Carly Ann Eliza Eastwood

The Crown applied under section 714.1 of the Criminal Code for the complainant, LS, to give evidence at trial by videoconference from Bracebridge, Ontario, citing her location and personal circumstances.

The defence opposed, arguing it would compromise the accused's right to a fair trial by impairing cross-examination and that the proposed location was unsuitable.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that LS's age, physical and mental disabilities, and the significant distance to the courthouse weighed in favour of the order.

The court dismissed the defence's concerns, noting that arrangements for physical evidence and police presence would mitigate risks to a fair trial and the integrity of testimony.

Shuvanga Khanal pleaded guilty to three counts of Dangerous Driving Causing Death.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the multiple deaths and the extreme dangerousness of the driving (175 km/h in a 60 km/h zone, running a red light), and mitigating factors, such as the guilty plea, community support, and the offender's own serious injuries.

The Crown sought 5-6 years custody, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a four-year period of incarceration followed by a ten-year driving prohibition, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence over rehabilitation in this severe case.

During a criminal trial for an Over 80 charge, the Crown sought to admit an utterance made by the accused.

The court conducted a blended trial/voluntariness/Charter application.

Justice Latimer ruled that the Crown failed to prove the utterance voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, primarily due to a deficient and largely inaudible audio recording of the interaction between the police officer and the accused in the breath room.

The court emphasized the Crown's burden to establish a sufficient record for voluntariness.

As a result of this ruling, the Crown advised they could not otherwise prove the charge, leading to its dismissal.

Tyriq Brooks was convicted of multiple offences, including three armed bank robberies and firearm possession.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the planned nature of the robberies, use of a real firearm, threats to victims, profound victim impact, the offender's significant role, and his criminal record including prior weapon prohibition.

Mitigating factors included his youth, family support, limited weight given to challenges as a young Black male, a late guilty plea to firearm possession, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions (Duncan credit).

The court emphasized deterrence and denunciation, imposing a global sentence of 10 years imprisonment, less enhanced pre-sentence custody.

Ancillary orders included a DNA order, lifetime weapon prohibition, non-communication order, and forfeiture.

The accused, D.M., was charged with historical sexual exploitation and sexual assault of his 16-year-old niece.

The court applied the principles of R. v. W.(D.) regarding credibility and reasonable doubt.

The complainant's evidence was found credible and reliable despite defence challenges.

The court found the accused guilty of sexual assault, concluding that the Crown proved intentional application of force, lack of consent, knowledge of non-consent, and sexual nature of the act beyond a reasonable doubt.

However, the accused was acquitted of sexual exploitation, as the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was in a position of trust or authority towards the complainant.

This ruling addresses a constitutional challenge to the statutory scheme for introducing defence-held records in criminal trials, specifically under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code.

The applicant, a young person charged with sexual assault, argued that the definition of "record" was overly broad and that the disclosure and complainant participation requirements violated their ss. 7 and 11(d) Charter rights.

The court dismissed the constitutional challenge, determining that electronic communications between the accused and complainant (unless containing s. 276(1) content) and material already disclosed by the Crown with complainant consent are not "records" for s. 278.92 purposes.

The court also clarified that the complainant's participatory rights at s. 278.94 hearings are limited to making submissions, without cross-examination or adducing evidence.

This criminal case involved a motion to exclude evidence obtained by police during an impaired driving investigation.

The accused was investigated on his private driveway without a warrant.

The court examined whether the police had lawful authority for the detention, specifically considering if a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity existed, as the statutory authority under the Highway Traffic Act for random sobriety checks does not extend to private property.

Applying the Debot factors for assessing tip reliability (compelling, credible, corroborated) and the Chehil standard for reasonable suspicion, the court found the unsourced and uncorroborated tip insufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.

Consequently, a Charter violation occurred, and the breath samples and observations made on private property were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, consistent with the principles in R. v. McColman.

The accused, C.M., was charged with one count of sexual assault.

The central issue at trial was consent.

The court found both the complainant's and the accused's evidence regarding consent to be unreliable due to inconsistencies and memory issues.

Despite concerns about the accused's understanding of consent, the court was ultimately left with a reasonable doubt on the issue of consent for all sexual activity that occurred.

Consequently, the accused was found not guilty.

The accused, C.M., brought a pre-trial application under section 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity in a sexual assault trial.

The application sought to admit a photograph, alleged conversations about sexual preferences (including physical restraint), and alleged prior sexual activity involving restraint.

The Crown conceded the admissibility of the photograph.

The court dismissed the application for the remaining evidence, finding no "air of reality" to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent based on the accused's own voir dire testimony, which indicated he sought and received explicit consent.

The court emphasized that the central issue was actual consent, not mistaken belief, and that the proposed evidence was not relevant to the live defence or necessary for full answer and defence.

The appellant, convicted of drug trafficking offences, had previously obtained a judicial order returning seized funds to pay for reasonable legal expenses under s. 462.34(4)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code, having demonstrated no other assets or means.

At sentencing, the Crown sought a fine instead of forfeiture under s. 462.37(3) equal to the returned amount.

The majority held that, as a general rule, sentencing judges should not impose a fine instead of forfeiture on funds judicially returned for the payment of reasonable legal expenses, as doing so would undermine Parliament's secondary purposes of providing access to counsel and giving meaningful weight to the presumption of innocence.

The discretion to impose a fine may be exercised only where the offender lacked a real financial need or did not use the funds to alleviate that need.

The dissent would have imposed the fine in lieu unless the offender could demonstrate a constitutional entitlement to state-funded counsel under the Rowbotham test.

The appellant was convicted of various drug offences and possession of proceeds of crime.

On appeal, he challenged the trial judge's decision to dismiss his application to exclude evidence obtained through a search warrant, arguing that the information to obtain the warrant (ITO) was insufficient to establish reasonable and probable grounds that evidence would be found at the specified residence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the information provided by confidential sources regarding the appellant's drug trafficking activities was sufficiently corroborated and that the trial judge properly exercised discretion in finding reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrant.