Rosella Cornaviera

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder at retrial following an earlier appeal that resulted in a new trial.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant arranged for someone, likely Daniel Di Trapani, to murder her husband.

The appellant challenged the trial judge's instructions to the jury, the alternative theory of liability permitting conviction based on an unknown killer, and the treatment of evidence from Teresa Mascia, a Crown witness who was declared adverse and cross-examined.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately related evidence to legal issues, the alternative theory had an air of reality, and the treatment of Mascia's evidence, while containing minor errors, did not render the trial unfair.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder in the death of William Mason.

The Crown's case relied primarily on the testimony of the appellant's co-accused, Jason Lusted, who pleaded guilty to accessory after the fact and became the main Crown witness.

The Crown also led circumstantial evidence including phone records, fire marshal testimony, and evidence from Edmund Huard regarding a plot to kill Lusted.

The appellant appealed on three grounds: errors regarding phone records, withdrawal of fire marshal evidence, and admission of Huard's evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that Huard's evidence was inadmissible as it lacked probative value and required circular reasoning.

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle (a farm tractor).

He argued he was denied an adjournment at the Summary Conviction Appeal Court and that the trial judge erred by finding dangerous driving without expert evidence on tractor operation and by inferring danger from the accident itself.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal due to a misunderstanding about procedure but dismissed the appeal.

The Court found ample evidence of dangerous driving, including ignoring police officers and driving erratically, and held that expert evidence was not required as the risks were plain and obvious.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge made a mathematical error in calculating pre-sentence custody credit (dead time).

The Crown agreed with the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, and substituted a sentence of 14 months and 3 days.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a loaded firearm and assaulting police, arguing that his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated during a traffic stop.

The trial judge found that while the appellant was arbitrarily detained, he initiated an unjustified assault against the police using excessive force, making the subsequent search that revealed a handgun reasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, her conclusion that there was no opportunity to provide right to counsel, or her refusal to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The appellant appealed three convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in her credibility findings, that parts of the trial transcript were missing, and that the assault by gesture charge was not made out.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully considered the evidence and made findings open to her.

The court also held that the missing transcript portions did not affect the grounds of appeal and that the assault by gesture charge was supported by the evidence.

The appellants, grandparents and legal guardians of the victims, appealed their convictions for second degree murder and forcible confinement, as well as their respective parole ineligibility periods of 22 and 20 years.

The victims, a five-year-old boy and his six-year-old sister, were subjected to prolonged starvation, abuse, and confinement in a squalid room, resulting in the boy's death.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge properly inferred the requisite mens rea for murder from the prolonged course of conduct and correctly rejected the defence's expert evidence on diminished capacity.

The court also upheld the admission of police statements and found the confinement vastly exceeded any lawful parental authority.

The sentence appeals were dismissed, with the court affirming that the extreme cruelty and inhumanity of the offences justified the lengthy parole ineligibility periods.

The appellant appealed a decision granting certiorari and mandamus, which had quashed a preliminary inquiry judge's decision to commit the appellant for trial on second degree murder rather than first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the reviewing justice erred by turning jurisdictional error into a sufficiency review.

The preliminary inquiry judge correctly applied the Arcuri test and was entitled to conclude that the evidence was insufficient for a committal on first degree murder.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm found in the trunk of his car during a traffic stop.

The motion judge had ruled the search lawful, finding the appellant consented.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred, as the police officer's threat to bring in a canine unit—which he had no lawful authority to do—vitiated the appellant's consent.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered to determine the admissibility of the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant was approached by a police officer investigating the use of a stolen credit card at a liquor store.

The officer told the appellant to 'wait a minute' while he asked preliminary questions.

After receiving further information over the radio, the officer arrested the appellant and informed him of his right to counsel.

The appellant argued he was detained from the moment the officer told him to wait, and that his right to counsel was violated.

The Supreme Court held that while the right to counsel must be provided immediately upon detention, the appellant was not detained during the initial exploratory questioning.

The appeal was dismissed.

On a ministerial review reference treated as a conviction appeal, the court admitted fresh forensic pathology and archival evidence undermining the reliability of the original time-of-death evidence that had been central to the Crown’s theory of exclusive opportunity.

Applying the fresh evidence framework, the court held that the conviction, as affirmed on the earlier reference, could no longer stand and amounted to a miscarriage of justice.

