Usman's relationship with DT. As DT refers to Nabeel as "Baba", Asra and Usman agreed that DT would call him "Abbi". But Nabeel actively discouraged DT from using "Abbi" when referring to Usman. Instead, at Nabeel's house, DT had to refer to Usman as "Uncle". In South Asian families, "uncle" often refers to an unrelated male adult. He's also derided Usman as a mere "spectator". In doing so, Nabeel was trying to isolate Usman from Asra and DT. Usman expressed concern that there's some distance between him and DT because he fears Nabeel's actions. Even so, he and DT seemed to have developed a strong bond around their shared interests.

[146] Third, Nabeel tried to intimidate the Halton CAS workers. At trial, Ms. Javet expressed discomfort at even being in the same room as Nabeel because of his hostility toward her. I have already discussed the aggressive tone of his communications with her and Ms. Simpson-Organ. Nabeel's actions were an attempt to coerce Halton CAS to change their narrative about their observations.

[147] In sum, there's a significant risk that Nabeel will use his decision-making responsibility over DT to try to control or coerce Asra and other caregivers. Nabeel is not afraid of using fear to intimidate others.

xi. Conclusion

[148] Taking all this together, it's in DT's best interests that Asra and Nabeel have some shared decision-making responsibility. There has been no conflict so far over DT's extra-curricular activities or culture, language, and religion. As a result, I order the parties shall have joint decision-making responsibility for DT over these areas.

[149] Nabeel concedes that Asra can have sole decision-making responsibility over DT's health. Thus, I order that Asra shall have sole decision-making responsibility for DT over that area.

[150] On education, it's not in DT's best interest that Nabeel have sole decision-making responsibility in this area. He doesn't put DT's needs first. He has shown poor judgment. He's prepared to use DT to try to control Asra. It's also not in DT's best interest that Nabeel and Asra share joint decision-making responsibility over education. They have shown an inability to communicate and cooperate, which has undermined DT's routines. Though Asra has also resorted to self-help, she's shown a greater willingness to compromise in DT's best interest. Thus, I order that Asra shall have sole decision-making responsibility for DT over education.

[151] I also make several other incidental orders:

• both parents shall be listed as emergency contacts with DT's schools or other organizations involved with DT
• the parties shall notify each other immediately if DT experiences a medical emergency
• both parties have the right to make emergency medical decisions respecting DT while DT is in their care
• in an emergency, both parents shall attempt to reach the other parent before making emergency medical decisions for DT
• Nabeel has the right to consult with and obtain information, records, and report cards directly from DT's teachers, doctors, and any other professionals involved with DT's health, education, and general welfare
• if any professional involved with DT requires the consent of the other party before providing information to them, all parties shall execute all necessary consents immediately upon request
• the parties shall keep each other informed about their residential address and telephone number and shall notify the other party within 24 hours whenever the information changes
• the parties shall convey any necessary information about DT using a family communication app
• no party will speak negatively about any other party or Usman in DT's presence, and make their best efforts to prevent any other person from speaking negatively about other parties
• no party will discuss this court case or other adult issues implicating the parties with DT

B. Issue #2: Parenting Time

[152] Asra seeks an order that DT have 113 hours of parenting time, inclusive of school hours, with Nabeel every two weeks:

• every other weekend from Friday 330pm to Monday 830am
• every week, starting on Tuesday at 9am and ending on Wednesday at 9am

[153] Nabeel requests equal parenting time (168 hours, inclusive of school hours). He suggests several models, including a 2-2-3 or a 2-2-5-5 schedule.

[154] For the reasons discussed below, I order that DT shall reside primarily with Asra, and DT shall have parenting time with Nabeel in accordance with the status quo (six overnights every two weeks), as follows:

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
Asra	Asra	Nabeel	Asra	Nabeel	Nabeel	Nabeel
Asra	Nabeel	Asra	Nabeel	Asra	Asra	Asra

1. Legal Framework

[155] Parenting time may be allocated through a schedule. See Divorce Act, s 16.2(1). Children should have as much contact with each parent as aligns with their best interests. See Divorce Act, s 16(6); Barendregt v Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, at para 133.

[156] Again, the court shall take into consideration "only the best interests of the child of the marriage in making a parenting…order" See Divorce Act, s 16(1).

[157] The court's "unrelenting focus" on the best interests of each particular child means that there can be no presumption in favour of any one type of parenting order. All things being equal, each child deserves to have meaningful and consistent relationships with both of their parents. See EMB v MFB, 2021 ONSC 4264, at paras 69-71; Dayboll v Binag, 2022 ONSC 6510, at para 18. "It may end up being equal time. It may not. Each family is different, and the principle is a guide set out to benefit children." See Knapp v Knapp, 2021 ONCA 305, at para 34.

[158] The party who seeks to reduce "normal parenting time" will usually be required to justify taking such a position. The greater the restriction sought, the more important it becomes to justify that restriction. See Dayboll, at para 27.

2. Facts

[159] The allocation of parenting time between Asra and Nabeel has changed often over the years. After the parties separated, when DT was still an infant, he had intermittent parenting time with Nabeel at Asra's home. The parties disagree on how long, how often, and how much Nabeel was engaged with DT during parenting time.

[160] In April or May 2017, when Asra started working part time, DT had parenting time with Nabeel three times a week for a few hours. DT's parenting time was exercised in Nabeel's car while she worked. The parties disagree on why. In October 2017, DT started having parenting time with Nabeel from 11am to 4pm every Saturday and Sunday.

[161] In May 2018, Seppi J ordered, on consent, an interim allocation of parenting time:

a) Week 1 Friday at 4:30 pm to Saturday at 6:00pm; and Sunday at 11:00am to 6:00pm.

b) Week 2 Saturday at 10am to 6pm

c) Week 3 Friday at 4:30 pm to Saturday at 6:00pm; and Sunday at 11:00am to 6:00pm.

d) Week 4 Thursday at 3:00pm to 7:00pm; and Tuesday at 3:15pm to 7:00pm.

[162] In April 2019, the parties mutually agreed to change the allocation of parenting time:

Week 1: Tuesday 3pm-7pm Friday 430pm-Sunday 7pm

Week 2: Tuesday 3pm-7pm Thursday 3pm-7pm

[163] When DT started in-person school in October 2019, Asra proposed that DT's weekday parenting time finish at 6pm (instead of 7pm) so he could go to bed on time. She suggested that Nabeel make up the missed time (3 hours) by picking DT up from school earlier on Fridays (330pm). Nabeel rejected this proposal. He proposed that DT have parenting time with him every weekend, and with Asra from Monday to Friday. Asra rejected this proposal, and two other shared parenting schedules that Nabeel proposed, preferring to maintain the status quo.

[164] In response, Nabeel imposed a parenting schedule. I have quoted Nabeel's schedule in paragraph 82 above. The OCL also described the parenting plan, which may be easier to understand:

[DT] has parenting time with Mr. Tunio on a two-week rotational schedule with week one parenting time from Friday after school to Monday morning and every Wednesday after school to Thursday morning return to school and week two from Tuesday after school to Wednesday morning return to school and Thursday after school to Friday morning return to school.

[165] Asra tried to raise this issue at a motion before Shaw LAJ in November 2019. But as Asra was only seeking an order that she could travel with DT in December 2019 and January 2020, the parenting time issue didn't get litigated.

[166] Asra decided not to challenge Nabeel's unilateral imposition of a schedule because of the battles and conflicts between them.

3. Analysis and Disposition

i. Child's Needs

[167] The AFCC-O guide concludes that children in the age 10-12 group should have "overnights or dinners during the school week and some weekends with each parent." It also states that children at this age may do well with "alternate weeks with each parent or a 5-5-2-2 arrangement". Ultimately, children should have frequent contact with both parents.

[168] The OCL recommended that the current time-sharing schedule continue "as [DT] is doing well with this schedule." But Asra testified that the current schedule isn't "working" for DT—she says the back-and-forth is hard on him. That said, Asra's evidence devolved into a complaint about Nabeel's home environment. She says their home environments are "different" because Nabeel doesn't have books, and he and DT don't go biking or swimming together.

