Jessica Carvell

The accused was charged with sexual assault involving five female complainants he met through online dating platforms.

The central issue was consent and the credibility and reliability of the witnesses.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court assessed the evidence for each complainant.

The court found the accused guilty of sexually assaulting two of the complainants, finding their evidence credible and rejecting the accused's testimony.

For the other three complainants, the court found the accused not guilty, as the evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding either the reliability of the complainants' memories or their subjective non-consent.

The applicant, Naoum Abi-Samra, sought an order to sever count one (sexual assault of a fellow teacher in 2009) from counts two through seven (sexual assault and sexual interference of students in 2013-2016).

The court considered the risk of prejudice to the applicant, the factual and legal nexus between counts, the applicant's intention to testify on one count but not others, the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, multiplicity of proceedings, similar fact evidence, and the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found significant differences between count one and the other counts, particularly regarding the complainant's status (adult teacher vs. underage students) and the context of the incidents.

The applicant's objective intention to testify on count one due to a prior mediation, but not necessarily on the others, was a strong factor.

The court was not satisfied that the charges were sufficiently similar to support a similar fact evidence application.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the significant risk of prejudice to the applicant outweighed the benefits of a joint trial, and severance was required in the interests of justice.

The Applicant sought to admit extrinsic similar fact evidence against the Respondent, who was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference.

The evidence involved five non-charged witnesses who described the Respondent, a mathematics teacher, engaging in inappropriate physical contact with female students.

The Respondent argued the evidence lacked probative value as it did not amount to sexual assault and was tainted by potential collusion due to media publicity.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the prejudicial effect of the proposed extrinsic evidence outweighed its probative value, as it did not support the inference of sexual purpose and the Applicant could achieve the same objective with less prejudicial count-to-count similar fact evidence.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his wife in 2002, and with assaulting and threatening to kill his daughter R. The court found the accused not guilty on all three counts.

For the sexual assault charge, the Crown failed to prove mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, considering the complainant's cultural beliefs about marital obligations and the significant delay in reporting.

For the assault and threatening charges against the daughter, inconsistencies and contradictions in the complainant's and other witnesses' testimonies prevented the Crown from meeting the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on impaired driving charges.

The trial judge had found "bolus drinking" was in play, and excluded evidence of the respondent's weight, obtained without statutory or common law authority, under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's findings on bolus drinking and the s. 8 Charter breach, agreeing that compelling the respondent to be weighed without proper legal authority was a serious breach.

The court also upheld the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, emphasizing the need for police policy to be authorized by law and the importance of protecting a detainee's right against self-incrimination.

The accused brought a section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to trial within a reasonable time on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with more than the legal amount of alcohol in his blood.

The parties agreed that the net delay was less than 18 months, placing the case within the presumptively reasonable delay threshold established in R. v. Jordan.

The court applied the transitional framework from Jordan, considering whether the accused took meaningful steps to expedite proceedings and whether the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The court found that after deducting neutral delay periods (intake period, preparation time, defence counsel unavailability, and post-adjournment defence delay), the Crown delay was approximately 8.6 months, well within Morin guidelines.

The application was dismissed.