At the remedial stage, the court undertook an extensive review of the historical record, expert evidence, archival material, and the practical impossibility of a retrial.

Although an acquittal was not the only conceivable verdict, the court concluded that an acquittal was clearly the more likely result at a hypothetical new trial and entered that remedy.

In a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice concerning the 1959 murder conviction of Steven Truscott, the Crown sought to introduce fresh evidence from a witness, Ms. X. The proposed evidence described a brief, unwanted sexual advance by Truscott in a cornfield approximately a year before the murder.

The Crown argued the evidence was relevant to rebut good character, challenge credibility, support another witness's testimony, and act as similar fact evidence identifying Truscott as the killer.

The Court of Appeal ruled on the admissibility without hearing the testimony viva voce, finding the evidence clearly irrelevant to any material fact in issue.

The Crown's application to tender the evidence was dismissed, and the defence's request for a publication ban on the ruling was denied.

In the context of a Reference regarding his 1959 murder conviction, the applicant sought production of third-party nursing school and psychiatric records of a key Crown witness.

The applicant tendered fresh evidence from two individuals who claimed the witness admitted to lying at trial and sought psychiatric hospitalization to avoid testifying at a 1966 Supreme Court rehearing.

The Court of Appeal applied the O'Connor test and ordered production of the nursing school records, finding they provided independent confirmation of the fresh evidence with minimal prejudice to the witness's privacy.

However, the court refused to order production of the psychiatric records, concluding that the witness's high expectation of privacy outweighed the limited probative value of the one-page discharge form.

In the context of a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice regarding a 1959 murder conviction, the Crown applied for a production order under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code against third-party journalists.

The journalists had produced a documentary about the case and interviewed several witnesses who were now providing fresh evidence.

The journalists resisted, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction to issue a production order against a third party for investigative purposes.

The Court of Appeal held it had jurisdiction to order production where it is in the interests of justice to assist in determining the admissibility of fresh evidence.

The court ordered the production of two of the three retained video recordings.

In a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice under s. 696.3(3)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code regarding the 1959 murder conviction of Steven Murray Truscott, the parties sought directions on the scope of the issues.

The Court of Appeal ruled that the Reference is limited to the issue of fresh evidence, which means material not presented in prior court proceedings (including the 1966 Supreme Court Reference).

The Court further held that the Kaufman Report does not limit the evidence the parties can tender, and that transcripts from the Kaufman investigation are part of the record but must satisfy hearsay exceptions to be admitted for their truth.

In the context of a ministerial reference regarding Steven Murray Truscott's 1959 murder conviction, the court addressed two preliminary issues.

First, the court granted the appellant's request to have the panel hear witness evidence viva voce rather than out of court.

Second, the court dismissed a motion by the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation to permit camera access to the proceedings, finding that recording is prohibited under s. 136(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the statutory exemptions did not apply because the Crown did not consent.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge made serious errors of law regarding the defence of mistaken belief in consent within a marriage.

However, the appeal from the acquittal was dismissed because the trial judge had found the accused credible, which required an acquittal under the rule in W.(D.).

The Court allowed the Crown's appeal regarding costs, setting aside the costs order against the Crown as there was no evidentiary basis for a finding of misconduct.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued procedural directions for the hearing of a Reference directed by the Minister of Justice concerning the 1959 murder conviction of the appellant.

The Reference is to be heard as if it were an appeal on the issue of fresh evidence.

The directions address the preparation and sealing of the Record, the scope of the Reference, and the potential release of specific paragraphs of the Kaufman Report.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder.

At trial, he claimed to have suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and amnesia, rendering him unable to remember the events.

The defence introduced statements the appellant made during a court-ordered psychiatric assessment, which the Crown then cross-examined him on.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to caution the jury against using disbelief of his amnesia as circumstantial evidence of guilt, by allowing cross-examination on protected statements under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code, and by failing to instruct the jury not to rely on third-party opinions of his truthfulness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions and holding that the appellant waived the protection of s. 672.21 by introducing the statements himself.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge made erroneous evidentiary rulings and errors in the jury charge.

The evidentiary issues included the refusal of a courtroom voice demonstration and the admission of post-offence conduct evidence.

The jury charge issues involved instructions on post-offence conduct, eyewitness identification, bad character evidence, the application of the W.(D.) framework, the presentation of the defence theory, and the trial judge's expression of opinion.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or instructions and dismissed the appeal.