COURT FILE NO.: FS-19-94635

DATE: 2024-05-27

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Meys Albaz

Applicant

• and -

Mahmoud Rihawi

Respondent

HEARD: January 11-18, 2024

REASONS FOR DECISION

The Honourable Justice Ranjan K. Agarwal

I. INTRODUCTION

[1] The applicant Meys Albaz applies for relief following the breakdown of the marriage between her and the respondent Mahmoud Rihawi. She requests a divorce, decision-making responsibility for the four children of the marriage, allocation of parenting time, equalization of net family properties, a vesting order over the matrimonial home, post-separation adjustments, child support (ongoing and retroactive), spousal support, and a restraining order. In response, Mahmoud also seeks relief, often the opposite of what Meys is requesting. He also seeks occupation rent.

[2] Both parties are self-represented. There’s little or no agreement between them on almost anything that has happened since they separated, or how this application should be resolved. The central issue in this case is what form of parenting order is in the best interests of the children. Though there are also financial issues, these are modest compared to the scope of the parties’ conflict about the children.

[3] The court has, in the end, little admissible evidence to determine the children’s best interests. The parties relied on their oral evidence and many reports, notes, and written communications. But most of this evidence was hearsay and, as a result, unreliable. That said, the parties’ actions and communications disclosed a lot about the children’s physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being.

[4] Sadly, the four children of this marriage have lived in an environment of pervasive discord. Both parents have needlessly exposed the children to their parental conflict. Though Meys has undertaken self-study to improve her parenting skills, her anger at Mahmoud and her fear of him has seriously impaired her ability to communicate and cooperate with him about the children. Mahmoud has abused his children. He refuses to acknowledge his negative contribution to the family dynamic, including his estrangement from the two older children. He insists on an unbending approach, driven in part by his anger at Meys and his unshakable belief that she’s alienated the children from him.

[5] All that said, I believe that Meys and Mahmoud can, following the end of this litigation, ameliorate their conflict in their children’s best interests. My hope is that Meys and Mahmoud will find a way to effectively co-parent the children and, in doing so, allow Mahmoud to repair his relationship with all of them.

[6] To assist the parties, my orders on all the issues are described in Schedule A. That said, the critical parts of my order can be summarized as follows:

• Meys shall have decision-making responsibility for all the children

• the children’s parenting time with Mahmoud shall continue in accordance with the status quo established by Justice Bielby’s June 2021 order

• the matrimonial home shall be sold

• Mahmoud shall pay $148,965.54 for equalization, the Mahr, post-separation adjustments, retroactive child support, and retroactive section 7 expenses—along with Mahmoud’s ongoing obligations for 50 percent of the maintenance of the home, these shall be paid from his share of the proceeds of the sale of the home

• Mahmoud shall pay $935 monthly in child support and 37 percent of the children’s section 7 expenses

• there shall be a restraining order against Mahmoud

II. BACKGROUND

A. Background Facts

[7] The parties were married in September 2005. They have four children: LR (age 16), YAR (age 14), SR (age 13), and YOR (age 8).[1] Both parties self-identify as Arab and Muslim. Meys is Palestinian; Mahmoud is Syrian and Turkish. They each immigrated to Canada as teenagers. They first met in high school, and reconnected as young adults.

[8] Meys says the parties separated in April 2017. Mahmoud says they separated in December 2017. Nothing material turns on the date of separation. The parties and the children continued to live together in the matrimonial home (a condo apartment on Hillcrest Avenue, in Mississauga) until November 2018, when Mahmoud was arrested for assaulting Meys. He was acquitted in February 2020.

[9] The children had shared parenting time with Meys and Mahmoud, both when they were “nesting” in the matrimonial home and after. Following Mahmoud’s arrest, LR refused to exercise parenting time with Mahmoud. LR resumed parenting time with Mahmoud in March or April 2020. In June 2021, Justice Bielby endorsed an interim split parenting time order.

[10] In June 2022, Mahmoud was arrested for uttering threats to LR. Since then, LR has refused parenting time with Mahmoud. He was acquitted of this charge in June 2023. Since Fall 2022, YAR has also refused parenting time with Mahmoud. Mahmoud alleges that Meys is alienating LR and YAR; he fears she will also alienate SR and YOR as they get older.

[11] Meys worked as an Early Childhood Educator before LR was born. She hasn’t worked outside the home since then. In 2021, Meys trained as a Personal Support Worker, but found this career too challenging given the physical demands. She’s receiving Ontario Works social assistance and the Canada child benefit. Her family financially supports her. She continues to live in the matrimonial home.

[12] Mahmoud is employed by Air Canada. He’s on disability leave. He’s also a reservist with the Canadian Armed Forces, a part-time service position. Mahmoud briefly worked for Canada Post in 2021 during a lay-off from Air Canada.

[13] Mahmoud has vertigo. He received long-term disability benefits for two years, until May 2023, because he did not return to his job. Though Mahmoud says he’s unable to return to his job at Air Canada, he didn’t lead any medical evidence to show that he can’t perform any other job. Mahmoud has appealed the termination of his benefits. His vertigo prevents him from doing jobs with loud noises or computer work. He has a diploma in electronics engineering technology, though he’s never worked in this field. His family and partner financially support him.

[14] The parties’ income, for the last five tax years before the trial, is:

	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022
Meys	$2042	$11,516	$19,079	$9400	$14,693
Mahmoud	$66,467	$62,373	$56,948	$71,220	$58,355

[15] Neither party currently has health or dental benefits.

B. Procedural History

[16] Meys started a proceeding in the Ontario Court of Justice in 2018. In January 2019, Justice Sullivan endorsed a consent order on entitlement to health and education information, communication between the parties, Mahmoud’s liability for mortgage payments, and parenting time (which only governed the parties until January 30th).

[17] In 2019, Meys started this proceeding in the Superior Court of Justice. In July 2019, at a case conference, Justice Dennison endorsed temporary without prejudice orders for child support, reunification counselling for LR, and a request that the Office of the Children’s Lawyer prepare a report under the Courts of Justice Act, RSO 1990, c C.43, s 112. At the time, both parties were represented by lawyers.

[18] Mahmoud stopped paying child support ($600 monthly) in violation of the order. He says that he only consented to paying child support because Meys agreed to sell the matrimonial home, which never happened. Justice Dennison’s order doesn’t reflect such an agreement.

[19] In January 2020, Meys moved for interim child support. Justice Doi endorsed an order that Mahmood shall pay $434 in child support starting in February 2020, 60 percent of the children’s special or extraordinary expenses going forward, and $586.69 for special and extraordinary expenses already incurred. Justice Doi didn’t make an order regarding child support arrears as the parties had diverging accounts of their agreement before Justice Dennison.

[20] In January 2021, the OCL filed its report.

[21] In June 2021, Meys moved for an interim parenting order based on the recommendations in the OCL report. The record is unclear on the parties’ allocation of parenting time until then. Justice Doi, on the earlier motion, found that, informally, the children had 40 percent of their parenting time with Mahmoud. The OCL clinician observed that the parties “continued to argue over how the children spend time with each of them”. Both parties accused the other of both overholding and neglecting the children. Justice Bielby ordered that:

(a) Meys shall have sole decision-making over the children; and

(b) Mahmoud shall have parenting time from Fridays 4pm to Monday 9am and Wednesdays 4pm to Friday 9am on alternate weeks (adjusted for school holidays) and one-week summer parenting time in each of July and August.

[22] Justice Bielby also made several orders to try to encourage cooperation and discourage conflict. Though the parenting order was police-enforceable, Mahmoud didn’t force LR, and later YAR, to have parenting time with him.

[23] In January 2022, at a settlement conference, Justice Price scheduled the trial of this proceeding for January 2024. Though he scheduled a trial management conference for July 2022, it was struck from the list for unknown reasons. Justice Price also made several orders regarding financial disclosure. The OCL declined his request for an updated report.

[24] In April 2022, Meys moved for an order striking Mahmoud’s answer on the basis he breached his disclosure obligations. Justice Woollcombe dismissed the motion, finding that Mahmoud made “significant disclosure or virtually all of the most important documents”. That said, she urged him to produce any missing documents. She also ordered that the parties have a conference with a Dispute Resolution Officer in June 2022. The DRO adjourned the conference because Mahmoud didn’t file materials—Mahmoud believed the “appearance was optional and unnecessary”. At the adjourned DRO conference, Mahmoud arrived late, was unprepared, hadn’t filed his materials, and contended that he wouldn’t agree to anything Meys wanted (I note that this conference was around when Mahmoud was arrested for allegedly threatening LR).

[25] The trial of this application was called for January 2024. Though the parties had a lengthy list of friends and family that they intended to call as witnesses, they ultimately decided not to. As a result, each of them testified and cross-examined the other. As Mahmoud raised several issues that Meys couldn’t have reasonably anticipated, I allowed her to introduce rebuttal evidence.

[26] At the “exit” conference on January 10, 2024, Justice McGee endorsed an order that “each party is limited to one day in direct evidence and one day in cross-examination”. Given scarce judicial resources, I tried to manage the trial in the allotted time. In order to ensure I received relevant and material evidence, I extended the length of the trial to 6 days. I allowed each party to file their opening statements as exhibits. At the same time, I provided the parties with time limits for their evidence to try to help them focus on relevant and probative evidence, rather than airing every grievance from their marriage and separation as they seemed to want to do.

[27] After the trial finished, I made a temporary parenting order, which was intended to fill some gaps in Justice Bielby’s order that he couldn’t have anticipated.

C. Evidentiary Issues

[28] Again, the parties are self-represented. They didn’t challenge any of the other party’s documentary or oral evidence, likely because the rules of evidence are too technical and too foreign for a self-represented litigant to confidently assert. For that reason, the Statement of Principles on Self-Represented Litigants and Accused Persons encourage judges to apply the rules of evidence flexibly: “Judges should ensure that procedural and evidentiary rules are not used to unjustly hinder the legal interests of self-represented persons.”

[29] Although some of the parties’ evidence was plainly inadmissible, I admitted almost all of it. That said, I repeatedly cautioned the parties that I may not give the evidence any weight. Rules of admissibility are rules of exclusion and, as such, inadmissible evidence shouldn’t be admitted and marked as an exhibit—not just given no weight. Bur it would’ve been unjust for me to refuse to admit certain evidence on my own motion (since the parties rarely objected) and without a proper briefing. The parties have waited a long time for their “day in court”, and prepared extensively. It would’ve been unfair to refuse to admit documents that helped the parties explain their narrative.

[30] That said, I did refuse to admit two sets of documents, both of which were opinion evidence. First, Meys sought to rely on two property assessments of the matrimonial home. Second, Mahmoud sought to rely on online reports and oral evidence about rental rates for his occupation rent claim. Neither party served reports signed by the experts under rule 20.2 of the Family Law Rules. Though Mahmoud brought his expert witness to court on the last day of the trial, it would’ve been unfair to allow expert evidence to be admitted without notice. A litigation expert may not testify about an issue at trial unless the substance of the testimony is set out in a report that meets the requirements of rule 20.2. See Family Law Rules, r 20.2(6). Meys had no opportunity to serve a responding report. In both cases, the parties didn’t have the underlying documents from the other party until just before or during the trial, meaning that they couldn’t even effectively cross-examine the adverse expert.

[31] Having now heard all the evidence, there are many documents that I can give no weight to. For example, Meys tendered a drawing that YAR allegedly made to support her claim for sole decision-making and supervised parenting time. The drawing was made for a social worker. YAR didn’t testify. The social worker didn’t testify. Though Meys was present when YAR allegedly made the drawing, Mahmoud questions whether YAR was coerced into making the drawing. This document is hearsay evidence.

[32] The essential defining features of hearsay are: (a) the fact that the statement is adduced to prove the truth of its contents; and (b) the absence of a contemporaneous opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. See R v Khelawon, 2006 SCC 57, at para 35.

[33] I can’t rely on this drawing for the truth of its contents (i.e., that YAR feels like he’s “falling off a cliff” when his dad is “yelling at [him] and breaking stuff”).

[34] Another example: Mahmoud introduced text messages between him and LR from December 2021 to support his claim that the children wanted to revert to a shared parenting schedule because Meys didn’t spend time with them. LR didn’t testify. These messages are also hearsay evidence. I can’t rely on these messages for the truth of their contents (i.e., that Meys doesn’t spend time with the children and they prefer parenting time with Mahmoud).

