WARNING

This is a case under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 and subject to subsections 87(8) and 87(9) of this legislation. These subsections and subsections 142(3) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, which deals with the consequences of failure to comply, read as follows:

87(8) Prohibition re identifying child — No person shall publish or make public information that has the effect of identifying a child who is a witness at or a participant in a hearing or the subject of a proceeding, or the child’s parent or foster parent or a member of the child’s family.

(9) Prohibition re identifying person charged — The court may make an order prohibiting the publication of information that has the effect of identifying a person charged with an offence under this Part.

142(3) Offences re publication — A person who contravenes subsection 87(8) or 134(11) (publication of identifying information) or an order prohibiting publication made under clause 87(7)(c) or subsection 87(9), and a director, officer or employee of a corporation who authorizes, permits or concurs in such a contravention by the corporation, is guilty of an offence and on conviction is liable to a fine of not more than $10,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than three years, or to both.

CITATION: CAS SDG v. V.P.M. and D.D.B., 2026 ONSC 2047

COURT FILE NO.: 23-301

DATE: 20260407

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE ONTARIO

INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS PROHIBITED FROM PUBLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 87(8) and 87(9) OF THE CHILD, YOUTH AND FAMILY SERVICES ACT, 2017

IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD, YOUTH and FAMILY SERVICES ACT, S.O. 2017

and in the matter of

RE: Children’s Aid Society of the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry, Applicant

AND:

V.P.M. and D.D.B.

BEFORE: Madam Justice Hélène C. Desormeau

COUNSEL: Emily Gallagher, Counsel for the Applicant Jennifer Ho, Counsel for the Respondent mother V.P.M. Cedric Nahum, Counsel for the Respondent father D.D.B.

HEARD: April 7, 2026

REASONS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

Justice Hélène C. Desormeau

Overview

1This matter is set for a summary judgment motion regarding the children, C.A.M., born November 2020, and A.M.C., born May 2024, who are currently in the care and custody of the Children’s Aid Society of the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry.

2Having reviewed the endorsements, I have not conducted a settlement conference in this matter.

3The children’s particulars were confirmed on July 23, 2025.

4The Society’s Notice of Motion sees the following relief:

1. An Order determining that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial in this matter and a final order as per the Society’s Applications as follows:

2. The child, C.A.M. is found to be a child in need of continued protection.

3. The child, A.M.C. is found to be a child in need of protection.

4. C.A.M. and A.M.C. shall be placed in the extended care of the Children’s Aid Society of the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry.

5. Access between M.D. and the children shall occur one (1) weekend per month. M.D. and the children shall be access holders and recipients for the purposes of openness.

6. Access between V.P.M. and the children, A.M.C. and C.A.M. shall occur once per month.

7. Access between D.D.B. and the children, A.M.C. and C.A.M. shall occur once per month.

8. The parents will be required to meet with workers prior to access visits being scheduled and will be required to complete check-ins prior to each visit.

9. The children shall be access holders and D.D.B. and V.P.M., access recipients for the purposes of openness.

5Neither the mother nor the father have filed any affidavit evidence in response to the Society’s motion.

6D.D.B. was not opposing the motion but he was also not consenting to the orders sought.

7V.P.M. would have agreed to interim society care but is not consenting to extended society care.

8The current kin caregiver, M.D., filed an affidavit in support of the Society’s plan.

9I have reviewed the materials filed in support of this motion, including the 7 affidavits filed by the Society and the affidavit of M.D. I have also reviewed the Society’s factum.

10I have not considered any hearsay evidence contained in any of the affidavits filed, including but not limited to paragraphs 13 and 20 of Robin Young’s affidavit; paragraphs 5, 12, 17, 19 and 23a of Lisa Marie Sequin’s affidavit; paragraphs 18(c) and the first two sentences of paragraph 29 of Tracy Laundrie’s affidavit. From Andrea Gariepy’s affidavit I have not considered paragraphs 13(e)(i) and 13(i), the last sentence of paragraph 16, the first sentence of paragraphs 22 and 23, paragraph 26, 27, 28, and paragraph 62.

