Erica Kathryn Whitford

The appellant appealed his convictions for discharging a firearm with intent to wound or prevent arrest and attempted murder, and his sentence.

The charges arose from a violent encounter with police where the appellant fired shots at officers during an arrest attempt.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's self-defence claim, finding he was lawfully arrested, used unreasonable force, and had no reasonable grounds to believe the police were acting unlawfully.

On appeal, the court found no error in the trial judge's credibility findings or the rejection of self-defence, including the assessment of the appellant's subjective fear of police.

The court also upheld the sentence, finding the trial judge properly considered the collateral consequences of the appellant's injuries (sustained during arrest) as not mitigating, given they flowed from his own conduct.

Furthermore, the court found the trial judge adequately weighed anti-Black racism and mental health issues as slight mitigators, and correctly applied principles regarding "Duncan credit" for pre-sentence custody.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of six years imprisonment for charges including distributing child pornography and breaching a s. 161 Criminal Code prohibition order.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge's reasons inadequate for failing to sufficiently explain the sentence in light of sentencing objectives and comparable authorities.

Re-exercising its discretion, the Court reduced the global sentence to five years imprisonment, finding it to be a fit sentence considering all aggravating and mitigating factors.

The appellant, convicted of criminal harassment, sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his summary conviction appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, finding that the appeal raised no issues of general importance and was devoid of merit, being entirely fact-based.

The court also upheld the publication ban previously imposed to prevent the appellant from continuing to post about the complainant.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and appealed, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b), and seeking exclusion of evidence.

The trial judge found a minor s. 10(b) breach but no ss. 8 or 9 violations, and declined to exclude the handgun evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding that the police had reasonable grounds for the appellant's detention and search, and that any Charter breach was minor and did not warrant exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Matthew Lewis, appealed convictions for obstruct justice, uttering death threats, and two counts of breach of recognizance.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by misapprehending the victim's motive to lie, approaching defence evidence piecemeal, and misapprehending defence witness testimony.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, noting the case turned on credibility and that the trial judge's observations regarding defence witnesses and the victim's lack of motive to fabricate were supported by the record.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant, E.H., appealed his sentence for multiple sexual offences against his young cousin.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by not giving sufficient mitigating weight to the appellant's acceptance of responsibility and expressions of remorse, despite his not formally pleading guilty, and by overemphasizing the absence of a formal guilty plea.

The court reduced the appellant's effective sentence of imprisonment from seven and a half years to five and a half years.

The Court of Appeal also addressed an unlawful lifetime Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order, noting it was legally defective due to a Supreme Court of Canada decision (R. v. Ndhlovu) but concluded it lacked jurisdiction to correct this error on a sentence appeal, advising the appellant to seek remedy from the trial court.

The court declined to vary a s. 161(1)(a.1) Criminal Code prohibition order.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, appealed on the grounds that the trial judge relied on impermissible stereotypical inferences and ungrounded common-sense assumptions in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypical reasoning regarding the complainant's willingness to engage in public sexual activity and sexual activity during menstruation, which materially influenced the credibility assessment.

The court emphasized that such reasoning violates the rule against stereotypical inferences and impermissible character reasoning.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the curative proviso could not be applied due to the lack of overwhelming evidence.

The appellant, Nicholas Beauvais, appealed his convictions for possessing, accessing, and making child pornography available.

He argued that the trial judge failed to properly consider alternative inferences to his guilt, specifically that the child pornography was downloaded by another resident or by a third-party attacker via a virus.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by dismissing these alternative inferences as "pure speculation" without adequately assessing the evidence, including conflicting testimony regarding laptop access and expert evidence about the virus's capabilities.

The court also found the trial judge attached undue weight to the "Moose" username and recycle bin evidence.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for four counts of aggravated assault and five counts of assault with a weapon, alleging unreasonable verdicts, an erroneous similar fact evidence ruling, and ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly applied the similar fact evidence test and that the verdicts were reasonable given the ample evidence.

The claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was also rejected.

The appellant, H.A., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and his sentence.

The trial judge had found that the appellant touched the complainant in her vaginal area on multiple occasions when she was nine years old.

The appellant claimed the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the use of a blanket and the complainant's clothing, and erred by failing to provide a proper analysis under the third prong of *R. v. W.D.* The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, noting the trial judge's reasons were clear and comprehensive.

The court also found no error in the application of the burden of proof.

No submissions were advanced on the sentence appeal.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, C.L., appealed his sentence for two counts of sexual assault and one count of assault.

