Cheryl Lafrenière

The applicant father sought unsupervised parenting time and shared decision-making responsibility for the parties' young child.

The respondent mother sought sole decision-making, supervised parenting time for the father, and a final restraining order due to a history of family violence, alcohol abuse, and coercive control.

The court found the father engaged in a relentless campaign of harassment and threatening behaviour against the mother, her counsel, and various service providers.

The court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility, ordered the father's parenting time to remain supervised indefinitely, granted a final restraining order against the father, and ordered him to pay ongoing and retroactive child support.

The applicant and respondent separated after a six-year marriage.

The matrimonial home was registered in the applicant's name alone.

The respondent remained in the home post-separation and claimed the parties had a verbal agreement that he would keep the house and pay the applicant $10,000 for her equity.

The applicant sought a sale of the property and equal division of the proceeds.

The court found no enforceable verbal agreement existed, as there was no part performance to take it outside the Statute of Frauds.

However, the court found the property was a joint family venture and granted the respondent a 50% interest by way of constructive trust, ordering the net sale proceeds to be divided equally.

In a Hague Convention application, the court held that the younger child’s habitual residence remained Naples, Florida notwithstanding an extended visit to Ontario during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Applying the hybrid habitual residence approach, the court found the child had been wrongfully retained in Ontario after the end of the school year and that the evidence did not establish maternal consent or acquiescence to a change of residence.

The court rejected reliance on the child objection exception under Article 13(2), concluding the child had not attained sufficient age and maturity for his views to govern the return analysis.

The application was allowed and the child was ordered returned immediately to Florida, with costs presumptively to the successful mother.

The respondent, Zafar Ahmad, brought a motion to set aside a default order issued on January 17, 2020, in a family law application initiated by Maria Zia.

The court applied the established test for setting aside default judgments, which requires considering promptness in bringing the motion, a plausible excuse for the default, an arguable defence on the merits, good faith, potential prejudice to both parties, and the overall integrity of the administration of justice.

The court found that Zafar Ahmad only satisfied the promptness criterion, failing to provide an adequate explanation for his non-response to the application or to demonstrate an arguable defence with sufficient financial disclosure.

Consequently, the motion to set aside the default order was dismissed, and Maria Zia was deemed presumptively entitled to costs.

The applicant mother sought an urgent order for the immediate return of her two children, who had been unilaterally retained by the respondent father after an access visit.

The court found the matter urgent, applying the factors from *Thomas v. Wohleber*.

The court strongly condemned the father's self-help actions, noting his failure to seek judicial intervention despite serious allegations and his attempt to gain an advantage during the COVID-19 court suspension.

The court ordered the immediate return of the children to the mother's care and granted a police enforcement order, emphasizing that unilateral changes to a long-standing status quo are not in the children's best interests.

The applicant mother sought an urgent order to enforce existing access arrangements and obtain make-up time, including a police enforcement clause, due to the respondent father's unilateral withholding of access.

The father brought a cross-motion to restrict the mother's access to video conferencing until counselling was completed, citing concerns about the mother's partner and the child's safety, despite a Children's Aid Society (CAS) investigation not verifying his allegations.

The court found the mother's motion urgent, criticized the father's unilateral actions and his undermining of the child's relationship with the mother, and dismissed the father's cross-motion.

Following the dismissal of an application for judicial review regarding the refusal to renew a trapline licence, the respondent Minister sought costs.

The applicant did not make any costs submissions.

The Divisional Court awarded the Minister costs of $8,000 on a partial indemnity basis, noting the commercial nature of the dispute and the reasonableness of the quantum sought.

The Public Guardian and Trustee, acting for an incapable beneficiary, applied to require the estate trustee to pass accounts.

The estate trustee relied on a release signed by the beneficiary before she was declared incapable.

The application judge ordered the passing of accounts, finding 'red flags' regarding the beneficiary's capacity.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found the application judge erred in applying s. 2(4) of the Substitute Decisions Act by failing to consider what the estate trustee actually knew about the beneficiary's capacity at the time the release was signed.

The appeal was allowed and the order to pass accounts was set aside.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to refuse to renew his commercial trapping licence for a specific trapline and to allocate it to an Indigenous trapper.

The applicant had initially been allocated the trapline, but the Ministry later determined it had erred in rejecting the Indigenous trapper's claim of ancestral connection to the area.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's discretionary decision was reasonable, intelligible, and transparent.

The court also held that the applicant was afforded adequate procedural fairness, as he was kept informed and had no substantive property right to the trapline.

The appellant sought to appeal an order refusing a stay of summary judgment.

The Divisional Court held that under s. 71(3) of the Construction Lien Act, no appeal lies from an interlocutory order.

Citing Court of Appeal precedent, the court confirmed that an order refusing a stay of summary judgment is procedural and therefore interlocutory.