1. The OCL Report

[35] Mahmoud rejects the OCL’s recommendations. He argues that the OCL’s investigation was hampered by, among other things, the clinician’s personal circumstances (which she acknowledges in the report). As a result, he didn’t agree that the views of the children should be put into evidence through the OCL report.

[36] The report shall form part of the evidence at the hearing of the proceeding. See CJA, s 112(6). Within 30 days after being served with the report, a party may serve and file a statement disputing anything in it. See Family Law Rules, r 21(e).

[37] Mahmoud never delivered a dispute statement. That said, it’s clear from Justice Bielby’s endorsement in June 2021 that Mahmoud didn’t accept the report’s conclusions.

[38] Meys, who relies on the OCL’s recommendations, didn’t summons the OCL clinician to give evidence at the trial. The OCL didn’t seek to attend the hearing under section 112(7) of the CJA, presumably because Mahmoud didn’t serve a dispute statement.

[39] Even though the OCL’s report is evidence at the hearing of this proceeding, I don’t give it any weight. It doesn’t reflect the current circumstances of the parties or their children. The children were observed and the older children interviewed in late 2019, almost 5 years ago. YOR wasn’t interviewed at all because, at the time, he was too young. The report presents a snapshot of the OCL’s observations and conclusions from 2020, but that’s long enough ago that I find the report to be unreliable. See Proulx v Proulx, 2021 ONSC 3657, at para 58.

[40] A lot has happened to this family since then. The report was made before LR started, and then LR and YAR stopped, having parenting time with Mahmoud. It was made before Justice Bielby’s split parenting time order. It’s unfortunate the OCL refused Justice Price’s request for an updated OCL report.

2. CAS Notes

[41] In November 2023, Peel Children’s Aid Society produced its records to the parties. Both parties sought to rely on the narratives recorded by CAS employees, including excerpts from emails and police reports. In some cases, the parties sought to rely on statements the other parent made to CAS. But in most cases, they were seeking to rely on statements the children made to CAS.

[42] Though it may be possible to admit some or all of this evidence (e.g., the evidence isn’t being adduced for the truth of its contents, the declarants are available to be cross-examined, or under the state of mind exception), the issue here is that the authors of the notes didn’t testify. The notes are unreliable if the author doesn’t testify about what they heard and wrote. Unlike the OCL report, there’s no law that makes CAS notes evidence on their own. So, absent a witness that can put the notes into evidence, they aren’t admissible.

D. Credibility

[43] Credibility and reliability are different. Credibility has to do with a witness’s veracity; reliability with the accuracy of the witness’s testimony. Reliability engages consideration of the witness’s ability to accurately observe, recall, and recount events in issue. Any witness whose evidence on an issue isn’t credible can’t give reliable evidence on the same point. Credibility, on the other hand, isn’t a proxy for reliability: a credible witness may give unreliable evidence. See R v GF, 2021 SCC 20, at para 82; R v HC, 2009 ONCA 56, at para 41.

[44] Mahmoud wasn’t candid or straight-forward with the court. There were stark differences between his testimony and the documentary evidence. Mahmoud had a tendency to “double-down” on his position—if Meys pointed out his error, he became more resolute, even though his evidence contradicted his own communications. Mahmoud also took unreasonable positions. He often made bald statements with no supporting evidence or particulars (e.g., alleging that Meys purposefully enrolled the children in different schools to make it more difficult for him to drop them off on time). As I detail below, he violated Meys’s privacy by accessing Air Canada’s passenger database—his attitude about this obvious breach was cavalier. He didn’t see much wrong with his actions, even in hindsight.

[45] Meys was more credible. She seemed reasonable and consistent. She acknowledged her mistakes. She seemed honest. On one issue, Meys tried to evade an unfavourable answer. In July 2020, Meys put hot sauce in YOR’s mouth for arguing with his siblings and refusing to stop screaming or yelling. Mahmoud called the police. The police attended at the scene, and no further action was required. At trial, Mahmoud asked Meys whether she “poured” hot sauce into YOR’s mouth. She denied doing so, both in her response to request to admit and orally. Upon being shown documents discussing the incident, she finally agreed that she “put” hot sauce in YOR’s mouth but didn’t “pour” it. I don’t believe Meys’s inconsistency tainted all of her evidence.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Divorce

[46] Though Mahmoud doesn’t expressly request or concede Meys’s request for a divorce, I find that there’s been a breakdown of the marriage. The parties have lived separate and apart since November 2018. There’s no bar to a divorce. As a result, I order that Meys and Mahmoud, who were married on September 2, 2005, shall be divorced, and that the divorce takes effect 31 days after the date of this order.

B. Decision-Making Responsibility and Parenting Time

[47] Meys seeks an order that she have sole decision-making responsibility for all the children. She proposes to consult with Mahmoud, but retain the right to make the final decision. Mahmoud requests sole decision-making responsibility for SR and YOR.

[48] Meys asks for a parenting time order that SR and YOR shall have only supervised parenting time, until they turn 12, with Mahmoud: (a) on alternate weekends from Friday 4pm to Monday 9am (with exceptions for statutory and school holidays and Mother’s Day); (b) from July 24th to July 30th and August 24th to August 30th; and (c) on Eid Al Fitr and Eid Al Adha from 6pm to 9pm. Meys also seeks an order that LR and YAR (and SR and YOR, after they turn 12) shall have parenting time with Mahmoud “as per the children’s wishes and preferences”. Finally, Meys seeks several ancillary orders related to this allotment of parenting time.

[49] Mahmoud seeks a parenting time order that all the children shall have only supervised parenting time with Meys on alternating Saturdays and Sundays from 12pm to 6pm. He doesn’t seek any ancillary orders.

[50] Under the interim order of Justice Bielby, the status quo is as follows:

• the children’s primary residence is with Meys

• Meys has sole decision-making responsibility for all the children

• the children have parenting time with Mahmoud on alternate weekends from Friday 4pm to Monday 9am and alternate weeknights from Wednesday 4pm to Friday 9am (adjusted for school holidays) and one-week summer parenting time in each of July and August (though LR and YAR refuse to exercise their parenting time)

[51] Under the interim order, the children are exercising around 35 percent of their parenting time with Mahmoud over the course of the year (106 hours every two weeks plus 336 hours in the summer).

1. Legal Framework

[52] This court may make an order for the exercise of decision-making responsibility for any child of the marriage, on application by either spouse. See Divorce Act, RSC 1985, c 3 (2nd Supp), s 16.1(1)). Decision-making responsibility means making significant decisions about a child’s well-being, including for: (a) health; (b) education; (c) culture, language, religion, and spirituality; and (d) significant extracurricular activities. See Divorce Act, s 2(1).

[53] The court may allocate decision-making responsibility for the child, or any aspect of that responsibility, to either spouse or to both spouses. See Divorce Act, s 16.1(4)(b), 16.3. Decision-making authority helps ensure that a parent’s relationship with their child isn’t marginalized. See Rigillo v Rigillo, 2019 ONCA 548, at para 12.

[54] In deciding on the appropriate decision-making responsibility regime, the court must consider all possible frameworks, and not simply those proposed by the parties. The goal in crafting an appropriate decision-making regime is to promote the child’s “right to grow up within a parenting regime that is co-operative and effective, where decisions are made in a child-focused way and with the least amount of acrimony and stress.” See McBennett v Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610, at para 96. See also RG v JG, 2022 ONSC 1678, at paras 117-122, and KM v JR, 2022 ONSC 111, at paras 46-62.

[55] For the court to grant joint decision-making in some or all areas, there must be some evidence that the parties are able to communicate effectively in the areas under consideration for the sake of the child, despite their differences. The best interests of the child won’t be advanced if the parties can’t make important decisions about the child under a joint decision-making arrangement. In analyzing the ability of the parties to communicate, the court must delve below the surface and consider the source of the conflict. See McBennett, at para 97.

[56] The quality of each party’s past parenting and decision-making, both during the parties’ relationship and post-separation, is key to determining whether an order for joint decision-making in some or all areas is appropriate. See McBennett, at para 97.

[57] A party who has not been granted decision-making responsibility for “significant decisions about a child’s well-being” nonetheless supports the child’s life and retains a decision-making role in daily issues that can be equally important to the child’s overall well-being. See Divorce Act, s 16.2(2). This section protects children and parents who have parenting time with each other from attempts by the party granted decision-making authority respecting significant decisions to intrude upon or marginalize the role of the other parent. See McBennett, at para 80. Section 16.4 establishes the right of parents who have been allocated parenting time to request and receive information about the child’s well-being, including their health and education.

[58] Parenting time may be allocated through a schedule. See Divorce Act, s 16.2(1). Children should have as much contact with each parent as aligns with their best interests. See Divorce Act, s 16(6); Barendregt v Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, at para 133. “It may end up being equal time. It may not. Each family is different, and the principle is a guide set out to benefit children.” See Knapp v Knapp, 2021 ONCA 305, at para 34.

[59] Siblings are typically good emotional supports for one another, and keeping them together in a parenting schedule often provides them with security. It’s generally emotionally preferable and more practical to keep siblings together during parenting time, even if there are differences in age that extend over several years. See EML v CL, 2024 BCSC 73, at para 73; Association of Family and Conciliation Courts, Ontario, Parenting Plan Guide (December 2021), online: <afccontario.com> at p 15.

[60] The court shall take into consideration “only the best interests of the child of the marriage in making a parenting…order” See Divorce Act, s 16(1). The court must consider the following factors in carrying out the “best interests” analysis:

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each spouse, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents, and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

(c) each spouse’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other spouse;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they can’t be ascertained;

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing, and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child’s care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact; and

(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security, and well-being of the child.

[61] In considering these factors, the court is required to “give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being”. See Divorce Act, s 16(2).

[62] The list of factors isn’t a “checklist to be tabulated with the highest score winning”. See Phillips v Phillips, 2021 ONSC 2480, at para 47. The “primary consideration” recognizes that there may be conflicts in attempting to weigh the enumerated criteria. Any such difficulties should be resolved by ensuring that the child’s physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security, and well-being are promoted. See McBennett, at para 82.

[63] In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the court shall not consider the past conduct of any person unless the conduct is relevant to the exercise of their decision-making responsibility. See Divorce Act, s 16(5). In cases of family violence, particularly spousal violence, it is “crucial that the court consider whether a co-operative parenting arrangement is appropriate.” See Bell v Reinhardt, 2021 ONSC 3352, at para 15.

2. Needs and Circumstances

[64] The court must consider the unique needs and circumstances of the child. For example, age, level of maturity, and temperament can all influence a child’s ability to cope with change and their need for a particular parenting style. See Khurmi v Sidhu, 2022 ONSC 6413, at para 98. A child’s needs change over time, and a child’s stage of development is vital to determining their reaction to any situation. For example, school-age children generally need far more predictability in terms of schedules and routines than adolescents.

[65] As adolescents, LR and YAR are developing their own identity, separate from the family. Their social relationships and activities are a bigger priority than family time. Leaving aside their estrangement from Mahmoud, they’re at an age where they likely need a “home base” and clear guidance on whose supervision and authority they are under at all times. Most importantly, they need to be consulted, informed, and involved when making parenting plans. See Parenting Plan Guide, at pages 25-28.

[66] For SR, he needs a parenting plan that encourages him to develop social and intellectual skills, take part in extracurricular activities, and develop age-appropriate friendships. He should have frequent contact with both parents. Children at this age “may strongly identify with one parent” in high-conflict disputes. The “allied parent” must ensure that they follow the agreed-upon schedule to prevent the child from resisting seeing the other parent. See Parenting Plan Guide, at pages 25-28.

[67] For YOR, he should have significant involvement with both parents. It’s appropriate for him to have equal parenting time with each parent, given that both parties had an equal role in parenting before separation. Though transitions can be challenging for school-age children (and have been made more challenging by the parties’ conduct during transitions), his siblings can and do provide an important emotional support. See Parenting Plan Guide, at page 22.

3. Nature and Strength of Relationships

[68] The nature of the child’s relationship with each parent, including the nature of their relationship as it existed during the marriage, is especially relevant to parenting. In addition, children often have important relationships with other family members, such as siblings or grandparents. These relationships can provide stability at a time of substantial change in the children’s life. See Khurmi, at para 101.

[69] The four children here have strong and important relationships with each other, which favours a parenting plan that provides that stability together. They also have important relationships with their grandparents, aunts, uncles, and cousins, on both sides of the family. The parenting plan shouldn’t inadvertently prevent the children from contacting their extended families, or force the siblings apart.

