Emmanuel Ray Gibson

The Appellant, a retired judge, appealed a reassessment denying charitable donation tax credits for a claimed $100,000 gift to the Banyan Tree Foundation in 2004.

The Appellant participated in a leveraged donation arrangement, pledging $100,000, paying $11,000 in cash, and borrowing $89,000.

At trial, he conceded the $100,000 claim and sought credits only for the $11,000 cash component.

The Tax Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the Appellant lacked donative intent.

The Court concluded that the Appellant participated in the program for the significant financial benefits he expected to receive, including a self-funding loan and an addition to his investment portfolio, vitiating any donative intent.

The Appellant appealed reassessments for the 2011 and 2012 taxation years based on a net worth assessment that added unreported business income and imposed gross negligence penalties.

The Appellant argued that the Minister failed to account for cash payments made to sub-contractors.

The Tax Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that the Minister's total rejection of sub-contractor expenses was a patent error given the business required sub-contractors.

The Court allowed additional business expenses of $44,681.12 for 2011 and $65,775.25 for 2012.

The Court also deleted the gross negligence penalties, finding the Appellant's failure to report arose from abject ignorance and inexperience rather than wilful blindness.

The Respondent mother brought a motion for temporary sole custody, no access to the Applicant father, and a restraining order, following the Applicant's arrest for first-degree murder.

The Applicant did not file a responding affidavit.

The court granted the Respondent temporary sole custody, no access to the Applicant, permission to obtain a passport for the child and travel internationally without the Applicant's consent, and an interim restraining order against the Applicant for the safety of the Respondent and children.

The court declined to extend the restraining order to the maternal grandparents due to jurisdictional and standing issues and limited the radius to 100 meters.

Leave was granted for the Respondent to amend her Answer.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion to add the respondent father to a parenting capacity assessment that the mother and children were previously ordered to undergo as a condition of a supervision order.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction under section 54(1) of the Child and Family Services Act because there was no active proceeding before the court, as the trial order was final and no status review application had been commenced.

The father's request for costs was also dismissed.

Applying the established principles for awarding costs against a society, the court found the society's conduct was not exceptional or patently unfair.

This endorsement clarifies and replaces the terms of a supervision order and access conditions previously issued in a child protection matter.

The court ordered the Children's Aid Society to devise a gradual reintegration schedule for the children M and C to return to the mother's full-time care by August 14, 2017.

It also set out detailed conditions for the mother's twelve-month supervision order, including no contact with the father or other specified individuals, cooperation with the Society, drug testing, and participation in recommended programs.

For the father, limited supervised access of one hour every two weeks was granted, subject to specific conditions including cooperation with the Society and no unsupervised contact with the children.

The applicant sought Crown wardship of two young children based on allegations of severe physical, emotional, and sexual abuse by the parents against older siblings.

The court found the children in need of protection due to a real risk of physical and emotional harm, primarily stemming from the father's historical violence and the mother's failure to protect the older siblings.

However, applying the least disruptive alternative principle, the court rejected Crown wardship.

Instead, the court ordered that the children be placed in the mother's care under a 12-month supervision order with strict conditions, including that she have no contact with the father, who was granted only limited supervised access.

A respondent in a child protection trial brought a motion for the judge to recuse himself and declare a mistrial, alleging reasonable apprehension of bias.

The allegation stemmed from the judge contemplating, and seeking submissions on, whether to summon additional witnesses under s. 49 of the Child and Family Services Act (CFSA) to address conflicting evidence, a possibility the judge later decided against.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that a reasonable, informed person would not conclude that the judge would not decide the case fairly.

The decision emphasized the high threshold for proving bias, the presumption of judicial impartiality, and the unique procedural flexibilities afforded to courts in child protection proceedings under the CFSA and Family Law Rules.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa sought a final order of Crown wardship for adoption for the child B. The respondent mother and father opposed, proposing the child be returned to the mother under a supervision order.

The court found the father had a history of domestic violence, lacked insight, and showed minimal commitment to addressing issues or exercising access.

The mother consistently prioritized her relationship with the father over the child's safety, lied to the Society, and failed to implement recommended therapies or parenting courses.

Considering the child's best interests and the parents' lack of commitment to rehabilitation, the court granted Crown wardship for adoption to the paternal uncle and his partner, with structured access for both parents.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the child was in need of protection and an order for Crown wardship.

The child had been apprehended due to domestic violence between the parents and the mother's failure to protect the child from the father.

The court granted summary judgment finding the child in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act, noting the parents' history of conflict and the mother's lack of insight.

However, the court dismissed the motion for summary judgment regarding Crown wardship, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the appropriate disposition, as the mother had made efforts to rehabilitate herself and raised concerns about the parenting capacity assessment.