Rosella Cornaviera

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for having care and control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over 80 milligrams.

He argued that his Charter rights under s. 8 and s. 10(b) were violated, and that the Crown failed to prove care and control.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant waived his right to counsel by stating 'I'll blow first' and that there were sufficient grounds to demand a breath sample.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding of care and control based on the appellant standing beside the vehicle with keys in the ignition.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment for possession of child pornography and a concurrent 6-month sentence for breach of probation.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended a joint submission, improperly punished him for past lenient sentences, and sought to introduce a psychiatric report as fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no joint submission existed regarding the sentence range, the trial judge properly applied the jump principle for repeat offenders, and the proposed fresh evidence failed the Palmer test for admissibility.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his convictions and 12-year sentence for robbery, attempted robbery, and conspiracy.

He had used the confidential police CPIC system to obtain vehicle registration information of bank employees, which he provided to a co-accused to facilitate bank robberies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were logically based on the circumstantial evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no error in principle and held that the sentence, while at the high end of the range, was not demonstrably unfit given the appellant's breach of trust.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 12 years following a retrial.

He appealed the conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge improperly intervened during the cross-examination of the main Crown witness and erred in admitting clothing seized in breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's interventions did not result in a miscarriage of justice and that the admission of the seized clothing would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The court also upheld the 12-year parole ineligibility period, noting it reflected a careful consideration of mitigating and aggravating factors as well as the jury's recommendation.

The intervener, a media outlet, brought a motion seeking limited access to a sealed affidavit to determine whether to challenge the sealing order.

The Crown opposed the motion, stating the affidavit contained confidential information pertaining to an ongoing criminal investigation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the risk of compromising the ongoing investigation outweighed the public's right to know, especially given that the sealing order was temporary and set to expire in three months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder arising from a random drive-by shooting.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a change of venue or trial by judge alone due to extensive pre-trial publicity.

He also raised several grounds regarding the jury charge, including alleged errors in instructions on the fact-finding process, reasonable doubt, and the use of discreditable conduct evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's rulings or instructions to the jury.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, seeking to introduce fresh evidence that he was in custody on a date the complainant claimed to have seen him prior to the offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence and the appeal, finding that the specific date was of no particular significance in the context of the trial and the fresh evidence could not reasonably be expected to have affected the trial judge's acceptance of the identification evidence.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

At trial, he challenged the constitutionality of the 'rape shield' provisions in s. 276 of the Criminal Code, which restrict the admissibility of evidence of a complainant's prior sexual activity.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provisions, finding that they do not violate the accused's right to make full answer and defence, the right to a fair trial, or the right against self-incrimination.

The Court held that the provisions properly balance the accused's rights with the need to protect the integrity of the trial process and the privacy of complainants.

The respondent choreographed and took neo-Nazi photographs in a Jewish cemetery, featuring a young male simulating urinating on identifiable gravestones.

He was charged with offering indignities to human remains under s. 182(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted him, but the Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that physical contact with the remains was required.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that physical interference is not necessary and that offering indignities to monuments marking human remains constitutes offering indignities to the remains themselves.

The Court also amended the charges to accurately reflect the respondent's conduct in choreographing the event.

The appellant wrote anonymous letters to three cheerleaders threatening to rape them.

He was acquitted at trial on the basis that a threat to rape did not necessarily constitute a threat to cause serious bodily harm under s. 264.1(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittal and entered convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that 'serious bodily harm' includes psychological harm and that a threat to rape, viewed objectively in its context, constitutes a threat to cause serious bodily harm.

The appeals concerned the constitutionality of the former rape-shield provisions in Criminal Code ss. 276 and 277, which restricted defence use of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct in sexual offence prosecutions.

The Court held that s. 276 violated ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter because its blanket exclusion could bar relevant defence evidence whose probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and that the provision was not saved by s. 1.

Section 277, which barred sexual reputation evidence to support or attack credibility, was upheld as targeting an illegitimate use of evidence.

The Court also held that preliminary inquiry judges lacked jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions, so the appeals from the committals nevertheless failed and the matters were to proceed to trial.