10 total
The court upheld an over 80 conviction, finding the officer had subjective reasonable suspicion for an ASD demand even without the compelled statement.
The appellant was convicted of operating a conveyance over 80.
The appeal concerned whether the trial judge erred in finding a valid Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand existed, even after excising a compelled statement about alcohol consumption.
The appellant argued the trial judge replaced a subjective/objective test with an objective/objective test for the officer's grounds.
The court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly assessed the officer's subjective belief, considering the circumstances from the perspective of a reasonable police officer, and that the finding of subjective reasonable suspicion was supported by evidence even without the compelled statement.
Privacy Appeal allowed
The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for aggravated sexual assault.
The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his mens rea analysis by requiring evidence of the complainant's communication of non-consent, which was irrelevant given that no defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent was raised.
This legal error materially impacted the acquittal.
The Court allowed the appeal, set aside the acquittal, entered a conviction for aggravated sexual assault, and remitted the matter for sentencing before a different judge.
The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, clarifying that agreeing to commit a sexual offence against a child requires the intent to agree and a genuine consensus.
The Crown appealed an acquittal for an offence under s. 172.2(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, which criminalizes agreeing or arranging to commit enumerated sexual offences against a person believed to be under a certain age.
The respondent had communicated with an FBI agent posing as a mother of young girls, discussing sexual acts and travel arrangements.
The trial judge acquitted, finding the Crown failed to prove the respondent intended to follow through with the plan, characterizing the communications as fantasy role-play.
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in interpreting the mens rea, clarifying that the mens rea is the intent to agree, not the intent to carry out the underlying offence.
The court further clarified that the actus reus requires a "true consensus" or genuine agreement on the part of the accused, even if the other party is an undercover officer.
As the trial judge's reasons were unclear on whether the actus reus was proven under the correct legal test, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered on the relevant count.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the sexual interference conviction and sentence appeals.
The appellant, H.A., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and his sentence.
The trial judge had found that the appellant touched the complainant in her vaginal area on multiple occasions when she was nine years old.
The appellant claimed the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the use of a blanket and the complainant's clothing, and erred by failing to provide a proper analysis under the third prong of *R. v. W.D.* The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, noting the trial judge's reasons were clear and comprehensive.
The court also found no error in the application of the burden of proof.
No submissions were advanced on the sentence appeal.
Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.
The court admitted fresh evidence of a subsequent acquittal involving a similar fact witness and declared a mistrial.
The accused, David Wilson, brought an application to admit fresh evidence and seek a mistrial after being convicted of sexual touching but before sentencing.
The fresh evidence was his subsequent acquittal in a separate trial involving a similar fact witness (K.B.) who had testified in the initial trial.
The court considered whether the subsequent acquittal met the Palmer test for fresh evidence and whether the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Mahalingan overruled the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. G. (K.R.) regarding the retrospective application of issue estoppel.
The court found that Mahalingan did not overrule G. (K.R.) in this context, as the trial was not yet completed by sentencing.
The application to admit the fresh evidence was granted, and a mistrial was declared.
Warrantless arrest was lawful and observing plain-view phone notifications did not breach Section 8.
The accused brought a Charter motion alleging breaches of Sections 8 and 9 due to an unlawful warrantless arrest and an unlawful search incident to arrest, including the observation of a phone notification.
The court found that the arrest was lawful, based on reasonable and probable grounds derived from police surveillance and communication with the accused, who was believed to have sexually assaulted the complainant.
The court also ruled that observing a plain-view phone notification on a lawfully seized phone did not constitute a search engaging Section 8 Charter rights, as there was no reasonable expectation of privacy.
Consequently, the accused's application to exclude evidence was dismissed.
Summary conviction appeal dismissed; suspended sentence for vehicle vandalism upheld as fit.
The appellant appealed his sentence for mischief under $5000 after pleading guilty to vandalizing an 87-year-old woman's vehicle.
The sentencing judge imposed a suspended sentence with 12 months of probation, rejecting the appellant's request for a conditional discharge.
On appeal, the appellant argued the judge failed to apply the principle of restraint.
The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the sentence was fit and within the judge's discretion given the need for denunciation.
Police officer partially qualified as expert on outlaw motorcycle gangs; hearsay-based tattoo removal evidence excluded.
The Crown sought to qualify a police detective as an expert witness on outlaw motorcycle gangs, specifically the Hells Angels and Red Devils, in a trial where the accused allegedly attempted to forcibly remove a victim's gang-related tattoo.
The defence opposed the qualification, arguing the evidence was unnecessary, unreliable, and the officer lacked proper qualifications.
The court applied the Mohan criteria and found the officer was properly qualified based on her extensive experience.
The court ruled her evidence on gang structure and culture was necessary, but excluded her proposed testimony interpreting text messages and her evidence on tattoo removal practices that relied on inherently suspect hearsay.
Directed verdict granted discharging accused on all drug and firearms charges due to lack of evidence.
The accused was charged with conspiracy to traffic fentanyl and cocaine, and multiple counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking and firearms offences.
The charges arose from a police investigation into two other individuals, during which the accused was observed associating with them and visiting a storage locker and driving a vehicle where drugs and guns were found in secret traps.
At the close of the Crown's case, the defence brought an application for a directed verdict.
The court granted the application and discharged the accused on all counts, finding there was no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find the accused had knowledge and control of the drugs and guns, or that he was part of a conspiracy.
Evidence from vehicle search admitted, but evidence from residence search excluded due to insufficient warrant grounds.
The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and firearms offences, brought an application under s. 8 of the Charter challenging tracking warrants and telewarrants executed on a vehicle and his temporary residence.
The court found the tracking warrants and the telewarrant for the vehicle were validly issued, and a minor post-seizure reporting breach did not warrant exclusion of the evidence found in the vehicle under s. 24(2).
However, the court found there were insufficient grounds to issue the telewarrant for the residence, constituting a serious Charter breach, and excluded the evidence seized from the residence.