Michael P. Michaud

This is an appeal from a trial decision that found a s.10(b) Charter breach and excluded evidence, leading to an acquittal on an '80+' offence.

Counsel agreed the trial judge erred in finding the s.10(b) breach and vacating the acquittal.

The Crown sought a conviction, while the respondent requested a new trial due to an insufficient record for a fresh s.24(2) analysis.

The appeal court set aside the acquittal but declined to register a conviction, remanding the case for a new trial in the Ontario Court of Justice, citing the lower court's expertise in such matters and concerns about the sufficiency of the record for appellate review.

Mohammed Younus was tried for the murder of his brother, Shamsul Alamshah.

The initial charge of first-degree murder was reduced to second-degree murder.

The court assessed the accused's defenses of accident, self-defence, and provocation.

The judge found Younus's testimony incredible and unreliable, concluding that he was the aggressor in the fatal stabbing.

The court rejected all defenses, finding that the Crown had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Younus intended to cause death or bodily harm likely to cause death.

Younus was found guilty of second-degree murder.

The applicant was charged with operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration equal to or exceeding 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a constitutional challenge to section 320.27(2) of the Criminal Code, which permits police officers to demand a breath sample from drivers of motor vehicles without any suspicion of alcohol consumption.

The applicant alleged violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that while section 320.27(2) engages section 8 protections, the search and seizure is reasonable and constitutional.

The court also found that any breach of section 9 rights is justified under section 1 of the Charter, and that section 10(b) rights are appropriately suspended during brief roadside sobriety investigations.

The applicant was found guilty as charged.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100mL under the former section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The charge was laid before December 18, 2018, when new impaired driving legislation (Bill C-46) came into force, replacing the old provisions with Part VIII.1.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused applied for a directed verdict, arguing that the presumption of identity—previously available under the repealed section 258(1)(c)—no longer applied to transitional cases.

The court held that the presumption of identity continues to apply to prosecutions under the former section 253(1)(b) offence, and dismissed the application for a directed verdict.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle by a drug.

The defendant requested rolling logs as part of disclosure.

The Crown denied the request on two grounds: (1) new evidence demonstrated the rolling logs were not relevant, and (2) new legislation prohibited their disclosure.

The court considered whether it could revisit binding precedent from R. v. Stipo, which held that rolling logs are relevant and must be disclosed.

The court applied the doctrine of stare decisis and the exceptions to revisiting binding authority, finding that neither the new evidence nor the legislative changes met the high threshold required to depart from precedent.

The court granted disclosure of the rolling logs.

The offender, a 33-year-old first-time offender and single mother of four, was convicted of acting as the getaway driver in two armed robberies at bus stops.

The principal offender used an imitation firearm.

The Crown sought 2-3 years imprisonment, while the defence sought time served to avoid potential deportation consequences under the IRPA.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the serious impact on the victims, but acknowledged the offender's lesser role compared to the principal.

The court imposed a sentence of 18 months incarceration, reduced to 4 months after crediting pre-sentence custody and time spent on bail with a curfew, followed by 2 years of probation.

The offender, a 33-year-old first-time offender and mother of four, acted as the getaway driver for her boyfriend in two armed robberies at bus stops.

The principal offender used an imitation firearm and received a five-year sentence.

The court considered the offender's lesser role, her lack of a criminal record, and the potential immigration consequences of her sentence.

The court imposed a sentence of 18 months' incarceration, reduced to 4 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and strict bail conditions, followed by two years of probation.

During a trial for three robberies, the Crown sought to admit a 911 call made by a victim who was unavailable to testify.

The court found that the 911 call was made almost immediately after the robbery while the victim was still in shock, leaving no opportunity for concoction or fabrication.

The court ruled the 911 call admissible under the traditional res gestae exception to the hearsay rule, and alternatively under the principled approach to hearsay, as it met the requirements of necessity and threshold reliability.

The accused was charged with three counts of robbery for allegedly acting as the getaway driver for her boyfriend, who robbed three victims at bus shelters over the course of one evening.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including cell tower data showing the accused's phone moving in tandem with the principal offender's phone, and a victim recording the licence plate of the accused's van.

The court found the principal offender committed all three robberies.

The court acquitted the accused on the first count, finding a reasonable doubt as to whether she knew a robbery was about to occur.

However, the court convicted the accused on the second and third counts, concluding she knew of the principal's intentions by that point and intended to aid him by acting as the getaway driver.

The accused was tried on a three-count indictment alleging that she aided a series of armed robberies committed by an accomplice at bus stops over the course of a single evening.

The Crown alleged that the accused acted as the getaway driver while the accomplice robbed victims of cellular phones using a firearm.

The court relied on circumstantial evidence including cell tower records, a licence plate identified by a victim, and property from one robbery found in the accused’s vehicle.

While the court had a reasonable doubt that the accused knew of the first robbery in advance, it concluded that by the time of the subsequent incidents she knew of and intended to assist the robberies.

The accused was acquitted on the first count but convicted as a party to the second and third robberies.

On a voir dire during a robbery trial, the court determined whether a police statement made by the accused was voluntary under the common law confessions rule.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to inducements, references to potential Children’s Aid Society involvement, and allegedly oppressive conditions including cold temperature and lack of medication for diabetes.

The court assessed the totality of the circumstances, including the accused’s demeanor, the recorded interview, and police testimony.

While acknowledging some inducements and pressure during the interview, the court found the accused retained an operating mind and was not subjected to oppressive conditions sufficient to overbear her will.

The Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and the statement was admitted at trial.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a single-vehicle collision in the early morning hours of June 21, 2013.

The trial addressed three main issues: whether the accused's section 7 Charter right was breached by being compelled to identify herself as the driver under the Ontario Highway Traffic Act; whether the police had reasonable grounds to believe the offence occurred within three hours of the breath demand; and whether there was sufficient evidence of impairment if evidence were excluded due to a Charter breach.

The court found no Charter breach, as the accused's belief in legal compulsion was not reasonably held given the absence of clear evidence of reportable damage and her mixed motivations for cooperating with police.

The court also found the breath demand was valid based on reasonable grounds.

The accused was convicted on both counts.