[70] There’s no dispute that LR and YAR are estranged from Mahmoud. That said, the evidence at trial was that they each had strong relationships with Mahmoud during the marriage and after. In both cases, there were culminating incidents that severed those relationships, and now need to be repaired through therapy. Mahmoud seems to recognize this reality by not asking for decision-making responsibility or parenting time for LR and YAR.

4. Supporting Relationship with Spouse

[71] It’s generally important that each parent support the child’s relationship with the other parent. A positive relationship with both parents provides stability for the child during their parents’ separation and divorce. See Khurmi, at para 103.

[72] In some cases, it may be inappropriate for one parent to support a child’s relationship with the other parent, such as in situations of family violence where there are safety concerns. In cases involving family violence, courts must consider the effect of the violence on all the best interests of the child factors, including on the willingness of a spouse to support the child’s relationship with the other spouse. In every case, the court must give primary consideration to the child’s safety, security, and well-being.

[73] Though both Meys and Mahmoud say they are willing to support their children’s relationship with the other parent, the evidence suggests otherwise. Mahmoud has intentionally or unintentionally impacted the quality of the relationship between Meys and the children by insulting her and unilaterally restricting the time the children spend with her. Mahmoud points to two incidents where he scolded the children for not “respecting” their mother. Mahmoud doesn’t seem to realize that his failure to respect Meys but demanding that they do so is confusing to the children, and ultimately harmful to their relationships with both parents.

[74] Similarly, Meys has introduced no evidence of steps she’s taken to urge the children to have a relationship with Mahmoud. Mahmoud’s actions have definitely played a role in Meys’s unwillingness to encourage LR and YAR to see their father. There’s no dispute that LR and YAR have become estranged from Mahmoud. The issue is why the estrangement has occurred.

[75] Based on the evidence at trial, I can’t conclude that Meys alienated LR and YAR from Mahmoud. Each case of alienation must be considered on its own facts. See CW v EC, 2010 ONSC 3575, at para 169. In AM v CH, 2018 ONSC 6472, at para 109, aff’d 2019 ONCA 764, Justice Nicholson identified several indicators of alienation. They include various behaviours and attitudes that a parent can display in front of a child that sends a negative message about the other parent or that parent’s relationship with the child.

[76] Here, there’s too little evidence for me to make this finding. It’s true that Meys has engaged in attitudes and behaviours that have undermined LR’s and YAR’s relationship with Mahmoud, including insulting Mahmoud and interfering in his relationship with the children (though, in several cases, Meys’s explanation is justifiable).

[77] At the same time, Mahmoud’s own actions have contributed to the children’s estrangement. Mahmoud’s narrative is that Meys has manipulated the children into thinking that he abuses them, to the point that they are now under the care of mental health professionals. There’s just no evidence to support that theory. Further, as I discuss below, Mahmoud’s position is undermined by his own actions, which show a violent and abusive approach to parenting his children.

[78] Both parents allege that the resident parent blocks phone communications between the children and the other parent. Both parents filed several documents attempting to show missed calls between them and the children. Meys admits making Mahmoud’s calls harder. She believes Mahmoud is using SR’s phone to listen to them during her parenting time, so she only allows SR to talk to Mahmoud using her phone (she disables the mobile network and Wi-Fi on the device that Mahmoud gave him). Mahmoud says he needs to have regular contact with the children because of Meys’s history of mental illness. If he can’t reach the children, he does his own “wellness checks”, which causes Meys to fear for her safety. I infer that Mahmoud, in retaliation for Meys’s conduct, has equally frustrated contact between the children and Meys. After the trial, I made a temporary order regarding phone calls. I endorse that order as a final order.

5. History of Care

[79] Courts must consider who knows the child’s routines, preferences, and health-related challenges, and can provide stability. This includes past caregiving roles and the child’s relationship with each person.

[80] Based on the evidence at trial, the parties had a traditional marriage—Mahmoud worked outside the home and Meys was the primary caregiver. But they both played important roles in their children’s lives before separation, and appear equally capable of caring for the children. Neither of them disputed that both parents were involved and engaged in caring for the children from infancy.

6. Child’s Views and Preferences

[81] Children who are able to form their own views should have a say in the decisions that affect their lives, whether made by judges or parents. The older and more mature a child, the more weight their view will carry.

[82] Here, I have no admissible evidence on the children’s views and preferences. That said, LR’s and YAR’s preferences are reflected in their unwillingness to have parenting time with Mahmoud. When Mahmoud tried to visit LR at school, she refused to see him.

7. Cultural and Religious Upbringing

[83] The children’s culture or religion may provide an added support system for them. Meys’s and Mahmoud’s ability to maintain and promote the children’s understanding of, and link to, their cultural, linguistic and religious heritage, as well as the potential for them to develop their own cultural identity and self-esteem, are important factors. See Khurmi, at para 105.

[84] There was no significant dispute on this factor. Meys and Mahmoud share a cultural and religious background. They’re raising their children as Muslims, with an appreciation for Arabic culture and language. Though Meys was slightly critical of Mahmoud’s lack of adherence to certain religious practices, it’s not uncommon that one parent is stricter than the other. The key issue for decision-making authority and parenting time is whether one parent is more or less supportive of the children’s cultural and religious upbringing. That’s not an issue here.

8. Ability and Willingness

[85] The past, present, and future ability and willingness of a person to care for the child are important factors in determining the best interests of the child. In some cases, a parent’s physical, psychological, or other limitations may raise concerns for the child’s health, safety, well-being, and development. Courts must consider a person’s strengths and limitations when determining parenting arrangements. See Khurmi, at para 108; Mane v Mane, 2023 ONSC 5343, at para 111.

[86] Meys has a diagnosed mental illness. She’s under the care of a psychiatrist. She regularly takes her medication. Despite Mahmoud’s allegations, there was no evidence at trial that Meys’s illness raises any concerns for the children’s safety or security.

[87] In October 2019, Mahmoud was admitted to hospital after police found him overdosed on anxiety medication. He claims he accidentally took extra medication and, when he felt drowsy, he called 9-1-1 as a precaution. Mahmoud admitted being stressed and anxious because of the high-conflict separation from Meys.

[88] Meys alleges that the children are unsafe with Mahmoud because of his anger issues. She also challenges his parenting ability. First, she alleges that Mahmoud often allowed or even forced the children to drive a car. Mahmoud doesn’t deny this allegation—his answer is that he allowed them to do so only in a parking lot, when no cars were coming out, after they turned 9 years old because it’s a “child’s dream”. For his part, he alleged that Meys allowed YOR to drive on her lap when he was baby, but I didn’t find his evidence reliable (the photo he introduced showed YOR on Meys’s lap in the driver’s seat but there’s no evidence the car was in motion).

[89] Second, Meys alleges that Mahmoud neglects the children’s health. In July 2022, she alleges that YAR’s knee became infected during parenting time with Mahmoud, but Mahmoud refused to disinfect it or take YAR to a doctor. In October 2023, SR hurt his foot during parenting time with Mahmoud. She alleges that SR and YOR were playing unsupervised at 2am. Meys took SR for an x-ray. The doctor reported an “undisplaced midshaft facture” and recommended that SR’s toes be bandaged together. Mahmoud allegedly refused to do so. Meys alleges that Mahmoud either doesn’t provide YOR with a puffer for his asthma, or he uses a puffer at home that should be used only in hospitals. Mahmoud, as a general response, says that he provides appropriate first aid to the children, which he’s trained to do as a reservist.

[90] Finally, Meys alleges that Mahmoud doesn’t exercise parenting time with any regularity—she alleges that he often picks up the children several hours late. She also alleges that SR and YOR are often late for school when they have parenting time with Mahmoud because he sleeps in. Meys says that SR is at risk of failing math because it’s his first period class. Mahmoud couldn’t explain why SR and YOR were often late for or absent from school.

[91] Meys testified to parenting courses and self-study that she’s done. She sees a therapist regularly. In contrast, Mahmoud denies that he has anger issues (on the strength of a counsellor’s opinion) or that he needs coaching.

[92] That said, Mahmoud’s actions at trial suggest otherwise. He cross-examined Meys about an incident to show that he supports the children’s relationship with her. YAR accidentally broke Meys’s fingernail. In his telling, Mahmoud yelled at YAR, gave him “hell”, “ripped into him”, and made YAR kiss Meys’s hands and feet. This example, which Mahmoud relies on, undermines his claim that he doesn’t need anger management or parenting coaching. Separately, he admits calling one of the children a “demon”.

[93] He also doesn’t acknowledge the harm his and Meys’s interactions have caused the children. During the audio recording of their November 2018 dispute, LR is heard crying and wailing in the background. At trial, Mahmoud casually described her as “freaking out”—an exceedingly cavalier way of describing his daughter’s obviously traumatic response to her parent’s violent conflict.

[94] I’ve no doubt that Mahmoud is willing to care for the children. But he has limitations that raise concerns for the children’s health, safety, well-being, and development. Those limitations are exacerbated by his “father knowns best” attitude.

9. Communicate and cooperate

[95] Children benefit when their parents cooperate and communicate. Parents who cooperate and communicate are more likely to manage flexible parenting arrangements and joint decision-making about their children. See Khurmi, at para 111; Mane, at para 118.

[96] There’s a total breakdown in communication between the parties. Their written communications bristle with passive-aggressive comments and tone. They don’t trust each other, and assume that the other parent is manipulating the situation or the children. If the parties communicate in person, it inevitably leads to police or CAS intervention. The parties often communicate about parenting time through the children.

[97] A few examples:

• in December 2019, Mahmoud texted Meys using AppClose, saying among other things, “So tomorrow im gonna pick them up 4pm. All of them. And we will follow the schedule i provided. Anything other than shows clearly that you are limiting my time with my kids and further alienating me from them.”

• in February 2020, Mahmoud texted Meys, again using AppClose: “Lastly, should I not be able to speak to all of my children, as a last resort, I will be coming up to my condo to speak with them, which is in my right. You don’t need to be present and can leave as soon as I arrive. Anyone else found in my apartment without my concent [sic] will be asked to leave and if they do not comply the police will be called and they will be arrested.”

• in response, Meys texted: “I have reported your text to Police. The police has advised me that if you come to the building, I should call 911, and a new no contact order will be put in place since there’s a safety concern. Since you have a history of assaulting the children, I may even apply for a no contact order for the children. [SR] went to school, [YAR] had a stomachache.”

• in July 2022, Meys emailed Mahmoud about YAR’s infected scab and SR’s fractured finger, gratuitously adding:

Also [LR] was telling me that she and the boys hate the food you force them to eat. She told me that the better food is ‘reserved’ for you and your partner. They’re sick of the repetitive cheap food which makes them gag like mjaddara and eggs. The kids said they’ve told you they hate these foods and you’ve seen them gag on it, but you still force them to eat it because it’s cheap. Please feed them better food. They are your kids. They’re supposed to be your first priority. It’s disturbing that the kids talk about how you can afford to order expensive food frequently for yourself and your partner but you force them to eat cheap foods that they gag on. I’m happy to relieve you of some of your parenting time if you can’t provide proper food or care for the children. Just let me know.

• over two days August and September 2023, the parties exchanged five lengthy emails over whether SR needed to see a periodontist, who would take him and, ultimately, who takes better care of the children’s health needs

[98] It has gone on like this for months and years. Indeed, I’m hard-pressed to find a single communication between the parties where they are civil to each other.

[99] The parties are, as shown from the above communications, highly suspicious of the other parent’s motivations on benign decisions. For example, Mahmoud believes that Meys enrolled the children in different schools to make drop-offs harder for him. That suspicion is unfounded, and doesn’t make common sense.

[100] Further, Mahmoud often engages in self-help rather than cooperating with Meys or seeking relief from the court. That said, Meys’s response often leads to more conflict. The parties devoted a fair amount of time to the following example, which demonstrates the breakdown between them.

[101] Under Justice Bielby’s order, in 2022, the children had parenting time with Mahmoud from July 6th to July 8th, July 15th to 18th, July 20th to 22nd, and July 29th to August 1st. They were also entitled to one week of parenting time with Mahmoud in each of July and August. On July 6th, Mahmoud announced to Meys that he would “keep the kids until July 22”. Meys responded that he should return the children on July 8th and pick them up again on July 10th for a week of summer parenting time. Mahmoud then responded to Meys: “Your interpretation of the order is incorrect. I am exercising my right to select the schedule. There is no stipulation on you agreeing to it. The kids will be staying with summer with me as I have indicated in my previous email I have plans for them as well. We have done this last summer.”

