Emily Gallagher

The applicant children's aid society sought an order for extended society care for two First Nations children with special needs.

The children were removed from their father's care following disclosures of inappropriate touching, though the court could not conclude on a balance of probabilities that the father was the perpetrator.

The court found the children in need of protection due to a failure to provide treatment, emotional harm, and risk of emotional harm stemming from the parents' residential instability, the mother's unaddressed alcohol addiction, and exposure to domestic violence.

The court ordered the children placed in extended society care, finding that neither parent nor the maternal grandmother could provide a safe and stable environment.

Specified access was granted to both parents and the children's First Nations band.

In a child protection proceeding, the Society sought to introduce 45 out-of-court statements made by two children to various individuals, including social workers, a foster mother, a teacher, and therapists.

A voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of these hearsay statements.

The court found that it was reasonably necessary to admit the statements without requiring the children to testify, given their age, special needs, and history of trauma.

Applying the principled approach and traditional exceptions to the hearsay rule, the court assessed the threshold reliability of each statement.

Ultimately, the court admitted some statements for the truth of their contents, some for the children's state of mind, some for narrative, and excluded others where the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value or threshold reliability was not met.

The applicant children's aid society applied for a status review, initially supporting the child's adoption by his foster mother, but later amending its application to support adoption by the child's paternal aunts.

The foster mother, who had cared for the child for 28 months and helped him overcome severe attachment and anxiety issues, was added as a party and sought to adopt him.

The court found that removing the child from the foster mother's care would cause significant emotional harm and that remaining with her was in his best interests.

Finding a legislative gap in the Child and Family Services Act that prevented a custody order in favour of a foster parent on a status review, the court exercised its parens patriae jurisdiction to declare the child a Crown ward with the express purpose of being adopted by the foster mother.