The trial judge had imposed concurrent sentences of 4.5 years, giving credit for presentence custody.

The appellant argued that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the harsh conditions of presentence custody.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge did consider these conditions as a mitigating factor and that the sentence was fit.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a three-year penitentiary sentence imposed on the respondent for sexually assaulting a developmentally disabled woman.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to properly apply the Friesen principles, which dictate that sexual offences against vulnerable individuals akin to children are inherently wrongful and require substantial sentences.

The sentencing judge mistakenly reduced the respondent's moral culpability by considering factors such as the absence of overt sexual objectification and "generous" treatment of the victim.

The Court found the original sentence demonstrably unfit and increased it to six years, ordering the respondent's reincarceration despite his recent release on day parole.

The appellant, Brent William Diehl, appealed his conviction for sexual assault with a weapon, arguing that the trial judge relied on myths and stereotypes in assessing credibility and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis, which correctly applied the principles of credibility assessment and reasonable doubt, and did not engage in stereotypical reasoning or uneven scrutiny.

The trial judge's assessment of the complainant's evidence as credible and reliable, and the appellant's account as illogical, was upheld.

The appellant, N.H., appealed his convictions for four counts of assault and one count of sexual assault, and his three-year custody sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically regarding counsel's limited role under s. 486.3 of the Criminal Code, failure to pursue exculpatory evidence, and the appellant's seating arrangement at trial.

The Court of Appeal found no basis for the claims of unfair trial or ineffective assistance, concluding that counsel acted competently and went beyond their limited appointment.

The court also dismissed the appellant's complaint about appeal delay.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of child luring, invitation to sexual touching, possession of child pornography, accessing child pornography, and weapons dangerous, receiving a global sentence of 34 months.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was unfit for a first offender with mitigating factors, and that the trial judge failed to resolve disputed aggravating factors.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the sentence unsupported due to unresolved aggravating factors.

The court substituted the sentence to 28 months (time served).

Additionally, the appellant successfully appealed overly broad terms of a s. 161 order regarding internet access, which the court directed the parties to amend by consent or the court would amend after two weeks.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, uttering threats, and failing to comply with probation.

The appeal raised numerous grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel, judicial bias, misapprehension of law, failures to assess credibility, non-disclosure, evidentiary inconsistencies, inappropriate limitation of amicus curiae, prejudicial media coverage, insufficient evidence, and Charter s. 11(b) issues.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the entire record and found no error, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred by imposing a "straitjacket" on the sentencing process by expressing a starting point for the sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error, concluding that the trial judge carefully explained how a fit global sentence was reached, considering all mitigating and aggravating circumstances, and properly deducted credit for time served.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appeal raised issues regarding alleged improper cross-examination by Crown counsel concerning the appellant's attraction to the complainant, and claims of uneven scrutiny of evidence by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found the cross-examination permissible given the specific circumstances of the case, which involved a non-physically forced relationship with an underage teenager.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility or the fairness of the trial.

Regarding the sentence, the court affirmed that the six-year and six-month imprisonment for sexual interference was not demonstrably unfit, considering aggravating factors such as breach of trust, grooming, and the victim's age, consistent with sentencing principles for child sexual offences.

The conviction appeal was dismissed, and the sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant, Ivan David Lira, appealed his convictions for robbery and firearms offences, and his sentence.

The conviction appeal centered on an alleged s. 10(b) Charter breach due to delayed access to counsel.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the delay was justified under the *Rover* exception due to police and public safety concerns and preservation of evidence, and that even if there was a breach, the evidence seized prior to the delay would not be excluded under s. 24(2) due to lack of causal link.

The sentence appeal argued insufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence confinement conditions.

The Court affirmed the trial judge's approach of applying 1.5:1 *Summers* credit and treating harsh conditions as a mitigating factor in the global sentence calculation, consistent with *Marshall*, without a specific mathematical quantification.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Jason Ebanks, appealed his conviction for attempted murder with a firearm and other related charges, as well as his sentence.

The primary ground of appeal concerned the trial judge's jury charge regarding the victim's photo line-up identification of the appellant.

The appellant argued that the caution given was insufficient because the victim already knew the appellant and believed him to be the shooter, rendering the line-up identification of little value.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the jury instructions, while not perfect, adequately equipped the jury to assess the photo line-up evidence in light of the specific frailties raised by the defence.

Leave to appeal sentence was refused as no submissions were made.