[102] Mahmood acknowledged, at trial, that he was wrong. He seemed to believe that he was entitled to two weeks of parenting time between July 8th and July 22nd when, in fact, even with summer parenting time during that period, the children should have returned to Meys starting July 18th for two nights. Though the mistake was modest, Mahmoud’s response wasn’t. Rather than acknowledging that Meys was right, he unilaterally imposed his own, incorrect interpretation of the schedule on the children and her.

[103] The dispute didn’t end there. Meys called the police on July 9th because Mahmoud was overholding. At trial, Mahmoud tried to make it seem like Meys called the police because he notified her about the schedule four days later than he should have. He also suggested that Meys had unreasonably denied him parenting time on Eid al-Adha, which started July 8th that year. In his telling, he gratuitously offered to share the holiday on July 9th with her but she didn’t respond. As the police were now at his house, he let her take the kids, provided they return by 6pm because he had dinner plans with his extended family. In his telling, Meys said she would return the children at 8pm. At 8pm, when the children weren’t returned, he called the police. Around 9pm, Meys called to advise Mahmoud that they were in Hamilton. The finally returned at 1015pm.

[104] Mahmoud interpreted Justice Bielby’s order wrong. When he was corrected by Meys, he doubled-down and overheld the children. She called the police. Furthering his mistake, he unilaterally offered her 10 hours of parenting time on a religious holiday even though it was her parenting time. She agreed to return them at 8pm, but then she overheld them. He called the police.

[105] Eid is one of the two main holidays celebrated in Islam. Muslims gather with family and friends. They wear their best clothes and eat special foods. It’s a day of celebration like so many celebrated in other faiths around the world. But, because of the parties’ abject inability to communicate, these children spent Eid that year with the police not once, but twice.

[106] The utter lack of cooperation and communication militates against any form of joint decision-making. Given that neither party seeks joint decision-making, they seem to implicitly acknowledge that.

10. Family violence

[107] The court must consider the effect of family violence on parenting and contact arrangements, including its impact on the ability and willingness of the person who engaged in family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child. In cases of family violence, the court must also consider whether to require the parties to co-operate on matters related to the child. See Mane, at para 99.

[108] To assess the ability and willingness of a perpetrator of family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, the court must consider what the history of family violence demonstrates about that person’s ability to parent in the child’s best interests. For example, the court would need to consider whether the person,

• might be violent with the child

• might use their relationship with the child to be violent with or control another person

• has caused the child to be fearful of them

• can be an appropriate role model for, and provide guidance to, the child

See JI v New Brunswick (Justice), 2021 NBQB 150, at para 22; AW v NP, 2022 SKQB 150, at para 50; Mane, at para 100.

[109] In cases of family violence, particularly spousal violence, it’s crucial that the court consider whether a co-operative parenting arrangement is appropriate. A victim of family violence might be unable to co-parent because of the trauma they have experienced or ongoing fear of the perpetrator. In addition, co-operative arrangements may lead to opportunities for further family violence. See Bell, at para. 15.

[110] In considering the effect of any family violence under section 16(3)(j), the court shall take the following into account:

(a) the nature, seriousness, and frequency of the family violence and when it occurred;

(b) whether there is a pattern of coercive and controlling behaviour in relation to a family member;

(c) whether the family violence is directed toward the child or whether the child is directly or indirectly exposed to the family violence;

(d) the physical, emotional and psychological harm or risk of harm to the child;

(e) any compromise to the safety of the child or other family member;

(f) whether the family violence causes the child or other family member to fear for their own safety or for that of another person;

(g) any steps taken by the person engaging in the family violence to prevent further family violence from occurring and improve their ability to care for and meet the needs of the child; and

(h) any other relevant factor.

[111] Meys relies on four major incidents of family violence that she says should inform the best interests analysis.

[112] First, the November 2018 incident. Mahmoud allegedly assaulted Meys and her sister in front of the children. Mahmoud alleges that Meys assaulted him. He played an audio recording of the incident. I can’t tell from the audio recording who was assaulted. Again, the charges against Mahmoud were dismissed after a trial.

[113] Second, in May 2022, Mahmoud allegedly threatened to “knock the teeth out of [LR’s] mouth”. Mahmoud denies doing so. Following this incident, LR was admitted to hospital for suicidal ideations. Mahmoud was charged with uttering threats. The charges were dismissed after a trial. Again, there was little or no admissible evidence about this incident. LR stopped parenting time with Mahmoud. Both before and after this incident, LR was self-harming and had suicidal ideations. She’s been seeing a counsellor for these issues and an apparent eating disorder.

[114] Third, in August 2022, Mahmoud allegedly threatened to kick YAR out of the house for disrespecting him. Mahmoud denies doing so. Following this incident, YAR was admitted to hospital for suicidal ideations. The police were involved, but no charges were laid. Once again, there was little or no admissible evidence about this incident. YAR stopped parenting time with Mahmoud. Both before and after this incident, YAR was self-harming and had suicidal ideations. He’s been seeing a counsellor for these issues. As the parties don’t have medical insurance, LR and YAR have to rely on free counselling services, which are limited and inconsistent.

[115] Finally, in 2006, Mahmoud allegedly sexually assaulted Meys. She says that he initiated sex; she asked him to stop; he refused and restrained her hands. She says she didn’t report the abuse to the police then or ever because of her shame and cultural stigma.

[116] There was also evidence about several other incidents of alleged family violence by Mahmoud:

• in January 2018, Mahmoud allegedly slapped YAR on the face—Mahmoud says he only “touched” YAR but doesn’t deny then texting, “He’ll be fine. Let that remind him to keep his shit together” when Meys accused him of slapping YAR

• in September 2018, LR complained that Mahmoud verbally abused her—when Meys confronted Mahmoud by text, he responded “she needs another ass kicking”

• in December 2018, Mahmoud allegedly spanked YAR and SR using a rolled-up newspaper—Mahmoud doesn’t deny hitting the children but he says it wasn’t excessive

• in March 2019, Mahmoud yelled at YAR, broke a table, and ripped up the children’s allowance money (and then allegedly replaced the table before a CAS visit)—Mahmoud denies this allegation

• again in March 2019, Mahmoud allegedly slapped SR in the mouth for making noises while he chewed his food—Mahmoud denies doing so

• in October 2019, Mahmoud allegedly slapped YOR and shoved vitamins into his mouth—Mahmoud denies doing so

• in December 2019, Mahmoud allegedly smacked YOR and SR for arguing together—Mahmoud denies doing so

[117] I don’t find Mahmoud’s denials credible. In several cases, he admits to violent acts, but tries to downplay their effect. In other cases, he uses extreme language (e.g., “keep his shit together”, “ass kicking”) that undermines his denials. I acknowledge that Mahmoud was acquitted twice. But the totality of the evidence leads me to conclude that he might be violent with the children, and he’s caused the children to be fearful of him. I have no doubt he loves his children. But he’s not an appropriate role model for them.

[118] Meys also alleges that Mahmoud uses coercive control. For example, she alleges that Mahmoud refused to pay for LR’s counselling unless the counsellor told him what LR was saying. Mahmoud denies this allegation—he says that the counsellor was charging his credit card without pre-approval from him. I don’t find Mahmoud’s explanation credible. If there was some misunderstanding about payment, why didn’t he resolve it so LR could get the counselling she needed? Meys’s narrative is more consistent with Mahmoud’s lack of respect for his family’s privacy and his paternalistic approach to parenting. I also discuss a number of “stalking” incidents below—a form of coercive control.

[119] Mahmoud alleges that Meys has been violent with the children. Meys intentionally underplayed these incidents, making her evidence about her conduct less credible. But there’s no evidence, other than the “hot sauce” incident, of Meys being violent toward the children since separation or recently. I don’t believe there’s a pattern to Meys’s conduct that compromises the children’s safety.

[120] Mahmoud also alleges that Meys coerced the children. For example, he alleges that Meys or her family bought YAR a scooter and PlayStation 5 just before the criminal trials to manipulate his evidence. Mahmoud’s suspicion is unfounded.

11. Disposition and Conclusion

[121] I’m persuaded that the status quo should, for the most part, continue. Mahmoud has exposed the children to family violence. Mahmoud and Meys have both involved the children in their parental conflict. The children are afraid of Mahmoud. Mahmoud and Meys, in part because of this family violence, are unwilling to support their children’s relationship with the other spouse and can’t communicate or cooperate in the children’s best interest. Mahmoud’s unwillingness to acknowledge his limitations (and, as a result, his refusal to get coaching) is further evidence that he’s not focused on the best interests of his children.

[122] For these reasons, on decision-making responsibility, I order that:

(a) the children’s primary residence shall be with Meys;

(b) Meys shall have sole decision-making responsibility for all the children’s health, education, culture, language, religion, and spirituality, and significant extra-curricular activities, after consulting with Mahmoud and the children; and

(c) when the children are in Mahmoud’s care, he shall make day-to-day decisions about homework, meals, seeing friends, and so on, but Mahmoud will follow the plans made by Meys about the above significant matters.

[123] The children need a home base, which has been with Meys since separation. The children are each other’s best support and should stay together. The other adults in their lives—their doctors, mental health professionals, teachers, guidance counsellors—all need to know who is making decisions for the children without mixed messages or conflict. More importantly, the children need to know who is making important life decisions for them, again without mixed messages and conflict.

[124] That said, I don’t agree with Meys’s request that the children only have supervised parenting time with Mahmoud on alternate weekends (which is less than they have now). Mahmoud has had unsupervised parenting time with all four children since separation. In my view, it wouldn’t be in their best interests to change the allocation of parenting time, especially where SR and YOR have gotten used to significant involvement with both parents. But I’m not prepared to increase Mahmoud’s allocation of parenting time. The children’s physical, emotional and psychological safety, security and well-being favours maintaining the status quo. As a result, I order that parenting time with Mahmoud shall be allocated as follows:

(a) the children shall have parenting time with Mahmoud every second weekend from after school on Fridays until start of school on Mondays;

(b) if there is a school long weekend when Mahmoud has the children, the children shall have parenting time with Mahmoud from after school on Thursdays (if Friday is a school holiday) and until start of school on Tuesday (if Monday is a school holiday);

(c) the children shall have parenting time with Mahmoud every second week from after school on Wednesdays until start of school on Fridays;

(d) the children shall have parenting time with Mahmoud for one week in July and in August (from Friday 12noon to Friday 12noon)—Mahmoud may unilaterally select the weeks on or before June 30th;

(e) the weekly parenting time allocation shall be suspended during the summer schedule; and

(f) Mahmoud shall have parenting time from 9am to 9pm on Eid Al Fitr in odd years and from 9am to 9pm on Eid Al Adha in even years.[2]

[125] This parenting order applies to LR and YAR. That said, this order isn’t enforceable by the police. If LR and YAR choose not to have parenting time with Mahmoud, I respect their preference. These four children have had too many police in their short lives. Police enforcement should be used sparingly, in exceptional circumstances, and as a last resort. See Patterson v Powell, 2014 ONSC 1419, at para 34.

[126] That said, I encourage Mahmoud, and LR and YAR, to engage in reunification counselling in the hopes that they might repair their relationship. I encourage Mahmoud to take anger-management classes. I’m not making reunification counseling or anger management a condition of this parenting order. I don’t have enough evidence on the children’s preferences to be confident that an order for reunification counselling will be reasonably implemented. See CB v EG, 2023 ONSC 1571, at para 39. Similarly, given Mahmoud’s firm belief that he doesn’t have anger management issues, I’m not persuaded that ordering him to undertake counselling will help.

[127] Finally, Meys requests several ancillary orders that Mahmoud doesn’t oppose. In a parenting order, the court may include requirements for any means of communication that is to occur during the parenting time allocated to a person, between a child and another person to whom parenting time or decision-making responsibility is allocated; and provide for any other matter that the court considers appropriate. See Divorce Act, s 16.1(4).

[128] In Schedule A, I have made several other parenting orders intended to facilitate execution of my orders on decision-making and parenting time.

C. Equalization

[129] When spouses are separated and there’s no reasonable prospect that they will resume cohabitation, the spouse whose net family property is the lesser of the two net family properties is entitled to one-half the difference between them. See Family Law Act, RSO 1990, c F.3, s 5(1).

[130] Net family property means the value of all the property that a spouse owns on the valuation date, after deducting: (a) the spouse’s debts and other liabilities; and (b) the value of property, other than a matrimonial home, that the spouse owned on the date of the marriage, after deducting the spouse’s debts and other liabilities, other than debts or liabilities related directly to the acquisition or significant improvement of a matrimonial home, calculated as of the date of the marriage. See FLA, s 4(1).