11I have given no weight to the medical records attached at Exhibit B to Ms. Gariepy’s affidavit dated March 26, 2026, nor the Permanency Planning meeting notes found at Exhibit F.

12Having reviewed the evidence properly before me at this Summary Judgment motion, I am of the view that the orders sought by the Society in their Notice of Motion are appropriate and will be granted for the reasons set out below.

Amendment of Application Deficiency

13Procedurally speaking, as noted below, the Society amended their Application on March 4, 2026, fourth amended Protection Application regarding C.A.M., and first amendment regarding A.M.C. Neither amended Applications were “signed” or “dated” as required by Rule 11 of the Family Law Rules. This deficiency was raised by counsel for the father during argument as he argued the amended versions are not valid. This deficiency had not been brought to the Society’s attention prior to today despite having been served on March 4, 2026.

14A review of Rule 11(4) of the Family Law Rules articulates that an amendment shall be clearly shown by underlining all changes, and the rule or order permitting the amendment and the date of the amendment shall be noted in the margin of each amended page.

15The Society’s amended Applications do not comply with the date and signature requirement.

16However, the Society did double underline and cross out in both Applications the changes made. Further, the amended Applications were served on both counsel on March 4, 2026, which was 34 days ago. Neither the mother nor the father filed amended Answers and Plans of Care to the amended Applications. The Applications are consistent in that the Society continues to seek orders for extended society care. The terms as to access are different, and the facts outlining the events are updated from August 2025 to February 2026, as well as an update regarding the kin caregiver no longer being able to present a permanent plan.

17Rule 2 (2) FLR identifies that the primary objective of the Family Law Rules is to enable the court to deal with cases justly. Rule 2(3) FLR identifies that dealing with cases justly includes (a) ensuring that the procedure is fair to all parties; (b) saving expense and time; (c) dealing with the case in ways that are appropriate to its importance and complexity; and (d) giving appropriate court resources to the case while taking account of the need to give resources to other cases. Rule 2(4) states that the court is required to apply these rules to promote the primary objective, and parties and their representatives are required to help the court to promote the primary objective.

18In this instance, for the following reasons, I am of the view that the deficiency is not fatal. The parties were served over 30 days prior to the motion for Summary Judgment. The deficiency was not brought to the Society’s attention prior to making submissions at the motion. It is unclear if the “amended on” date is supposed to be completed by the litigant or by Court Services Division.

19The primary objective requires this court to ensure the procedure is fair to all parties, and deal with cases in ways that are appropriate to their importance and complexity. I am of the view the Society properly articulated what amendments were sought. The parents were already on notice that the Society was seeking extended society care. The parents were advised that the kin caregiver was unable to present a permanent plan. The access changes were articulated in the amended Applications. No action was taken by the parents until the 11^th^ hour.

The Law

20Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules, sets out the framework to be considered in motions for Summary Judgment in family law proceedings, including in child protection proceedings. As contained in the Rules, the moving party must set out in affidavit evidence the specific facts showing there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. In response, the parties responding to the motion may not rest on mere allegations or denials but shall set out, in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue requiring a trial.¹ If there is no genuine issue requiring a trial of a claim or defence, the court shall make the final order accordingly.²

21In determining whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial, the court shall consider the evidence submitted by the parties, and the court may exercise any of the following powers for the purpose, unless it is in the interest of justice for such powers to be exercised only at a trial:

1. Weighing the evidence;

2. Evaluating the credibility of a deponent.

3. Drawing any reasonable inference from the evidence.³

22If the only genuine issue is a question of law, the court shall decide the issue and make a final order accordingly.⁴

