Erica Kathryn Whitford

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing a detention order.

The appellant argued the Board failed to properly apply the statutory test for significant threat and failed to adequately explain why a detention order was the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal held the Board's decision was reasonable, noting the appellant's refusal to take psychotropic medication for his delusional beliefs and the ongoing risk to public safety.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Jason Windebank, appealed his designation as a Dangerous Offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence following convictions for violent offences against his domestic partner.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge’s errors were immaterial, that Gladue principles were sufficiently considered, and that the judge properly exercised her discretion in imposing an indeterminate sentence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted the Crown’s application to revoke the respondent’s bail pending retrial on historical sexual offences.

The court found that the motion judge erred in law by concluding that the release order was a nullity due to a typographical error referencing the wrong provision of the Criminal Code.

The error was deemed minor and not prejudicial.

The respondent’s breach of a condition prohibiting contact with children under 16 was established, and the release order was revoked.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible on account of a mental disorder, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that continued his detention order at a psychiatric facility.

The appellant argued that the Board's decision to deny him a conditional discharge was unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the Board's decision was well-supported by evidence of the appellant's decompensation, untreated mental illness, and history of absconding from his treatment team.

Accordingly, the Court found no error in the Board's reasoning and dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario declined jurisdiction to hear Dwayne Gordon’s application for judicial release pending retrial on human trafficking charges, following the setting aside of his convictions.

The court found that the Superior Court of Justice was better suited to conduct the contested bail hearing, particularly given the Crown’s desire to cross-examine the proposed surety.

The decision clarifies the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the appellate and trial courts regarding bail release after an order for a new trial, and the circumstances in which the appellate court will exercise its jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed Dwayne Gordon’s appeal from his guilty plea to human trafficking-related offences, finding that the plea was uninformed.

Gordon believed, based on his counsel’s assurances, that the plea judge would impose no more than six additional months in custody, but was instead sentenced to two-and-a-half years.

The court held that this misunderstanding constituted a serious unknown legal consequence and that Gordon would not have pleaded guilty had he known the true risk.

The plea was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 2 years and 11 months' imprisonment for firearms and drug trafficking offences, arguing he should have received additional credit for lockdowns and triple bunking during presentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge was aware of the difficult circumstances and that the few additional days of lockdown and triple bunking shown in newly filed records would not impact the sentence.

The Crown applied to revoke a release order after the respondent allegedly breached a condition.

The respondent argued the release order was a nullity because it was issued under s. 679(5) of the Criminal Code (release pending appeal) after the Court of Appeal had already allowed his appeal and ordered a new trial.

The motions judge agreed, finding that release pending a new trial must be ordered under s. 679(7.1).

The Crown's application was dismissed, and the matter of interim release was remitted to the Superior Court of Justice for a de novo hearing.

The appellant pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of his domestic partner and was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment, less pre-sentence custody credit, based on a joint submission.

On appeal, he argued for a further sentence reduction due to harsh conditions in pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the sentence was based on a joint submission by experienced counsel and was entirely fit.

The appellant appealed his sentence of seven years and seven months for firearms and drug offences, arguing the trial judge erred by treating him as a recidivist based on his youth record and by failing to grant a further sentence reduction for harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the appellant's continuous criminal record, including a youth conviction for first-degree murder using a firearm, to assess moral culpability.

The Court also held that the trial judge appropriately factored the harsh pre-trial conditions into the global sentence without requiring a mathematical deduction.

The appellant, Landi Hanna, appealed a 4-year sentence for two counts of robbery (one causing wounds) and one count of failure to comply with an undertaking.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by not respecting the "jump" principle and by imposing a disproportionate sentence that relegated rehabilitation to a secondary role.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error, affirming that the sentencing judge correctly identified denunciation and deterrence as paramount objectives for robbery, properly considered aggravating factors including the appellant's criminal record and re-offending while on release, and appropriately applied the "jump" principle given the appellant's pattern of committing serious robberies shortly after being granted bail.

The court also found that the sentencing judge reasonably concluded the appellant's rehabilitative potential was low due to his repeated criminal history and lack of serious engagement in addressing his drug addiction.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for four firearms-related charges, arguing that the trial judge improperly used judicial notice regarding drug subculture and the operational nature of firearms, and denied procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions were well-anchored in the evidence and that any comments about the drug industry were peripheral to the core reasoning, not constituting improper judicial notice or procedural unfairness.

The appellant, Cedric Agard, appealed a global sentence of eight-and-a-half years imposed for multiple drug and firearm offences.

He argued the sentence was harsh and excessive, specifically contending that the sentencing judge did not grant sufficient credit for time spent in harsh jail conditions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the sentencing judge had carefully considered all relevant factors, including the appellant's personal circumstances and the harsh jail conditions, and that the sentence was within the appropriate range and not demonstrably unfit or based on an error in principle.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life with 12 years parole ineligibility.

He appealed both conviction and sentence, and alleged ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence and credibility.

However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence, reducing the parole ineligibility period from 12 to 10 years.

The court held that pre-sentence custody conditions, especially those exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, are a relevant mitigating factor in determining parole ineligibility under s. 745.4 of the Criminal Code, even without a Charter application, disagreeing with previous Superior Court decisions.

The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was dismissed due to lack of evidence.

The appellant, S.H., appealed his convictions for historical sexual offences against his two stepdaughters and his seven-year global sentence.

The Court of Appeal identified two key errors by the trial judge: improper use of the appellant's provincial driving record to draw adverse inferences about his character and credibility, and a misapprehension of the appellant's testimony regarding a television program.

Despite the Crown's argument that these errors were harmless and could be cured by the proviso, the Court found that the cumulative effect of the errors was material to the trial judge's credibility assessment of the appellant, especially given the sparse reasons for accepting the complainants' evidence.

The Court concluded that the errors contributed to a miscarriage of justice and ordered a new trial on all counts.

The appellant appealed a 12-year sentence for incest, criminal harassment, sexual exploitation, making child pornography, and possession of child pornography.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by not alerting counsel to potential criticisms or rejection of an expert's risk assessment report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a sentencing judge is not required to accept an expert's opinion in whole or in part and is entitled to weigh evidence.

The court found the sentence was not harsh given the severe aggravating factors, including the breadth, nature, and duration of the appellant's conduct and abuse of trust.

The appellant, B.B., appealed his conviction for multiple counts of assault and sexual assault with a weapon, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to provide a general propensity instruction to the jury regarding uncharged conduct and cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, holding that while such an instruction is generally required for morally outrageous behaviour, in this specific case, the defence had strategically utilized the bad character evidence to challenge the complainant's credibility.

The court reasoned that providing a limiting instruction would have risked prejudicing the appellant by needlessly highlighting impermissible reasoning.

The court further noted that the uncharged conduct was less severe than the charged offences and was integral to the narrative of the relationship, diminishing the risk of improper jury reasoning.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, incest, and sexual assault against his biological daughter and sentenced to nine years imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and that trial counsel was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal found no merit to the uneven scrutiny argument, affirming the trial judge's credibility findings, and no support for the inadequate counsel claim.

The court also found no error in the sentence, noting its consistency with sentencing principles for sexual violence against children.

However, the court granted a Charter remedy, varying the lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) registration order to 20 years, with the Crown's consent.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant, Richard Alexis, appealed his global sentence of 8.5 years for multiple charges including firearm possession, dangerous operation, and flight from police.

He argued the sentencing judge erred by discounting Gladue principles, failing to adequately credit for harsh COVID-19 custody conditions, and violating the parity principle.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's approach to Gladue principles due to lack of evidence of impact, properly considering custody conditions as a mitigating factor without specific deductions, and determining that the parity principle was not engaged as the comparator cases were not sufficiently similar.

The appellant, Chad Michael Kennedy, appealed his convictions for arson, criminal harassment, uttering death threats, possession of an explosive substance, disobeying a court order, and breaches of probation, as well as his global sentence of 28 months.

The appeal primarily focused on the reliability of eyewitness identification and alleged inconsistencies with video evidence regarding the arson charges.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly cautioned himself regarding eyewitness testimony and adequately grappled with the alleged inconsistencies, concluding the video quality was too poor to contradict the eyewitness account.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in principle.