[131] The onus of proving an asset or deduction under the definition of “net family property” is on the person claiming it. See FLA, s 4(3). The caselaw identifies several considerations:

• the party with the burden of proof has to adduce “sufficient credible evidence” (see Menage v Hedges (1987), 8 RFL (3d) 225 (Ont Sup Ct), at para 52)

• that party must provide a realistic value for each asset or deduction, not a “guess or fictional amount” (see Sheikh v Sheikh (2005), 17 RFL (6th) 303 (Ont Sup Ct), at para 110)

• failure to provide credible evidence to support a value may result in a value being assigned that is less advantageous to the party claiming the asset (see Sheikh, at para 110)

[132] Though judges have rejected valuations because the party claiming them didn’t have documentary proof (see, e.g., Jukosky v Jukosky (1990), 31 RFL (3d) 117 (Ont Sup Ct), and Bilas v Bilas (1994), 3 RFL (4th) 354 (Ont SC)), documentary proof isn’t always necessary. It’s possible to prove a valuation if a party’s oral evidence is credible and reliable. See Skrak v Skrak, 2024 ONSC 1574, at para 56.

[133] The parties were equally challenged by the task of calculating their net family property. Mahmoud’s Net Family Property Statement shows that Meys is entitled to $23,000 as an equalization payment. Meys’s Net Family Property Statement shows that she’s entitled to $10,651.25. At trial, Mahmoud advised that he’d transposed several of the figures in the form, leading to an erroneous calculation.

1. Assets and Deductions

[134] To begin, it doesn’t matter whether the value of the matrimonial home is $650,000 (as Mahmoud asserts) or $365,000 (as Meys asserts) as it doesn’t affect the equalization of their NFPs. I’ve used the lower amount.

[135] The parties’ positions on various assets and deductions, and my rulings on each are as follows.

Asset or Deduction	Ruling
Mahmoud’s position is that the 2011 Dodge Caravan, which now belongs to Meys, had a value of $8000 on the valuation date. Meys’s position is that the van’s value was $10,000.	The higher value of this asset is adverse to Meys’s position. As a result, I treat Meys’s position as a concession, and I find that the van’s value was $10,000.
Mahmoud’s position is that the 2016 Chrysler 200, which now belongs to Mahmoud, had a value of $17,000 on the valuation date. Meys’s position is the car’s value was $26,000.	Mahmoud has led no evidence about the value of the car. As he’s seeking the benefit of the deduction, he has the burden of proof. I find that the value of the car was $26,000.
Mahmoud’s position is that he owned “TV and other electronics” with a value of $2000 on the valuation date. Meys doesn’t have any information about this asset.	Given that Meys effectively concedes Mahmoud’s valuation, I find the value of the TV and other electronics was $2000.
Mahmoud’s position is that Meys had “household goods and furniture” with a value of $7000 on the valuation date. Meys’s position is that the furniture is worn and used and, as a result, she guesses that it’s worth $1000.	Meys has led no reliable evidence about the value of the furniture. As she’s seeking the benefit of the deduction, she has the burden of proof. I find that the value of the furniture was $7000.
Meys discloses that she had $697.49 in a chequing account on the valuation date. Mahmoud’s NFP Statements, dated April 13, 2022, and January 8, 2024, omit “Part 4(c): Bank Accounts and Savings, Securities and Pensions”. His financial statement, dated February 22, 2022, state that he has nothing in savings. Meys’s position is that Mahmoud failed to produce Scotiabank, CIBC, TD, and RBC bank account statements. Justice Woollcombe’s endorsement ordered Mahmoud to produce any missing documents. Mahmoud didn’t introduce these statements at trial to respond to Meys’s allegation.	As a result of Mahmoud’s failure to disclose and produce his bank accounts and savings assets, I draw an adverse inference that Mahmoud’s financial disclosure would conflict with his position, or at least wouldn’t support it. Given that the parties were of modest means but Mahmoud earned employment income since separation, I find that Mahmoud’s bank accounts and savings had a value of $2500 on the valuation date.
Mahmoud asserts that the value of his pension on the valuation date is $5000. He’s produced a document from IAM Multi-Employer Pension Plan, which states that the commuted value of his pension plan as of December 14, 2023, is $17,971.52.	There’s some evidence that Mahmoud refused to cooperate in getting a statement of the imputed value of the pension. Absent any other evidence, I find that Mahmoud had, as an asset on the valuation date, a pension plan with a commuted value of $17,971.52.
Mahmoud seeks a deduction for credit card debt and bank loans totaling $46,000. Meys’s position is that: (a) she doesn’t have any information about Mahmoud’s credit card debts; and (b) Mahmoud borrowed funds from the bank without her knowledge or for his sole benefit.	Mahmoud has led no evidence about these debts or their value. As he’s seeking the benefit of the deduction, he has the burden of proof. I find that the value of the debts was nil.
Meys introduced evidence of several debts, including amounts owed to Legal Aid Ontario and for student loans.	Meys’s evidence is that she retained a lawyer in 2019. On Meys’s own evidence, this debt was incurred after the valuation date. Meys introduced into evidence a screenprint showing that, as of October 3, 2023, she owes $9331.01 for student loans. Meys didn’t lead any evidence of the value of this debt on the valuation date, or if it was even incurred before separation (she trained to be a PSW in 2021). As she’s seeking the benefit of the deduction, she has the burden of proof. I find that the value of the debts was nil.
Meys seeks a deduction for property tax arrears as of the valuation date.	Meys didn’t lead any evidence of property tax arrears as of the valuation date. As she’s seeking the benefit of the deduction, she has the burden of proof. I find that the value of this debt is nil.
Mahmoud includes, as date of marriage assets, a 1995 Chevrolet Cavalier, valued at $2000, and a bank account, valued at $3000.	Mahmoud didn’t lead any evidence of the value of these assets on the marriage date. As he’s seeking the benefit of the deduction, he has the burden of proof. I find that the value of the assets was nil.

2. Mahr

[136] Meys requests an order that Mahmoud pay her $10,000 under their Islamic Marriage Certificate.

[137] The general treatment of the Mahr is that the wife owns an asset on the valuation date and on the marriage date, and the husband has a debt on the valuation date and on the marriage date. The Mahr is treated as a lien on the husband that can be called on by the wife if there is a breakdown of the marriage. See El Khatib v Noun, 2023 ONSC 1667, at paras 128-130.

[138] The Islamic Marriage Certificate here is a domestic contract under the FLA, s 55(1), because it was made in writing, signed by the parties, and witnessed. Mahmoud doesn’t seek to set aside the Mahr under section 56(4) of the FLA. He doesn’t argue, for example, that the amount is unreasonable or unconscionable.

[139] Meys’s evidence is that Mahmoud agreed to pay her $10,000 if they divorced. For his part, Mahmoud doesn’t deny this obligation but says that: (a) it’s unfair to “pick and choose” between parts of their faith; and (b) he gave Meys a van in exchange for him being able to see the children. Neither of these is grounds to disregard the Mahr. He doesn’t identify other faith-based obligations that he says form part of the contract and that Meys didn’t abide by. His argument about the car may be about fairness but it doesn’t rise to the level of unconscionability.

[140] As a result, I endorse an order that the Mahr of $10,000 shall be treated as an account receivable to Meys on the date of marriage and the separation date, and a debt to Mahmoud on the date of marriage and the separation date. Because Mahmoud had no assets on the marriage date, it means his marriage date deduction is nil. I also order and adjudge that Mahmoud shall pay $10,000 under the Mahr.

3. Conclusion

[141] Because of my findings, Meys’s NFP is the lesser of the two net family properties:

	Meys	Mahmoud
Total 1: Assets on V-Date	$210,197.49	$230,971.52
Total 2: Debts/Liabilities	$89,612.22	$99,612.22
Total 3: Property/Liability on Marriage Date	$10,000	$0
Total 4: Excluded Property	$0	$0
Total 5: (Total 2+3+4)	$99,612.22	$99,612.22
Total 6: NFP	$110,585.27	$131,359.30

[142] As a result, Meys is entitled to one-half the difference between them. I order and adjudge Mahmoud to pay $10,387.02 to Meys as an equalization payment.

D. Matrimonial Home

[143] Meys requests an order that the matrimonial home be vested in her because of Mahmoud’s failure to honour his interim child support obligations.

[144] In any application to determine a spouse’s entitlement to an equalization payment or for an order for child support, the court may order that, if appropriate to satisfy an obligation imposed by the order, property be vested in a spouse. See FLA, s 9(1), s 34(1)(c).

[145] Vesting orders are discretionary and have their origins in the court’s equitable jurisdiction. The court should be satisfied that there is some reasonable relationship between the value of the asset to be transferred and the amount of the targeted spouse’s liability. See Lynch v Segal (2006), 82 OR (3d) 641 (CA), at paras 27-29, 33.

[146] The onus is on the party seeking such an order. The court’s discretion will only be exercised where it is established, based on the targeted spouse’s previous actions and anticipated future behaviour, that the equalization payment order granted won’t be complied with in the absence of additional, more intrusive provisions. These remedies should not be imposed indiscriminately or routinely, and only if there is a real need and there are sound reasons on the record for doing so. See Thibodeau v Thibodeau, 2011 ONCA 110, at paras 40-42.

[147] Though I find that Mahmoud has arbitrarily decided not to obey this court’s orders regarding his financial obligations, I decline Meys’s request for a vesting order. First, Justice Doi’s order for temporary support was based on the parties’ annual incomes at the time—though Mahmoud shouldn’t have resorted to self-help by simply refusing to pay the order, the evidence at trial is that he doesn’t have the means to pay the child support as ordered. He should’ve moved for a variation order. Second, Mahmoud has been asking Meys to consent to sell the matrimonial home since at least January 2020. I’m satisfied that any equalization payment will be complied with from the sale proceeds.

[148] The parties agree that if I decline to make a vesting order, the matrimonial home should be partitioned and sold. Meys would like to buy the home—she says she’s pre-approved for a mortgage based on the assessed value. Mahmoud agrees to sell the house, but doesn’t accept Meys’s assessment and doesn’t want her to buy the house.

[149] I’m not prepared to bar Meys from making an offer on the house. As the parties can’t agree on the appraised value (or even an appraiser), I order a process for the sale of the home. To be clear, Meys may buy the home at the appraised value. If she refuses to do so or if she can’t obtain a mortgage, then the parties shall retain a real estate agent to sell the home.

[150] To that end, I endorse the following order regarding the sale:

(a) Mahmoud shall provide the names of three appraisers accredited by the Appraisal Institute of Canada to Meys within 10 days of this order. Meys shall, within 10 days of being provided the list, select one of the appraisers.

(b) Mahmoud shall obtain an appraisal from the selected appraiser at his cost. Mahmoud shall be allowed to attend with the appraiser, but he shall not bring anyone else with him. Meys may have any third-party present. Mahmoud won’t communicate with Meys during the appraisal. The appraisal will be either on the weekend or any weekday after 5:30pm.

(c) Meys may apply for a mortgage on the basis that Mahmoud shall be removed from the current mortgage and using the appraised value from this appraiser.

(d) If Meys is approved for a mortgage, the matrimonial home shall be transferred into her name within 60 days of the appraisal. The parties shall equally share the cost of the transfer.

(e) If Meys isn’t approved for a mortgage within 30 days of being provided the appraisal, she shall provide the names of three licensed real estate agents to Mahmoud within 10 days (i.e., 40 days from being provided the appraisal). Mahmoud shall, within 10 days of being provided the list, select one of the real estate agents. The parties shall enter into a representation agreement within 10 days of Mahmoud selecting the agent.

(f) The matrimonial home shall be listed for sale by a real estate agent on the following conditions:

(i) the listing price will be as recommended by the real estate agent; and

(ii) the parties shall accept any offer that is at least 95% of the listing price.

[151] I dismiss Meys’s request for an order that Mahmoud reimburse her for half the cost of the appraisal she obtained for trial. This appraisal report wasn’t admissible evidence. Meys could’ve cooperated with Mahmoud in getting an appraisal. That said, if Mahmoud insists on a second appraisal, he has to bear the cost.