[169] I conclude that DT needs as much time as possible with both parents. That said, he also needs stability and a routine.

ii. Nature and Strength of Child's Relationships

[170] DT has a strong relationship with both parents. He also has a strong relationship with his brother and his extended family. Though Nabeel's extended family is smaller and farther away, it's important that DT's parenting time allows him to engage with both sides of his extended family.

iii. Supporting the Child's Relationship with the Other Spouse

[171] Nabeel's failure to support DT's relationship with Asra has extended to manipulating DT to say and do things that he doesn't believe. Asra's main argument for reducing Nabeel's parenting time is to mitigate this coaching.

[172] The OCL observed that DT sometimes said things that appeared to be prompted by Nabeel:

There were concerns with consistency in the two private interviews with [DT]. In the first interview while [DT] was in his mother's care he cited no concern with his mother and step- father. He made comments that suggested his father was making negative comments about his expressed being happy with the current parenting schedule.

In the second interview which took place while [DT] was in his father's care, he expressed fear of his stepfather, and cited that he wanted a 50/50 schedule. [DT]'s comments in the second interview were not always prompted by questions and it seemed important that he let this clinician know that he wanted more time with his father and that he was afraid of his stepfather.

[173] Ms. Javet made the same, independent observation: "Father has continued to make allegations towards the mother, and the child continues to make disclosures about the mother's home. However, the Childs demeanor does not align with his disclosures."

[174] So too Ms. Simpson-Organ. In July 2025, Asra called Halton CAS because DT was refusing to go to her house after his parenting time with Nabeel. Ms. Simpson-Organ called Nabeel. She also spoke to DT, who eventually agreed to return to Asra's house. When she told Nabeel that, he yelled at DT, asking if DT had just agreed to go to Asra's home. Ms. Simpson-Organ heard DT crying and saying no in the background. Ms. Simpson-Organ concluded that Nabeel was manipulating DT: "During this call with Nabeel I felt he was coaching his son based on statements that [DT] made to not see his mom, and he was highly agitated with the idea that I was supporting access with mom to [DT]."

[175] As discussed above, Nabeel also tried to manipulate DT into alleging that Usman kicked him.

[176] Nabeel's manipulation of DT undermines DT's relationship with Asra and Usman. It risks more scenarios like the one where DT refused to leave Nabeel's house. Nabeel can't get more parenting time through this strategy.

iv. History of Care

[177] The parties agree that they both know DT's schedules and habits. Though DT had limited parenting time with Nabeel when he was an infant and toddler, the allocation of parenting time has been consistent since November 2019. Nabeel is less involved in DT's school life or friendships than Asra, but that doesn't detract from his knowledge about DT's routines.

v. Child's Views and Preferences

[178] The OCL reports reflect DT's overall needs and preferences on parenting time:

• DT enjoys his time in both homes
• he's well connected to both parents
• he has positive relationships with Asra, Usman, and his brother
• he was happy with the current parenting schedule

[179] DT told the OCL that he wanted a 50/50 schedule and wanted to spend more time with Nabeel. But, as discussed above, the clinician observed that DT's comments weren't "always prompted by questions", which suggested that Nabeel had coached DT.

[180] I conclude that DT wants to spend as much time with both parents as possible.

vi. Child's Cultural and Religious Upbringing

[181] As above, there's no dispute about DT's cultural and religious upbringing. My determination is that he should spend as much time with both parents as possible to encourage this part of his life.

vii. Plans for Child's Care

[182] As discussed above, Nabeel unilaterally changed the parenting plan in November 2019. Though he asserted this new plan was in DT's best interests, he never explained how. He changed the plan even though Asra disagreed.

[183] In determining what was the "status quo", situations unreasonably or unilaterally created by one party to the detriment of the other, to create a tactical advantage, shouldn't be considered the "status quo". The legal status quo is not a status quo created by one party unilaterally taking matters into their own hands, without any consent from the other party. See LMV v FJD, 2020 ONCJ 239, at para 31; Sanchez v Goeva, 2025 ONSC 4770, at para 27.