23If the court does not make a final order, or makes an order for a trial of an issue, the court may, in addition to exercising a power listed in subrule 1 (7.2), (a) Specify what facts are not in dispute, state the issues and give directions about how and when the case will go to trial (in which case the order governs how the trial proceeds, unless the trial judge orders otherwise); (b) Give directions; and (c) Impose conditions (for example, require a party to pay money into court as security, or limit a party’s pretrial disclosure).⁵

24The leading case on motions for summary judgment is Hryniak v. Mauldin⁶, where there is a recognized culture shift to promote timely and affordable access to the civil justice system. This shift entails simplifying pre-trial procedures and moving the emphasis away from the conventional trial in favour of proportional procedures tailored to the needs of the particular case. The balance between procedure and access struck by our justice system must come to reflect modern reality and recognize that new models of adjudication can be fair and just.⁷ Summary judgment rules must be interpreted broadly, favouring proportionality and fair access to affordable, timely and just adjudication of claims.⁸

25At paras. 49 and 50 of Hryniak, Justice Karakatsanis stated the following:

There will be no genuine issue requiring a trial when the judge is able to reach a fair and just determination on the merits on a motion for summary judgment. This will be the case when the process (1) allows the judge to make the necessary findings of fact, (2) allows the judge to apply the law to the facts, and (3) is a proportionate, more expeditious and less expensive means to achieve a just result. These principles are interconnected and all speak to whether summary judgment will provide a fair and just adjudication. When a summary judgment motion allows the judge to find the necessary facts and resolve the dispute, proceeding to trial would generally not to be proportionate, timely or cost effective. Similarly, a process that does not give a judge confidence in her conclusions can never be the proportionate way to resolve a dispute. It bears reiterating that the standard for fairness is not whether the procedure is as exhaustive as a trial, but whether it gives the judge confidence that she can find the necessary facts and apply the relevant legal principles so as to resolve the dispute.

26Justice Karakatsanis went on to state that on a summary judgment motion, the evidence need not be equivalent to that at trial but must be such that the judge is confident that she can fairly resolve the dispute. A documentary record, particularly when supplemented by the new fact-finding tools, including ordering oral testimony, is often sufficient to resolve material issues fairly and justly.⁹

27The proper approach to Summary Judgment in child protection proceedings was set out in Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W.¹⁰:

Hryniak’s fairness principles for summary judgment must be applied recognizing the distinctive features of a child protection proceeding. In determining whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial the court must exercise caution and apply the objectives of the CYFSA including the best interest of the child.

The burden of proof is on the party moving for summary judgment. Although r. 16(4.1) sets out the obligation of the respondent to the motion to provide “in an affidavit or other evidence, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial” this does not shirt the ultimate burden of proof. Even if the respondent’s evidence does not establish a genuine issue for trial, the court must still be satisfied on the evidence before it that the moving party has established that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court must conduct a careful screening of the evidence to eliminate inadmissible evidence. The court should not give weight to evidence on a summary judgment motion that would be inadmissible at trial.

Judicial assistance must be provided for self-represented litigants. In particular, judges must engage in managing the matter and must provide in accordance with the principles set out in the Statement of Principles on Self represented Litigants and Accused Persons (2006) (online) established by the Canadian Judicial Council.

The special considerations that apply to Indigenous children must be part of every decision involving Indigenous children.

28The case law also establishes that there is an obligation for the responding party to put their “best foot forward” when responding to the motion for summary judgment.¹¹

29Further, the test for granting summary judgment is met when the moving party satisfies the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact that requires a trial for its resolution. Not every disputed fact or question of credibility gives rise to a genuine issue for trial. The fact must be material to the determination of the trial. A disputed fact, the existence or non-existence of which will not affect the outcome of the trial, does not raise a genuine issue requiring a trial.¹²

30“No genuine issue for trial” has been equated with “the outcome is a foregone conclusion” and “there is no realistic possibility of an outcome other than as sought by the applicant.”¹³