E. Post-Separation Adjustments

[152] Meys seeks an order that Mahmoud pay half of the carrying costs of the matrimonial home since separation:

Expense	Total Amount	Mahmoud’s Share (50%)
Mortgage Payments	$32,0323.88	$16,016.44
Maintenance Fees	$43,367.96	$21,683.98
Property Tax (2017-2022)	$13,237.14	$6618.57
Property Tax (2023)	$2006.80	$1003.40

[153] Mahmoud doesn’t dispute these amounts. Mahmoud admits he unilaterally stopped making mortgage payments in 2019. I order and adjudge that Mahmoud shall pay to Meys the amount of $45,322.39 in post-separation carrying costs. Further, Mahmoud shall pay 50 percent of the mortgage payment, maintenance fees, and property taxes from January 18, 2024, until the property is sold, which shall be paid from his share of the sale proceeds.

[154] Meys seeks $14,934.30 for mortgage interest from September 2020. She alleges that Mahmoud refused to renew the mortgage in September 2020, causing the interest rate to increase from 1.75 percent to 7.45 percent. I decline to make this order. First, the increased carrying costs are already reflected in the amount sought by Meys for mortgage payments. Second, to the extent that Meys is asking that Mahmoud pay for more than his equal share of the mortgage payments, I heard no evidence on this issue except that he refused to cooperate. I infer that Mahmoud refused to cooperate to force Meys to sell the home. I heard no evidence from Meys about what steps she took to mitigate her losses, including why she didn’t agree to sell the home.

[155] Meys also seeks compensation from Mahmoud for amounts charged to their home equity line of credit. She argues that he didn’t consult her before borrowing the money in 2011. All of the documents filed by Meys show her as a co-borrower. The documents are addressed to her. Though the application is unsigned, there is a space for both parties’ signature. It doesn’t make sense that RBC would make Meys a co-borrower on Mahmoud’s debt without her approval. I find that Meys was a co-borrower for this loan and, as a result, it’s a joint debt (which appears to have been, at some point, added to the mortgage principal).

[156] Finally, Meys seeks an order that Mahmoud also pay:

• half the cost of the utilities (which she estimates to be $888.04)

• “Mr. Rihawi’s debt which was in collections for $3756.49”

• “borrowed monies” valued at $7027

• half the value of the “home appliances”, valued at $802.64

Other than Meys’s bald assertion about these amounts, she filed no evidence or argument to support payment of these costs. Thus, I decline to order that Mahmoud pay these amounts.

[157] Mahmoud requests an order that Meys reimburse him for devices he bought the children and his Telus account going into collections. Leaving aside whether he can make such a claim, he didn’t prove that Meys caused the loss of the devices. He led no evidence about the Telus account. Mahmoud also requests an order that Meys reimburse him for his legal fees for the two criminal trials. This court has no jurisdiction to award costs for criminal proceedings and, in any event, Meys wasn’t a party to those proceedings. The Crown laid the charge.

F. Child Support

[158] A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to pay for the support of any or all children of the marriage. See Divorce Act, s 15.1(1). A court making an order under section 15(1) shall do so in accordance with the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175. See Divorce Act, s 15.1(3).

[159] There’s no dispute that LR, YAR, SR, and YOR are children of the marriage.

[160] Mahmoud requests an order that the Family Responsibility Office stop enforcing his child support obligations (as of July 2023, the arrears are $5737.10). Under the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996, SO 1996, c 31, I have no jurisdiction to withdraw the temporary support order. Indeed, even if I did, I wouldn’t do so. In January 2022, Mahmoud simply stopped paying child support, forcing FRO to garnish his bank account. Mahmoud says that he can’t afford the child support ordered by Justice Doi. I appreciate that his income decreased in May 2021 and again in May 2023, but he should have moved for a variation order rather than violating a court order. I also find Mahmoud’s self-help less than sincere as he still hasn’t paid even the $586.69 for special and extraordinary expenses ordered by Justice Doi (he says his father paid for some of the Islamic school tuition in lieu—that’s not a justification for disobeying a court order).

1. Ongoing Child Support

[161] Meys requests an order that Mahmoud pay $1690.63 monthly based on Mahmoud’s imputed income of $71,220. Mahmoud requests an order that “child support be based on an offset amount given that parenting time is 40/60” (I note that the interim, and now final, parenting time allocation is 35/65). He also asks the court to impute an income of $55,000 to Meys.

[162] The court may impute such amount of income to a spouse as it considers appropriate in the circumstances, including where the spouse is intentionally under-employed, other than where the under-employment is required by the needs of a child of the marriage, or any child under the age of majority, or by the reasonable educational or health needs of the spouse. See Federal Child Support Guidelines, s 19(1).

[163] There is no need to find a specific intent to evade child support obligations before income can be imputed. The parent required to pay is intentionally under-employed if that parent chooses to earn less than they are able to earn. That parent is intentionally unemployed when they choose not to work when capable of earning an income. The word “intentionally” makes it clear that the section doesn’t apply to situations in which, through no fault or act of their own, spouses are laid off, terminated or given reduced hours of work. See Drygala v Pauli (2002), 61 OR (3d) 711 (CA), at paras 25, 28.

[164] Section 19 of the Guidelines doesn’t allow the court to arbitrarily select an amount as imputed income. There must be a rational basis underlying the selection of any such figure. The amount selected is an exercise of the court’s discretion and must be grounded in the evidence. When imputing income based on intentional under-employment, a court must consider what is reasonable in the circumstances. The factors to be considered are age, education, experience, skills, and health of the parent, standard of living during the parties’ marriage, the availability of job opportunities, the number of hours that could be worked in light of the parent’s overall obligations including educational demands, and the hourly rate that the parent could be expected to obtain. See Drygala, at paras 44-45; Duncan v Donaldson, 2023 ONSC 5114, at para 33.

[165] I find that both Meys and Mahmoud are intentionally under-employed or unemployed. Meys is trained and has work experience as an ECE. She is also trained as a PSW. Though I appreciate that she hasn’t worked outside the home in over 15 years, her circumstances have changed. She’s now a single mother. She has a duty to seek employment so she can become self-sufficient. Indeed, she seems to have recognized that by retraining as a PSW. But her decision not to work as an ECE (because she finds it challenging to work with other children after parenting her own) or a PSW (because of the physical demands) is an intentional choice. Though Meys has some education and experience, I acknowledge that it’s stale. Meys has some parenting obligations but her children are now school-age, and the older three children are old enough to be self-sufficient immediately before and after school. As a result, I impute $33,540 as income, based on Ontario’s minimum wage and hours of work laws. Though Mahmoud asks the court to impute $55,000 as income to Meys, his evidence is based on a friend’s salary as a PSW. This evidence is unreliable.

[166] Mahmoud is disabled. Though he didn’t lead any medical evidence at trial, I infer from the fact that he was approved for long-term disability benefits that he was unable to perform the essential duties of his job at Air Canada. That said, I find his failure to reapply for LTD benefits after they were terminated to be questionable. As of May 2023, the insurer has declared him ineligible for benefits. He should have appealed the denial or returned to work. He didn’t provide a cogent explanation at trial about why he hasn’t done so. Though I appreciate that he has a disability, he failed to show that this disability is permanent or prevents him from performing any occupation. As a result, I impute $38,108.20 as income, based on Mahmoud’s average earnings in the three years before his diagnosis ($63,513.67) and the replacement income rate (60%).

[167] I endorse an order requiring Mahmoud to pay for the support of all children of the marriage in the amount of $935 monthly, effective June 1, 2024. Though LR and YAR are refusing to see Mahmoud, that isn’t a basis for the court to reduce child support or for Mahmoud to refuse to pay support. Child support is the right of the child, as long as they are a child of the marriage.

[168] Mahmoud requests an order that he can receive the Canada child benefit. I don’t have jurisdiction to make such an order. The parties should seek advice from a tax professional on whether they are eligible to receive the benefit or claim a tax credit.

2. Special and Extraordinary Expenses

[169] In a child support order the court may, on either spouse’s request, provide for an amount to cover all or any portion of the following expenses. The expenses may be estimated, taking into account the necessity of the expense in relation to the child’s best interests and the reasonableness of the expense in relation to the means of the spouses and those of the child and the family’s spending pattern before the separation:

(a) childcare expenses incurred because of the employment, illness, disability, or education or training for employment of the spouse who has the majority of parenting time;

(b) that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to the child;

(c) health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100 annually, including orthodontic treatment, professional counselling provided by a psychologist, social worker, psychiatrist, or any other person, physiotherapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, and prescription drugs, hearing aids, glasses, and contact lenses;

(d) extraordinary expenses for primary or secondary school education or for any other educational programs that meet the child’s particular needs;

(e) expenses for post-secondary education; and

(f) extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities.

See Guidelines, s 7(1).

[170] Meys requests an order that Mahmoud pay $4886.05 for retroactive section 7 expenses and 100 percent of all future section 7 expenses.

[171] The guiding principle in determining the amount of an expense is that the expense is shared by the spouses in proportion to their respective incomes after deducting from the expense, the contribution, if any, from the child. See Guidelines, s 7(2). Based on their respective incomes, I order that Mahmoud shall pay 53 percent of the section 7 expenses, and Meys shall pay 47 percent.

[172] For the retroactive section 7 expenses, Meys has interpreted the Guidelines far too broadly. She claims for the following expenses:

Expense	Amount
Health-related expenses	$91
Transit	$4.90
School breakfast and lunches	$474.50
School supplies	$133
Field trips	$234.57
School fundraiser	$12
Arabic and Islamic school registration	$3670

[173] I endorse an order that Mahmoud shall pay $2843.29, of which $2256.60 is 60 percent of the health-related expenses and the Arabic and Islamic school registration and $586.69 that he was ordered to pay by Justice Doi. I’ve used 60 percent for the retroactive expenses because Mahmoud should’ve abided by Justice Doi’s order—Meys incurred these expenses out-of-pocket and should now be reimbursed in accordance with that order.

[174] The balance of the expenses claimed by Meys aren’t section 7 expenses; they aren’t enumerated in section 7 (i.e., childcare, health insurance premiums, health-related expenses, post-secondary education expenses) or “extraordinary” expenses for primary or secondary school education or extra-curricular activities. These expenses, as best I can tell from the receipts, are the usual and ordinary expenses associated with being a primary or secondary school student, such as pizza lunches, school fundraisers, field trips, and school supplies. I do find the Arabic and Islamic school registration fees to be extraordinary expenses given the nature of the educational program (to further the children’s cultural and linguistic education), their special needs (given their ethnic origin), and the overall cost of the program.

[175] Going forward, Meys should provide Mahmoud with receipts for any enumerated or extraordinary expenses, and Mahmoud should pay his share of those expenses. Though Meys shouldn’t assume that Mahmoud will also contribute to the children’s day-to-day school expenses, Mahmoud should consider whether he wants his children to miss out on enrichment experiences because he won’t contribute his fair share.

3. Retroactive Child Support

[176] A court of competent jurisdiction may make an order varying, rescinding, or suspending, retroactively or prospectively, a support order or any provision of one. See Divorce Act, s 17(1).

[177] “Retroactive” awards are not truly retroactive. They don’t hold parents to a “legal standard that did not exist at the relevant time.” But they’re “retroactive” in that they are not being made on a go-forward basis: the payor is being ordered to pay what, in hindsight, should have been paid before. See DBS v SRG, 2006 SCC 37, at para 2.

[178] If each spouse exercises not less than 40% of parenting time with a child over the course of a year, the amount of the child support order must be determined by taking into account:

(a) the amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the spouses;

(b) the increased costs of shared parenting time arrangements; and

(c) the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought.

See Federal Child Support Guidelines, s 9.

[179] The Supreme Court of Canada has encouraged courts to “demand information” from the parties about increased costs (such as financial statements and detailed budgets regarding child-care expenses). See Contino v Leonelli-Contino, 2005 SCC 63, at para 57. In this case, I didn’t adjourn the trial to get this information. First, the parties are self-represented, and it’s unclear to me that they have the knowledge or experience to marshal the “robust” evidence suggested by the Supreme Court. Second, the evidence would have to be historical given that the parties ended shared parenting time in June 2021. It seems challenging for them to recreate their household budgets from six or seven years ago. Finally, the amounts at issue were small, meaning that the exercise would have been a disproportionate use of resources. See MacDonald v Brodoff, 2020 ABCA 246, at paras 16-17. As a result, for the period when the parties had shared parenting time, I’ve used a “simple set-off” of the table amounts.

[180] Meys claims that Mahmoud owes $84,837.65 in retroactive child support. She bases her calculations on her income being negligible.

