Court File and Parties

Court File No.: FC-24-00000464-0001 Date: 2025-12-10 Superior Court of Justice, Family Court - Ontario

Re: Children's Aid Society of the Niagara Region, Applicant And: J.B. and A.B., Respondents

Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Robert B. Reid

Counsel: Maggie Scull, Counsel, for the Applicant No counsel for the Respondents Deborah Stewart, Counsel, for the Children

Heard: October 22, 2025

Restriction on Publication

This is a case under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 and is subject to subsections 87(8) and 87(9) of this legislation. These subsections and subsection 142(3) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 , which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87 (8) Prohibition re identifying child — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child's parent or foster parent or a member of the child's family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence. under this Part.

142 (3) Offences re publication — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)( c ) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence. and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

Decision on Motion

Introduction:

[1] The applicant, Children's Aid Society of the Niagara Region ("the Society"), moves to terminate the supervision order of January 7, 2025, regarding the subject children L.M-B., and S.M., who were aged 14 and 17 respectively when the motion was made. S.M. has now turned 18 years of age.

[2] The respondents J.B. and A.B. are parents of the children. They did not have legal representation and have not filed materials in response to the Society's motion. The respondents are also the parents of I.M-B., who will turn eight years of age later this month, but who is not involved in this motion.

[3] On behalf of the two subject children, counsel from the Office. of the Children's Lawyer ("OCL") opposed the termination motion and submitted by cross-motion that the existing order should continue until dealt with by summary judgment or trial, or alternatively that a custodial order be made under s. 102 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act 2017 , S.O. 2017, c. 14 Sched. 1 (the " CYFSA ") placing the children in the custody of C.E., with access to their parents in accordance with the children's wishes.

[4] For the reasons that follow, the Society's motion is granted and the OCL's cross-motion is dismissed.

Background:

[5] The Society has been involved with the family for 13 investigations and one period of ongoing service. Themes of involvement have included lack of caregiving skills and neglect of the children's basic needs.

[6] The parents are separated.

[7] The Society became involved most recently in March 2024. The children had been residing with J.B. Concerns were raised about J.B.'s housing insecurity and living environment, as he reportedly had been evicted and was staying in a motel room with many snakes. The children had not been attending school regularly. J.B. was not cooperative with Society representatives.

[8] Initially, J.B. arranged for a family friend, C.E., to care for the children L.M-B. and S.M. for one night; however, the children reportedly refused to return to J.B.'s care given his home environment and have remained with C.E. since March 2024 to date.

[9] The Society found C.E. to be acceptable as a kin placement, and obtained a temporary supervision order placing the subject children with her on July 22, 2024. On January 7, 2025, on consent, a final order was granted placing L.M-B. and S.M. in the care and custody of C.E. for six months, subject to supervision. That is the order which is the subject of this status review.

[10] As to the child I.M-B., J.B. had arranged for I.M-B. to be cared for by A.B. She returned the child to J.B. when she was reportedly evicted from her home. I.M-B. has been diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder. A supervision order was made on July 22, 2024, placing I.M-B. with J.B. On consent of both parents and OCL counsel, the Society's application regarding I.M-B. was terminated on March 18, 2025, and I.M-B. continues to live with J.B.

Position of the parties:

The Society:

[11] The Society has investigated and observed that the children are doing well in the care of C.E., and that they enjoy seeing their parents for access, including overnight access with J.B.

[12] J.B. has advised the Society that he wishes that the children be returned to his care. Attendances at J.B.'s home have revealed that previous accommodation concerns for the children have been resolved and that there is now no inappropriate storage of reptiles.

[13] In effect, C.E. and J.B. have been time-sharing with the children, and both appear to prioritize the children's needs. Both have suitable accommodations. The children have not been removed by J.B. from C.E. without her permission and have been returned by him following access visits.

[14] The Society submits that the children are no longer in need of protection, based on resolution of the concerns that existed when the supervision orders were made. If the supervision order is terminated, the children will likely make their own choices about where to reside, and J.B. is a safe person to have custody if that option is exercised. In any event, the Society takes no position on which of the two custodial options are chosen by or for the children. If there is a dispute, there can be an application made under the Children's Law Reform Act , R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 (the " CLRA ").

The Parents:

[15] Although nothing was filed by the parents, both made verbal representations in court.

[16] J.B. noted that S.M. has been spending more and more time at his house. He supports the position of the Society that the existing order be terminated and would prefer to have the children return to his care.

[17] A.B. agrees with the Society's position, but also supports the children's apparent preference that they continue to reside with C.E.

The OCL:

[18] On behalf of the subject children, the OCL submits that their clear and consistent preference is to continue to reside with C.E. Their views are different from those of I.M-B. which led the OCL to consent to the termination of that supervision order.

[19] The OCL states that the subject children are anxious about potentially changing to the residence of J.B., and that even if some of the original protection concerns have been resolved, that anxiety would justify a protection finding which could only be fully articulated as a response to a summary judgment motion or at trial. Counsel submits that there could be a focussed trial or that, if the matter is dealt with by summary judgment, there should be an opportunity for cross-examination of J.B. on the protection issues.