31In a child protection proceeding the genuineness of an issue must arise from something more than a heartfelt expression of a parent’s desire to resume care of the child. There must be an arguable notion discernible from the parent’s evidence that he or she faces some better prospects than what existed at the time of the Society’s removal of the child from their care and that they have developed some new ability as a parent.¹⁴

32Although “fairness must not be sacrificed to expediency”, the court must consider the strict timelines in the Act and the underlying philosophy of the legislation to support permanency planning as soon as possible. The focus in all protection proceedings must be on the child rather than on the parents. It is not in the best interests of the child to delay permanent placement decisions while the parties conduct a trial, if the inevitable result is obvious to all.¹⁵

33Where the primary focus is whether the parents have recognized and successfully dealt with the problems of the past, and where the Society has made a prima facie case that they have not, then the parents must produce credible evidence showing that the concerns raised by their past conduct have been sufficiently resolved.¹⁶

34Jurisprudence also establishes that the best interests of a child should not be held in abeyance while waiting for a dysfunctional parent to eventually resolve their issues.¹⁷ Children are entitled to permanency planning, particularly where there is no evidence that the parents’ situation will soon change.¹⁸

35Subsection 105 (4) of the CYFSA states that where the court makes an order that a child be in extended society care, any order for access is terminated.

36Subsection 105 (5) sets out that in considering the issue of access to a child in extended society care, the best interests of the child is the test under subsection 74(3). The court shall make an order for access to the person who had charge prior to removal, unless the court is satisfied that continued contact with the person would not be in the child’s best interests.

37Section 74(3) establishes that where a person is directed to make an order or determination in the best interests of a child, the person shall:

(a) consider the child’s views and wishes, given due weight in accordance with the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(b) in the case of a First Nations, Inuk or Métis child, consider the importance, in recognition of the uniqueness of First Nations, Inuit and Métis cultures, heritages and traditions, of preserving the child’s cultural identity and connection to community, in addition to the considerations under clauses (a) and (c); and

(c) consider any other circumstance of the case that the person considers relevant, including,

(i) the child’s physical, mental and emotional needs, and the appropriate care or treatment to meet those needs,

(ii) the child’s physical, mental and emotional level of development,

(iii) the child’s race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, citizenship, family diversity, disability, creed, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity and gender expression,

(iv) the child’s cultural and linguistic heritage,

(v) the importance for the child’s development of a positive relationship with a parent and a secure place as a member of a family,

(vi) the child’s relationships and emotional ties to a parent, sibling, relative, other member of the child’s extended family or member of the child’s community,

(vii) the importance of continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity,

(viii) the merits of a plan for the child’s care proposed by a society, including a proposal that the child be placed for adoption or adopted, compared with the merits of the child remaining with or returning to a parent,

(ix) the effects on the child of delay in the disposition of the case,

(x) the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent, and

(xi) the degree of risk, if any, that justified the finding that the child is in need of protection. 2017, c. 14, Sched. 1, s. 74 (3).

38Subsection 105 (6) of the Act sets out additional factors to be considered in determining whether an access order would be in the best interests of a child in extended society care. These are:

a. Whether the relationship is beneficial and meaningful to the child, and

b. If the court considers it relevant, whether the ordered access will impair the child’s future opportunities for adoption.

39The case law from the previous child protection legislation was significantly more restrictive than that of the CYFSA. Now, the court may consider any factor, past, present or future when determining if a continued relationship is beneficial and meaningful. This includes considering the prospect of an openness order. Further, a child’s best interests are not static. This is confirmed by the wording of subsection 74 (3) which requires the court to consider: (i) any other circumstance of the case; (ii) the child’s development of a positive relationship; (iii) continuity in the child’s care and the possible effect on the child of disruption of that continuity; (iv) the risk that the child may suffer harm through being removed from, kept away from, returned to or allowed to remain in the care of a parent.¹⁹

Evidence

40The following are my findings based on the evidence before me.

Procedural evidence

41A Protection Application was commenced October 30, 2023, whereby the Society sought an order to have C.A.M. placed with M.D., under a six-month supervision order.

42On November 1, 2023, a temporary and without prejudice order was made placing C.A.M. in the care of M.D., subject to the supervision of the Society.

43On January 31, 2024, a final order was made; C.A.M. was found to be a child in need of protection and was placed in the care of M.D., subject to the supervision of the Society for a period of five (5) months.

44A further six-month supervision order was sought by the Society on June 4, 2024, based on their Status Review Application.

45On September 25, 2024, a final order was made. C.A.M. was found to be in continued need of protection and was placed in the care of V.P.M., subject to the supervision of the Society for a period of six (6) months.

46On February 13, 2025, the Society had a Status Review Application issued, seeking C.A.M.’s placement in the care and custody of V.P.M.

47On May 20, 2025, C.A.M. and A.M.C. were brought to a place of safety on the strength of a warrant. They were placed in the care of M.D. On May 23, 2025, a temporary order was made placing C.A.M. and A.M.C. in the care of M.D., subject to the supervision of the Society.

48On May 26, 2025, the Society had the Status Review Application amended and included A.M.C. The Society requested that C.A.M. and A.M.C. be placed in the care of M.D., subject to a three (3) month supervision order.

49On July 24, 2025, the Society had the Status Review Application amended, seeking the children’s placement in the custody of M.D. On July 31, 2025, a temporary order was made placing C.A.M. and A.M.C. in the care of Society (kin “in care” with M.D.).

50On October 31, 2025, the Status Review Application for C.A.M. was amended and Protection Application for A.M.C. was issued, seeking placement of the children in the extended care of the Society then a subsequent s.116 custody order in favour of M.D. At that time, no findings had been made regarding A.M.C.

51The Society again amended their respective Applications on February 27, 2026, regarding the children due to the kin placement not being able to care for the children past June 2026, seeking an order for extended society care. These amended Applications were served on March 4, 2026. The Society sought findings based on risk of physical harm due to failure to care for, provide for, supervise or protect the children adequately s.74(2)(b)(i); pattern of neglect (74(2)(b)(ii)); and risk of emotional harm pursuant to s. 74(2)(h). C.A.M. has already been found in need of protection.

52The mother, V.P.M., served an amended Answer and Plan of Care on November 28, 2025. She acknowledged that she was not in a position to care for her children and agreed to an order placing the children in the extended care of the Society, for the purpose of the order being converted upon status review, to a s. 116 custody order, placing the children in the custody of M.D.. However, this is no longer a viable plan as M.D. is not in a position to care for the girls. In her prior amended Answer and Plan of Care dated June 20, 2025, she sought the return of the children to her care.

53D.D.B. filed an Answer and Plan of Care on June 20, 2025, indicating he believed it would be in the children’s best interests to be placed with V.P.M. D.D.B. has not filed an amended Answer and Plan of Care.

54M.D. served an Answer and Plan of Care in November 2025 indicating her intention to care for the children. She has since advised that she is no longer in a position to do so but wants to remain involved in their lives as their grandmother.

Findings on Substantive Evidence

55V.P.M. and D.D.B. are the children’s parents. The children currently reside with kin, M.D., under a “kin in care” order. With regret, she is unable to present a permanent plan for the girls.

56Neither the mother nor the father provided any affidavit evidence for this Summary Judgment motion, which has been set since November 26, 2025.

57They have, however, provided their submissions in that the father does not consent to the order sought but it is not opposed; and the mother does not consent to the order sought but would agree to an order for interim society care.

58There is a significant history between the mother and father regarding domestic conflict and intimate partner violence. The father has faced serious criminal charges as a result of the intimate partner violence between the couple.

59Despite there being no-contact orders preventing the father from having contact with the mother, the evidence shows that the parents have had an on-again/ off-again relationship.