[181] I’ve calculated the retroactive child support owing as follows:

Year	Meys’s Income	Meys’s CSG Table Amount	Mahmoud’s Income	Mahmoud’s CSG Table Amount	Child Support
2017	$2042	nil	$55,285	$1286	$10,908
2018	$2042	nil	$66,467	$1570	$18,840
2019	$27,300	$688	$62,373	$1466	$9336
2020	$27,788	$702	$56,948	$1466	$9168
2021	$27,983	$707	$71,200	$1691	$5629.02 nil $10,618.55
2022	$30,225	nil	$58,355	$1364	$16,368
2023	$33,540	nil	$38,108	$935	$11,220
2024	$33,540	nil	$38,108	$935	$4675
TOTAL					$96,762.57

[182] My calculations are based on the following findings:

• for 2017 and 2018, I don’t find that Meys was intentionally unemployed because YOR was only born in April 2016

• Mahmoud didn’t adduce his 2017 tax return—Meys says his income was $55,285, and he doesn’t dispute that

• Meys didn’t adduce her 2017 tax return—I impute an annual income of $2042, which is what she earned in 2018, based on her being unemployed in both 2017 and 2018

• the retroactive child support for 2017 is from April 17, 2017, to December 31, 2017

• from 2019, I find that Meys was intentionally unemployed—I’ve imputed her income based on Ontario’s minimum wage, assuming she worked full-time

• following Justice Bielby’s order in June 2021, the parties went from shared parenting time to split parenting time

• the “go-forward” child support order is effective June 1, 2024—as such there is a retroactive child support order for January 1, 2024, to May 31, 2024

[183] Meys says that Mahmoud has paid $15,989.73. He doesn’t suggest he’s paid more. As a result, I order and adjudge that Mahmoud shall pay $80,772.84 for retroactive child support.

D. Spousal Support

[184] A court of competent jurisdiction may, on application by either or both spouses, make an order requiring a spouse to secure or pay such lump sum or periodic sums as the court thinks reasonable for the support of the other spouse. See Divorce Act, s 15.2(1). The court may make an order under section 15.2(1) for a definite or indefinite period or until a specified event occurs, and may impose terms, conditions, or restrictions in connection with the order as it thinks fit and just. See Divorce Act, s 15.2(3).

[185] In making an order under section 15.2(1), the court shall take into consideration the condition, means, needs, and other circumstances of each spouse, including: (a) how long the spouses cohabited; (b) the functions performed by each spouse during cohabitation; and (c) any order, agreement, or arrangement relating to support of either spouse. See Divorce Act, s 15.2(4).

[186] There are three dimensions to spousal support: (a) entitlement; (b) amount; and (c) quantum.

1. Entitlement

[187] There are three bases for spousal support: (a) contractual; (b) compensatory; and (c) non-compensatory. See Bracklow v Bracklow, [1999] 1 SCR 420, at para 37. Though Meys doesn’t use these words, her claim is for compensatory and non-compensatory support.

[188] Compensatory support aims to provide equitable sharing of the economic consequences of marriage. The goals of a compensatory award are to provide some compensation for economic loss or disadvantage experienced by the recipient spouse because of the roles adopted during the marriage or following separation, or for the economic benefits which the payor spouse derived from the claimant’s sacrifices and contributions, for which the claimant has not been adequately compensated. See Moge v Moge, [1992] 3 SCR 813, at pp 861-862; Bracklow, at para 18. A compensatory award recognizes that such sacrifices, contributions, and benefits experienced or conferred often lead to interdependency between the spouses and merger of their economic lives. See Cassidy v McNeil, 2010 ONCA 218, at paras 69, 71. Compensatory support can compensate a spouse for diminished earning capacity or loss of future prospects. It can also be used to allow the spouse to share in economic advantages enjoyed by the other spouse that their sacrifices made possible. See Thompson v Thompson, 2013 ONSC 5500, at paras 55-58.

[189] Compensatory support responds to two objectives under the Divorce Act: (a) recognizing the economic advantages or disadvantages arising from the marriage or its breakdown (s 15.2(6)(a)); and (b) apportioning financial consequences arising from the care of any child of the marriage beyond any obligation for support of any child of the marriage (s 15.2(6)(b)).

[190] Non-compensatory support is often called the “means and needs” approach: it aims to narrow the gap between the means and needs of the spouses. The need of the recipient spouse may arise because of health-related challenges, the roles they adopted during the relationship, or because a status quo developed over time with the party being out of the workforce. See McBennett v Danis, 2021 ONSC 3610, at para 356; Shen v Tong, 2013 BCCA 519, at para 76. Non-compensatory support is based on the concept of marriage as an interdependent union. As a result, the burden for meeting the needs of a disadvantaged spouse should fall on the former partner, rather than the state. See Bracklow, at para 23.

[191] Non-compensatory support also responds to objectives under the Divorce Act: (a) to relieve any economic hardship of the spouses arising from the breakdown of the marriage (s 15.2(6)(c); and (b) as far as practicable, promote the economic self-sufficiency of each spouse within a reasonable period (s 15.2(6)(d)).

[192] I find that Meys has both a compensatory and non-compensatory spousal support claim.

[193] Meys led little evidence about the parties’ standard of living before separation other than to say she needs support. That said, she didn’t dispute Mahmoud’s evidence on this issue.

[194] During the marriage, Mahmoud worked outside the home, doing several different jobs. He worked at a bank, a pizza restaurant, and security at a Sudbury mine. Eventually, he got regular employment with Air Canada in 2015. The parties lived modestly, renting apartments and, eventually, buying the matrimonial home. Meys worked as an ECE, but quit when she was pregnant with LR because of health complications. She never returned to working outside the home. Meys made sacrifices in her career, which led to an interdependency between her and Mahmoud. She was home with the children full-time, and she’s had primary care of the children since June 2022. Her contributions allowed Mahmoud to find gainful and steady employment with Air Canada.

[195] That said, I don’t find that Meys’s needs are as high as she suggests. As I discussed above, she’s intentionally unemployed. The children are in school full-time. She has familial support (and LR and YAR can and do provide childcare for SR and YOR). Though Mahmoud’s pre-disability income is significantly higher than Meys’s imputed income, his job prospects are limited by his disability. There’s no evidence of a drop in standard of living for Meys or that she’s experienced economic hardship after separation.

2. Quantum

[196] The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines provide guidance for the appropriate range of support. The quantum and duration ranges generated by the SSAG simply provide a general framework for the exercise of the court’s discretion. It’s therefore open to the court to go above and below the ranges in appropriate circumstances. See Kinsella v Mills, 2020 ONSC 4785, at para 107, for a discussion of the applicable principles.

[197] The SSAG range here is $0. Using the parties’ respective imputed income and benefits and credits, Meys has a higher net disposable income even though the children live with her.

[198] As a result, I decline to order any spousal support. Given that, I need not decide duration.

F. Restraining Order

[199] On application, the court may make a final restraining order against a spouse of the applicant if the applicant has reasonable grounds to fear for their own safety. See FLA, s 46(1), (2). The applicant’s fear may be subjective so long as it’s legitimate. It’s unnecessary for a spouse to have actually committed an act, gesture, or words of harassment to justify a restraining order. It’s enough if an applicant has a legitimate fear of such acts being committed. There should be some persistence to the conduct complained of and a reasonable expectation that it will continue without court involvement. See Yenovkian v Gulian, 2019 ONSC 7279, at para 45; Gill v Gill, 2023 ONSC 5882, at para 179.

[200] Meys requests a restraining order because Mahmoud is allegedly stalking her. In May 2015, she ran away from the matrimonial home after Mahmoud allegedly abused her. She stayed at a motel. Mahmoud tracked her down, even though she didn’t tell him where she was going. She believes that he’s installed tracking devices in her car and her phone.

[201] In November 2018, Meys alleges that she found her mailbox broken and the police found security footage showing Mahmoud going into the mailbox area using the building’s backdoor. Mahmoud cross-examined Meys on the police statement: “Police spoke with building security at 155 Hillcrest Avenue, who advised there is no video surveillance of the mail room.” Meys couldn’t explain the discrepancy between her evidence of what the police told her and the police records that suggest otherwise, though perhaps the police statement is incorrect.

[202] Meys alleges that Mahmoud followed her in March 2022. She and YAR were driving on Dundas St E when she saw Mahmoud’s car allegedly swerving in and out of traffic behind them. She drove to a near-by Starbucks. She alleges that Mahmoud changed lanes so he was in front of them in the drive-through lineup. Mahmoud says that he saw Meys’s car but was trying to avoid her because she would accuse him of spying. He says that when he saw her and YAR in the Starbucks lineup behind him, he ordered and paid for YAR’s drink.

[203] Meys also alleges that Mahmoud tries to intimidate or scare her and the children. In September 2023, Mahmoud went to the matrimonial home wearing his army uniform. Even though he doesn’t live at the matrimonial home, he accessed the building’s elevator and repeatedly “banged” on the apartment door, allegedly scaring the children. For his part, Mahmoud doesn’t deny the core of this incident—he says he was performing a “wellness check” because the children didn’t answer his calls and Meys has a history of mental illness. He says he only wears his uniform while on duty, though it’s unclear how he was on duty at the time of this incident. He tendered a video that he says shows him knocking, not “banging”, on the door. The video is incomplete and, as a result, unreliable.

[204] There are other incidents where Mahmoud has been wearing his uniform, such as at the hospital after YAR was hit by a car or at the school when discussing a bullying incident with LR’s principal. Meys says Mahmoud does so to intimidate others. Though Mahmoud insists he can only wear his uniform when on duty, he doesn’t explain why he needed to wear a uniform to LR’s school (I acknowledge that the hospital visit was urgent so it’s possible he came from work).

[205] In August 2023, Meys received a call in the middle of the night from someone claiming to be a police officer demanding that she come to the police station immediately or risk arrest. She says that when she arrived at the police station, there was no record of the officer or the call, and they believed she had been pranked. She believes Mahmoud was behind the call. He denies that.

[206] Most alarmingly, Mahmoud admits accessing Meys’s private travel information on Air Canada’s booking system. Remarkably, Mahmoud led this evidence himself, to try to show that Meys is an unfit mother. In December 2021, he emailed Meys to organize parenting time exchanges on December 24th and December 31st. She told him to drop the children off at her dad’s house, and pick them up on December 31st because she was unavailable on “new years eve/day”. That week, he texted with LR—those messages led him to believe that Meys was away. He was upset because LR said Meys told the children that he was on vacation. To confirm his suspicions, he accessed Meys’s travel information on SmartSuite, a web-based app for Air Canada employees. He discovered that Meys was in Hawaii until January 2nd. The app shows information about Meys’s flights, her seat number, how many checked bags she has, and when her boarding pass was scanned at check-in and at the gate. I find this an alarming breach of Meys’s privacy. Mahmoud was able, in real-time, to track Meys’s whereabout from Honolulu to Toronto, and through the various airports in between.

[207] Meys’s beliefs about tracking or scanning devices or apps is unproven. Though she’s reported these incidents to the police, no one has ever found any such evidence. That said, Mahmoud’s casual willingness to access Meys’s private travel information, using restricted employee access, because he was curious about her whereabouts is scary.

[208] As a result, I find that Meys has reasonable grounds to fear for her safety. I endorse an order restraining Mahmoud from: (a) coming within 100m of Meys’s residence or workplace; and (b) directing or indirectly contacting or communicating with Meys except for exercising parenting time or decision-making responsibility using a parenting app, email, or text.

G. Occupation Rent

[209] Mahmoud claims for occupation rent of $148,381.20 from 2019 to 2023.

[210] Where there is no order for exclusive possession, occupation rent is a common law remedy for balancing competing equities. A claim for occupation rent is discretionary when the trial judge considers it to be reasonable and equitable to do so. See Jasiobedzki v Jasiobedzka, 2023 ONCA 482, at para 15, aff’g 2022 ONSC 1854. Though an order for occupation rent must be reasonable, it need not be exceptional. See Chhom v Green, 2023 ONCA 692, at para 8. The award usually represents half the rent that could’ve been earned had neither spouse lived in the house. See Khan v Khan, 2015 ONSC 6780, at para 11; Doyle v De Sousa, 2023 ONSC 3163, at para 40.

[211] The following factors, if relevant, are considered when an occupation rent claim is made:

• the timing of the claim for occupation rent

• the duration of the occupancy

• the inability of the non-resident spouse to realize on their equity in the property

• any reasonable credits to be set off against occupation rent

• any other competing claims in the litigation.

See Khan, at para 12.

