Jenny Friedland

Following the withdrawal of a status review application by the child protection society, the respondent foster parents, maternal grandmother, and First Nation band sought costs against the society.

The court reviewed the principles for awarding costs against a child protection agency, noting that costs are only appropriate if the society acted in a patently unfair or indefensible manner.

The court found that the society's actions in bringing the application to address access issues and a breakdown in the foster placement were reasonable based on the information available at the time.

The requests for costs were dismissed.

The parties separated after a 6.5-year relationship during which they raised four children together.

The applicant sought custody of the twin girls, spousal support, and a division of property, while the respondent sought custody of all children and permission to relocate to Kamloops.

The court granted the respondent custody of her two older boys and the applicant custody of the twins, with a shared parenting schedule.

The court dismissed the respondent's mobility claim, awarded the applicant spousal support for seven years, and found that the parties' home and bank accounts were part of a joint family venture, ordering an equal division of those assets.

The appellants appealed a decision ordering Crown wardship with access to the maternal grandmother for two Aboriginal children.

The children had been apprehended and placed with a non-Aboriginal foster family for several years.

The appellants argued the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the children's First Nations status.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while Aboriginal heritage is an important consideration under the Child and Family Services Act, it does not override the paramount consideration of the children's best interests.

The court upheld the finding that removing the children from their established foster family would be damaging, and that their cultural connection could be maintained through access visits.

In this child protection proceeding under the Child and Family Services Act, the court determined that two Native children were in need of protection and made orders regarding their placement.

The Children's Aid Society sought Crown wardship with placement in a non-Native foster family (the S.D. family), while the maternal grandmother and the Algonquin Nation sought placement with the grandmother with CAS supervision.

The court found that the children had been in need of protection due to the grandmother's inability to protect them from unsupervised contact with their mother, who had a significant criminal history, and the grandmother's ongoing struggles with alcohol and dishonesty with authorities.

Despite the importance of cultural connection for Native children, the court prioritized the children's established attachment to their foster family, their expressed wishes to remain in that home, and their emotional security and stability.

The court ordered Crown wardship with the children remaining in the S.D. family's care, with reasonable access for the grandmother twice per year while the foster family resided in the United Kingdom.

Appeal in child protection proceedings where a First Nation community and a family member challenged a Crown wardship disposition.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by refusing a short adjournment when approximately 1500 pages of disclosure were provided on the first day of trial, preventing meaningful review and the ability to obtain counsel.

They also argued the trial judge failed to give adequate consideration to the children’s Indigenous identity, culture, and heritage in determining their best interests, particularly where the foster placement had relocated the children to the United Kingdom.

The court held that denying the adjournment constituted a denial of natural justice and that insufficient weight had been given to cultural identity considerations.

The original judgment was set aside and a new trial ordered before a different judge.

Following earlier reasons granting leave to file a late appeal subject to conditions, the appellant failed to perfect the appeals.

The respondent sought dismissal of the appeals and recovery of costs.

The court declined to consider an affidavit filed contrary to its earlier directions and found the appellant had not complied with the conditions imposed.

Considering the factors governing costs and the appellant’s conduct, the court ordered full indemnity costs in favour of the respondent.

The appeals were dismissed and the stay of the underlying orders lifted.

The father sought leave to extend the time to file a notice of appeal from an Ontario Court of Justice order granting the children’s grandmother temporary access.

The motion arose after the children’s mother removed the children from Ontario to the Bahamas shortly after the access order and the father claimed he was unable to comply due to the parties’ separation and the mother’s unilateral actions.

The court reviewed the governing factors for extending time to appeal, including bona fide intention to appeal, explanation for delay, prejudice, merits, and the justice of the case.

The court found the father’s explanation for the delay not credible and concluded the evidence suggested he facilitated the children’s removal from the jurisdiction and obstructed access.

Nevertheless, in light of the children’s interests and the broader administration of justice, leave to appeal was granted subject to strict conditions requiring the children’s presence in Ontario during the appeal process and staying enforcement of the underlying orders pending appeal.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction granted in favour of the defendants in a dispute between two family-owned companies over commercial lease rent payments.

The plaintiffs argued the motions judge erred in finding irreparable harm and exceeded his jurisdiction by characterizing their conduct as illegal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision and concluding the matter did not raise issues of public importance justifying a hearing by a full panel.

On a ministerial review reference treated as a conviction appeal, the court admitted fresh forensic pathology and archival evidence undermining the reliability of the original time-of-death evidence that had been central to the Crown’s theory of exclusive opportunity.

Applying the fresh evidence framework, the court held that the conviction, as affirmed on the earlier reference, could no longer stand and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

At the remedial stage, the court undertook an extensive review of the historical record, expert evidence, archival material, and the practical impossibility of a retrial.

Although an acquittal was not the only conceivable verdict, the court concluded that an acquittal was clearly the more likely result at a hypothetical new trial and entered that remedy.