60In 2023, there was at first very limited engagement from the parents and discussions of reconciliation. The father was then arrested on October 18, 2023, for domestic violence against the mother.

61Following the final order of January 31, 2024, where the children were placed with M.D. under a five-month supervision order, the mother has demonstrated periods of significant improvement regarding her level of engagement with the Society and with community services. She requested, and completed, Triple P. Her access to C.A.M. increased. She was pregnant with A.M.C., who was born in May 2024. With a strong safety network and 24/7 support, A.M.C. remained in her mother’s care. C.A.M. was also returned to the mother’s care subject to a six-month supervision order on September 25, 2024.

62The father meanwhile was released in April 2024 with no-contact conditions which he quickly breached. He was then hospitalized due to an apparent drug overdose. He was again arrested on September 1, 2024, for mischief and failure to comply, and on October 6, 2024. He was incarcerated until about February 21, 2025, with no contact conditions with the mother.

63During his incarceration the mother continued to make positive gains and took proactive steps in meeting her goals in meeting the children’s needs.

64On or about May 16, 2025, the father was again charged for failing to comply with no-contact conditions toward the mother.

65During the time the father was out of custody, the evidence supports a finding that the mother’s engagement with the Society declined, the condition of her home deteriorated and there was a marked disengagement by the support network. There were concerns raised by the Society about the mother’s contact with the father, and drug use, which were denied by the mother. Nevertheless, the Society received video evidence and information from the police about the contact between the parents. The mother was unable to develop a safety plan and minimized the Society’s concerns, which led to the children being brought to a place of safety on May 20, 2025. The children were again placed with M.D.

66Despite the Society’s efforts, the parents’ level of engagement declined tremendously. In spite of numerous attempts to meet with the mother, the last time the mother saw the worker, Ms. Gariepy, was October 22, 2025.

67Even more troubling, the last time the mother attended an access visit with the children was November 20, 2025. Shortly prior to then, the mother presented as unwell, thin, pale, large sores on her body, and falling asleep at visits, necessitating an early termination of same.

68The father’s last visit with the children was October 29, 2025. Since the Society’s initial involvement in June 2023, the father’s access with the children has remained supervised and occurring at the Society’s visitation centre.

69On March 10, 2026, following the father reaching out to the worker to discuss access, he too appeared unwell – thin, pale and grey in colour. He confirmed that he almost died multiple times due to fentanyl overdoses. While he advised that he was engaged in the methadone program, he explained that he sometimes missed doses and would replace the missed doses with hydromorphone. The meeting was not overly productive relating to access as D.D.B. requested to leave prior to any planning could be done. He has not reached out to workers to plan for any further access visits since.

70The children continue to reside with M.D. at this time, but this is not a permanent plan as she has expressed being unable to care for them on a permanent basis.

71C.A.M. and A.M.C. have resided outside of V.P.M. ’s care since May 2025. Prior to that, C.A.M. resided outside V.P.M. ’s care from June 2023 to September 2024.

72In total, A.M.C. has been outside of her parent’s care for the last 318 days and C.A.M. for 778 days of her life. Both have spent 258 days “in care” since they were brought into “kin and care” placement July 28, 2025.

73Historically speaking, when the parents were engaged and doing well with their mental health and / or addictions, they were fairly consistent with their access. When they were healthy, the visits were positive overall for the children. When they were struggling, this showed in their appearance and level of engagement. Also, when the father was incarcerated, the mother was able to step up and prioritize the children.

74M.D.’s affidavit evidence addresses her difficulties in being able to present a permanent plan for the girls despite being their stable caregiver. She consents to the Society’s Application for extended society care. She was of the view that neither parent made progress nor were able to provide full time care for the children. Due to her concerns, she articulated her belief that the parents’ access time ought to be supervised.

75Despite the Society’s efforts, no other kin caregivers willing to present a permanent plan for the girls have been located.