Consequently, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter, and the appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant general contractor appealed a trial judgment awarding $142,553.33 to the respondent subcontractor in a construction lien action.

The appellant argued the respondent abandoned the project when faced with a payment dispute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the respondent had fully performed its obligations and did not abandon the contract, but rather stopped work due to the appellant's material breach in refusing to pay.

The landlords appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board awarding the tenants rent abatement for a rodent infestation.

The landlords argued the Board erred in its definitions of landlord and tenant, and in finding they failed to meet their maintenance obligations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law in the Board's definitions and holding that the Board's conclusions regarding the infestation and maintenance obligations were unappealable findings of fact or mixed fact and law.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order for Crown wardship without access for two children.

The mother opposed the motion but failed to file responding materials and sought an adjournment, which was denied.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, noting the mother's long-standing, unaddressed substance abuse and mental health issues, and her failure to engage with services.

Relying on expert assessments indicating the children required stability and specialized care, the court granted the motion, making the children Crown wards without access for the purpose of adoption.

Annette Walters sought full recovery costs against Derek Walters following a settlement of their family law matter.

The court found Derek's conduct, including unproven allegations of fraud, relentless pursuit of irrelevant disclosure, and withdrawal of an unequal division claim shortly before trial, constituted bad faith.

Annette's offers were close to the final settlement, while Derek's offers did not trigger costs consequences.

The court awarded Annette full recovery costs, finding Derek's actions unnecessarily prolonged and complicated the litigation.

Following a motion to change child support, the court determined costs under Family Rule 24 and s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The applicant father was substantially successful in obtaining an order reducing child support to nil and fixing arrears payable by instalments.

Although the respondent mother argued she lacked the ability to pay costs, the court found that she ignored the litigation process and failed to engage with settlement opportunities.

The court held that the successful party is presumptively entitled to costs and that the amount sought represented only a small portion of the applicant’s actual legal expenses.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the applicant, with child support arrears permitted to be set off against that amount.

A father applied for custody of a young child and raised numerous allegations of neglect, abuse, and health concerns regarding the mother’s care.

The court considered extensive evidence, including Office of the Children’s Lawyer reports, a psychiatric assessment suggesting features of schizotypal personality disorder, and repeated unsubstantiated reports made by the father to authorities.

The court found the mother to be the credible and stable primary caregiver and determined the father demonstrated little insight into child development and a persistent inability to support the child’s relationship with the mother.

Given the father’s behaviour and risk of undermining the child’s security and relationship with the mother, the court ordered sole custody to the mother and restricted the father’s access.

Access was limited to supervised visits at a supervised access centre.

The applicant father brought a motion to change a final order to reduce child support based on a material change in circumstances arising from serious health issues and loss of employment resulting in disability income.

The respondent mother filed responding materials but did not attend the hearing.

The court accepted evidence that the father’s income had declined from approximately $60,000 at the time of the original order to $9,600 annually in long-term disability benefits.

The court declined to average the father’s income under s. 17 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines and instead relied on actual line 150 income under s. 16.

Child support was reduced to zero effective January 1, 2014, and arrears for prior years were fixed at $995.98 payable in monthly instalments.

The father brought a motion to change a final family law order seeking to reduce child support to reflect his current income, terminate spousal support, and compel the immediate sale of the matrimonial home.

The court considered whether a material change in circumstances had occurred since the original order, which had imputed income to the father and granted the mother exclusive possession of the home for a fixed period.

The court found that the father had not demonstrated reasonable efforts to obtain higher‑paying employment in his field and had failed to establish any material change in circumstances.

The court also found no basis to vary the order granting exclusive possession of the matrimonial home under the Family Law Act.

The motion to change was dismissed.

The respondent mother commenced a custody application after relocating with the parties’ child from Hungary to Ontario.

The father brought an application under the Hague Convention alleging the child was wrongfully retained in Canada and seeking an order for the child’s return to Hungary.

The court examined whether the child’s habitual residence remained Hungary or had changed following the parties’ joint relocation to Canada.

After reviewing the parties’ shared intentions, preparatory steps taken before leaving Hungary, and the family’s arrival at a refugee shelter to initiate residency processes, the court found the parents had a settled intention to abandon their Hungarian residence and establish a new life in Ontario.

Alternatively, even if the transition period initially left the child without a habitual residence, the evidence did not establish wrongful retention under the Hague Convention.

The application was dismissed and Ontario was held to be the proper forum for custody and access proceedings.

The mother appealed two orders: a temporary order denying her request for an adjournment, and a final order granting summary judgment to the Children's Aid Society on a status review application.

The summary judgment order continued the placement of the children with their father subject to Society supervision and denied the mother access.

The mother argued she was denied procedural fairness and that there were genuine issues for trial regarding her compliance with previous court orders requiring mental health treatment.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeals, finding the motion judge made no errors of law or fact, the mother failed to provide evidence of compliance with the previous orders, and there was no genuine issue for trial.