[212] Mahmoud didn’t lead any admissible evidence about the rent. So, even if I were inclined to order occupation rent, Mahmoud has failed to meet his burden of proving his loss. See Surridge v Ross, 2024 ONCA 314, at para 14.

[213] Even then, I wouldn’t exercise my discretion to award occupation rent. Mahmoud didn’t make a claim for occupation rent in his answer. There’s no evidence that Mahmoud moved for an order for either exclusive possession of the matrimonial home or to partition and sell the home. Most importantly, Mahmoud has not been paying support during the occupancy and he has made no financial contribution to the mortgage or property expenses. See Surridge, at para 14.

[214] Mahmoud asked this court to adjourn the trial so he could serve an expert’s report on the rental rate. Given my finding that it’s not reasonable or equitable to award him occupation rent, I decline to adjourn the trial for him to adduce damages evidence. As a result, Mahmoud’s claim for occupation rent is dismissed.

IV. CONCLUSION

[215] Meys and Mahmoud’s divorce has been violent and high-conflict. They have, unfortunately, involved their four children in this conflict. In doing so, they’ve violated their duty, as parents, to act in their children’s best interest. I hope that this judgment will mark the end of their marriage and the beginning of a new relationship between them, as co-parents. To do so, they must acknowledge their limitations, and work hard to overcome them. If they don’t do so, the put their children at risk.

[216] This judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 7 percent per year starting as of the date of this order.

[217] I endorse an order that the clerk shall prepare the order for signature because no party has a lawyer.

[218] Though the parties are self-represented, Meys seeks her costs of the case. The parties will engage in meaningful discussions and negotiations respecting the costs of this trial. If they can’t resolve costs, any party seeking costs will serve, file, and upload to CaseLines costs submissions (2500 words maximum), any relevant offers to settle, and their bill of costs by June 14, 2024, 4pm. The other party’s responding submissions (2500 words maximum) will be served, filed, and uploaded to CaseLines by June 28, 2024, 4pm.

_________________________________ Agarwal J.

Released: May 27, 2024

SCHEDULE A

Divorce

1. The applicant Meys Albaz and the respondent Mahmoud Shaker Rihawi, who were married on September 2, 2005, shall be divorced and the divorce shall take effect 31 days after the date of this order.

Parenting – Decision-Making Responsibility

2. The children’s primary residence shall be with Albaz.

3. Albaz shall have sole decision-making responsibility for all the children’s health, education, culture, language, religion, and spirituality, and significant extra-curricular activities, after consulting with Rihawi and the children.

4. When the children are in Rihawi’s care, he can make day-to-day decisions about the children (e.g., doing homework, meals, visiting with their friends, use of computer, etc.). Rihawi will follow the plans made by Albaz about the children’s health, education, culture, language, religion, and spirituality, and significant extra-curricular activities.

5. In a health emergency, the parent with care of the children at that time will make the treatment decision, on the advice of medical personnel. If a parent makes an emergency health decision, the parent who has made the decision must immediately contact the other parent.

6. In the event of the death of one parent, the other parent will care for the children, but the surviving parent will ensure that our children have continued relations with the relatives of the deceased parent.

Parenting – Parenting Time

7. The children shall have parenting time with Rihawi every second weekend from Friday 4pm until Monday 9am.

8. If there is a school long weekend when Rihawi has the children, the children shall have parenting time with Rihawi from Thursday 4pm (if Friday is a school holiday) and until Tuesday 9am (if Monday is a school holiday);

9. The children shall have parenting time with Rihawi every second week from Wednesday 4pm until Friday 9am.

10. The children shall have parenting time with Rihawi for one week in July and in August (from Friday 12noon to Friday 12noon)—Mahmoud may unilaterally select the weeks every year on or before June 30th. The summer parenting time may be attached to his regular weekends. The regular schedule shall be suspended during the summer schedule.

11. The parties will alternate the Muslim Eid holiday dates every year. For the 2024, the children will have parenting time Rihawi for the first Eid (which coincides with the end of Ramadan) from 10 am until 7:30 pm (if they are not otherwise in Rihawi’s care) and with Albaz for the second Eid (Haj) from 10 am until 7:30 pm (if they are not otherwise in the Albaz’s care). For 2025, they will have parenting time with Albaz for the first Eid and with Rihawi for the second Eid.

12. If not otherwise in Albaz’s care, regardless of the regular schedule, the children will have parenting time with Albaz on Mother’s Day from Saturday at 7pm to Sunday at 7pm. If not otherwise in Rihawi’s care, regardless of the regular schedule, the children will have parenting time with Rihawi on Father’s Day from Saturday at 7pm to Sunday at 7pm.

13. When a parent’s time with the children begins after school, that parent must pick up the children at school. When the parent’s time ends on a school morning, that parent must drop off the children at school on time, and ensuring that the children has what they need for the day at school.

14. In all other cases, the parenting exchanges shall take place at Square One Community Station, 100 City Centre Drive, Mississauga. The parties shall exchange the children without arguing and by acknowledging each other in a polite way.

15. Neither party shall schedule extra-curricular activities during the other party’s parenting time, unless the other parent agrees. The other parent will not unreasonably withhold their agreement.

16. During parenting time, each parent may telephone call the children between 6pm and 630pm when they are with the other parent for 15 minutes. Calls will normally be no more than 15 minutes and private. If the calling parent’s telephone call is not received or returned, they may contact the resident parent by AppClose to reschedule the telephone call as soon as reasonably possible. If the calling parent is concerned about the children’s safety or security, they shall not do a wellness check themselves. Instead, they may contact the police to do a wellness check.

17. Changes to the allocation of parenting time can be made only in writing on consent of both parties.

18. If a parent encounters an unexpected situation such as illness or a death in the family, or an irregular event like a family wedding, the other parent will try to accommodate a request for a change in the schedule. If the change in the schedule results in the children missing considerable time with the accommodating parent, reasonable “make-up time” will be arranged by the parents.

19. If childcare is required for more than twenty-four hours, the parent with whom the children are residing will notify the other parent and give them a chance to spend the period for which childcare is required with the children. If the other parent cannot accommodate the request, the resident parent has to arrange and pay for alternate childcare and will inform the other party of who will be caring for the children.

20. Albaz can apply for passports for the children without Rihawi’s consent.

21. If either party plans a vacation with the children, that parent will give the other parent at least 30 days’ notice before the planned trip, providing the flight information, the trip itinerary, as well as contact information for the children during the trip.

22. The parties will discuss new intimate relationships with the other parent before there is significant involvement of a new partner in the lives of the children (e.g., a vacation with a new partner, cohabitation, remarriage, a pregnancy is announced as a result of a new relationship).

23. All communications between the parents will be child-focused, cordial, brief, clear, and to the point. The parties shall remain courteous and polite in communications with each other at all times. Communications should have no profanity, insults, threats, and inflammatory or threatening comments.

24. The parties shall not involve the children in any conflict between them.

25. The parties shall exchange any new contact information (address, telephone numbers, email address) within 24 hours of any change so they can communicate effectively and exchange information about the children.

26. Neither parent will post any pictures on social media of the other parent or the children nor make any derogatory comments about the other parent on social media.

Equalization and Other Monetary Judgments

27. Rihawi shall pay $10,000 to Albaz under the Mahr, which shall be paid to her from the net sale proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.

28. Rihawi shall pay $10,387.02 to Albaz as an equalization payment, which shall be paid to her from the net sale proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.

29. Rihawi shall, within 30 days, pay $45,322.39 to Albaz for post-separation adjustments, which shall be paid to her from the net sale proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.

30. Rihawi shall pay 50 percent of the mortgage payment, maintenance fees, and property taxes from January 18, 2024, until the property is sold, which shall be paid to Albaz from the net sale proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.

Matrimonial Home

31. The matrimonial home shall be sold for the purpose of realizing the interest in it.

32. Rihawi shall provide the names of three appraisers accredited by the Appraisal Institute of Canada to Albaz within 30 days of this order. Albaz shall, within 10 days of being provided the list, select one of the appraisers.

33. Rihawi shall obtain an appraisal from the selected appraiser at his cost. Rihawi shall be allowed to attend with the appraiser, but he shall not bring anyone with him. Albaz may have any third-party present. Rihawi will not communicate with Meys during the appraisal. The appraisal will be either on the weekend or any weekday after 5:30pm.

34. Albaz may apply for a mortgage on the basis that Mahmoud shall be removed from the current mortgage and using the appraised value.

35. If Albaz is approved for a mortgage, the matrimonial home shall be transferred into her name within 60 days of the appraisal. The parties shall equally share the cost of the transfer.

36. If Albaz is not approved for a mortgage within 30 days of being provided the appraisal, she shall provide the names of three licensed real estate agents to Rihawi within 10 days (i.e., 40 days from being provided the appraisal). Rihawi shall, within 10 days of being provided the list, select one of the real estate agents. The parties shall enter into a representation agreement within 10 days of Rihawi selecting the agent.

37. The matrimonial home shall be listed for sale by a real estate agent on the following conditions:

a. the listing price will be as recommended by the real estate agent; and

b. the parties shall accept any offer that is at least 95% of the listing price.

Income Determination

38. Rihawi’s imputed income is $38,108.20 annually, unless Rihawi’s taxable income in any given year exceeds such imputation, in which situation his income shall be his taxable income as determined by his Income Tax Return.

39. Albaz’s imputed income is $33,540 annually, unless Albaz’s taxable income in any given year exceeds such imputation, in which situation her income shall be her taxable income as determined by her Income Tax Return.

Child Support

40. Starting on June 1, 2024, and on the first day of each month after that, Rihawi shall pay Table child support to Albaz in the amount of $935 per month for the support of the child, [CHILDREN’S NAMES AND DATES OF BIRTH], under the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

41. The children’s special and extraordinary expenses shall be shared by the parties in proportion to their incomes, with Rihawi paying 53 percent and Albaz paying 47 percent.

42. The party who has incurred the cost of a special or extraordinary expense shall deliver proof to the other party within 30 days of the expense being incurred, and within 30 days of receiving the proof, the other party shall pay their proportionate share of the expense. In determining the parties’ respective contributions to the expense, the parties shall deduct any income tax benefit or subsidy received by the other party for the expense.

43. The parties shall only contribute to the children’s special or extraordinary expenses if the parties consented to the expense in advance, in writing, except for a medical emergency. Neither party shall unreasonably withhold consent.

44. If there is an increase in either party’s total income shown on line 15000 of their 2023 tax return that would result in a different child support order, they shall pay the amount payable (i.e., the difference between the amount paid and the amount owed for 2023) in a lump sum on or before December 31, 2024.

45. Rihawi shall pay $80,772.84 to Albaz for retroactive child support, which shall be paid to her from the net sale proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.

46. Rihawi shall pay $2843.29 to Albaz for retroactive section 7 expenses, which shall be paid to her from the net sale proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home.

47. Unless this order is withdrawn from the Director’s office at the Family Responsibility Office, it shall be enforced by the Director and amounts owing under the order shall be paid to the Director, who shall pay them to the person to whom they are owed.

48. For as long as child support is to be paid, the support payors must provide updated income disclosure to the other party each year, within 30 days of the anniversary of this order, under section 25.1 of the Child Support Guidelines. Child support shall be adjusted annually upon the exchange of disclosure.

Restraining Order

49. Rihawi is restrained from: (a) coming within 100m of Albaz’s residence or workplace; and (b) directing or indirectly contacting or communicating with Albaz except for exercising parenting time or decision-making responsibility using a parenting app, email, or text.

Interest

50. The order bears post-judgment interest at the rate of 7 percent per year effective from the date of this order. Where there is a default in payment, the payment in default shall bear interest only from the date of default.

COURT FILE NO.: FS-19-94635

DATE: 20240527

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Meys Albaz

Applicant

• and -

Mahmoud Rihawi

Respondent

REASONS FOR DECISION

Agarwal J.

Released: May 27, 2024

[1] The children are all minors. They’re not parties to the proceeding. I see no reason to violate their privacy by identifying them in these reasons.

[2]

Monday	Tuesday	Wednesday	Thursday	Friday	Saturday	Sunday
Meys	Meys	Meys	Meys	Mahmoud	Mahmoud	Mahmoud
Meys	Meys	Mahmoud	Mahmoud	Meys	Meys	Meys
Meys	Meys	Meys	Meys	Mahmoud	Mahmoud	Mahmoud
Meys	Meys	Mahmoud	Mahmoud	Meys	Meys	Meys