76The Society supports continued access between the children and their parents, as well as M.D. Both the children and M.D. would be access holders and access recipients. However, they suggest that the parents only be access recipients as opposed to access holders for the purposes of adoption.

Analysis

77Having considered all the evidence, I am of the view that there is no genuine issue requiring a trial. Neither the mother nor the father have seen the children since November 20, 2025, and October 29, 2025, respectively. While the father reached out to the Society in March 2026, there is no evidence of any efforts made by him to re-establish parenting time with the children or engaging with the Society.

78The parents have an obligation to put their best foot forward, but neither have presented affidavit evidence for today’s motion for summary judgment. Their Answers and Plans of Care have nevertheless been reviewed and considered.

79I am of the view that the Society has demonstrated concerted efforts to communicate with, support, and safety plan with the parents.

80C.A.M. has been outside of her mother’s care from June 2023 to September 2024; and since May 2025. A.M.C. has been outside of her mother’s care since May 2025. Since the Society’s involvement in 2023, the children have never been in their father’s care. Both have spent 258 days “in care.”

81The evidence shows that there are periods of time when both the mother and father are committed to the children. This includes when the mother had C.A.M. returned to her care shortly after A.M.C.’s birth in May 2024. It is not lost on this court that the mother demonstrated a greater commitment, level of engagement and resiliency when the father was incarcerated. There is also evidence that when the mother is in this positive state of existence, her access with the children is also positive.

82There are also significant periods of time when neither parent was consistent in access, fully engaged with the Society, accessing services, complying with the safety network, abstaining from drugs.

83I am of the view that on a balance of probabilities, both parents have untreated addictions issues. I am also persuaded that the father suffers from underlying mental health issues.

84I am persuaded that the couple’s relationship is toxic and fraught with domestic conflict and intimate partner violence. Both parents struggle with maintaining regular contact with the Society workers.

85I am of the view that neither parent has demonstrated insight as to their issues.

86While the order sought is the most intrusive order which can be granted, the reality is that there has been no progress made by either parent since November 2025. While the mother has in the past been able to demonstrate a period of sobriety and ability to care for the children, there is no such evidence available today.

87There is no doubt in my mind that they dearly love both their children. The evidence establishes that the children also love their parents. However, this love does not equate to a genuine issue requiring a trial, particularly when it has been over four months since the children have seen either parent.

88Equally, I have no doubt that M.D. loves both children. She is unable to propose a permanent plan for the girls but wishes to continue to be a part of their lives and have them in her care one weekend per month.

89While I agree that the statutory timelines have not yet been exhausted, C.A.M. has been out of her parents’ care for 778 days of her life, and she is under the age of 6. A.M.C. has been out of their care for 258 days. There is no evidence provided by either parent of steps taken to demonstrate that anything will change if an order for interim society care were to be granted. There are no kin caregivers available past June 2026. The children have waited long enough for their parents to resolve their issues, to meaningfully engage with the Society to mitigate the Society’s concerns and to make them the priority.

90I am of the view that the Society has met its onus, and a finding shall be made that A.M.C. is in need of protection pursuant to s. 74(2)(b)(i) and 74(2)(b)(ii) CYFSA, and C.A.M. continues to be in need of protection under the same sections.

91I am of the view that it is in the children’s best interests to grant the order sought, and place the children in the extended care of the Society, with access as requested for M.D., and the parents. I am not persuaded that this order is premature. I find that the Society has made marked efforts to assist the parents and the children prior to intervening. Based on the evidence before me, in my view, this is the only option available

92I find that the access holders and access recipients as sought are equally appropriate.

Disposition

1. There is no genuine issue requiring a trial and a final order can be made accordingly, pursuant to Rule 16(6) of the Family Law Rules.

2. The child, C.A.M., born November 2020, is found to be a child in continued need of protection.

3. The child, A.M.C., born May 2024, is found to be a child in need of protection.

4. The children, C.A.M. and A.M.C. are placed in the extended care of the Children’s Aid Society of the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas & Glengarry.