[184] I can't to disregard the parenting plan that DT has been living with for almost six years now. I appreciate that Nabeel unilaterally created this new status quo by imposing a parenting plan on Asra. I also appreciate that Asra didn't consent to the plan. Nabeel's actions draw into issue his judgment. But all the evidence points to DT thriving under the current plan. He has frequent contact with both parents. Exchanges are minimized, which reduces conflict. He's an excellent student and has developed good friendships.

viii. Ability and Willingness

[185] As discussed above, Nabeel isn't prepared to accept that other people involved in DT's care may have different views about DT's best interests. This extends to parenting time, which is evidenced by Nabeel's imposition of a unilateral schedule in 2019. At trial, Nabeel never explained why it was in DT's best interests to have more parenting time with him. Nabeel has a clear limitation when determining parenting arrangements.

ix. Communicate and Cooperate

[186] The parties can't manage flexible parenting arrangements. Nabeel is the cause of this conflict. For example, Nabeel has refused to be open to changing parenting time. In December 2024, Asra asked Nabeel to swap parenting time weekends so DT could attend a wedding. Nabeel responded negatively: "We have never swapped a weekend regardless of circumstances especially when I asked. So No we will keep status thank you". In contrast, in March 2024, Nabeel advised Asra that he had a family emergency and couldn't pick up DT. He was still away that week, and needed Asra to care for DT. Asra didn't object in the slightest. Nabeel is also unwilling to consent to travel even though there's no grounds for his objections.

[187] Asra is more flexible. For example, Nabeel sometimes contacts Asra to talk to DT on video calls during her parenting time, which Asra always seems to facilitate.

[188] As a result, the parties, and Nabeel in particular, need a fixed plan, that spells out all the circumstances in which DT will have parenting time so there can be no dispute. For the same reason, the parties need clear rules about travel that don't allow Nabeel to arbitrarily refuse consent.

xx. Family Violence

[189] I'm not concerned that Nabeel is a risk to DT's safety and security when they have parenting time together. But, again, Nabeel's use of control to try to manipulate circumstances in his favour means that the parties need clear directions on parenting time.

xi. Conclusion

[190] Based on all the factors, it's in DT's best interest to continue with the allocation of parenting that he has now. This plan allows him to have frequent contact with Nabeel, including weekends and overnights. It ensures that he can build and strengthen his relationships with both sides of his immediate and extended family during that parenting time. It recognizes his preference to maximize contact with both parents.

[191] Asra urges me to reduce Nabeel's parenting time because he can be manipulative. In my view, that would punish both Nabeel and DT, and doesn't serve any practical purpose. If Nabeel wants to manipulate DT, he can do that whether he has one hour or 165 hours of parenting time. Reducing DT's parenting time with Nabeel doesn't go to the root cause of this problem.

[192] Nabeel asks me to increase his parenting time with DT, but he hasn't shown why that's in DT's best interests. Indeed, Nabeel seems to think he's entitled to more parenting time. He sees it as a right. But he didn't marshal evidence about why more parenting time is in DT's best interests, especially where things are going well now.

[193] For the reasons discussed below, I order that DT shall reside primarily with Asra, and DT shall have parenting time with Nabeel in accordance with the status quo, as follows:

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
Asra	Asra	Nabeel	Asra	Nabeel	Nabeel	Nabeel
Asra	Nabeel	Asra	Nabeel	Asra	Asra	Asra

[194] I also make several other incidental orders:

• weekend visits shall be extended by one day if DT is not required to attend school on the Friday before or Monday after the weekend
• each party shall have two consecutive weeks of vacation during the summer vacation period
• Nabeel shall notify Asra of his summer vacation plans for DT, including the weeks he proposes to have DT reside with him, by May 1 each year
• DT shall have parenting time with Nabeel from 7am to 9pm on Eid Al Fitr in odd years and from 7am to 9pm on Eid Al Adha in even years
• no party shall schedule activities for DT during another party's time with DT unless that party has agreed in advance, such agreement not to be unreasonably withheld
• if either party is not able to care for DT for one or more days of their time with DT, they shall give the other party the option of caring for DT before arranging a babysitter or childcare
• if a party is faced with an unexpected situation such as illness or a death in the family, or an irregular event like a family wedding, the other party will make every effort to accommodate a request for a change in the schedule
• if the change in the schedule results in DT missing considerable time with the accommodating party, reasonable "makeup time" will be arranged by the parties
• DT shall have phone or video calls with the party with whom they are not staying as determined by the party and DT
• DT shall be picked up and dropped off by the parties or Usman at the child's school

[195] Travel has also been a point of contention between the parties. Though Nabeel has once consented to DT traveling with Asra, he usually objects on baseless grounds. As a result, I order the following:

• Asra shall apply for a passport for DT, and Nabeel shall sign the passport application
• Asra shall keep DT's passport and give it to Nabeel when he needs it for travel, who will return the passport promptly at the end of the travel
• if any party plans a vacation with DT during their parenting time, that party shall give the other party a detailed itinerary at least 30 days before the vacation begins, or as soon as is practical if plans are made less than 30 days before the vacation begins, including the name of any airline carrier and flight times, accommodation, including address and telephone numbers, and details about how to contact DT during the trip
• the travelling parent shall advise the other parent right away of any changes to the above information
• each party shall provide a notarized letter to the other authorizing the child to travel outside of Canada with the other parent for the purpose of a vacation as requested by either party
• the parties shall not remove DT from Canada except for up to two weeks vacation time

C. Issue #3: Child Support

[196] Asra seeks a declaration that Nabeel's annual gross income is $42,576 and, as a result, the amount of child support is $354 monthly.

[197] Nabeel seeks a declaration that Asra's gross income is minimum wage, or $36,608. As he proposes equal parenting time, he submits that there should be a set-off. He doesn't state his income, but he proposes a further $250 per month set-off as a "shared cost adjustment". He requests that any arrears be set off against unpaid section 7 expenses.

[198] I declare that Nabeel's gross income is imputed to be $36,608, which is a full-time minimum wage income. I declare that Asra's gross income is imputed to be $25,000, which is a part-time minimum wage income. As the parties have shared parenting time, the resulting offset is that Nabeel shall pay $113 monthly in child support to Asra.

1. Legal Framework

[199] A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to pay for the support of any or all children of the marriage. See Divorce Act, s 15.1(1). A court making an order under section 15.1(1) shall do so in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175. See Divorce Act, s 15.1(3).

[200] If each spouse exercises not less than 40 percent of parenting time with a child over the course of a year, the amount of the child support order must be determined by considering:

(a) the amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the spouses;

(b) the increased costs of shared parenting time arrangements; and

(c) the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought.

See Guidelines, s 9.

[201] The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, including where:

(a) the spouse is intentionally under-employed, other than where the under-employment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage, or any child under the age of majority, or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse; or

(b) the spouse has failed to provide income information when under a legal obligation to do so.

See Guidelines, s 19(1)(a), (f).

[202] Section 19 of the Guidelines doesn't allow the court to arbitrarily select an amount as imputed income. There must be a rational basis underlying the selection of any such figure. The amount selected as an exercise of the court's discretion must be grounded in the evidence. When imputing income based on intentional under-employment, a court must consider what's reasonable in the circumstances. The factors to be considered are age, education, experience, skills, and health of the parent, standard of living during the parties' marriage, the availability of job opportunities, the number of hours that could be worked considering the parent's overall obligations including educational demands, and the hourly rate that the parent could reasonably be expected to obtain. See Drygala v Pauli, at paras 44-45; Duncan v Donaldson, 2023 ONSC 5114, at para 33.

2. Facts

[203] In early 2025, Nabeel started receiving Ontario Works assistance. He gets $1002 per month, and another $370 from the Canada child benefit. Nabeel's Form 13: Financial Statement, dated August 29, 2025, discloses that his monthly expenses are $3647. He's in rental arrears, and is borrowing money from friends and family to make up this shortfall.

[204] He reactivated his real estate license in early 2025 but hasn't been successful in earning any commissions. He's looking for work with TV wall mounting companies as an employee. Previously, he was engaged as an independent contractor. Nabeel has a GED certificate and work experience in sales and as an entrepreneur.

[205] Asra's only income is the Canada child benefit, which is $541.63 monthly. Her monthly expenses are $534, which I infer is her share of the household expenses given that Usman is employed full-time.

[206] Asra says that she's been unemployed since March 2020, after her employer closed during the pandemic. She's been unable to find work, in part because her younger son isn't school age yet. Even then, she says both children would need daycare if she started working. She also believes that she's been denied job opportunities because she wears a niqab, which is, sadly, believable. As a result, she's looking for remote positions or a job with a Muslim organization or charity.