[20] In the alternative, counsel submits that a s. 102 CYFSA order placing the children in the custody of C.E. is appropriate. C.E. would consent to such an order.

Applicable legislative provisions and principles:

[21] Section 113 of the CYFSA gives jurisdiction for this status review application. Section 114 permits the court to terminate the original order when doing so is in the children's best interests. The court's ability to terminate on that basis is consistent with the paramount purpose of the CYFSA found in s. 1 , namely, to promote the best interests, protection, and well-being of children. It is also consistent with the principle of restraint contained in s. 1(2) that the Society should not continue to interpose itself into family units unless it is necessary to do so in keeping with that paramount purpose.

[22] On a status review application, the court must make an inquiry about whether the children continue to be in need of protection. Do they require a court order to ensure that protection, and if so, what order is in their best interests? In making that inquiry, the court should consider whether the circumstances which led to the initial protection finding continue to exist, and whether new circumstances justify a protection finding.

[23] The definition of best interests applicable to this case is found in clauses 74(3) (a) and (c) of the CYFSA which include the children's views and preferences, given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity, and other circumstances including their physical, mental and emotional needs and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs, as well as their relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, or other member of their extended family or community.

Procedure:

[24] Clearly the Society must bring a motion so that the court can consider whether the Society can terminate its involvement with the children. If granted, the order would be a final disposition of the proceeding.

[25] Although the OCL submits that the Society must bring a motion for summary judgment to terminate its involvement, there is no legislative requirement that it do so.

[26] Subrule 16(2) of the Family Law Rules , O. Reg. 114/99, (the " Rules ") provides that a summary judgment motion can be made in any case, including a child protection matter. However, a request for court permission to terminate involvement does not fit easily into the concept of summary judgment. To the contrary, rule 16 contemplates the summary judgment procedure as just that: a "summary" alternative to trial to resolve the dispute between the parties.

Analysis:

[27] It appears that the children prefer to continue to reside with C.E. That is the position that they have taken in speaking to the OCL clinical assist. It is understandable that they may be less definitive on the subject in discussions with the Society and J.B., as appears from the Society's affidavit evidence. However, this motion is not about the children's views on where they should live, but rather about whether they continue to be in need of protection requiring ongoing Society involvement.

[28] Both children are of an age where they will likely live where and with whom they choose.

[29] Procedurally, I conclude that the Society is not required to bring its motion by use of the summary judgment procedure. It was the moving party in the original application, and it is entitled to seek the court's approval for simple termination of the protection proceeding on satisfactory evidence that the children are no longer in need of protection.

[30] There is no reason to dispute the Society's evaluation that its original protection concerns as to the children's residence with J.B. have been resolved. The affidavit evidence is clear on the point. The fact that J.B. is acting in a parental role for his eight-year-old child I.M-B. who has special needs and that the Society's involvement with that child was terminated over eight months ago supports the Society's view that its protection concerns about J.B. have been resolved. As demonstrated by the Society's review, both C.E. and J.B. offer acceptable living arrangements and have demonstrated their capability as caregivers.

[31] Counsel from the OCL submits that the children could be in need of protection on new grounds, despite the Society's view that the original concerns no longer exist. The theory is that the anxiety expressed by the children and especially by L.M-B. about possibly having to return to their father's care can of itself be a protection concern as a risk of harm.

[32] I acknowledge that the risk of psychological harm, as for example, arising from fear of being taken from a long-term de facto parent, could constitute a protection concern in certain circumstances. In this case, however, the children have been living with C.E. for less than two years. It is likely that any anxiety felt by the children at this point about a potential forced residence change will soon dissipate once this status review application is terminated. Their personal views are significant, and they undoubtedly can be reassured that those views carry significant weight.

[33] As noted, S.M. has become 18 years of age and as such has "aged out" of the CYFSA provisions. She is able to live where and with whom she wishes. L.M-B., who is currently over 14 1/2 years of age, is old enough that her wishes will likely be determinative, and there is nothing in the evidence to suggest that J.B. will try to force a relocation. In the absence of agreement on the part of L.M-B. to relocate to J.B.'s residence, it would be very unwise of him to try to force the issue. The Society has reviewed the existing situation of L.M-B. with C.E. and found that C.E. continues to be an appropriate caregiver, and that L.M-B. has been socially and academically thriving while living with her.

[34] As to the OCL's alternative proposal that a custody order be made under s. 102 of the CYFSA , I agree with the position of the Society that absent protection concerns, it should not be involved in the determination of custody of children. It would be more equitable for the Society representatives to testify, if at all, at the behest of one or the other party in CLRA litigation. Making a s. 102 CYSFA custody order in a case where J.B. has not filed responding material and C.E. is a non-party would inhibit their respective rights to make proper representations to the court on the subject. As a result, there will be no order under s. 102.

Conclusion:

[35] For the foregoing reasons, the motion requesting an order terminating the supervision order of Valente J. dated January 7, 2025 is granted. The cross-motion by the OCL is dismissed.

Reid. J.

Date: December 10, 2025