5. Access between the children and M.D. shall occur one weekend per month.

6. M.D. and the children shall be access holders and recipients for the purposes of openness.

7. Access between the children and V.P.M. shall occur once per month.

8. Access between D.D.B. and the children shall occur once per month.

9. The parents will be required to meet with workers prior to access visits being scheduled and will be required to complete check-ins prior to each visit.

10. The children shall be access holders and D.D.B. and V.P.M., access recipients for the purposes of openness.

Justice Hélène C. Desormeau

Date: April 7, 2026

CITATION: CAS SDG v. V.P.M. and D.D.B., 2026 ONSC 2047

COURT FILE NO.:23-301

DATE: 20260407

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Children’s Aid Society of the United Counties of Stormont, Dundas and Glengarry, Applicant

AND:

V.P.M. and D.D.B., Respondents

REASONS ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION

Justice Hélène C. Desormeau

Footnotes

1. 1Rule 16(4); (4.1) FLR.
2. 2Rule 16(6) FLR.
3. 3Rule 16(6.1) FLR.
4. 4Rule 16(8) FLR.
5. 5Rule 16(9) FLR.
6. 6Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2024 SCC 7.
7. 7Ibid, at para. 2.
8. 8Ibid, at para. 5.
9. 9Ibid, at para. 56.
10. 10Kawartha-Haliburton Children’s Aid Society v. M.W., 2019 ONCA 316, at para. 80.
11. 11Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v S.V., 2015 ONCJ 147, at para 36; Children’s Aid Society of the Regional Municipality of Waterloo v. V.L., 2006 32610 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 3785. at para. [48]; and Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. K.T., 2000 20578 (ON CJ), [2000] O.J. No. 4736 (Ont. C.J.) at para. 10.
12. 12Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v. S.V, supra, at paras. 38 to 40; .Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. K.T., 2000 20578 (ON CJ), [2000] O.J. No. 4736 (Ont. C.J.), at para. 12.
13. 13Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v. S.V, supra, at paras. 38 to 40; Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto v. L.O., 1996 7271 (ON CTGD), [1996] O.J. No. 3018 (Ont. Gen. Div.) per Chapnik J., at para. 80, Children’s Aid Society of Hamilton v. C.R., 2006 79342 (ON SC), [2006] O.J. No. 3442 (Ont. S.C.J.) per Czutrin J., at para. 54, Children’s Aid Society of the County of Simcoe v. C.S., [2001] O.J. No. 4915 (Ont. S.C.J.) per Mackinnon J., at para. 5, and Children’s Aid Society of the Region of Niagara v. S.C., 2008 52309 (ON SC), [2008] O.J. No. 3969 (Ont. S.C.J.) per Pazaratz J., at para. 43.
14. 14Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v. S.V, supra, at paras. 38 to 40; Children’s Aid Society of London and Middlesex v. L.A., 1999 20470 (ON CTGD), [1999] O.J. No. 5839 (Ont. Gen. Div.) per Vogelsang J., at para. 14; and Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v. R.H., 2000 3158 (ON CJ), [2000] O.J. No. 5853 (Ont. C.J.) per Katarynych J., at para. 18.
15. 15Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v S.V., supra, at para. 43; Children and Family Services for York Region v. S.S., 2003 2408 (ON SC), [2003] O.J. No. 2284 (Ont. S.C.J.) per Wildman J., at paragraph 33.
16. 16Children’s Aid Society of Haldimand and Norfolk v S.V., supra, at para. 54.
17. 17Ibid, at para. 82.
18. 18Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. C.B., 2010 ONSC 6961, at para. 57.
19. 19Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v R.R., 2024 ONCJ 233, Justice Sherr summarized the Ontario Court of Appeal decision in Children’s Aid Society of Toronto v J.G., 2020 ONCA 415, setting out the following regarding extended society care access at para 185