3. Analysis and Disposition

[207] I consider it appropriate to impute an income of $36,608 to Nabeel. I find that he's intentionally unemployed. Nabeel has shown himself to be a resourceful person. He's found work in a variety of sectors, and supported himself and, for a time, his immediate family. Though he only has a GED, he has training and qualifications to work as a real estate agent or in sales. He didn't adduce any evidence about why he's been unable to earn any commissions since reactivating his license or taken a sales job in another industry. Further, he hasn't adduced any evidence why he isn't doing TV mounting work as a gig worker until he can find stable employment. His decisions around work choices aren't reasonable.

[208] I also find that he's failed to provide income information. He's required to provide Asra with documents relating to support and a Certificate of Financial Disclosure under the Family Law Rules, r 13, which he hasn't done.

[209] The rational amount to impute to Nabeel is minimum wage. Nabeel can work 40 hours per week at a minimum wage job. He has several skills that make him employable.

[210] I also consider it appropriate to impute an income of $25,000 to Asra. I find that she's intentionally unemployed. She has a BBA, and experience working in retail and as an entrepreneur. I appreciate that she's the primary caregiver for her younger child. But she didn't satisfactorily explain why she can't work in the evening or at night, or on the weekend. She didn't explain whether someone else, like a family member, could care for the younger child. Nabeel isn't working, so he could help with DT's care if he was home sick, and Asra and Usman weren't available. The rational amount is minimum wage, but on a part-time basis (25 hours per week) recognizing that Asra has childcare obligations.

[211] Each party exercises at least 40 per cent of parenting time with DT. There's no evidence about the increased costs of this shared parenting time arrangements or one or the other party's conditions, means, needs, or other circumstances.

[212] As a result, I order that the parties shall pay the amount set out in the applicable table for each of them:

• starting on November 1, 2025, and on the first day of each month thereafter, Nabeel shall pay to Asra support for DT in the monthly amount of $297
• starting on November 1, 2025, and on the first day of each month thereafter, Asra shall pay to Nabeel support for DT in the monthly amount of $184

[213] The result is an offset amount of $113 monthly.

D. Issue #4: Section 7 Expenses

[214] There's no dispute that the parties must share in the costs of any special or extraordinary expenses under the Guidelines, s 7. The guiding principle in determining the amount of a section 7 expense is that the expense is shared by the spouses in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense, the contribution, if any, from the child. See Guidelines, s 7(2). As a result, I order that Nabeel shall pay to Asra 60 per cent of any special and extraordinary expenses related to DT.

[215] That said, the parties dispute whether DT's private school tuition is a special or extraordinary expense. I conclude that it's not a section 7 expense.

1. Legal Framework

[216] Section 7 expenses include any extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child's particular needs. See Guidelines, s 7(1)(d).

[217] In awarding section 7 expenses, the trial judge must:

(a) calculate each party's income for child support purposes;

(b) determine whether the claimed expenses fall within one of the enumerated categories of section 7 of the Guidelines;

(c) determine whether the claimed expenses are necessary "in relation to the child's best interests" and are reasonable "in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and to the family's spending pattern prior to the separation";

(d) if the expenses fall under sections 7(1)(d) or (f) of the Guidelines, determine whether the expenses are "extraordinary"; and

(e) finally, consider what amount, if any, the child should reasonably contribute to the payment of these expenses and then apply any tax deductions or credits.

See Titova v Titov, 2012 ONCA 864, at para 23.

2. Facts

[218] Again, the parties enrolled DT at Al Falah in October 2019 for JK. Asra paid the school tuition for the 2019-2020 school year.

[219] Starting in 2020, Nabeel paid the tuition, and he has done so every year since then.

[220] The tuition cost is currently $7000 per year.

3. Analysis and Disposition

[221] This expense isn't necessary in relation to DT's best interests. First, there was no evidence at trial about why DT must attend a private school, or a private Islamic school. Asra doesn't consider it necessary for DT, and she's heavily involved in the school council and school community. She was prepared to transfer him to public school in 2022 because of the pandemic. When DT started school in 2019, Nabeel was open to him attending public school—he just didn't want him homeschooled.

[222] Second, the tuition cost is far beyond the parties' means. Both parties are unemployed. Nabeel is borrowing money to pay his living expenses, never mind DT's tuition. Asra is candid that she can't afford private school. Though Asra has some money saved up, it's an emergency fund.

[223] As a result, I find that DT's tuition costs aren't a special or extraordinary expense under the Guidelines. Thus, Asra has no obligation to contribute to the costs.

[224] Asra is fine with DT continuing at Al Falah if Nabeel has the means to pay the tuition. Unless Nabeel advises Asra by August 1st (or whatever earlier date set by Al Falah for payment of DT's registration) that he's paid DT's tuition for the upcoming year, she may exercise her decision-making responsibility to enrol DT in public school. Given Asra's evidence that she's not seeking to homeschool DT, and there's no need for him to attend HCDSB Virtual Elementary School, my direction is that he will be enrolled in the elementary school in Asra's catchment area (River Oaks Public School).

E. Issue #5: Retroactive Child Support

[225] Asra seeks an order that Nabeel paid $12,816 in retroactive child support from June 2018 to October 2025. This amount is based on him having an imputed income of $41,000 during this period, and her having no income. It also is net of the $210 in monthly child support that Nabeel has been paying since Seppi J's order.

[226] Nabeel requests that any retroactive support be setoff against Asra's share of DT's tuition expenses, which he calculates to be $16,900.

[227] Using the parties' evidence at trial about their income, I order that Asra shall pay to Nabeel the amount of $506 in retroactive child support, and $12,580 in retroactive section 7 expenses. As I explain below, I've imputed income to both of them for several years. That conclusion, coupled with their evidence about their incomes and the fact that they have had a shared parenting plan since October 2019, means that Nabeel has overpaid child support since 2023. Further, I find that Asra is liable for 40 percent of DT's tuition fees.

1. Legal Framework

[228] A court of competent jurisdiction may make an order varying, rescinding, or suspending, retroactively or prospectively a support order or any provision of one. See Divorce Act, s 17(1).

[229] "Retroactive" awards aren't truly retroactive. They don't hold parents to a legal standard that didn't exist at the relevant time. But they're "retroactive" in that they're not being made on a go-forward basis: the payor is being ordered to pay what, in hindsight, should have been paid before. See DBS v SRG, 2006 SCC 37, at para 2.

[230] This case engages the first of the three situations identified in DBS: when there has already been a court order for child support, but this amount has been arguably inadequate for some time. See DBS, at para 62.

[231] There are four key factors to consider before making a retroactive child support order:

• the reason support or variation of support wasn't sought earlier
• conduct of the payor parent
• circumstances of the child at the current time and at the time the support should have been paid
• hardship occasioned by the retroactive award to the payor

See DBS, at paras 94-116.

[232] "Effective notice" for retroactive decreases is different from that for retroactive increases. This difference reflects the informational asymmetry. For retroactive increases, it is sufficient for the recipient to broach a potential increase. See DBS, at para 121. In decrease cases, "effective notice" requires that the payor provide reasonable proof of changes that is enough to allow the recipient to independently assess the situation. See Colucci v Colucci, 2021 SCC 24, at para 90. The payor also has an ongoing obligation to engage in meaningful dialogue with the recipient about any further changes to income or economic capacity. Failure to do so may impact the period of retroactivity when the court applies the discretionary DBS factors. See Colucci, at para 90.

2. Facts

[233] Nabeel has been paying $210 monthly in child support since May 2018. Though he's missed a couple of payments, Asra doesn't allege that Nabeel has breached Seppi J's order.

[234] Asra has produced her notices of assessment, which disclose her historical income:

Year	Income
2018	$13,111
2019	$10,094
2020	$10,717
2022	$0
2023	$0
2024	$0

[235] Though Asra didn't file her 2021 notice, I infer her income was $0 given that she testified that she became unemployed in 2020, and had a baby that year.

[236] Nabeel didn't produce his notices of assessment with his financial statement as required by the Family Law Rules. He did produce them for trial. That said, the notices of assessment are inconsistent with Nabeel's other documents. In his amended answer from May 2021, he pleaded that his current annual income was $30,000. In his August 2025 financial statement, he deposes that his gross income "last year" (i.e., 2024) was $24,117.40. I've relied on those numbers:

Year	Income
2020	$39,222.75
2021	$30,000
2022	$16,299
2023	$29,211
2024	$24,117.40

[237] Nabeel hasn't produced any receipts or statements for DT's tuition payments. But there's no dispute that Asra hasn't contributed anything since 2020. The parties agree on the historical tuition costs:

Year	Cost
2020-2021	$5450
2021-2022	$5250
2022-2023	$5750
2023-2024	$6550
2024-2025	$6900
2025-2026	$7000

[238] Nabeel didn't exercise more than 40 per cent of the parenting time with DT until November 2019.

3. Analysis and Disposition

[239] There's no dispute that Asra provided effective notice to Nabeel that she intended to seek retroactive support. She claimed for support in her application, and Seppi J's order was made without prejudice.

[240] To determine the amount of retroactive support payable, I first need to determine Asra's and Nabeel's income, including whether to impute income to one or both of them.

[241] For Asra, for 2018 to 2020, I accept that she wasn't intentionally unemployed or underemployed. She had a job and was earning an income. Though it was less than minimum wage, she was DT's primary caregiver. I also accept that she lost her job during the pandemic in 2020 and had a baby in September 2021, so it wasn't unreasonable for her to be unemployed in 2021. But she could've found part-time employment in 2023 (at trial, she acknowledged that she couldn't work until the end of 2022). As a result, I impute an income of $25,000 for 2023, 2024, and 2025.

[242] For Nabeel, he's failed to make financial disclosure. That said, he's filed his notices of assessment or admitted his income in certain years. For 2018 and 2019, I impute his 2020 income. He was working the same job in those years as in 2020, and it's rational to conclude that he was earning the same amount. For 2022, he didn't explain the significant dip in income. As a result, I find that he was intentionally underemployed that year. I use his 2021 and 2023 income to impute an average income of $29,605.

[243] Thus, the retroactive child support can be calculated as follows:

Year	Asra's Income	Nabeel's Income	Parenting Time	Net Monthly Child Support	Retroactive Support
2018	$13,111	$39,222.75	Asra	$350	$980
2019	$10,094	$39,222.75	Asra	$350	$1400
			Shared	$350	$280
2020	$10,717	$39,222.75	Shared	$350	$1680
2021	$0	$30,000	Shared	$256	$552
2022	$0	$29,605	Shared	$350	$504
2023	$25,000	$29,211	Shared	$50	($1920)
2024	$25,000	$24,117.40	Shared	($6)	($2592)
2025	$25,000	$36,608	Shared	$113	($1390)

[244] As a result, Asra is liable to Nabeel for $506 in retroactive child support for the period from June 1, 2018, to October 31, 2025.

[245] Asra's responsibility for the tuition costs is more complicated. Tzimas RSJ ordered that DT shall be enrolled in the local public school if "the parties are unable to agree to pay for the tuition to a private Muslim school." For the 2019-2020 year, the parties agreed that Asra would pay DT's tuition. But for the 2020-2021 year Asra didn't agree to pay tuition. Nabeel insisted on doing so to continue DT's enrolment. As a result, I don't find her liable for tuition costs for that year.

[246] For the 2021-2022 year and following, Bloom J's order governed. As I read Bloom J's order, Asra had to "pay equally the fees for [DT's] attendance" unless she took the position that she can't afford the expense—in that case, she had to provide an affidavit "with appropriate financial figures" to Nabeel. There's no evidence that she provided any such affidavit.

[247] As a result, I find that Asra is liable for DT's tuition fees for the 2021-2022, 2022-2023, 2023-2024, 2024-2025, and 2025-2026 school years. Based on Asra's proportion of section 7 expenses, her share is $12,580. Thus, I order Asra to pay to Nabeel the amount of $13,086 in retroactive child support.

V. CONCLUSION

[248] For almost 10 years, these parties have been litigating these issues. I hope that this decision has the effect of bringing some certainty to their co-parenting plans and support arrangements. I hope it provides DT with the stability that he needs to continue his growth and development.

[249] The parties will engage in meaningful discussions and negotiations respecting the costs of this trial. If they can't resolve costs, any party seeking costs will serve, file, and upload to Case Center costs submissions (2500 words), any relevant offers to settle, and their bill of costs by November 14, 2025, 4pm. The other party's responding submissions (2500 words) will be served, filed, and uploaded to Case Center by November 28, 2025, 4pm.

Agarwal J

Released: October 29, 2025